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ABSTRACT
Southeast  A sia  has h i s t o r i c a l l y  been an area o f  much 
turm oil and perhaps more so  during the l a s t  th ree  decades than any 
o th er  re g io n .  C e r ta in ly  the c o n f l i c t s  th at have occurred have tended  
to  be o f  a more sp e c ta c u la r  kind  than th o se  e lsew h ere ,  and the  
sp e c ta c u la r  and contemporary u su a l ly  le a v e  a great im print on p e o p le ' s  
mind. But w h ile  o th er  reg io n s  have t h e i r  c o n f l i c t s ,  s im ultaneous  
p r o c e sse s  o f  coop eration  and in t e g r a t io n  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  have taken  
p la c e .  I t  i s  in  t h i s  c o n tex t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  mention developments in  
Western Europe, L atin  America, and East A fr ic a .  As a r e s u l t  o f  a 
combination o f  fa c to r s  such as t r a d i t i o n a l  r i v a l r i e s ,  in t e r n a l  i n s t a b i ­
l i t y ,  e x te r n a l  in te r v e n t io n  and so  on, the c o u n tr ie s  o f  Southeast A sia  
have been slow er  in  d ev e lop in g  the c o o p e r a t iv e  s id e  o f  t h e ir  r e la t io n s  
than o ther  p arts  o f  the w orld . The l a t t e r  have exp erienced  a develop­
ment towards what Karl Deutsch and oth ers  have c a l l e d  a ' s e n se  o f  
community', th a t  i s ,  ' a b e l i e f  on the p art o f  in d iv id u a ls  in  a group 
th at  they have come to  an agreement on at l e a s t  t h i s  one p o in t ;  th at  
common s o c i a l  problems must and can be r e so lv e d  by p r o c e sse s  o f  
" p ea cefu l change". By p e a c e fu l  change we mean th e  r e s o lu t io n  o f  s o c i a l  
problem s, normally by i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  procedures w ith ou t r e so r t  to  
la r g e  s c a l e  p h y s ic a l  f o r c e . ’
Whatever e l s e  S ou th east  A sia  may be sa id  to  b e , the reg ion  
does not c o n s t i t u t e  a s e c u r i t y  community in  the  sen se  r e fe r r e d  to  by 
D eutsch . Nor have any two or more c o u n tr ie s  w ith in  the  reg ion  reached  
such a l e v e l  in  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s .
What then i s  the s i t u a t i o n  in  Southeast  Asia? I s  th ere  a 
trend towards in creased  co o p e r a t io n ,  a g r e a te r  sen se  o f  community and
vii
in te g r a t io n ?  What are the most s i g n i f i c a n t  fa c t o r s  urging such 
p r o c e sse s  along? What are on the other hand the fa c to r s  hampering 
such developments?
The answer to  th e se  and s im i la r  q u e s t io n s  may fo r  th ose  
fa m i l ia r  w ith  exp er ien ces  in  Western Europe in  p a r t i c u la r  seem rather  
s tr a ig h tfo r w a r d .  Once the c on d it io n s  which e x i s t e d  and e x i s t  in  
Western Europe and e lsew h ere ,  for  that m a tter ,  ob ta in  in  Southeast  
A sia ,  th e  reg io n  i s  f irm ly  s e t  on the path to  community and in t e g r a t io n .  
But apart from the fa c t  th a t  th ese  c o n d it io n s  may never o b ta in  in  
Southeast A s ia ,  those  th a t  do e x i s t  today would seem to be the very  
n eg a t io n  o f  th o se  a s s i s t i n g  the in te g r a t io n  p ro cess  in  Europe. C onditions  
such as advanced econom ies, near to s im i la r  l e v e l s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  
p lu r a l i s m ,  and democratic p o l i t i c a l  systems are not on the whole  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  Southeast  Asian s o c i e t i e s .  Must one, then , conclude  
that developments akin to  th ose  taking p lace  in  o th er  reg io n s  cannot 
even tu ate  in  Sou th east  Asia?
In order to  throw some l i g h t  on t h i s  q u est io n  t h i s  study w i l l  
examine some o f  the  c o n d it io n s  and p rocesses  in  Southeast A sia  favour­
ab le  and unfavourable to  in te g r a t io n  and community form ation , and i t  
w i l l  seek  to  r e l a t e  the  f in d in g s  to  the a lready  e x i s t i n g  body o f  know­
led g e  about r e g io n a l  in t e g r a t io n .  Such an a n a ly s i s  has i n t e r e s t  both  
in  terms o f  the  l i g h t  i t  may throw on r e g io n a l  p r o c e sse s  in  Southeast  
A sia ,  and the c o n tr ib u t io n  i t  may make to knowledge about r e g io n a l  
in t e g r a t io n  in  gen era l  e i t h e r  by confirm ing, m o d ify in g , or d i s ­
con tin u in g  e x i s t i n g  h y p o th e se s ,  or by gen eratin g  the form ulation  o f  new 
o n e s .
PART ONE
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
Southeast Asia has h i s t o r i c a l l y  been an area o f  much turm oil  
and perhaps more so during the l a s t  three decades than any o th er  r e g io n .  
C erta in ly  the c o n f l i c t s  that have occurred have tended to  be o f  a more 
sp e c ta cu la r  kind than th ose  e lsew here , and the sp e c ta c u la r  and contemporary 
u su a l ly  le a v e  a g rea t  imprint on p e o p le 's  mind. But w h ile  o ther  reg io n s  
have t h e ir  c o n f l i c t s ,  s im ultaneous p rocesses  o f  coop eratio n  and in t e g r a t io n  
a t  va r io u s  l e v e l s  have taken p la c e .  I t  i s  in  t h i s  c o n tex t  s u f f i c i e n t  to 
mention developments in  Western Europe, L a tin  America, and East A fr ic a .
As a r e s u l t  o f  a combination o f  fa c to r s  such as t r a d i t i o n a l  r i v a l r i e s ,  
in te r n a l  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  ex te r n a l  in te rv e n t io n  and so on, the c o u n tr ie s  o f  
Southeast A sia  have been slower in developing the  co o p era t iv e  s id e  o f  
t h e ir  r e la t io n s  than other parts  o f  the world . The l a t t e r  have experienced  
a development toward what Karl Deutsch and o th e r s  have c a l l e d  a 'se n se  o f  
community1, th a t  i s ,  'a b e l i e f  on the part o f  in d iv id u a l s  in  a group th at  
they have come to an agreement on at l e a s t  t h i s  one p o in t ;  th a t  common 
s o c i a l  problems must and can be reso lved  by p r o c e sse s  o f  " peacefu l  change". 
By p e a c e fu l  change we mean the r e so lu t io n  o f s o c i a l  problems, normally  
by i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  procedures without r e so r t  to  la r g e  s c a l e  p h y s ic a l  
f o r c e . '  1
Whatever e l s e  Southeast Asia may be sa id  to b e ,  the reg ion  
does not c o n s t i t u t e  a s e c u r i t y  community in  the  sen se  j u s t  r e fe r r e d  to .
Nor have any two or more c o u n tr ie s  w ith in  the r e g io n  reached such a l e v e l
1. Karl W. Deutsch e t  a l . ,  Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area (P r in ce to n , N .J .:  P r inceton  U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,
1 9 57) ,  p . 5.
What then i s  the s i t u a t io n  in  S ou th east  Asia? Is  th ere  a 
trend toward in creased  coop eratio n , a g rea ter  s e n se  o f  community and 
in te g r a t io n ?  What are the most s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s  urging such p ro cesse s  
along? What are on the other hand the fa c to r s  hampering such developments?
The answer to th ese  and s im ila r  q u es t io n s  may fo r  th ose  fa m i l ia r  
w ith  ex p er ien ces  in  Western Europe in p a r t ic u la r  seem rath er  s t r a i g h t ­
forward. Once the c o n d it io n s  which e x is te d  and e x i s t  in  Western Europe, 
and e lsew here  for  th at  m a tter , obta in  in  Southeast A s ia ,  the  reg io n  i s  
f ir m ly  s e t  on the path to community and in t e g r a t io n .  But apart from the  
f a c t  that th e se  c o n d it io n s  may never o b ta in  in  Southeast  A s ia ,  th ose  th at  
do e x i s t  today would seem to be the very n egatio n  o f  th ose  a s s i s t i n g  the  
in t e g r a t io n  p rocess  in  Europe. Conditions such as advanced econom ies,  
near to s im i la r  l e v e l s  o f  in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n ,  p lu r a l i s m ,  and dem ocratic  
p o l i t i c a l  system s are not on the whole c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  Southeast Asian  
s o c i e t i e s .  Must one, then , conclude that developments akin  to those  
tak in g  p la ce  in  other r e g io n s  cannot eventuate  in  Southeast  Asia?
In order to throw some l i g h t  on t h i s  q u es t io n  t h i s  study w i l l  
examine some o f  the c o n d it io n s  and p rocesses  in  S ou th east  Asia favou rab le  
and unfavourable to in te g r a t io n  and community form ation , and i t  w i l l  seek  
to r e l a t e  the f in d in g s  to the a lready e x i s t in g  body o f  knowledge about 
r e g io n a l  in t e g r a t io n .  Such an a n a ly s is  has i n t e r e s t  both in  terms o f  
the l i g h t  i t  may throw on reg io n a l  p rocesses  in  S ou th east  A s ia ,  and th e  
c o n tr ib u t io n  i t  may make to knowledge about r e g io n a l  in t e g r a t io n  in  g en e r a l  
e i t h e r  by con firm in g , m odify ing , or d isconfirm ing  e x i s t i n g  h y p o th e se s ,  
or by gen eratin g  the form u la tion  o f new ones.
THE APPROACH
In order to  make the purpose of t h i s  study q u it e  c le a r  i t  i s  
n ecessary  to s t a r t  w ith  a conceptual c l a r i f i c a t i o n .  As Ernst Haas has
2 .
in their relations.
integration on the one hand and the study o f  phenomena such as
regionalisms regional cooperationy regional organization3 regional systemss
2and so on on the o th e r .  Regional cooperation  may be s tu d ied  in  
i s o l a t i o n  from the concerns that d ir e c t  the s tu den t o f  r e g io n a l  in te g r a t io n  
and the  same may be sa id  about reg ion a lism , r e g io n a l  system s, and 
r e g io n a l  o r g a n iz a t io n .  But they may a l s o  be s tu d ied  w ith  a v iew  to  the  
p a r t ic u la r  problems that preoccupy the student o f  r e g io n a l  in t e g r a t io n  
and in  t h i s  c a p a c ity  they may y ie ld  ’va lu a b le  data  or a r e le v a n t  v a r ia b le  
. . . '  by provid ing  m a te r ia l  ’on important a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a c to r s  or on th e ir  
3b e l i e f s ' .  R egional o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  for example, ' through which  
i n t e g r a t i v e / d i s i n t e g r a t i v e  a c t i v i t y  i s  carr ied  on are  properly  considered  
in te rv e n in g  v a r ia b le s  which may help exp la in  our r e a l  concern , the  a t t a i n ­
ment o f  the p o s s ib l e  l a t e r  c o n d it io n s  in which the r e g io n  may f in d  
i t s e l f '
In Haas’ words the  ’study of reg io n a l  in t e g r a t io n  i s  concerned  
w ith  e x p la in in g  how and why s t a t e s  cease  to be w h olly  so v e r e ig n ,  how and 
why they v o lu n t a r i ly  m in g le ,  merge, and mix w ith  t h e ir  neighbors so as  
to l o s e  the  fa c t u a l  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  sovere ign ty  w h ile  acq u ir in g  new 
tech n iq u es  fo r  r e s o lv in g  c o n f l i c t  between themselves'."* The s t a t e s  o f  
Southeast Asia have not surrendered any o f  th e ir  powers and a u th o r i ty  
to  any r e g io n a l  or other  su p ra-n a tion a l body. In r e l a t i o n  to the  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  and the  d e f i n i t i o n  of reg io n a l in t e g r a t io n  g iv en  above t h i s
2. E rnst. B. Haas, uThe Study of Regional I n t e g r a t io n :
R e f le c t io n s  on the Joy and Anguish o f P r e th e o r ia in g " , 
International Organization, Vol.XXIV, No.A (Autumn 1 9 70 ) ,  
pp. 610-612 .
3. Ibid., p. 611.
4 . Ibid. s pp. 611-612 .
5. Ibid. 3 p. 610.
3.
argued, there is a need to distinguish between the study of regional
A.
stu dy , t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  an examination o f  some o f  the p r o c e sse s  
involved  in  r e g io n a l  coop eratio n  and o r g a n iz a t io n  in  Southeast A sia  and 
th e ir  r e la t i o n s h ip  to  an even tu al i n t e g r a t io n /d i s in t e g r a t io n  p r o c e ss .
In other words, to  what ex ten t  can co o p era t iv e  and o r g a n iz a t io n a l  p r o c e sse s  
among the  c o u n tr ie s  o f  Southeast Asia be sa id  to be c o n tr ib u t in g  to  the 
eventual l o s s  of a t t r i b u t e s  a s so c ia te d  w ith  th e ir  sov ere ig n  s ta tu s?  Are 
the c o u n tr ie s  m ostly  involved  in  these  p r o c e sse s  any nearer such a 
surrender o f  a u th o r i ty  and power than they were, sa y ,  f i f t e e n  years  ago,  
in  the e a r ly  19 60 's?
There are  e s s e n t i a l l y  two rou tes  by which to approach t h i s  
in q u ir y .  One can s t a r t  w ith  s p e c i f i c  g e n e r a l i s a t io n s  and hypotheses  taken  
from the body o f  a lread y  accumulated knowledge about in t e g r a t io n  in  gen era l  
and then proceed to t e s t  them w ith in  the con tex t of Southeast A s ia .  The 
a l t e r n a t i v e  ro u te  i s ,  o f  c o u r se ,  to do i t  the  other  way around, th at  i s ,  
to a n a ly se  the c o n d it io n s  and p ro cesses  e x i s t in g  in Southeast Asia and 
then r e l a t e  the f in d in g s  to r e le v a n t  elements o f th e  wider body of  
t h e o r e t i c a l  knowledge.
When in  t h i s  study the  l a t t e r  approach i s  chosen i t  i s  for  one 
important reason; l i t t l e  or nothing of the ev id ence  on which p resen t  
th e o r ie s  o f  r e g io n a l  in t e g r a t io n  are b u i l t  i s  based on s t u d ie s  o f  Southeast  
A sia .  Whatever the reason s  fo r  t h i s  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  -  and one can th in k  
of  many -  th e  f a c t  remains that in  the overwhelming number o f  c a s e s  the  
focus  has been on Europe, Latin -A m erica, and A fr ic a .^  I t  seems th e r e fo r e  
a d v isa b le  to  r e t a in  an i n i t i a l  but open-minded sk e p t ic ism  in  regard to  
the re le v a n c e  o f  the t h e o r ie s  to the co n d it io n s  p r e v a i l in g  in  Southeast
6. In the 1970 summary by Haas, ibid.s o f  f in d in g s  r e la te d
to r e g io n a l  in t e g r a t io n  there i s  hardly any mention o f  
ev id en ce  from Southeast A sia . This i s  not due to any 
a c c id e n t  on the part o f Haas but r e f l e c t s  both the  
a c tu a l  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  w ith in  the reg ion  i t s e l f  as  
w e l l  as  the scant a t t e n t io n  paid to  t h i s  a s p e c t  of  
r e g io n a l  a f f a i r s  by s c h o la r s .
A sia .  Moreover, the  em pirica l g e n e r a l iz a t io n s^  put forward u n t i l  now 
d ea l w ith  p r o c e sse s  and con d it ion s  the outcome o f  which are  a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  l e v e l s  o f  in te g r a t io n  not reached in  any p a r ts  o f  Southeast  A sia .
For t h i s  reason  they may indeed by con sidered  ' i d e a l '  type outcomes as  
far  as Southeast A sia  i s  concerned, and th ere  i s  no a p r io r i  reason  to  
b e l i e v e  that they w i l l  ever be a tta in ed  w ith in  th e  r e g io n .  Furthermore, 
to r e ly  on th ese  outcomes as the s t a r t in g  p o in t  may lead  to  a c t s  o f  o v er ­
s ig h t  not on ly  in  regard to  p o s s ib le  o ther  outcomes but as w e l l  to the  
r e j e c t io n  or n e g le c t  o f  fa c to r s  and v a r ia b le s  unique to  the r e g io n .
F in a l l y ,  to argue why l e v e l s  o f in te g r a t io n  ach ieved  e lsew h ere  have not 
been reached in  Southeast A sia , which would be th e  c a se  i f  the  f i r s t  
approach was adopted , would n e c e s s a r i ly  in v o lv e  a c o n s id e r a b le  amount o f  
sp e c u la t io n  concerning p o s s ib le  in terv en in g  f a c t o r s  about which one can have 
a t  b e s t  on ly  w e l l  informed g u e s se s .  Thus to e s t im a te  the  e x te n t  to which 
such id e a l  ( in  the  Southeast Asian con tex t)  outcomes may be reached in  
the fu tu re  in v o lv e s  e x tr a p o la t io n s  from the p a st  and the  p resen t which 
can n e ith e r  be used to confirm nor d iscon firm  e x i s t i n g  h yp o th eses .
'THEORIES' OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
There are e s s e n t i a l l y  three modes o f  ex p la n a t io n  which compete 
for  the  a t t e n t io n  o f  the  student o f  r e g io n a l  in t e g r a t io n .  These are  the  
federalist, the  communicationsy and the neo-functionalist which each in  
i t s  own way purports to ex p la in  the form ation and th e  maintenance o f  
sup ran ation al communities. I f  by theory i s  meant ' a s e t  o f  hypotheses
gs tructu red  by the r e la t i o n  o f  im p lica t io n  or d e d u c i b i l i t y '  , none o f
5.
7. For an ex p la n a t io n  o f  t h i s  term, see  ibid. 3 p. 614.
8. Johan G altung, Theory and Method of Social Research 
(Oslo: U n i v e r s i t e t s f o r l a g e t , 1967), p. 451 .
th ese  modes o f  ex p lan a tio n  i s  a theory because  'th ey  do not now provide  
an ex p la n atio n  o f  a recurr ing  s e r ie s  of ev e n ts  made up o f  dim ensions
9of  a c t i v i t y  c a u s a l ly  l inked  to one a n o th e r ' .  This u n c e r ta in ty  about 
the  r e la t io n s h ip  between the v a r ia b le s  or f a c t o r s  in vo lved  has prompted 
the in t e g r a t io n  t h e o r i s t s  to ta lk  about 'p r e t h e o r ie s '  as the  more proper 
terra to a t ta c h  to  the  most developed modes o f  exp la n atio n .^ ^
The f e d e r a l i s t s  approach the study o f  p o l i t i c a l  communities in  
a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  ways"^ which makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  to argue th a t  th ere  
i s  one p a r t ic u la r  f e d e r a l i s t  approach. The ou ts ta n d in g  example o f  the  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  approach, Wheare, based h i s  s tudy on the four governmental
system s -  the  United S t a t e s ,  the  Sw iss , th e  Canadian, and the A u s tr a l ia n ,  -
12which were then regarded as  f e d e r a l .  He i s o l a t e d  th e  common fe a tu r e s
o f  th e se  system s on the b a s i s  o f  which he co n s tru c ted  a kind o f  model
'which led  ob serv ers  to  d e sc r ib e  [th ese  system s] a s  f e d e r a t io n s .  These
fe a tu r e s  were d e f in ed  in  terms of c o n s t i t u t io n a l  law and then in  terms o f
p o l i t i c a l  r e la t io n s h ip s  which had developed on the b a s i s  o f  th e  c o n s t i -
13tu t io n a l  p r o v i s i o n s ' .  The heavy r e l ia n c e  o f  t h i s  approach on l e g a l  
and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  coupled w ith  i t s  l im ite d  u s e f u ln e s s  in  r e la t i o n  
to i n v e s t ig a t io n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  systems other than the  four on which i t  
was based, l o s t  i t  favour w ith  many stu d en ts  o f  fe d e r a l is m .  P a r t ly  a s  a 
r e a c t io n  a g a in s t  t h i s  mode o f  a n a ly s i s  some r e se a r c h e r s ,  in  p a r t ic u la r  
L iv in g s to n ,  employed an approach e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c i o l o g i c a l  in  c h a r a c te r .
I t  argued th a t  fe d e ra l ism  was a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  d i v e r s i t y  ra th er  than
6.
9. Haas, op.cit.3 p . 623.
10. Ibid.
11. A.H. B irch , "Approaches to the Study o f  Federalism ", in  
J . P e ter  Meekison (E d . , )  Canadian Federalism: Myth or 
Reality (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), pp. 3 -2 0 .
12. K.C. Wheare, Federal Governments (London: Oxford 
U n iv e r s i ty  P r e ss ,  1956, th ird  e d i t i o n ) ,  p . 33 .
13. B irch , o p . c i t p . 3.
c o n s t i t u t io n a l  dynamics. Since a l l  counitr ies  are  c h a r a c te r ize d  by more
or l e s s  s o c ia l  d i v e r s i t y ,  they a l l  d i s p la y  a tendency towards fe d e r a l ism .  
Doubts were r a is e d  about the u t i l i t y  of t h i s  approach too, m ainly on the  
grounds that g e n e r a l i z a t io n s  about the members o f  a ca teg o ry  whose member­
sh ip  i s  u n d efin ed , cannot be made, and th a t  through the in c lu s io n  o f  a 
wide v a r ie t y  o f  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  phenomena, noth ing  very  p r e c i s e  can be 
sa id  about fe d e ra l ism  as a phenomenon,^^ In other  words, th ere  i s  a 
tendency to co n s id er  everyth ing  fed era l ism .
A th ird  approach argues that f e d e r a l  c o n s t i t u t io n s  are  the  
r e s u l t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  barga ins  which take p la c e  in  h i s t o r i c a l l y  unique • 
s i t u a t i o n s .  Two c o n d it io n s  have n e v e r th e le s s  always been p r e se n t ,  namely 
the e x i s t e n c e  o f  p o l i t i c i a n s  who wish to expand th e  area o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  
c o n tr o l  e i t h e r  to meet an ex tern a l m i l i t a r y  or d ip lo m a tic  th r e a t  or to 
prepare fo r  m i l i t a r y  or d ip lo m atic  a g g r e ss io n ,  and a w i l l in g n e s s  o f  
p o l i t i c i a n s  to surrender part of th e ir  independence, again  e i t h e r  because  
they d e s ir e  p r o te c t io n  from a m i l i ta r y  th rea t  or p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  the  
p o t e n t ia l  a g g r e ss io n  o f  th e  f e d e r a t i o n . ^  As far  as  the maintenance  
of f e d e r a l  system s are  concerned, William R iker, the  main exponent o f  t h i s  
approach, came to the c o n c lu s io n  that the c r u c ia l  f a c t o r s  were the  s tr u c tu r e  
of the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and the nature o f the party  system."^
A fou rth  approach, exem plified  by the work o f  Carl F r ie d r ic h ,
18s e e s  fe d e ra l ism  as  a dynamic p rocess .  Although the a t t e n t io n  paid to
14. W.S. L iv in g s to n ,  "A Note on the Nature o f  Federalism ",  
in  Meekison, op.ait., pp. 20-30.
15. B irch , op.ait., p p .4 -5 .
16. Ibid., pp. 7 -8 .
17. Ibid., p. 8 .
18. See Carl J .  F r ie d r ic h ,  Trends of Federalism in Theory 
and Practice (New York: Frederick  A. P raeger , 19 68 ) ,  
passim , and same author, Constitutional Government and 
Democracy, Theory and Practice in Europe and America 
(Waltham, M asach u setts : B la i s d e l l  P u b lish in g  Company,
1968, fo u r th  e d i t i o n ) ,  ch .X I, pp. 188-227 .
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the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and l e g a l  a sp e c ts  o f  fe d e ra l ism  has not been abandoned 
by t h i s  approach, th e ir  s ta tu s  as the paramount e lem ents has been c o n s id ­
erab ly  reduced as  can be seen from th e se  remarks by F r ie d r ic h .
A f e d e r a l  system should not o n ly  be con sid ered  
s t a t i c a l l y ,  i . e . ,  in  terms o f  a f ix e d  p a ttern  
o f  a p a r t ic u la r  and p r e c i s e  d i v i s i o n  o f  powers 
between governmental l e v e l s .  Instead  "federalism "  
seems the most s u i t a b le  term by which to d e s ig n a te  
th e  p rocess  o f  f e d e r a l iz in g  a p o l i t i c a l  community, 
th at i s  to say , the p rocess  by which a number o f  
sep a ra te  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  be they s t a t e s  or 
any o th er  kind o f  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  en ter  in to  arrangements  
fo r  working out s o lu t io n s ,  adopting  j o i n t  p o l i c i e s ,  
and making j o i n t  d e c i s io n s  on j o i n t  problems; o r ,  
r e v e r s e ly ,  the  process  through which a h i th e r to  u n ita r y  
p o l i t i c a l  community, as i t  becomes d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
in to  a number o f  separate  and d i s t i n c t  p o l i t i c a l  
communities, a ch iev es  a new o r g a n iz a t io n  in  which the  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  communities, now s e p a r a te ly  org a n ized ,  
become capable o f  working out s e p a r a te ly  and on t h e ir  
own th o se  problems they no lon ger  have in  common1 .
20F r ie d r ic h ’ s view  o f  the importance o f v a lu e s ,  i n t e r e s t s ,  and b e l i e f s  as
21w e l l  as the emphasis on economic, s o c i a l ,  and c u l t u r a l  f a c t o r s  tend to  
put c o n s id e r a b le  d i s ta n c e  between him and such s tu d e n ts  o f  f e d e r a l ism  as  
Wheare.
The second p retheory  o f  reg io n a l in t e g r a t io n  i s  th at which has
Karl Deutsch as i t s  most prominent advocate , and i t s  c h ie f  arguments r e v o lv e
around and are  derived  from the  concept o f  s o c i a l  communication and i n t e r -
22a c t io n .  In Political Cormumty and the North Atlantic Areas Deutsch  
and h i s  c o l la b o r a t e r s  a rr iv ed  a t  sev era l  c o n c lu s io n s  r e la te d  to  t h i s  
concept such as  ’unbroken l i n k s  o f  s o c ia l  communication, both g e o g r a p h i ­
c a l l y  between t e r r i t o r i e s  and s o c i o l o g i c a l l y  between d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  
s t r a t a 1, ’m o b i l i ty  o f p erso n s ,  a t  l e a s t  among the p o l i t i c a l l y  r e le v a n t
23s t r a t a 1, and ’a m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  ranges o f communication and t r a n s a c t io n ’
19. Constitutional Government and Democracy 3 p . 193.
20. Ibid.
21. Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice3 p p .173-184 .
22. Op.cit.
23. Ibid,3 p. 58.
which were found in te r  a l i a  to be e s s e n t i a l  c o n d i t io n s  for  amalgamated
sec u r ity -c o m m u n it ie s .
Some time l a t e r  Deutsch provided a more s u c c in c t  and compre-
24h en s iv e  summary of the communications approach to in t e g r a t io n .  By
look in g  'upon n a t io n s  and governments a s  communication system s, im personal,  
v e r i f i a b l y  ev id ence  can be obta ined  to  check gen era l d e s c r ip t iv e  or q u a l i ­
t a t i v e  a s s e r t io n s  about n a t io n a lism , about s o v e r e ig n ty ,  and about the
25merger o f  s t a t e s ' .  Such im personal, v e r i f i a b l e  ev id ence  can be found
by paying 'a t t e n t io n  to the q u est ion  o f  p e r c e p t io n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  to q u es t io n s  
of  communication, tra n sm iss io n  o f  m essages , d i s t o r t i o n  o f  m essages ,
speed o f  response  to m essages , and memories that are  being brought to  bear
26upon messages for  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' . To serve  as  in d ic a t o r s  o f in t e g r a t io n
or d i s i n t e g r a t i o n ,  a whole range o f  communications and tr a n s a c t io n s  may be
27used such as the flow  o f  m a i l ,  trade and so on.
A c r u c ia l  element o f  th e  communications approach d e a ls  w ith
loads and c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  th a t i s ,  the load of t r a n s a c t io n s  and communications
that the system s invo lved  are c a l l e d  upon to r e c e iv e  and p rocess  e f f i c i e n t l y
and the c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  th e se  sytems to meet the demands put upon them in
t h i s  r e s p e c t .  A predominance o f  load s  over c a p a b i l i t i e s  i s  in  t h i s  v iew
28seen as d i s i n t e g r a t i v e .
Several problems a t ta c h  to t h i s  approach o f  which the most 
important i s  cen tered  on the u n ce r ta in ty  about the c a u s a t iv e  l in k s  between  
an in t e n s iv e  p a ttern  o f  communications and t r a n s a c t io n s  w ith  lo a d s  and 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  in  b a lance  and the  p o s ite d  c lo s e r  community. 'Communications
24. See ch ap ters  I I  and I I I  in  P h i l ip  E. Jacob and James
V. Toscano (E d s . ) ,  The Integration of Political Communities 
(P h i la d e lp h ia :  J .N . L ip p in c o t t ,  19 6 4 ) .
25. Ibid., p. 49 .
26. Ibid.
27. See Deutsch in  Jacob and Toscano, op.cit., c h . I l l ,  for  
examples o f  in d ic a t o r s  and t h e i r  v a r io u s  d im ensions .
28. Ibid., ch . I I .
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29v a r ia b le s  at the system ic  l e v e l '  w ith o u t ,  however, e x p la in in g  how
tr a n sa c t io n s  o f  various  kinds are c l e a r ly  r e la t e d  to  human p ercep t io n s
and m o tives . 'The approach does not t e l l  us the content o f  the  messages
and t h e ir  imputed r e la t io n s h ip  to the e v o lu t io n  o f  c a p a c ity  on the part of
re g io n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I t  does not ex p la in  when and how t r u s t  and resp on s-
30iv e n e ss  among a c t o r s ,  e l i t e s  as w e l l  as m asses , are to  o c c u r . '  As has 
been p o in ted  o u t ,  the ev idence  i s  ambiguous as to  the r e la t io n s h ip  between
31presumably so important an in d ic a to r  as trade  and th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  community.
The th ir d  approach to r e g io n a l  i n t e g r a t io n ,  n e o - fu n c t io n a l ism
o f  which Ernst Haas i s  the lead in g  proponent, la y s  much emphasis on a c to r
p ercep t io n s  and b e l i e f s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th ose  o f  the v a r io u s  e l i t e  groups.
I t  shares w ith  the communication approach
a commitment to  a c e r ta in  number o f  independent v a r ia b le s  
con sidered  of great s a l i e n c e :  r e g io n a l  t r a n s a c t io n s  and 
the ga ins and l o s s e s  a s so c ia te d  w ith  them by a c to r s ;  verb a l  
and sym bolic  communications between crucual e l i t e s ;  mutual 
e x p e c ta t io n s  o f  e l i t e s ;  mutual r e sp o n s iv e n es s  between e l i t e s ;  
the adequacy o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  to  handle the tr a n s a c t io n a l  and 
communicational lo a d . But they d i f f e r  in  the way they t r e a t  
the load: Communications t h e o r i s t s  con s id er  a l l  types o f  
t r a n sa c t io n s  e q u a l ly  s a l i e n t  and th e r e fo r e  measure whatever  
the s t a t i s t i c s  permit to  be measured; n e o - f u n c t i o n a l i s t s ,  
however, argue th a t  w e l f a r e - r e la t e d  and fo r e ig n  and d efense  
p o l i c y  i s s u e s  are most s a l i e n t  fo r  a c t o r s .  . . . [ N e o - f u n c t i o n a l i s t s ]  
p r e fe r  to  observe barga in ing  s t y l e s  and s t r a t e g i e s  as t h e i r  
b a s ic  data rath er  than to s t r e s s  the  volume and
theorizing rests content with the demonstration of covariance among
29. Haas, op.oit.3 p. 626.
30. Ibid. Eor a modest and prudent view  o f  the c o n tr ib u t io n s  
o f  t r a n sa c t io n  a n a y ls i s  which emphasizes i t s  d e s c r ip t iv e  
v a lu e ,  s ee  Donald J. Puchala, " In te r n a t io n a l  T ransaction s  
and R egional In te g r a t io n " ,  I n t e r n a t io n a l  O rga n iza t io n , op. 
cit.3 pp. 732-763.
31. Haas, ibid. 3 p. 627.
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rate of transactions or the ebb and flow of public opinion. 
Moreover, they prefer to study cases of organizational 
growth or decay rather than the aggregate data preferred 
by the followers of the communications approach'.^
Much of the neo-functional analysis 'has drawn a good deal
of its explanatory strength from using concepts which are rather close
to the categories used by the decisionmakers, and it has often scored actor
33perceptions of facts rather than the facts themselves’.
THE ’REGION' OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Whether or not Southeast Asia constitutes a region is not an 
uncontroversial question. Much will in this respect depend on the criteria 
employed. At a superficial level one could be forgiven for defining it 
by default, as it were, that is, once the extent of East and South Asia 
has been determined, what lies in between is Southeast Asia. It could 
also be argued that the countries involved distinguish themselves as a 
separate area more in terms of their propensity for intra-state instability 
and conflict than inter-state cooperation. Without constituting serious 
definitional criteria both arguments point, however, to factors which 
have long been part of Southeast Asian existence, the former by indicating 
the pressures and pulls of extra-regional forces and the latter by pointing 
to unresolved problems and conflicts, many of long standing.
In the real world 'regions are what politicians and peoples want
32. Ibid., p. 628.
33. Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional 
Integration’1, International Organization, op.cit., 
p.83. For further differences between the various 
approaches to regional integration, see Joseph S. 
Nye, Peace in Parts. Integration and Conflict in 
Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971), ch.2.
rthem to be 1. The empirical diversity implied in this remark is
reflected in the academic literature on the subject in which the reasons
for considering a group of countries a region vary from writer to writer
according to his interest and purposes. We are nevertheless not confronted
with a completely fluid situation in academic writings as to the nature
of regions. Common to most, though not all, definitions is the notion of
35geographic contiguity , largely because to dispense with it would open up 
'the possibility that any entities related to each other with respect to 
one or more attributes will meet the requirements for consideration as a
region. This leads to a situation in which the term "region" is apt to
36become so inclusive that it is useless'.
Instead of attempting a precise definition of Southeast Asia
qua region a position of convenience will be adopted by drawing a line
around a particular group of geographically contiguous states and calling
37it a region for the purposes of this study. This approach is advantageous
12.
34
34. Michael Banks, "Systems Analysis and the Study of 
Regions", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.13,
No.4 (December 1969), p. 338. See also Joseph S. Nye 
(Ed.) International Regionalism. Readings (Boston,
Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. vi-vii.
35. See, for example, George Modelski, "International 
Relations and Area Studies", International Relations,
Vol.II, No.3 (April 1961), pp. 148-158, Michael Brecher, 
"International Relations and Asian Studies. The Sub­
ordinate State System of Southern Asia", World Politics,
Vol.XV, No.2 (April 1963), pp. 213-235, Bernard K. Gordon,
The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966) passim, and Peter Lyon,
War and. Peace in Southeast Asia (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), passim. For a view that does not make geo­
graphical contiguity essential to a definition of region, see 
Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International 
System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).
36. Oran R. Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor 
to a Naked Emperor", World Politics, Vol. XXI, No.3 
(April 1969), pp. 487-488.
37. For an elaboration and justification of this approach, see
David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 30-34. See also 
Oran R. Young, A Systematic Approach to International Politics, 
Princeton University, Center of International Affairs, 1968, 
pp. 15-16.
in that it does not prejudge the issue of whether or not Southeast Asia
constitutes a region in any meaningful sense of the word. But the choice
of this alternative should not be taken to mean that in approaching the
group of states called Southeast Asia one is without any indications of an
entity of sorts. The use of this terra to designate the area north of
Australia, east of India and Bangla Desh, and south of China and Japan,
although of relatively recent standing, is alone a sign that at least to
outsiders the area displays commonalities of sorts. Known to the Chinese
and the Japanese as Nanyang and Nanyo respectively, which means the South
Seas, and labelled Stidostasien by German and Austrian geographers and
anthropologists in the inter-war period, the term Southeast Asia only gained
wide currency after it was used to designate the theatre of war commanded
38by Lord Louis Mountbatten in World War II. The list of countries 
included under the name has on occasions varied but it is now most commonly
agreed that Southeast Asia comprises the following countries; Burma, 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia (The Khmer Republic), North Vietnam, South Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It also includes 
Portugese Timor and the Sultanate of Brunei - a British Protectorate.
Equally as important as the perceptions of outsiders are 
those of the peoples within the area. As there will be opportunities to 
observe later in this study, the people within increasingly consider the 
countries in the area a region distinct from others.
A study such as this cannot hope to do justice to all the aspects 
of cooperative and integrative conditions and processes in a region the
13.
38. The term was in fact used already in 1900 in
its English form in a British Parliamentary Paper,
Trade and Shipping in Southeast Asia. Other terms 
have also been used such as Further India, the Far 
Eastern Tropics, and the Tropical Far East. See 
Charles A, Fisher, "A View of Southeast Asia", Southeast 
Asia, An International Quarterly,Vol.l, No.1-2 
(Winter-Spring, 1971), esp. pp. 5-11.
extent of Southeast Asia. A selective approach is necessary and this 
study will concentrate on what are deemed important and salient aspects 
of the international politics of the region in the belief that these to a 
great extent reflect underlying and basic structures and processes. A 
prominent feature of inter-state relations in Southeast Asia, for example, 
has been the questions associated with frontiers and minorities. Such 
issues at the international level point to issues related to the level of 
internal integration within the individual states. Moreover, in the 
initial stages at least, processes of cooperation and integration are but 
part of or an extension of such relations that exist between sovereign 
states under conditions of peace. Taking place within the framework of 
normal interaction they are profoundly influenced by political relations 
and decisions.
SALIENT ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Although not exclusively so because of the continued independence 
of Thailand throughout the period of colonial rule, the international 
relations of Southeast Asia are principally a story about inter-state 
relations in the post World War II period. The reason is, of course, that 
with the exception of Thailand, all the countries in the area gained their 
independence after the Second World War.
This contemporaneity of the relations should not obscure the 
extent to which they are a mixture of new as well as old factors. The new 
arise out of the demands for modernization and the difficulties associated 
with co-existence in an international environment in which power, influence, 
and wealth are unevenly distributed among numerous sovereign entities.
The old derive their obstinate existence from historical memories the 
roots of which in many instances can be traced back to pre-colonial times. 
Indeed, one cannot but be impressed by the strong impress of the past on
14.
The Western colonial influence, 'though diverting much of Southeast
Asian life from its peculiar, indigenous course, did not necessarily
39cancel out age-old traditions and institutions'. Nor did it cancel out 
age-old enmities and conflicts between various national groups and peoples. 
Sometimes also exacerbated by it, colonialism temporarily suppressed 
existing hostilities only for the present generation to see them surface 
again once the colonial powers relinquished control.
In contemporary Southeast Asia such hostilities are often expressed 
in terms of conflicts over frontiers and territory. On the other hand, 
not all frontier and territorial conflicts owe their existence to traditional, 
indigenous enmities. Some are primarily a legacy of colonialism and they 
have 'resulted from arbitrary arrangements among the Western powers'^ w h o , 
in Southeast Asia as elsewhere, paid only scant attention to the require­
ments of the peoples concerned. Many boundaries failed to follow clear
ethnic or cultural divides often incorporating groups with no feelings of
41common identity or tradition.
Whatever their origin inter-state rivalries re-emerged with the 
departure of colonial control. Thailand, who with Japanese support had 
taken advantage of the weakness of the Western powers by reclaiming 'lost 
territories', was forced after World War II to divest herself of these 
territories when the colonial powers for a brief period arrived back on 
the scene. With the final departure of colonial control, however, Thai
39. John Bastin and Harry J. Benda, A History of Modem 
Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
Hall, 1968), p. viii.
40. Ibid.j p. 159.
41. Alistair Lamb, Asian Frontiers, Studies in a 
Continuing Problem (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1968), 
pp. 7-11.
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present relations between the states of Southeast Asia.
territorial ambitions were again activated, or so at least it seemed to
her neighbours. Nurtured by traditional fears and suspicions Thailand’s
42relations with Cambodia became especially embittered.
More serious was the conflict centered on the formation of the 
Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Apart from the war of words that erupted 
this conflict also involved regular and guerilla warfare between Malaysia 
and her allies (most notably Britain) on the one hand and Indonesia on the 
other. Overt hostilities ceased only in 1966 when the new rulers in 
Indonesia moved toward reconciliation with Malaysia. Behind this conflict 
lay anti-’neocolonialist’ and colonialist sentiments.
Related to this conflict was the dispute between the Philippines
43and Malaysia over Sabah, for the moment a dormant but not extinct dispute. 
This last conflict was instrumental in virtually destroying the Association 
of Southeast Asia (ASA) as well as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) at a later stage. Chapter 3 is an examination and compari­
son of the effect of ASA and ASEAN on the ’resolution’ of the Sabah dispute 
between Malaysia and the Philippines. The analysis may also be able to 
tell us something about the extent to which these regional organizations 
have been instrumental in bringing about ’islands of peace’ in the region.
In some senses related to the frontier question but with wider and 
unique implications is the problem of minorities. No country in Southeast 
Asia has avoided the difficulties associated with a multiplicity of ethnic 
or national groups within their boundaries. As the various territories 
in Southeast Asia gained independence political power and the control of 
government passed to the majority groups which were charged with the 
responsibility of transforming what to a large extent still were traditional
42. Ibid., pp. 168-170 and 181-182, Bastin and Benda, 
op.cit.3 p. 160.
43. Bastin and Benda, ibid.
16.
17.
assimilation or integration of the minorities into the larger political,
economic, and social structure, a task toward the fulfilment of which the
colonial powers for a variety of reasons had taken no or only rudimentary
44steps.
Growing ethnic consciousness and the resulting opposition to
majority group rule among minorities in Southeast Asia have been expressed
in various ways, including violence, and in this respect no country has
45suffered more than Burma. Ethnic rebellions played a major part in
bringing the Union to the brink of collapse in the first couple of years
46after its independence in 1948. In the ensuing years the government has 
at no time been in complete territorial control. Rebellion has ebbed and 
flowed without ever ceasing to exist.^
In Thailand a similar problem exists although not as widespread 
as in Burma. Much opposition to Thai rule has surfaced over the last decade 
especially among the Meo of north Thailand, the Lao-Thai (ethnically related 
to the Thai) of the north east, and the Malays of the southern provinces 
and instances of armed revolt and conflict have increased in number,
societies into modern ones. This was in many cases thought to entail the
44. Ibid., pp. 161-166.
45. For a reasonably detailed account of events involving 
ethnic minorities between 1948 and 1960, see Hugh 
Tinker, The Union of Burma (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1961, third edition), esp. pp. 34-61. See also 
Frank N. Trager, Burma (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), 
pp. 95-139. For a description of the population and 
linguistic affiliations of ethnics groups in Burma, see 
Peter Kunstadter (Ed.), Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, 
and Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1967, 2 vols.), pp. 7-9.
46. Tinker, ibid., pp. 49-50.
47. See frequent and periodical reports of rebel activities 
in various issues of Far Eastern Economic Review, for 
example, 21 August 1963, 23 November 1967, 7 December 1967,
28 August 1969, and 20 August 1970.
In the Philippines the ancient conflict between Muslims and 
Christians has erupted Into serious violence and large scale armed clashes 
in recent years. At least some factions among the Muslims are advocating 
secession.
Malaysia has not avoided ethnic conflicts either. The most serious 
in recent years was the rioting which followed in the wake of the May 1969 
elections.^
Indonesia has over 350 ethnic groups each with its own cultural 
identity. But with the exception of violent conflicts immediately following 
independence and the conflicts between the indigenous population and the 
Chinese minority, Indonesia's ethnic divisions have on the whole tended to 
be overshadowed by the division between the centre (Djarkarta and Java) and
18.
48especially in the north and the northeast.
48. Jeffrey Race, "The War in Northern Thailand", Modern 
Asian Studies3Vol.8, No.l (1974), pp. 85-112, Far Eastern 
Economic RevieW,19 May 1966, 9 November 1967; David 
Morell, "Thailand: Military Checkmate", Asian Survey>
Vol.XII, No.2 (February 1972); David A. Wilson,
"Introductory Comment on Politics and the Northeast",
Asian Survey> Vol.VI, No.7 (July 1966); Charles F. Keyes,
Isan: Regionalism in Northeast Thailand, Cornell University 
Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 65, 1967; Frank
C. Darling, "Thailand: Stability and Escalation", Asian 
Survey, Vol.VIII, No.2 (February 1968); Clark D. Neher, 
"Thailand: The Politics of Continuity", Asian Surveys 
Vol.X, No.2 (February 1970); Thomas M. Fraser, Fishermen 
in South Thailand: The Malay Villagers (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1966); Astri Suhrke, "The Thai Muslims: 
Some Aspects of Minority Integration", Pacific Affairs,
Vol. XLIII, No.4 (Winter 1970-1971).
49. On this conflict and some of the problems Involved, see 
Aprodicio A. Laquian, "The Political Integration of Muslims 
Filipinos", Philippines Journal of Public Adminstration,
Vol. XIII, No.4 (October 1969); John M. Adkins, "Philippines 
1971: Events of the Year, Trends of the Future", Asian 
Survey3 Vol.XII, No.l (January 1972); Hans Luther, "Background 
to the Muslim Secessionist Movement in the Philippines"
Asia Research Bulletin, Vol.3, March 1974.
50. See, for example, Nancy L. Snydes, "Is National Integration 
Necessary? The Malaysian Case", Journal of International 
Affairs3 Vol.27, No.l (1973).
the various regions (the Outer islands) as well as the socio-political 
conflicts that followed in the wake of the socalled Gestapu affair in 
October 1965.51
Many more examples could be cited to indicate the magnitude of 
the problem. One of its main features has been its intractibility and 
defiance of nearly any solution. Apart from its internal significance, 
the existence of unevenly and poorly integrated groups at the domestic level 
may have considerable influence on the ability of states to participate in 
cooperation at the international level. While this problem cannot properly 
be considered a part of the cooperative and organizational processes it 
has nonetheless considerable potential as a disruptive force in relation to 
these processes. This question will be explored in detail in chapter 4.
A further set of questions to be explored in chapter 5 concerns 
the relationship between threats and security and regional cooperation.
Violence and insecurity have long been part of everyday life in many
52countries in Southeast Asia. In the postcolonial era the issue of 
security has rarely receded to the background in the minds of the political 
leaders. It has instead been for long periods a daily preoccupation of 
theirs, sometimes to the exclusion of nearly all other business. Whether 
or not these feelings of threat and insecurity, real or imagined, have 
contributed more than any other single factor to the flavour of international 
politics in Southeast Asia is debatable. What is fairly certain though is 
that they have profoundly influenced processes of cooperation and integration.
51. Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities",
in Ruth T. McVey (Ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 
n.d.), Mohammed A. Nawawi, "Stagnation as a Basis of 
Regionalism: A Lesson from Indonesia">Asian Survey3 
Vol. IX, No.12 (December 1969).
52. For an instructive overview of the role of revolts and 
violence in Southeast Asia in the past and the present
see Milton E. Osborne, Region of Revolty Focus on Southeast 
Asia (Adelaide: Pergamon Press Australia, 1970).
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or less serious security problem arising from one or more sources of threat.
But the intensity of the insecurity experienced, the conclusions drawn,
and the policies adopted to counter this threat have varied considerably
from country to country depending on the circumstances, historical factors,
the direction from which the most serious threat was thought to come, and
so on. Some countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines, have relied
heavily on the Western powers, especially the United States, for their
security, whilst Malaysia and Singapore have looked to Britain until
relatively recently. Other countries such as Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia,
53each in its own way, have sought to steer a neutral or non-aligned course.
All these different perceptions and policies have influenced and lent a 
distinctive flavour to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.
Yet another set of questions to be explored in chapter 6 is 
related to the influence of diplomatic processes on regional cooperation. 
Diplomatic processes refer in this context more to the style and techniques 
of diplomacy than to actual policies.
Processes of cooperation and integration are, at least in the 
initial stages, but a part of normal inter-state relations and they take 
place within and are subject to the modes and conduct of conventional 
diplomacy as practised by the states concerned. In the advanced stages, 
however, which begin with the first effective transfer of functions and 
decision-making powers from the member governments to regional decision­
making bodies, these processes gradually cease to be part of normal inter­
state relations as well as subjects of conventional diplomacy. Decisions
20.
All the countries in the region have felt and still feel they have a more
53. A number of scholarly works deal with this aspect of
regional affairs. Suffice it here to mention Peter 
Lyon, op.cit. > and D.E. Kennedy, The Security of 
Southern Asia (London: Chatto & Windus, 1968).
concerned with these processes are increasingly made within bureaucratic 
and institutional structures at the regional level in much the same 
ways decisions concerning similar processes at the domestic level are 
made within more or less centralized domestic institutions. Cooperation 
and integration processes in Southeast Asia have as yet plainly not 
effectuated any transfer to regional bodies of functions and powers which 
previously rested exclusively with the individual states. For this reason 
these processes in Southeast Asia must still be considered to be in their 
initial stages and therefore subject to the mode and conduct of diplomacy 
as practised by the countries in the region.
A final group of questions to be analysed in chapter 7 concerns 
the influence of the international environment in general and particular 
extra-regional actors on regional cooperative processes. The tendency 
of these extra-regional forces to influence and even exacerbate indigenous 
conflicts should not make us blind to the possible positive influence they 
have had on cooperation within the region be it by their example or by more 
direct methods, whether intentional or unintentional. An important part 
of this chapter will consist of an analysis of the perceptions the various 
leaders have of the nature of the international environment in general 
and their influence on cooperative and integrative processes. A segment 
of this problem is dealt with in chapter 5 as a separate issue, namely the 
international environment as a source of threat to the security of the 
countries involved.
In chapter 8 the various threads will be drawn together and an 
assessment made of the state of cooperative and integrative processes in 
in Southeast Asia.
But before the analysis turns to the substantive issues outlined 
above an account will be given in the next chapter of the motives and 
aspirations underlying the formation of the two most significant attempts
21.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
ASA AND ASEAN
Roughly speaking one can say that the development of regionalism 
in Southeast Asia has gone through three phases the last of which has not 
run its full course. ^
In the first phase, from 1945 to about 1959-60, most of the init­
iatives and much of the impetus came from outside the region, the lead being 
provided by such non-Asian powers as Britain and the United States, and 
Asian powers such as India. Part of the explanation may be sought in the 
fact that by 1950, for example, there were only four independent countries
in the region, namely Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Of
2these Burma experienced considerable internal upheavals and tended any­
how to look outside the region for meaningful relations, especially to 
India and Britain. Thailand and the Philippines entered into close rel­
ations and alliances with the Western powers, especially the United States, 
for security reasons as well as for reasons of economic assistance. After 
independence Indonesia increasingly began to steer a non-aligned course 
and with the ascent of Sukarno to a dominant position she saw her primary
role as one of leadership within the socalled Third World countries,
3epitomized by the staging of the Bandung conference in 1955.
1. I owe this division to Peter Lyon. See his "ASEAN and 
the Future of Regionalism", in Lau Teik Soon (Ed.),
New Directions in the International Relations of South­
east Asia, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973) 
pp. 156-164.
2. See chapter 4 below.
3. Lyon, op. c i t pp. 157-158. On the Bandung conference,
see George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 
April 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956).
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Chapter 2
The most significant economic organizations with Southeast 
Asian membership to emerge in this period were the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), established in 1947 with 
headquarters in Bangkok, and the Colombo Plan which started as a Common­
wealth project, initially with a membership of seven but now drawing its
membership, at present twenty-four, from outside the Commonwealth as
4well. Both organizations were to a large extent reliant on and sus­
tained by British and American support.
In the military and security field the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) was launched in 1954 largely on the initiative of 
the United States. In Southeast Asia only Thailand and the Philippines 
joined. ^ Another significant security arrangement from this period was 
the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) which came into effect upon 
the independence of Malaya in 1957. This agreement ceased to function 
in November 1971 when it was replaced by the Five-Power Defence Agreement 
(ANZUK) involving Malaysia and Singapore as well as Britain, Australia 
and New Zealand. On the whole, however, during this first period Southeast 
Asian initiatives and sustaining actions in relation to regional organ­
izations and associations were, as Peter Lyon has observed, "either non­
existent, negligible, or merely rhetorical". ^
4. See L.P. Singh, The Politics of Economic Co-operation in Asia; 
a Study of Asian International Organizations (Columbia;
University of Missouri Press, 1966). This study concentrates 
in particular on ECAFE and the Colombo Plan.
5. Lyon, op. cit., p. 158.
6. See George Modelski (Ed.), SEATO. Six Studies (Melbourne:
F.W. Cheshire, 1962).
7. Lyon, op. cit.s p. 158. See also Russell H. Fifield, The 
Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958 (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1958), ch. 10, pp. 449-462 for a somewhat 
detailed general account of early efforts at regionalism 
in Southeast Asia.
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The second phase lasted from about 1960 to 1967. This period saw 
some notable initiatives on the part of one or more Southeast Asian count-
g
ries which had by now all, save Singapore, become independent. The two 
most important were the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) involving
Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines and Maiphilindo with Malaya, the Philip-
9pines and Indonesia as members. The significance of these two initiatives 
from a Southeast Asian point of view was that they originated from within 
the region and that the membership was likewise drawn exclusively from 
Southeast Asia. However, barely after being launched both associations 
became victims of conflicts between the members. Maphilindo, officially 
ushered into existence in June 1963, did not survive the ensuing conflict 
over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in September that year 
and was for all practical purposes still-born. Instead of a Greater Malay 
Confederation, the hope of Filipino President Macapagal, came Konfrontasi 
(Confrontation), an armed conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia not 
officially brought to an end before August 1966, and the dispute between 
Malaysia and the Philippines over the right to exercise sovereignty over 
Sabah (British North Borneo). ^  ASA's lifespan was somewhat longer. 
Established in July 1961 in Bangkok it too, however, collapsed or at 
least ceased to function because of the Sabah dispute. ^
Apart from these unsuccessful attempts at regional organization 
the countries of Southeast Asia joined various other organizations with
8. The two Vietnams (North and South), Cambodia and Laos became 
independent in 1954.
9. For an account of these two attempts at regional organization 
see Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast 
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966) esp. pp. 22-40 and chapters
5 and 6. See also Peter Lyon, Wav and Peace in South-East 
Asiaj (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) pp. 154-58.
10. Gordon, loc. cit. and pp. 68-72.
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an Asian, and sometimes wider, base. Thus Thailand, Malaysia, the Philip­
pines and South Vietnam joined the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) in
1966 together with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan and the non-Asian powers 
Australia and New Zealand. Indonesia, Laos and Cambodia opted for 
observer status. Originally meant as a security pact of non-communist 
countries by its initiator, South Korea, it became, especially on the 
insistence of Japan, a non-military organization devoted to the preser­
vation of national integrity and independence and the promotion of 
12economic growth. Throughout its existence, however, ASPAC has been 
enveloped in an atmosphere of strong anti-communism which has tended to 
dissipate its attractiveness, especially after the changes in China's 
foreign policy over the last years.
The second phase also saw the establishment of a number of poten­
tially significant and more durable organizations and associations than 
those mentioned. The most important was the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
established in 1966 with headquarters in Manila. As of March 1973 it had
18 members of which 7 were Southeast Asian countries (the exceptions being
13Burma, North Vietnam and Indonesia). Others established in this period
with membership from Southeast Asia include the Asian Productivity Organ­
ization (APO) of 1961, the Asian Institute for Economic Development and 
Planning (AIEDP) of 1964, and the Asian Industrial Development Council 
(AIDC) of 1966. Still others were established on a Southeast Asian regional 
basis such as the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization 
(SEAMEO) in 1965 which promotes cooperation among the member countries
12. See Michael Haas, "The 'Asian Way' to Peace," Pacific 
Community, Vol. 4, No. 4 (July 1973) p. 509.
13. See Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 2, March 1973, pp. 1733- 
1735 for a comprehensive list of Asian regional organizations. 
See also Lau Teik Soon, op. cit., pp. 203-205 for a similar 
list as well as Haas, ibid, especially pp. 507-510.
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through education, science and culture; the Southeast Asian Central Bank 
Group (SEACEN) in 1966, an annual conference of governors to discuss mone­
tary policies, banking, capital market development and so on; and the 
Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia 
(MCEDSEA) in 1966 which holds annual meetings to discuss economic progress 
and regional problems. ^
The second phase is significant in that, firstly, the countries 
of Southeast Asia only in this period started to involve themselves in 
international organization on a broad scale. Previously membership had 
been largely confined to the United Nations and its various specialized 
agencies. Secondly, in spite of the failures the period is also signif­
icant in that the Southeast Asian countries themselves started to take the 
initiative. It was as if they only in this period began to realize that 
they were masters in their own house. Thirdly, and most significantly, 
attention began to be focused on the region itself, that is, the countries 
of Southeast Asia began to think in terms of purely regional organizations. 
Especially important in this context was the budding involvement of Indo­
nesia in the affairs of the region. By far the largest country in the area 
Indonesia under Sukarno had in the preceding period been primarily inter­
ested in playing a role on the world 'stage' through her aspirations to 
leadership of the non-aligned group of countries, a position she was not 
alone in seeking. Without, however, giving up her more ambitious aspir­
ations she began in the early 1960's to direct more of her attention to 
the region of which she was herself a part.
The third and current phase of the development of regionalism in 
Southeast Asia began in 1967. More precisely, it commenced with the 
establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in
27.
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Bangkok in August that year. The members were Thailand, Malaysia, Singa­
pore, Indonesia and the Philippines. On account of its membership as 
well as the interest its members have taken in it, ASEAN is the most 
important of the initiatives to have come out of Southeast Asia so far.
To a great extent one is justified with Bernard Gordon in considering 
ASEAN an enlarged version of ASA with a different name. ^  ASA, which 
in 1963 had ceased to function because of the break between Malaysia and 
the Philippines over Sabah, had not ceased to exist. In March 1966 the 
association was reactivated together with some of the recommendations 
and projects proposed and initiated between 1961 and 1963. Shortly after
ASEAN was founded in 1967 ASA was dismantled but most of its ongoing
16activities were incorporated into ASEAN.
Apart from ASEAN the growth in intergovernmental organizations 
and agencies has continued after 1967. Purely Southeast Asian initiatives 
include the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDC) of 1970, 
located in Bangkok; the Intergovernmental Co-ordinating Committee for 
Southeast Asian Cooperation in Family and Population Planning (SEARCFPP) 
of 1971, and the Southeast Asian Agency for Regional Transport and Commun­
ications (SEATAC) of 1972, set up to serve the Coordinating Committee of 
Southeast Asian senior officials on Transport and Communications (C00RDC0M) 
of 1967. 17
The countries of the region continued to involve themselves in 
extra-regional organizations. Thus a number of projects spawned by ECAFE 
included the formation of commodity arrangements such as the Asian Coconut
15. See Bernard K. Gordon, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia," 
in Robert 0. Tilman (Ed.), Man, State, and Society in 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1969), p.507.
16. Ibid, p. 507 and p. 509.
17. Asia Research Bulletin, toe. c i t Lau Teik Soon, loc. cit.
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Community (ACC), established in 1969 and with a permanent secretariat 
in Djakarta, and the Asian Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC), 
set up in 1970 with a permanent secretariat in Kuala Lumpur. Among 
the members of the former are Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, 
and of the latter Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and South
Vietnam. In fact the bulk of the membership of the last two organ-
18izations is Southeast Asian.
This involvement in transnational activities was not confined to 
governments alone. In 1971 and 1972 respectively two non-governmental 
associations were set up, both with links to ASEAN. The first was the 
Southeast Asian Businessmen's Council (SEABC) which is concerned with 
intra- and extra-regional business in general, and the second was the 
Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI), 
associated with the ASEAN Permanent Committee on Commerce and Industry,
and established to organize trade missions and participation in trade
, . 19 fairs.
Generally speaking the trend toward increasing involvement in 
international organization started in the second phase has continued 
throughout the current phase thus linking the countries of Southeast 
Asia more firmly to the global network of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. However, some more specific points are in order. Firstly, 
the involvement in international organization is by no means uniformly 
spread throughout the region. Some countries such as Burma, Laos,
Cambodia and the two Vietnams have been on the whole considerably more 
reticent than others to involve themselves. In this respect the conflict 
in Vietnam with its ancillary conflicts in Laos and Cambodia have played
29.
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an obvious role. But other reasons discussed later have also influenced 
the situation. Whatever the explanation, this uneven involvement has 
had the effect of dividing the region into two camps, as it were, of 
states with a high level and a low level of participation and involve­
ment. This is particularly so viewed from the regional angle. This fact 
alone raises the question of how appropriate it is to consider Southeast 
Asia a ’region'.
Secondly, among the countries with relatively high involvement - 
essentially the ASEAN states - the attitude of Indonesia has undoubtedly 
been the most significant in this current phase. From a position of scant 
attention to regionalism in the preceding phases she made a volte face 
which spiralled her into a position where she became perhaps the leading 
proponent of regionalism in Southeast Asia. She not only took an active 
part in the formation of ASEAN but has since played an active and leading 
role within the association. The immediate cause for this change in her 
attitude was the so called Gestapu affair in September 1965 that ushered 
in a new leadership signalling the demise of Sukarno as a political force 
in Indonesia.
Thirdly, perhaps no less compelling in their significance than 
intra-regional events have been changes in the nature of the involvement 
and the attitudes of extra-regional forces, especially those with the 
capacity to greatly influence regional affairs - the big powers.
Especially important has been the cessation of active military partici­
pation in the Vietnam and Cambodia conflicts by the United States, who 
also has reduced her military presence in other parts of Southeast Asia 
such as Thailand and the Philippines. The greatly reduced British 
presence east of Suez is also significant in spite of the existence of 
the Five-Power Defence Agreement. Equally important as these developments 
have been the change in China's foreign policy and the establishment of
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relations between China and the United States. Encouraged and, indeed, 
perhaps compelled by these developments the ASEAN countries have had to 
review their attitudes and policies toward China. From a position of out­
right hostility at the official level they have moved cautiously to improve 
their relations with China who on her part has shown herself willing to 
reciprocate. Taken together these and other developments stemming from 
extra-regional influences have greatly changed the environment in which 
Southeast Asian regionalism is currently operating.
Having in broad terms sketched the development of regional organ­
ization in Southeast Asia the rest of this chapter will be taken up by an 
analysis of the formation and development of ASA and ASEAN. The reasons 
for selecting especially these two are as follows. Both are regional 
organizations, that is, the membership is confined to states within South­
east Asia, and unlike the many functionally specific organizations, of 
which a few have been mentioned above, both ASA and ASEAN are functionally 
inclusive organizations in that they were created with the fulfilment of 
many purposes and functions in mind.
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (ASA)
The first suggestion of a regional association would appear to
have been made by the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman. At
the 10th anniversary celebrations of Ceylon's independence in Colombo in
February 1958 he called for a meeting of Southeast Asian leaders in the
20'not far distant future' to forge unity in the region.
The impression quickly formed that what the Tunku had in mind 
was a broadly based regional, anti-communist association of some kind.
This impression was not without foundation. Only a few days before his
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Colombo appeal he had expressed concern that numerous Southeast Asian
countries had not taken a definite stand against communism. ’I think
22they will have cause to regret it', he said. When a New Delhi news­
paper a couple of months later carried a report that the Tunku had pro­
posed the formation of a defense organization outside the framework of 
23SEATO , an announcement from the Prime Minister's office in Kuala
Lumpur in response to this report only denied that a formal proposal had
been made. It went on, however, to say that the Tunku had been 'toying'
with the idea of a collective security pact outside SEATO. 'The idea
has been in the Tunku's mind for some time and he merely wished to sound
2 Aout other nations on the suggestion'. Such a defence pact should,
according to the Tunku, include Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South 
Vietnam and the Philippines.
The anti-communist sentiments of the Tunku were echoed in Manila.
In December 1958, on the eve of a visit of the Tunku to Manila, President 
Garcia spoke to the Overseas Press Club in Manila about 'the relentless
drive of Communism for world domination...' as '...something that cannot
25be ignored by any free Asia'. Whilst SEATO's deterrent effectiveness
was beyond dispute Garcia maintained that among 'the members of the free
Asian community there must develop a broad and sympathetic understanding
of each others' thinking, problems and national objectives. Only with
such understanding can we explore the common ground upon which a common
economic, political and spiritual defense may be based and collective
action undertaken... against Communist economic and political aggression...'
26
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When the Tunku came to Manila in January 1959 he had already
responded to Garcia's ideas by commenting; ’It will be a good thing
when we Asians can defend ourselves against external aggression and I
agree with President Garcia that Asian nations should try to get together
27and consider ways and means of defending ourselves'. However, in
spite of this comment the Tunku, on his arrival in Manila, would appear 
to have turned away from the idea of a regional security pact to some
kind of cooperative arrangement that would serve as an example in com-
28batting 'infiltration of ideas'. The arrangement he had in mind and
to which he wanted to elicit the Filipino reaction, had already been 
under consideration for months in Kuala Lumpur. It was referred to as
29a 'Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty' - SEAFET, for short.
The move from suggesting a possible security or defence organ­
ization to stressing economic cooperation did not so much reflect a
softening in the Tunku's anti-communist sentiments as a shift from one to
30another way of combatting communism and communist infiltration. Tact­
ical considerations were involved as well. In order to get the support 
of the countries he had in mind he realized he had to tone down the anti­
communist aspects of his ideas. An anti-communist pact 'would antagonize
31many other Asian countries' , and would serve to divide the Southeast
32Asian countries many of whom pursued a neutral or non-aligned policy. 
Largely due to the strong anti-communist pronouncements of the Tunku and
33.
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Garcia during this initial period, however, the ensuing efforts at forming 
a regional grouping became closely associated with an attitude of anti­
communism which was eventually to rub off on ASA when it was established 
in July 1961. No amount of public denials and stress on ’non-political' 
cooperation could dissipate this image and its direct result was to severely 
limit the membership of the association as well as to render futile all 
attempts at later extending this membership.
The joint communique issued at the close of the meeting between 
the Tunku and Garcia reflected the new emphasis on non-military cooperation.
It talked about the urgent need for ways and means of elevating the standard 
of living and improve the welfare of their peoples, and urged that as soon 
as practicable representatives of the Philippines and Malaya should meet in 
either country to discuss ways and means of achieving the above mentioned
33goal. However, nothing was said about what ’ways and means' might entail.
Ostensibly in full agreement the two leaders would nevertheless
appear to have entertained different ideas as to the nature of the proposed
cooperation. While the Tunku had come to the conclusion that it would be
best to play down the anti-communist theme in the interest of more inclusive
participation, Garcia continued to emphasize the combatting of communism.
Thus when in late January he announced his intention of visiting South Vietnam
and Malaya, the purpose of the visit was inter alia to discuss the idea of
a non-military alliance of Asian countries to counteract the encroachments
34of communism. The Tunku, on his part, continued to stress economic and
35cultural cooperation . The somewhat divergent views did not, however, 
prevent the two governments from keeping the idea of regional cooperation
34.
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35. See, for example, Straits Timesy 18 February, 1959.
ASA came as a result of Thai involvement. In April Thailand's Foreign
37Minister, Thanat Khoman, expressed his country's interest. It is, indeed,
likely that the Thais already were occupied with the idea because in July
that year they were able to circulate to all regional capitals, except
Hanoi, a carefully formulated proposal for regional cooperation, titled a
38'Preliminary Working Paper on Cooperation in Southeast Asia'.
At the general level the Thais argued against limiting the cooper­
ation to the economic and cultural fields, as the proposals of the Filipinos 
and the Malayans did. Any practical and concrete problems affecting the 
region, be they political, economic, or otherwise, ought to be considered.
As to the particular field of cultural cooperation the Thais were neverthe­
less more sceptical. In a region in which each state tended to be either 
exclusively Buddhist, Muslim or Christian such cooperation might create more 
division than cohesion. Cultural cooperation should therefore be replaced 
by educational, artistic and technical cooperation. Moreover, since so many 
of the region's difficulties could be attributed to economic problems the 
Thais' proposal argued that the emphasis should be on economic cooperation. 
Because of the dependence of the economies on agricultural exports the pro­
posal sought to make specific recommendations based on this fact such as
39market arrangements and commodity pricing.
The working paper also outlined what the Thais thought ought to be 
the shape of the institutional structure of the proposed cooperation. No 
permanent headquarter was envisaged. On the contrary, the administrative
36. See Ibid; and the following issues of Manila Bulletin;
18 February, 14 March, 4 April, 25 April, 5 May, 1959.
37. Manila Bulletin3 4 April, 1959.
38. See Gordon, op. oit.3 pp. 167-70 on the Thai proposal.
39. Ibidj pp. 169-68
alive in the time ahead.
The next important step in the process leading to the formation of
machinery should be kept at a minimum geared to 'informal’ and ’practical’
cooperation. Meetings should be conducted in private with press and public
attendance confined to formal, opening sessions. No record should be kept
40of the meetings of prime-ministers and foreign ministers.
The significance of the Thai proposal, as Gordon has pointed out,
lies in the fact that this was very much along the lines ASA later developed. 
41
The next initiative came from Kuala Lumpur. In October 1959 the
Tunku sent letters to all the countries in the region, except North Vietnam,
42asking for comments on his regional proposal and suggesting a meeting.
However, apart from the countries already involved, Thailand and the Philip-
43pines, who as expected reacted favourably , the response was generally
muted throughout the rest of the region. Indonesia's president Sukarno
replied that although close cooperation among the countries of Southeast
Asia might be desirable, a new association would only become a stumbling
bloc. Instead he suggested bilateral arrangements, and to the extent wider
cooperation was desired this could be undertaken within the Afro-Asian con- 
44text. Other non-aligned or neutral countries such as Burma and Cambodia
45showed no enthusiasm either. This negative reception of his proposal did
46not deter the Tunku who continued to push his SEAFET scheme. In April
1960 he sent a special envoy, Inche Mohamed Sopiee, to Manila and Bangkok for
36.
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establishment of working parties in the three countries to further coordinate
48the preparations for the formation of a regional organization. At the
end of the talks Sopiee again stressed that the grouping would be neither
'political’ nor identified with any ideological blocs and existing defence
49arrangements in Southeast Asia or elsewhere.
In July 1960 the Tunku changed the name of the proposed organ­
ization to the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASAS) and it 
was thought that the planned state-visit of President Garcia to Malaya 
in September would result in the launching of the association. ^  This 
was not to be, however, partly because Garcia’s visit did not take place
and partly because events in Laos took a turn to the worse diverting the
52attention of Thailand and the Philippines as members of SEATO.
The theme of an anti-communist security organization had for 
some time now taken a back seat in the discussion about regional cooper­
ation. The situation in Laos changed this when it caused the Philippines 
to again revert to the idea of a broadly based security alliance thus for 
a time bringing into sharp relief the extent to which the Philippines and 
Malaya differed on the subject of regional cooperation. On Filipino init­
iative a conference of Asian anti-communist powers was hurriedly convened 
in Manila in January 1961. The intended participants were Pakistan,
Thailand, Malaya, Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam and the Philippines.
37 .
47further talks on the proposal. The result of these talks was the
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As it happened the meeting derived more of its significance from the 
absence of the three first countries on this list than from the pres­
ence of the rest. The Thais concealed their lack of enthusiasm behind
53the excuse that they had been given too short notice and that their
foreign minister would be preoccupied with the return of the King and
Queen to Thailand. However, it is more likely that the Thai leaders
felt that little or nothing worthwhile would accrue from such a confer-
54ence as long as the United States was not involved , and that, at any 
rate, action in relation to the situation in Laos would have to come 
through SEATO.
The Malays, on their part, had not been particularly concerned 
with Laos, a problem in which they did not wish to become involved. With 
an excuse identical to the Thais - insufficient notice - they too declined 
the invitation apparently because they wished to prevent the inclusion in 
the discussion of the ASAS scheme any ideas of an anti-communist alliance. 
'In the absence of detailed information it would appear that the Manila 
talks were concerned mainly with Laos, but there are other matters which 
require the attention of Southeast Asian countries', commented the Tunku. 
^  When the Philippines' Foreign Minister Serrano declared his intention 
of discussing the result of the Manila meeting with his counterparts in 
the three countries which stayed away, the response in Kuala Lumpur was 
cool. Officials there were said to be 'mystified' by the reports from 
Manila about consultations on common security problems and to know nothing 
of these talks. ^
38.
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The state visit of Garcia to Malaya, originally planned for 
September 1960 but postponed, did finally take place in February 1961.
The month that lapsed between the Manila meeting and the Garcia visit 
witnessed new efforts on the part of the Filipinos to involve the Mal­
ayans in a security arrangement. In the beginning of February Serrano went 
to Kuala Lumpur apparently in an attempt to change the Tunku’s mind about
an anti-communist alliance. ^  The Filipinos considered the visit the
58'second phase' of the Manila talks.
Serrano's second objective was to discuss the ASAS proposal and
again speculation mounted that the association would at last be launched.
59 When the talks ended it was clear that the Filipino foreign minister 
had not extracted any promises from the Tunku as far as the first objective 
was concerned. The most he obtained was to have the topic included on the 
agenda of the talks between Garcia and the Tunku which were to follow a 
few days later. As to his second objective Serrano found, not unexpectedly, 
the Malayans more receptive. It was tentatively agreed to go ahead with 
ASAS, the final decision to be made during the Garcia visit to Kuala 
Lumpur. ^ However, as it turned out the meeting between the Tunku and 
Garcia was far from conclusive in respect of ASAS . The two leaders con­
fined themselves to agreeing to the formation of the association but only
61if Thailand also joined. Thus everything came to depend on the Thai who
would appear to have been reluctant and apprehensive about being put in 
62this position. Nevertheless, no sooner had the Garcia visit ended
39.
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before Thanat Khoman went to Kuala Lumpur where he met the Tunku and 
Serrano. This meeting proved to be the turning point. The three mini­
sters decided to proceed with the formation of a regional association, 
and, in pursuance of this goal, to set up working parties in each of the 
three countries to work out concrete proposals. The working groups 
would then meet in Bangkok within two-three months to consider the
findings and to arrive at a joint proposal which would be discussed at a
6 3meeting of the foreign ministers of the three countries. The 'non-
64political1 character of the association was again stressed.
Events developed rapidly from now on and the 'schedule’, as set
down in the Kuala Lumpur agreement, was followed. The expert committees
from the three countries met in Bangkok in June where they formed a Joint
Working Party to consider the proposals from the individual countries.
The result was a 100 page report which went back to the various govern-
65ments for consideration. In late July the foreign ministers of the
three countries met in Bangkok where, on the 31st, they issued the Bangkok
Declaration formally establishing the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). 
66 The aims and purposes of ASA were as follows :
1. To establish an effective machinery of friendly 
consultation, collaboration and mutual assistance 
in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and 
administrative fields.
40.
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The name ASAS, short for the Association of Southeast Asian 
States, was introduced and initially preferred, by the Malayans, 
because in Malay Asas means ’foundation’. However, the Tunku 
would appear to have had second thoughts when it was pointed 
out that ASAS could be pronounced in English as "Asses". See 
Bangkok Post, 29 July, 1961.
Al.
2. To provide educational, professional, technical, 
and administrative training and research facilities 
in their respective countries for nationals and 
officials of the associated countries.
3. To exchange information on matters of common interest 
or concern in the economic, cultural, educational
and scientific fields.
A. To cooperate in the promotion of Southeast Asian 
studies.
5. To provide a machinery for fruitful collaboration in 
the utilisation of their respective natural resources, 
the development of their agriculture and industry, 
the expansion of their trade, the improvement of 
their transport and communication facilities, and 
generally raising the living standards of their 
peoples.
6 . To cooperate in the study of the problem of inter­
national commodity trade.
7. Generally to consult and cooperate with one another 
so as to achieve aims and purposes of the Association 
as well as to contribute more effectively to the
work of existing international organizations and
67agencies.
In pursuance of these goals the joint communique issued at the end 
of the meeting outlined the organizational and administrative structure to 
be set up:
a) Annual meeting of Foreign Ministers which shall be 
by rotation;
b) Annual meeting of the Joint Working Party which 
shall take place about a month prior to the meeting 
of Foreign Ministers;
67. See H.P. Gopalan "The Launching of ASA", Far Eastern Economic
Review3 21 September, 1961, p. 551.
c) Establishment of a Standing Committee under 
the Chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of 
the host country or his designated represent­
ative and having as its members accredited 
ambassadors of the other member countries,
to carry on the work of the Association in 
between meetings of the Foreign Ministers;
d) Setting up of a number of ad hoc and permanent 
committees of specialists and officials on 
specific subjects, and
e) Creation of a national secretariat in each
member country to carry out the work of the
68Association on behalf of that country.
The communique also announced that the Standing Committee would be 
set up in Kuala Lumpur at a special meeting of Foreign Ministers on 1 Dec­
ember 1961. The regular annual meeting of the Foreign Ministers was to be
69convened in Manila in August 1962.
After much talk and rhetoric accompanied by intermittent and spas­
modic planning the cooperative venture, first publicly mooted by the Tunku 
some three years and a half earlier, had finally come into being.
Many ideas and plans had been put forward, some tentatively, 
others more assertively. When one considers the end result and the process 
of formation leading to it, it is not an exaggeration to say that the ques­
tion of the nature of the cooperation to be undertaken and the identity of 
the initiators became the pivot on which turned a number of other important 
issues not the least of which were the membership and structure of the 
association.
From an early stage the proposals for regional cooperation became 
identified with strong anti-communist orientations and 'bloc1 politics.
This is not how it was perceived and understood by the leaders of the non-
42.
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aligned or neutral countries only . Their view was shared in the Western 
countries as well although without the associated misgivings. In an edit­
orial which generally approved of ASA the New York Times on 7 August, 1961 
called the association 'anti-communist but non-military' and commented on 
the 'anti-communist and pro-Western orientation of the founders'.
As indicated above the responsibility for the link between regional 
cooperation and anti-communist ’bloc' politics must be attributed in the 
first instance to the Tunku who initially had 'toyed with the idea' of a 
collective security pact directed against communism. The Tunku's pre­
occupation with communism is understandable against the background of the 
Malay experience. Ever since it started in 1948 the Malays had been 
fighting a communist insurrection. This period, the socalled Emergency, 
was not to end officially before 1960, and although the insurrection had 
been largely defeated by 1958-59, the memories of it were still very much 
alive in the minds of the Malay leaders, including the Tunku. Nevertheless, 
by early 1959 the Tunku would appear to have given up the idea of a security 
pact, and in the ensuing time he and other Malayan leaders tried repeatedly 
to divorce the idea of regional cooperation from the idea of an anti-communist 
military alliance. Behind this change of mind on the part of the Tunku was 
a belief that the spread of communism could ultimately only be stopped if 
the conditions on which it fed were removed. To this end economic develop­
ment and the raising of the standard of living of the peoples were necessary. 
72 But there were other reasons as well. The Tunku realized that if he was
to be successful in forming a broadly based organization, an anti-communist
73security pact would not achieve this aim. In January 1959, while in
43.
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from Malaya and the Philippines); Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, South
74Vietnam and Taiwan. On this list were two countries, Indonesia and
Cambodia, which professed a neutral or non-aligned policy and to which 
participation in an anti-communist pact together with Taiwan and South 
Vietnam was ruled out. However, if, as we must assume, the intention 
of the Tunku was to keep the proposal of a regional association separated 
from all ideas involving cooperation within the field of military security, 
he was not entirely successful. Despite vehement protestations to the 
effect that the regional cooperation proposal was ’non-political* and not 
directed at anybody, the Tunku had the unfortunate tendency on certain 
occasions to mention regional economic and cultural cooperation in the 
same breath as he lamented the evils of communism and advocated the neces­
sity of an ever vigilant opposition to it. Thus, in November 1959, for 
example, on the arrival back from a visit to Australia he talked about 
the time when the various pacts, defence and others, between Britain and 
Malaya would be abrogated thus making collaboration in Southeast Asia 
essential. And in a speech to the annual conference of the United
Malay National Organization (UMNO) in April 1960 he warned the delegates
against communist subversion. ’Having had little success through propa-
76ganda they are now trying other means like trade'. He revealed that
the Malayan Government recently had refused permission to a communist 
trade mission, which visited Singapore, to enter Malaya for this reason.
'[We] cannot deal with the Communists because their ambitions know no 
bounds. They have no other aim but to rule’, said the Tunku. 77 However,
74. Manila Bulletin3 7 January 1961.
75. See Straits Times, 18 November, 1959.
76. Bangkok Post, 18 April 1960.
77. Ibid.
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Manila, he mentioned the following countries as possible members (apart
only a few moments earlier he had outlined the goals of the SEAFET scheme
78stressing that '[such] cooperation is not directed at anybody...'. On
the occasion of the Garcia visit to Malaya in February 1961 the Tunku 
again linked the threat of communism and regional cooperation when he 
asked, 'Is it not obvious... that if we do not get together... in the eco­
nomic sphere... we shall always be the prey and the prize for those who
79seek power by world domination'.
But whilst the Tunku himself no doubt contributed, perhaps unwit­
tingly, it was nevertheless the Filipinos who more than any others tainted 
ASA with the anti-communist connotations it so clearly seemed to possess 
in the eyes of the rest of Southeast Asia. The repeated talk of President 
Garcia and Foreign Minister Serrano about the need for a common defence 
against communism and, indeed, their efforts in the pursuit of this goal, 
could not but lead to the impression that when the Filipinos talked about 
regional cooperation in general, they really meant cooperation in the 
fields of defence and security. The meeting in Manila in January 1961 and 
the visit of Serrano to Kuala Lumpur just prior to the Garcia visit to Mal­
aya in February did nothing to dispel this impression. Coming as it did 
a bare six months before the establishment of ASA, it was yet another 
attempt on the part of the Filipinos to involve Malaya in some kind of 
security alliance. ^
The efficacy of what appeared to the rest of Southeast Asia as 
collusion between anti-communism and regionalism on the part of Malaya and 
the Philippines, received further confirmation with the involvement of 
Thailand who was the only Southeast Asian member of SEATO apart from the 
Philippines. Thus the three countries most involved in the planning of
45.
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regional cooperation were seen as not only strongly anti-communist but also 
as perhaps the most pro-Western countries in the region. This was the 
factor that perhaps more than any other came to decide the membership of 
ASA in that the attitude of the other countries to ASA, both in the plan­
ning stages and after, came to a great extent to be determined by reference 
to it. Because of her intrinsic importance to the region the position of 
Indonesia was especially important.
From the very start the Tunku's proposal for regional cooperation 
was received with considerable coolness by Indonesia. Dr. Subandrio, the
Foreign Minister, was reported to have said that he could see no point in 
81the proposal. Sections of the Indonesian press were said to see the
82sinister hand of 'certain foreign powers'. The continued coolness of the
Indonesians and others would seem to have irked the Tunku, because when it
was reported that Manila had intensified its campaign to convince Indonesia
of the advisability of joining the proposed SEAFET, he reacted by indicating
the desirability of other participants and then went on to say, '... but far
83be it from the truth that we are going out of the way to woo anybody'.
The Philippines would indeed seem to have been particularly active in try­
ing to bring Indonesia into the scheme. In May 1960 the Philippines' Minister 
to Malaya expressed his optimism in these terms (in reference to Burma, Indo­
nesia, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), 'It is significant that none of 
the Southeast Asian countries has spoken against this concept for closer 
economic and cultural relations among the countries in this region. It is
a matter of time before these countries decide to join and openly declare
84their support for the treaty'.
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Formulated in terms such as these the Filipinos may indeed have 
been right. No country would appear to be opposed to regional cooper­
ation in principle. But already in December 1959 Sukarno, in his reply to
the Tunku’s letter of October, had declared his opposition to this partic-
85ular scheme by stating his preference for bilateral arrangements. More­
over, repeated attempts by the Filipinos to entice Indonesia to join met 
86with no success. In February Dr. Subandrio declared that although Indo­
nesia could not support ASAS this was not because
’we are afraid or suspicious as if (sic) ASAS will become 
an alliance against any ideology or a defence pact.
We in Indonesia only consider ASAS as being unreal­
istic (sic) endeavour as long as bilateral relations between 
states have not yet been given its full contents so 
that this alliance can easily be used as a forum to 
discuss political issues.
What we ought to note is that at the present 
time Indonesia indeed does have a policy which is
87rather different from those of our neighbours’.
Indonesian newspapers were less guarded in their comments one of
them asking, 'What’s the use of setting up a small SEATO?’, and labelling
88the proposed scheme a ’protest military pact’. Suluh Indonesia, the
newspaper of the party with which Sukarno was most closely associated, the
P.N.I., urged more attention to be paid to Asian-African solidarity than
89to the forming of new associations. Serrano was quick to respond to
Subandrio’s statement when a few days later he assured that ASAS would
47.
85. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict, p. 171, note 24.
8 6. For references to Filipino initiatives directed at Indonesia see 
Times of Indonesia, 1 July, 1960; Straits Times,
26 August, 1960, Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 September and
1 December 1960, p. 596 and 505 respectively, Manila Chronicle,
2 February, 1961.
87. Indonesian Observer, 15 February, 1961; Bangkok Post, 15 February 
1961; Straits Times, 1£ February, 1961.
8 8. Quoted in Bangkok Post, 8 February, 1961.
89. Ibid.
not become a forum for political discussions , but to no avail. In
April Subandrio commented that ASAS would be an organization without
substance and that it might give rise to political ambitions despite
91denials to the contrary. The most outspoken and revealing statement
came from Kusumowidadjo Sumito, Secretary-General of the Indonesian
Department of Foreign Affairs. In an interview with the Far Eastern
Economic Review in July 1961 he said inter alia,
’Frankly public opinion in Indonesia tends to take 
the ASAS idea as the SEATO countries’ efforts to 
make a subtle link between SEATO and non-SEATO 
countries in Asia. The public suspicion is under­
standable.
We certainly canvass the idea of greater Afro-Asian 
development on a large canvas but not minor regional 
groupings which may tend to develop into small blocs.
We want to refrain from these multilateral arrange­
ments even though it is only an economic bloc.
The spirit behind the ASAS is any way anti-this and
anti-that (as revealed by many statements of Tunku
Abdul Rahman) and Indonesia does not want any part
in a negative policy in international affairs; we
92want to be positive, constructive’.
From the various utterances of Indonesian spokesmen it can be 
seen that they were far from convinced by the stress on non-political 
cooperation and the denials of any anti-communist bias as far as ASA 
was concerned.
To understand the Indonesian misgivings about ASA it is necessary 
to look beyond the perceived danger on their part of being involved in an 
anti-communist alliance of sorts. As Dr. Subandrio himself had said in
48.
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his statement in February, Indonesia’s policies differed in important
93respects from those of her neighbours , and the main exponent and 
inspiration behind these policies was Sukarno. The formative period 
of ASA coincided with the introduction of the socalled Guided Democracy 
in Indonesia, and the rise of Sukarno to a dominant position, especially 
as far as foreign policy was concerned. In terms of foreign policy 
Sukarno’s aspirations had a global rather than a regional focus, and 
his many travels abroad to conferences of non-aligned nations and else­
where, and his strong advocacy at this time of the causes of the non- 
aligned or Afro-Asian world were the overt manifestations of this policy. 
His ideological convictions, including strong anti-colonialist and anti­
imperialist sentiments, were expressed through concepts such as the New 
Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) and the 
clash between them. They led him also to view with suspicion such count­
ries as Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines, partly, but not exclusively,
94because of their links with colonial and former colonial powers.
The formative period of ASA also coincided with two other events 
in Indonesia, and by occupying the attention of Sukarno and other Indo­
nesian leaders they may have contributed in a lesser and more indirect 
fashion to the rejection of ASA. The first was the regionalist rebellions 
to which outside forces such as the United States and Britain would appear 
to have extended support. The Indonesian leaders, including Sukarno, also 
harboured strong suspicions of Malayan support to the rebellions which
49.
93. See above this chapter.
94. See Frederick P. Bunnell, ’’Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 
1960-65", Indonesia_, (Ithaca) 2 (October 1966) esp. pp. 44-57. 
See also J.D. Legge, Sukarno3 A Political Biography (Penguin 
Books, 1972), pp. 337-356, esp. pp. 343-356, and pp. 358-384, 
esp. pp. 363-364.
campaign. The recovery of West Irian from the Dutch had been high on
the priority list of Indonesian leaders for many years, and on none more
so than Sukarno's. Although the final stage of this process of recovery,
or 'confrontation', started only in December 1961, that is, after the
establishment of ASA, it had nonetheless been preoccupying Sukarno for a
long time. It was finally settled in August 1962 when the Dutch agreed
96to relinquish control.
Burma was the other non-aligned country to figure prominently
in the discussion of prospective members of ASA. Like Indonesia she too
was cool to the whole idea and like Indonesia she refused the invitation
to join. Again as in the case of Indonesia the close identification of
the sponsors with the West - especially the membership of Thailand and
the Philippines in SEATO - was the immediate and most obvious factor
97influencing Burma's decision. However, her attitude to the inter­
national affiliations of ASA's sponsors and, therefore, to ASA itself 
was a natural, even inevitable, extension of her own particular brand of 
non-alignment which was very much formulated with the dominating existence
95. On the rebellions, see Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End 
of the Indonesian Rebellion", in Robert 0. Tilman, op. cit.3
on the involvement of the United States and Britain, see 
Franklin B. Weinstein, "Indonesia", in Wayne Wilcox et. al.
(Eds.), Asia and the International System (Cambridge: Winthrop 
Publishers, 1972), p. 135. As to the Indonesian accusation of 
Malayan involvement, see Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict3 
pp. 87-88, and Legge, op. cit.3 p. 363. See also Far Eastern 
Economic Review3 14 July 1960, p. 55.
96. Bunnell, op. cit3 pp. 45-54. See also Legge, ibid3 pp. 359-60 
and Weinstein, ibid3 pp. 135-39.
97. The Nation3 17 February, 1961. Straits Times3 23 November 1961.
50.
95lasted from early 1958 to 1961. The second event was the West Irian
of China in mind. Cambodia was yet another non-aligned country often
appearing in the membership discussion. Although for different reasons
she displayed much the same attitude as Burma and refused as well to join.
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THE CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF ASA
The other issue to be greatly influenced by the identity and the 
general foreign policy outlook of the initiators was the nature of the 
cooperation to be undertaken and the administrative and organizational 
structure of the association.
The first plan to be put forward was the idea of a ’Southeast 
Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty' (SEAFET) which the Tunku brought 
with him to Manila in January 1959. For reasons discussed above the 
Tunku had at this time discarded his earlier idea of a security alliance 
as impractical. However, the main aim of (SEAFET) was, as in the case of 
the security alliance, to eliminate or at least to contain what he per­
ceived to be the communist threat to Southeast Asia. Only the means by 
which to achieve this aim had changed.
When this is said it should also be noted that there is no reason 
to believe that the Tunku was not also motivated by a genuine desire to 
promote the welfare of, firstly, his own people as well as the other 
peoples of the region. Regional economic cooperation was a means among 
many by which this aim could possibly be achieved. What is argued here, 
in other words, is that the Tunku considered the kind of cooperation envis-
98. On Burma and China, see Ralph Pettman, China in Burma's 
Foreign Policy (Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 1973). On Cambodia, see Michael Leifer, Cambodia3 
The Search for Security (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).
For a fuller treatment, see chapter 5 below for a discussion 
of Burma's and Cambodia's policies within the context of 
security and threat.
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was an internationalist. It is significant in this context that the
Tunku would appear to have been impressed and influenced by the various
regional organizations and associations established in Western Europe and
99elsewhere in the post-war period. His favourite example was the
Nordic Council to which he referred on several occasions as a model for
* . 100 Southeast Asia.
What, then, did the Tunku have in mind when he put forward his
proposal? In his treatment of it Bernard Gordon merely says that the
Tunku saw in SEAFET a 'non-political' group functioning largely in the
fields of economic and cultural cooperation. Granted that the pro-
102posal was characterised by a degree of vagueness it is, however,
possible to piece together a reasonably accurate picture of what it 
entailed. The first indication appeared in the communique issued after 
the talks between Garcia and the Tunku in Manila in January 1959. SEAFET 
was a main topic of discussion in these talks, and in view of the fact 
that Garcia would appear, at least in general terms, to have concurred 
with the idea of regional cooperation, it is not an unreasonable assumption 
that the communique to some degree reflected the ideas contained in the 
Tunku's proposal. The communique listed six points on which the two 
leaders had agreed including the urgent need for finding ways and means 
of elevating the standard of living and the material welfare of their 
peoples. To that end closer economic and cultural cooperation was needed
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as well as frequent meetings between the leaders of the region to discuss
103common problems. Apart from this the communique did not contain any
further suggestions as to what ’ways and means’ might refer to.
The next indication came with the involvement of Thailand. In
July 1959 the Thai circulated to other governments their ’Preliminary
104Working Paper on Cooperation in Southeast Asia'. The Thai were
familiar with the SEAFET proposal and it is not unreasonable to view 
their proposal as an indication that they were not entirely satisfied with 
the SEAFET scheme. To be sure, on the general question of what kind of 
cooperation should be undertaken there would appear to have been agreement, 
that is, apart from the expressed reservations concerned with cultural 
cooperation, the Thai agreed with the general aim of economic, non-political 
cooperation. Rather their dissatisfaction may have been directed at the 
vagueness of the Malayan plan because their own proposal would appear to 
have been considerably more detailed as to what kind of cooperation ought to 
be undertaken. But the Thai proposal also argued against any elaborate
organizational structure such as permanent headquarters. Instead they 
suggested that the administrative machinery should be kept at a minimum.
It is not to draw an undue inference to suggest that the Thai argued in this 
way because either the SEAFET scheme contained provisions for an ’elaborate 
administrative machinery’ or the Malayans had suggested something along 
these lines in their discussions with the Thai but had not had it incorpor­
ated in their proposal. The exemplary influence of European regional 
organizations coupled with the use of the term tveaty in the Malayan pro­
posal was certainly suggestive of an organization along lines similar to
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If the suggestion is correct that the Malayans initially were 
contemplating a fairly tightly knit organization based on a treaty which 
stipulated the establishment of a relatively complex administrative 
machinery, including perhaps permanent headquarters, they were not alone 
in intertaining such ideas. The Filipinos were thinking in similar terms. 
Their thoughts focused on a formal organization based on a multilateral 
treaty with bodies'such as a secretariat or central institution of sorts 
to take care of the day-to-day business and with provisions for decision­
making at the ministerial or heads of state level. The similarities 
between these ideas and the EEC's Council of Ministers and Commission are 
obvious.
But while the content of the proposed cooperation remained non­
political, economic, cultural, etc. and thus much the same throughout the 
years of discussion, the ideas of the Malayans and the Filipinos pertaining 
to the institutional and administrative structure changed considerably.
From the kind of organizational structure discussed above they eventually 
moved to a position practically identical to the Thai. From a 'tightly 
knit' organization bound together by a treaty signed by all the members 
they switched to the idea of a loosely structured association in which the 
members’ sole contractual obligations were expressed in such bilateral or
multilateral treaties concerning specific projects as they cared to under- 
108take. Two factors in particular conspired to make the Malayans and the
Filipinos change their minds on this important question. Firstly, there 
was the influence of Thailand whose participation was seen as essential and
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whose pragmatic and incremental approach played an important modifying 
role. The example of the 'Working Paper' has already been invoked to 
illustrate her attitude. Her cautious and piecemeal policy was also well 
reflected in the remarks by her Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. In July 
1960, when expressing his approval of the idea of regional cooperation, he 
urged that
this association be most carefully formed...
We want an association that will surely succeed.
It must not damage itself by haste... Remember, 
this is not to be hurried. It will take time.
We want to build our program through mutual 
cooperation and found it on a solid foundation...
The process may take one to three years to become
-  M  ^  A  1 0 9established.
The second factor to persuade the Malayans and the Filipinos was 
the question of the membership. Realizing that their own foreign policies 
and persuasions might not be all that palatable to the other countries in 
the region and that the latter would not like to be so closely associated 
with the pro-Western attitudes of the sponsors, they sweetened the pill by 
suggesting cooperation on a less formal basis without a treaty specifying 
duties and obligations which the neutrals and the non-aligned would find 
impossible to reconcile with their general foreign policies. It is
likely that the Thai early on realized this aspect and that it partially 
influenced their stand as well.
Thus, two measures - both employed to encourage more members - 
came to put their indelible mark on ASA as it emerged in July 1961. The 
nature of the field of cooperation was changed by substituting non-political, 
economic and cultural for military and security cooperation. The adminis­
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trative and institutional machinery and structure had been changed by sub­
stituting an informal association without supranational connotations for a 
more formal, treaty-based organization with supranational overtones remin­
iscent of regional organizations in Western Europe and elsewhere. Both 
measures failed to accomplish the broader, more representative membership 
at which they aimed primarily because of the close identification of the 
sponsors with one side in the Cold War.
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THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)
The gradual improvement in relations between Malaysia and the
Philippines and the abortive coup in Indonesia paved the way for the
commencement of a new phase in Southeast Asian regionalism, the former
by providing for the reactivation of ASA and the latter for ushering in
new leaders in Indonesia with a different foreign policy outlook in
general and a different attitude to regional cooperation in particular.
The last months of 1965 witnessed tentative hints related to the
possible revival of regional cooperation. In September Thanat Khoman and
the Philippines Foreign Minister Mauro Mendez held talks in Manila during
which ASA was discussed. According to Thanat the Filipinos had expressed
their desire to revive the association. In December similar hints
came from an unexpected source only this time they related to Maphilindo
rather than ASA. The Indonesian Defence Minister General Nasution said
Indonesia still yearned for a Maphilindo association with Malaya, the
112Philippines, Singapore and the North Borneo territories. Nasution's
choice of terms did not escape the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun
Razak who characterized them as an interference in the internal affairs of 
113Malaysia , and the Tunku, predictably enough, rejected the idea while
114at the same time calling for the revival of ASA. In the opinion of
the Tunku Maphilindo ought to be scrapped altogether because it had failed 
to achieve peaceful relations based on equality and mutual respect.
The intensified discussion which now ensued about a possible 
revival of ASA was facilitated by the continuing improvement in relations
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between Malaysia and the Philippines. When the Marcos administration was 
inaugurated in December 1965 the Tunku sent as his special representative 
the Malaysian Minister for Home Affairs Dato Dr Ismail bin Dato Haji Abdul 
Rahman. The new administration wasted no time in confirming its previously 
expressed intentions of moving toward a full normalization in relations 
with Malaysia as well as its support for the revival of ASA.
As it happened the revival of ASA preceded the establishment of 
full diplomatic relations. In March 1966 the association was officially 
again in business when the Standing Committee met in Bangkok. This was 
followed by a meeting of the Joint Working Party in April, another meeting 
of the Standing Committee in June, and finally a meeting of the Joint 
Working Party in July in preparation for the meeting of the foreign mini­
sters which was held in August.
On 3 June the Philippines recognised Malaysia. The process leading 
to this decision involved not only Malaysia and the Philippines but also 
Indonesia. In the three first months of 1966 the Indonesian government 
would appear to have exerted considerable pressure on the Philippines even
to the extent of threatening to break off diplomatic relations with Manila
118if the latter recognised Malaysia. These pressures must be attributed
to Sukarno. Although his influence in this period was slowly being eroded
Sukarno nevertheless retained a measure of control and influence over foreign
policy. However on 11 March 1966 Sukarno's influence came to an end when he
119was forced to step aside by General Suharto. The new Indonesian Foreign
Minister Adam Malik immediately started on a process of reorientation of
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Indonesian foreign policy. One of his early acts was to get in touch
with the Philippines government requesting that it delay its recognition
of Malaysia so that Indonesia and the Philippines could coordinate their
policies. Malik’s aim was not only the recognition of Malaysia but also
the end to confrontation, and in April he met his Filipino counterpart
Ramos in Bangkok where they agreed to the timing of the Philippines'
recognition of Malaysia and Indonesia's recognition of Singapore. The
120termination of confrontation was also discussed. And after a number
of difficulties had been overcome Malik and Razak agreed on the means to
121end confrontation at a meeting in Bangkok on 30 May. Thus by mid 1966
the stage was set for a new beginning in the relations between Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines as well as Singapore who also had been 
embroiled in the turbulent events of the previous three years.
Indonesia's new foreign policy outlook and apparent desire to get 
on good terms with her neighbours raised the question of what her place 
in the scheme of things should be, especially her role in regional cooper­
ation. References have already been made to General Nasution's tentative 
hint of a possible resurrection of Maphilindo and of the Tunku's flat 
rejection of this suggestion. However, the idea was more favourably 
received in Manila where foreign minister Mendez welcomed the Tunku's plea
t
for a revival of ASA while at the same time taking him to task for his
122negative attitude to Maphilindo.
Whether the Indonesians felt a real attachment to the Maphilindo 
concept or not is difficult to say. However, to the extent they were 
genuinely interested in participating in regional cooperation it might be
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rather than ASA of which they were not a member. As to the Filipinos it
should be borne in mind that it was the outgoing administration of Maca-
pagal, to which Mendez belonged, which had been the driving force behind
the Maphilindo idea in the first place.
In spite of the Malaysian opposition, to which the Thai lent their
123support , Maphilindo did not disappear from the discussion of regional 
cooperation in the months ahead either.
After the effective revival of ASA and the political demise of 
Sukarno in March the discussion that ensued revolved around the role of 
Indonesia and the ways and means of bringing her within the regional cooper­
ative framework. The Indonesians themselves gave encouragement to this 
debate by indicating their interest in regional cooperation. The issue
was in all probability raised in the meeting in late April between Ramos 
124and Malik and again in the meeting in Bangkok between Malik and Tun
125Razak during which the end to confrontation was agreed on. After a
three days visit to Indonesia in August Ramos returned to Manila predicting
126that Maphilindo and ASA would merge. It is likely that Ramos was
referring less to an organizational merger than to a future organization 
with the countries involved in ASA and Maphilindo as members. His character­
ization of the talks as exploratory and his comment that the Indonesians
127would prefer an expanded Maphilindo to an expanded ASA are indications 
that no formula for Indonesian participation had been found during the
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talks. However, only a few days later Thanat Khoman visited Djakarta. 
According to Bernard Gordon his talks with Indonesian leaders were suc­
cessful in that a format and a procedure would appear to have been found. 
The approach to be followed stipulated that Malik would make his views 
known to Thanat, who would then issue a Thai invitation to the ASA members. 
In this way it would appear that Indonesia had not ’asked’ for ASA member­
ship. Consequently in December 1966 a ’Draft Joint Declaration’ was sent
128from Bangkok to the various capitals.
However, the Thanat-Malik understanding - if one can term it so - 
did not erase all the problems. Throughout the period the Malaysians 
remained rather aloof to the developments as they unfolded and the problem 
became increasingly one of overcoming Malaysian, and especially the Tunku’s 
suspicions of Indonesian motives. Indeed, throughout 1967 the most promin­
ent feature of the process leading to the establishment of ASEAN in August
1967 was the reconciliation and adjustment of Indonesian and Malaysian 
attitudes and sensitivities in a manner conducive to the participation of 
both countries in one regional organization. The difficulties involved 
and the obstacles to be overcome were epitomized in the attitudes to 
Maphilindo and ASA.
To the Malaysians Maphilindo was far too closely associated with 
confrontation and the Sabah issue. In their eyes it had miserably failed 
as an instrument through which these conflicts could have been solved. As 
has been noted when the first hints of a possible revival of Maphilindo 
appeared in late 1965 the Tunku was adamant in his rejection of the idea.
In the ensuing time the Malaysians were not to waver in their attitude, a 
point brought out in unmistakable terms when Tun Razak in January, 1967
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declared Maphilindo 'dead and buried'.
To the Indonesians, on the other hand, Maphilindo would appear 
initially to have had certain attractions. However, the eventual abandon­
ment by the Indonesians of the idea of a resurrected Maphilindo would seem 
to suggest that these attractions were related to tactical considerations 
rather than any deeply felt attachment to the idea. There are several 
reasons why this may be so.
As already suggested the Indonesians may have considered Maphilindo 
a suitable stepping stone from which to approach the whole problem of Indo­
nesian participation in regional cooperation. Once the initial contacts had 
been made thus facilitating the discussion of other ideas Maphilindo could 
be discarded. The Indonesians must also have realized that Maphilindo was 
anathema to Malaysia. Domestic political conditions in Indonesia itself 
may also have been responsible for this initial advocacy of Maphilindo.
A striking feature of the domestic scene in Indonesia was the caution with 
which Suharto and the new leadership went about changing internal as well
as external policies as long as Sukarno could be expected to wield any pol- 
130itical influence. The changes that occurred did so gradually and with
increasing pace as Sukarno's influence was eroded and eventually destroyed. 
Hence, the hints of a possible resurrection of Maphilindo may have been 
nothing but a concession in the foreign policy field to the transition from 
the old to the new policies which Suharto and the other leaders were eager 
to implement.
After the visits of Ramos and Thanat to Djakarta in August no 
further talks took place during the remainder of 1966 about Indonesian
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Indonesians themselves began to take an increasingly active role and
apart from the occasional reference to it, usually by the Filipinos,
Maphilindo gradually disappeared from the discussions about regional
cooperation. The talks came now to centre around the possibility of
expanding ASA to include Indonesia.
To the Thai and the Filipinos an extension of ASA to include
132Indonesia was a proposition they on the whole could readily accept.
The Malaysians, however, would appear to have been much more ambivalent.
The statements and messages emanating from Kuala Lumpur during much of
the first half of 1967 were not only ambivalent but also contradictory,
and would seem to point to considerable differences of opinion within the
Malaysian political leadership as far as Indonesian membership in ASA was
concerned. The Tunku would appear to have been the most sceptical. In
his reply to Thanat Khoman's letter of late December 1966 he warned against
a too close relationship with Indonesia, especially as long as Sukarno was
still around. He also stressed the danger to ASA if a country was admitted
whose past behaviour suggested that she would leave any organization if it 
133suited her. But in late February 1967 Tun Razak disclosed that he had
extended an invitation to Indonesia to join ASA the previous August. At
134the same time he made clear that the matter rested with Indonesia. By
March, however, a further complication had been added to the already con­
fused picture. Indonesia, so it appeared, was not interested in joining 
ASA. In an interview with an Indian newspaper Malik declared that within
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three months Indonesia would sponsor a conference of several Southeast Asian
countries to discuss regional cooperation. It was evident that he did not
contemplate an expanded ASA, or Maphilindo for that matter, but rather a
135new larger organization which would include Burma as well as Cambodia.
The Malaysian response was again ambivalent and inconsistent. In 
mid April Tun Dr Ismail declared that Malaysia was not opposed to the Indo­
nesian proposal and that such a new organization need not be built around
136 137or on ASA , only to be contradicted the following day by the Tunku.
Indeed, the Tunku appeared very reluctant to give up ASA in favour of the 
Indonesian proposal. In mid March he stated that ASA was open to any
138country in Southeast Asia who would accept the goals of the association.
When during April the Indonesians started an intensive campaign in support
of their proposal, the Tunku*s answer was negative in the extreme. On 13
April he expressed his disapproval of the Malik proposal. 'We already have
our regional organization in ASA. I don't see the need to set up another
139regional economic grouping' he was quoted as saying. He then went on
to extend an invitation to Indonesia to join ASA emphasizing his belief
that ASA must be made a success before the establishment of another regional
. , 140organization .
In a comment a few days later Malik appeared anxious to play down 
the effect of the Tunku's remarks by suggesting that they had been uttered 
for internal consumption and that, in fact, Malaysia did support the Indo­
nesian proposal. Such assurances had been given by the Permanent Secretary
141of the Foreign Affairs Department in Malaysia, Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie.
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Toward the end of April there were signs that the Malaysian govern­
ment was arriving at an outwardly more consistent policy in relation to the 
Indonesian proposal. A foreign affairs spokesman in Kuala Lumpur said that
Malaysia was not adopting a rigid position and was open to any new suggest-
142ions concerned with regional cooperation. However, the most important
contribution to the clarification of the Malaysian stand came when the 
Tunku finally relented. On 22 April he said, '...if Dr. Malik has something 
new, we will always listen. As it is, I don't know anything about it, but 
we have never said it was a bad idea'.
The attempts at forming the new regional organization were spear­
headed by Thanat and Malik. The latter concentrated his efforts on per­
suading Burma and Cambodia to join whilst the former concentrated on per-
144suading the Tunku to accept the idea. Of the two Thanat was most
successful. On 23 May he brought Malik, on the way to Burma, and the Tunku,
on the way to Japan, together in a meeting at Bangkok airport at which the
Tunku stated his willingness to go along with whatever new grouping was pro- 
145posed. Malik, on the other hand, was less successful in his missions.
The Burmese as well as the Cambodians politely refused the invitation argu­
ing that membership in the proposed organization was incompatible with their
i . . 146 general policies.
After his visits to various countries in the region, rounded off by 
a three day stay in Manila from May 27 to 30, Malik was able to announce on
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his return to Djakarta that five countries would soon meet to discuss the
147regional cooperation. This meeting, which led to the formation of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), took place in Bangkok 
between August 5 and 8 , 1967. Attending it were the Indonesian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik, the Philippines Foreign Secretary Narcisco 
Ramos, the Singapore Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Rajaratnam, the Thai 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Thanat Khoman and the Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister Tun Abdul Razak.
To say that the process leading to the formation of ASEAN was 
greatly influenced by the involvement of Indonesia is not very illumin­
ating. In what followSjtherefore^closer attention will be paid to the 
attitudes she in particular brought to bear on this process. This is all 
the more important because these attitudes to a considerable degree 
determined the policies of especially Malaysia and the Philippines.
In March 1967 it had become quite clear that Indonesia would not 
join ASA. Indeed, there had been several previous indications coming from 
Indonesian spokesmen to that effect. For example^ at the signing of the
agreement in Kuala Lumpur in August 1966Jwhich officially ended confront-
148ationjMalik explicitly said that Indonesia would not join ASA.
The Indonesian rejection of ASA and the insistence on a completely
new organization are related to some commonly held attitudes to the exter­
nal world and Indonesia’s position within it. In the first place Indo­
nesian political leaders both during Sukarno and Suharto tend to view the 
international system as essentially exploitative and hostile in nature and 
it is consequently viewed with suspicion and scepticism. The consequence 
of such attitudes is a foreign policy with strong emphasis on the independence
6 6.
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aspect. But the external world is also the necessary source of needed
assistance to the economic development of Indonesia. Such assistance
however brings with it the danger of undue Indonesian reliance on the
external world. To ward off this danger it is therefore necessary that
Indonesia plays on the conflict between the big powers extracting roughly
equal assistance from both camps which are unable to cooperate to exploit
Indonesia. The dilemma is thus seen to lie in the need for a balance in
the foreign policy between the desire for independence on the one hand and
149economic development on the other.
The second set of attitudes which represents a continuity between 
Sukarno and Suharto is related to Indonesia's position in the world, esp­
ecially her position and role in regional affairs. As the largest and 
most populous state in Southeast Asia,Indonesian leaders consider,she has 
a natural right to play a leadership role in regional affairs. In
relation to these attitudes membership in ASA was not an acceptable prop­
osition. The strongly pro-Western image of ASA could not be reconciled 
with the ideas of an independent and neutral foreign policy even to a 
leadership which had undertaken a major reorientation of Indonesian foreign 
policy away from the communist camp and China in particular. Furthermore, 
membership in ASA, which after all was the creation of lesser regional 
powers, could not easily be adapted to the role of leadership Indonesia saw 
for herself. To enter ASA would mean participation in an organization which 
Indonesia had not herself built up and molded.
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There were other reasons as well. From an early stage Burma 
and Cambodia figured in the Indonesian plans for regional cooperation, 
and Malik spent considerable effort in an attempt to persuade these two 
countries to join. But they were unlikely to do so if this was to be 
accomplished through membership in A SA , an organization they had both 
refused to join some six or seven years previously when it was being 
formed. Neither country had changed the general tenor of their foreign
4
policies nor their political leaders in the meantime.
These Indonesian attitudes notwithstanding, the Tunku and Ramos
continued to talk in terms suggesting that they considered ASA the only
viable alternative. As late as the middle of March Ramos was still
151talking about the expansion of ASA and on 13 April the Tunku insisted
on the preservation of ASA rather than the formation of a new organization 
152
Why this insistence on ASA on the part of the Tunku and the
Filipinos? As far as the former is concerned it should be remembered
that ASA was his brainchild first and foremost, and the Tunku undoubtedly
felt a certain attachment to it. The thought also could easily have come
to his mind that the Indonesian insistence on a new regional organization
was just another means by which they sought to circumvent and dismantle
ASA, an organization towards which the Indonesians in the past, after all,
had been none too favourably disposed.
But there was another, more specific reason for the attitude of
the Tunku and the Filipinos. The proposal for a new regional organization
first distributed by Bangkok in December 1966, was known as the SEAARC
153(Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) scheme. This
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152. See above this chapter.
153. See Gordon in Tilman, op. oit.3 pp. 514-517.
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proposal contained references to security matters which neither the 
Malaysians nor the Filipinos could have found very palatable. It began 
with these words;
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and Malaysia, 
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines., and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand...
Believing that the countries of Southeast Asia share a 
primary responsibility for ensuring the stability and 
maintaining the security of the area,...
Being in agreement that foreign bases are temporary in
nature and should not be allowed to be used directly or
indirectly to subvert the national independence of
Asian countries, and that arrangements of collective
defense should not be used to serve the particular
154interest of any of the big powers.
About the same time as the SEAARC proposal was being studied in 
the various capitals the Indonesian Lt-Gen Mokoginta, on a visit to Malay­
sia, expressed his belief that a military alliance between Indonesia,
Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries ’might soon become a necessity’ 
155 In December Lt-Gen Panggabean, the Deputy Commander of the Army, had 
stated that such an alliance might be needed to face the threat from 
China who would have nuclear weapons in operating condition in 1968. By 
then Indonesian armed forces must be able to operate in any neighbouring 
country needing defense assistance and 'also be ready to operate with 
nuclear weapons'. Shortly afterwards Panggabean was reported to have
said that the Southeast Asian states should have the ability to take care 
of the defense and security of their territory on their own thus abrogating 
the need for outside powers to station military forces in the region.
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To a man as sensitive to anything Indonesian as the Tunku these
statements from prominent military circles, taken in conjunction with
the formulations of the SEAARC proposal, must have been profoundly
disturbing. It is not unlikely that he may have been interpreting
them as confirming his fears of Indonesian motives, and that he may have
viewed the SEAARC proposal as just another way of promoting Indonesian
ambitions and institutionalising her quest for dominance in Southeast
Asia. More directly, Malaysia still had extensive defense ties with
Britain and other extra-regional powers and the SEAARC proposal may have
151been interpreted by the Tunku as an indirect criticism of these links.
Similar considerations are also valid as far as the Philippines 
was concerned. The Marcos Administration may also have interpreted the 
passages of the SEAARC proposal quoted above as an implied criticism of 
the security policies it and preceding administrations had been pursuing. 
Although they shared the views of the Indonesians of the threat from 
China and communism, they nevertheless saw their interests best served 
by close military cooperation, especially with the United States, because 
they believed the countries of Southeast Asia not as yet capable of fend­
ing for themselves militarily. In an interview with The New York Times
159 in early March Marcos stressed the need for SEATO to counteract 
China whose military forces no one nation or group of nations in Asia 
could hope to equal. At the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers in 
Washington in April Ramos said that the Philippines was ’convinced more
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than ever before of the validity of the SEATO idea* and 'of the continuing
pertinence of the existence of SEATO as a defensive shield for our region'.
160
In the light of these considerations the continued Malaysian and 
Filipino stress on ASA was partly a demonstration of their opposition to 
what they considered objectionable aspects of the SEAARC proposal. However, 
by the end of May the Malaysians and the Filipinos had ceased to insist on 
an expansion of ASA to accommodate Indonesia. The persuasive influence of 
Thanat Khoman would appear to have played no small part in this process 
especially as far as the Tunku was concerned.
THE CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF ASEAN
As already mentioned,the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
162(ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok when the represent­
atives of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines 
signed the Joint Declaration, also called the ASEAN Declaration.
The most difficult obstacle to overcome in the negotiations lead­
ing to the founding of the Association would appear to have been the quest­
ions related to security matters. Although the Philippines and Malaysia 
had stopped insisting on Indonesian membership in ASA as her only real 
alternative, the Philippines in particular was not satisfied with the pro­
visions in the SEAARC proposal dealing with the security and defense links 
of the members. Ramos went to Bangkok with a draft proposal which omitted 
all references to foreign bases and security matters in general whilst the
160. SEATO Record, Vol. VI, No. 3 (June 1967), p. 7.
161. On the role of Thanat Khoman see Gordon in Tilman,<9p. cit. , p . 518. 
p. 518. For a substantially similar account of the formation
of ASEAN see Gordon, East Asian Regionalism and United States 
Security, McLean; Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation,
RAC-P-45, October 1968, pp. 50-58.
162. It was ASEAN rather than SEAARC apparently because Ramos objected 
that the latter could be construed to sound like 'shark'. See
Straits Times, 8 August 1967.
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Indonesian draft, presented by Malik, contained the following specific 
reference to these matters;
Being in agreement that foreign bases are temporary in 
nature and should not be allowed to be used directly or 
indirectly to subvert the national independence of their 
countries, and that the arrangements of collective 
defence should not be used to serve the particular 
interest of any of the big powers; ^ ^
This formulation was nearly identical to that contained in the 
SEAARC draft and contained as well passages which had also been part of the 
Manila Declaration of August 1963 which established Maphilindo. On that
164occasion the passages had been included on the insistence of Indonesia, 
whose initial influence on the SEAARC proposal is obvious when a comparison 
is made.
Once in Bangkok the Filipinos were not willing to accept the Indo­
nesian draft in full and considerable hard bargaining followed. In his 
statement after the signing of the Declaration Ramos alluded to the diffic­
ulties (he was the only one to do so) when he said; 'The Declaration we 
just signed was not easy to come by; it is the result of a long and tedious
negotiations which truly taxed the goodwill, the imagination, the patience
165and the understanding of the participating ministers'. As indicated
by the text of their proposal, the Filipino position was that; rather than 
accepting the formulations of the SEAARC proposal as well as the nearly 
identical Indonesian draft, they would prefer no mention to be made of 
security matters at all. In this they would appear to have been supported
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by Singapore and somewhat less strongly by Malaysia and Thailand who
166would appear to have occupied a position somewhere in between.
Malik, however, found this unacceptable and appealed to the others to
include the paragraphs on the ground that it was necessary for the pol-
16 7itical survival of the 'new order' in Indonesia. A compromise was
found to the effect that the part of the Indonesian draft proposal which 
referred to 'arrangements of collective defence which should not be used 
to serve the interest of any of the big powers' was deleted while the 
rest was included. Hence, the ASEAN Declaration began with the following 
preamble;
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Thailand:
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common 
problems among the countries of South-East Asia and convinced 
of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of 
regional solidarity and co-operation;
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation or common action 
to promote regional co-operation in South-East Asia in the 
spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute 
towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region;
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the 
cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and 
economic well-being are best attained by fostering good under­
standing, good neighbourliness and meaningful co-operation 
among the countries of the region already bound together by 
ties of history and culture;
CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a 
primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and 
social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and 
progressive national development, and that they are determined 
to ensure their stability and security from external inter­
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ference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their 
national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspir­
ations of their peoples;
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain 
only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned 
and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to 
subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the 
area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national 
development;
DO HEREBY DECLARE: 168
The discussion at the Bangkok meeting, especially the controversy 
between the Philippines and Indonesia about whether or not to include the 
references to security questions, should not be understood to mean that 
one or the other of the participants were not profoundly motivated by 
basic considerations of security and threat. The last two paragraphs of 
the preamble bear witness to this. It was rather a matter of arriving 
at a wording which allowed for somewhat different perceptions and above 
all different ideas as to how best to cope with defense and security 
problems.
The transformation from the ’old' to the 'new order' and the 
ascent of the military to power in Indonesia had led to some drastic 
changes in Indonesian foreign policy. These were particularly concerned 
with a new emphasis on economic development and the complete reversal of 
the pro-communist and pro-China policies of Sukarno, both of which made 
for a markedly more pro-Western policy compared to the Sukarno days.
But whilst the new leadership denounced the socalled Peking-Djakarta axis 
of Sukarno, which they saw as an aberration of the traditional Indonesian 
policy of non-alignment, they were not therefore prepared to go to the 
opposite extreme and throw themselves into the arms of the Western powers.
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interests and believing that outside powers, both ’East1 and ’West',
will remain intent on dominating Southeast Asia, the Indonesian leaders
are determined on a policy of self-reliance especially in security and
defense matters. They also believe that so should other Southeast Asian 
169states behave. In this view, then, the paragraphs in the ASEAN Dec­
laration are a reminder that the region has a security problem and that 
eventually (and in the not too distant future) the countries of the area 
must take care of it themselves if they are to retain their independence 
and avoid foreign domination. It goes without saying that Indonesian 
leaders envisage a dominant role for themselves in regional affairs.
The Filipinos see the problem differently. Ever since it gained 
its independence from the United States in 1946 the Philippines has had 
intimate defence contacts and agreements with the United States, and the 
latter has operated a number of military bases in the islands. Apart 
from their common membership in SEATO this defence cooperation has been 
based on three bilateral agreements; the Military Bases Agreement of 
1947, the Military Assistance Pact, also of 1947, and the Mutual Defense 
Treaty of 1951. If there is one recurrent theme in particular in
Filipino foreign policy it is anti-communism and a preoccupation with 
security. These twin factors have led her foreign policy to, at times, 
oscillate between a strong reliance on the alliance with the United States 
and a search for security alternatives within Asia in general and South­
east Asia in particular. In the end, however, her policy has always tended
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Being fundamentally suspicious of the external world and foreign
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op. oit. and Weinstein, "The Uses", op. oit . 3 and in Wilcox,
op. oit.
170. Ibid.
171. For details about these agreements, see Fifield, The
Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-58, pp.60-63 and pp.68-69.
to revert back to reliance on the United States in security matters.
The preference of Ramos at Bangkok for the deletion of the paragraphs 
in the Indonesian proposal referring to the security of the prospective 
memberstates was not, therefore, a sign that the Filipino government con­
sidered these matters unimportant or less urgent than the Indonesians, but 
rather that to Manila they were an indication of prejudice towards the 
particular security policies pursued by successive Filipino governments.
As far as Singapore was concerned similar motives were behind her 
objections. She too had extensive defence links with a Western power, in 
her case Britain. In fact Singapore provided space for the biggest base 
by far Britain had in the area. Although her leaders realised that she 
could not forever rely on Britain, prime minister Lee Kuan Yew as late 
as March 1966 spoke confidently of having ten to fifteen years before 
Singapore would have to fend for her own defence. Despite the fact that 
there were indications by August 1967 that this period might be somewhat 
shorter than anticipated, the Singapore leaders were still banking on 
British protection, and with good reason because as late as November 1967
the British defence minister Denis Healey assured Singapore and Malaysia that
173Britain would maintain her forces until the middle of the 1970's.
Hence, at Bangkok, Rajaratnam, Singapore's foreign minister, probably 
tended to see the security paragraphs of the Indonesian proposal as an 
implicit criticism of Singapore as well. Moreover, as an overwhelmingly 
ethnic Chinese state, Singapore was sensitive to the fact that she must 
survive in a 'Malay sea', that is, on all her sides she is surrounded
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by states predominantly or wholly Malay in terms of ethnicity. Being 
very much aware of the latent and frequently manifest anti-Chinese 
sentiments throughout the region her feelings of insecurity stem not 
only from communism but this fact as well. To the extent that the 
Indonesian proposal implied a reliance, albeit in the future, on her 
Malay neighbours for her security this was only adding to her feeling 
of uneasiness.
The position taken in Bangkok by Malaysia and Thailand, both of 
them countries with extensive defence links with Britain and the United 
States respectively, is somewhat more difficult to explain insofar as 
their opposition to the security paragraphs would appear to have been 
less strong than that of the Philippines and Singapore. One possible 
explanation is simply that they refrained from too vocal an opposition 
for tactical reasons. As long as there was somebody to fight the battle 
for them they were content to take a back seat. But there were other likely 
reasons not necessarily incompatible with the previous explanation. Not­
withstanding the Tunku's suspicions and reservations about relations 
with Indonesia a number of agreements and new cooperative measures had 
been established between the two countries following the official end to 
confrontation in August 1966. These included the setting up of a joint 
commission for defence and security, announced on 16 August 1966; the 
stationing of liaison teams on each other's territory in Borneo for the 
purpose of coordinating anticommunist activities, announced three weeks 
later; closer telecommunication links,announced in December; also in 
December the announcement of the planned loan of Indonesian teachers to 
Malay language schools in Malaysia, a measure given formal substantiation
in the Indonesian-Malaysian Education Agreement of 3 June 1967; an agree-
174ment normalising trade relations in May 1967 and so on. Thus by August
174. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign Policys p. 56-57.
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1967 a substantial number of ties had been formed between Indonesia and 
Malaysia. The responsibility for these developments on the Malaysian 
side rested not so much with the Tunku as with Tun Razak and Tun Ismail 
who, together with Ghazali Shafie, the influential permanent head of the 
Foreign Affairs Department in Kuala Lumpur, were not hampered by the same 
reservations about everything Indonesian as the Tunku. Indeed, these
men quickly developed considerable rapport with Malik as well as Suharto
175and other Indonesian leaders. Despite Malaysia's and Singapore's
substantially similar defence links with Britain, the security paragraphs 
in the Indonesian proposal did not appear in quite the same obnoxious 
light to these Malaysians as to the Singaporeans, especially since they 
were not on the whole burdened with inter-ethnic suspicions and ani­
mosities in their relations with Indonesia in anywhere near the same 
degree as Singapore. The role of Tun Razak in Bangkok strongly suggests 
that the Malaysian opposition to the SEAARC proposal during the first half 
of 1967 wholly or to a substantial degree originated with the Tunku who
only may have been persuaded to give his consent by Thanat Khoman with
176whom he had close relations.
As in the case of the Philippines the United States occupied a 
prominent role in the calculations the Thai leaders made when they viewed 
the world around them. Since 1950 the relationship between Thailand and 
the United States, in spite of high and low points, had tended to become 
closer and more mutually committed with each passing year. By 1967 their 
relationship amounted to a factual, if not formal, bilateral alliance
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oriented towards the war in Indo-China. ^ 7 However, since the middle of
last century Thailand has sought to establish a more or less clearly
defined position in world affairs. During the period of expansion of
European imperialism she developed an active and resourceful diplomacy
178which enabled her to survive as an independent state. The fact that
she was never colonised alone gave her a position of importance in the 
regional context. More relaxed and self-confident about her sovereign 
status she is less prone than other Southeast Asian countries to see 
threats to her independence where perhaps none exist. Her Foreign Mini­
ster Thanat Khoman had a long standing commitment to regional cooper­
ation and had been deeply involved in the creation of ASA. But unlike 
the Tunku he was prepared to forego ASA if this could bring Indonesia
closer to the rest of the region, and as noted he was intimately involved
179in the preparation and ’selling’ of the SEAARC idea. He did not
share the Tunku’s misgivings about the Indonesians, and Thailand had at 
any rate not been directly a victim of Sukarno’s policies during the 
preceding years. More concerned with the overriding objective of accommo­
dating Indonesia, Thailand’s objections to the security paragraphs were at 
best muted, and her role would appear to have been of a conciliatory 
nature more than anything else.
Thus the discussion in Bangkok was between Indonesia who believed 
that the Southeast Asian countries at the earliest opportunity should 
take steps to ensure their own security and defence without resort to 
alliances with any of the big powers, and the rest who, in varying
177. See David A. Wilson, "Thailand, Laos and Cambodia", in Wilcox 
et al. (eds.) op. oit. 3 pp. 185-186.
178. Ibid . 3 p. 186. 179. Gordon in Tilman, op. oit . 3 p. 518.
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degrees, believed their own security to be best safeguarded by defence 
arrangements with the Western powers at least for some time to come.
Hence, to the extent the discussion was primarily centered around the 
efficacy of existing alliances, bases, and defence commitments, it was 
concerned with the means with which the individual countries sought to 
achieve an acceptable degree of security. In this respect there were 
differences between Indonesia and the others but perhaps not so sharp or 
clear cut as the debate in Bangkok would seem to indicate.
If one, however, looks at the other facet of security, threat, 
in particular the perceptions of the direction from which the most 
immediate and serious threats were thought to come, then the differences 
between the ASEAN countries are somewhat less obvious and do, at any rate, 
not divide the countries along the same lines as did the question of means.
The discussion about security and the related paragraphs in the 
ASEAN Declaration are indications that the member states were motivated by 
more than a desire to cooperate to enhance their economic and social well 
being. Since the whole question of the role of threat and security as a 
motivating force will be dealt with in a later chapter suffice it here to 
say that there are other indications as well of a preoccupation with these 
matters.
Whether or not the leaders who met in Bangkok were fundamentally 
motivated by considerations of security and threat, the organization they 
set up was nonetheless not a defence organization. The aims and purposes 
of ASEAN were the economic growth, social progress and cultural develop­
ment of the region. They also included the promotion of regional peace 
and stability through respect for justice, the rule of law and the adherence 
to the principles of the United Nations Charter. To these ends cooperation 
should be undertaken such as in the economic, social, cultural, technical,
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scientific and administrative fields. The institutional machinery at the 
disposal of the members consisted of a) an annual meeting of Foreign Mini­
sters as the highest decision-making body. This ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
was to be rotated between the capitals. The calling of special Meetings 
of Foreign Ministers was also provided for; b) a Standing Committee under 
the chairmanship of the foreign minister of the host country or his rep­
resentative and the accredited ambassadors of the other member countries. 
This committee was charged with carrying on the work of the association in 
between meetings of the foreign ministers; c) Ad Hoc or Permanent Com­
mittees of specialists and officials on specific subjects; and d) a 
National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the 
organization on behalf of their country and to assist the other bodies.
The similarities between ASA and ASEAN are striking enough to
justify Gordon’s claim that ASA, rather than having been supplanted, had
181simply been enlarged and given a new name.
The question of the institutional and administrative structure 
would not appear to have given rise to the same amount of debate in the 
case of ASEAN as it did when ASA was being formed. On that occasion the 
countries involved had had little or no experience pertaining to the form­
ation of regional organizations, and it had taken a considerable effort to 
arrive at a structure to which all could agree. In 1967 the countries which 
established ASEAN - three of which had participated in the formation of ASA 
- could look to the latter as a model for the new organization. There is 
also evidence that some of the considerations which had motivated the 
members of ASA in 1961 and before were present also in 1967. Indonesia’s 
insistence on a new organization rather than an expansion of ASA was partly
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caused by the desire to attract Burma and Cambodia as members. The refer­
ence in the preamble of the ASEAN Declaration to the temporary nature of 
extra-regional military bases in the region would likewise appear to have
been inserted partly to make ASEAN a more palatable proposition to countries
182such as Burma and Cambodia. Several attempts were later made to attract
especially these countries but without success.
Vithout prejudging the issue, especially in the light of later
developments, it can safely be said that the formation of ASEAN in August
1967 was by far the most important attempt at regional cooperation ever
undertaken in Southeast Asia. The fact that it outweighed ASA must be
attributed to the participation of Indonesia. Apart from including a
country well-endowed with natural resources Indonesia's membership in
ASEAN meant that about 68 per cent of the total area and about 72 per
cent of the population of Southeast Asia were included within the ASEAN 
183framework. Thus, to the extent they would be able to act and speak
together the ASEAN countries possessed an authority in regional as well 
as world affairs well beyond that of ASA.
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PART TWO
CHAPTER 3
REGIONAL CONFLICT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
It is impossible to approach the study of Southeast Asia 
without immediately becoming aware of the prevalence of conflict both 
within and between states, both violent and non-violent. Some have their 
roots in historical events long passed, others in processes of coloniz­
ation and decolonization, and still others in modern ideological cleavages.
The difficulties involved in solving these conflicts are 
notorious, something to which the whole story of the Vietnam conflict 
bears tragic witness. It has been suggested on more than one occasion 
that regional organization is one way by which international conflicts can 
be kept within limits and perhaps resolved. To the extent interstate con­
flicts in Southeast Asia have been directly related to regional organ­
ization this has been done mostly in terms of the impediments to closer 
cooperation created by specific conflicts. In other words, the approach 
has been one according to which the assessment has been made of the impact 
of a particular conflict on the prevailing relations between two or more 
states. ^ In the following an attempt will be made to analyse the relation­
ship between regional organization and member state conflict from the 
opposite angle, that is, the point of view will be one whereby an assess-
1. This is the approach of Michael Leifer, Dilemmas of Statehood 
in Southeast Asia> (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 
1972). Ch. 8. It is also essentially the approach of Bernard 
K. Gordon, The Dimensionss op. cit., passim.
ment is made of the influence of organizations such as ASA and ASEAN qua 
organizations on conflicts between member states.
Southeast Asia is rich in conflicts and this chapter cannot 
deal with all of them. Given the approach just outlined neither would all 
conflicts be suitable subjects of analysis. From the point of view of 
regional organization intra-regional conflicts can be divided into mainly 
three categories. Firstly, there are conflicts between states outside 
the regional cooperative framework dealt with in this study. The entire 
complex of conflicts in Indo-China belongs essentially in this category.
Secondly, there are conflicts between states inside and states 
outside this framework. The more or less overt state of hostility between 
Thailand and Cambodia which lasted throughout the entire 1960fs belongs to 
this second category.
The third category of conflicts are those between states 
chiefly involved in the regional cooperation under study here, that is, 
conflicts between the member states of ASA and ASEAN. Only the conflicts 
within the third category readily lend themselves to analysis according 
to the approach of this chapter, and only one conflict will be chosen as 
subject of study. The specific conflict to be examined is the dispute over 
Sabah between Malaysia and the Philippines. The reasons for selecting this 
particular dispute are two. Firstly, the dispute is at present dormant but 
on two previous occasions it was a critical issue in the relations between 
Malaysia and the Philippines, and it did pose a threat to the existence of 
two different regional organizations. Secondly, the fact that the Sabah 
dispute twice flared up and that it affected two regional organizations 
means that an examination of it offers excellent opportunities for com­
parison.
THE FIRST SABAH CRISIS
British North Borneo) is a long and complicated story of which only a
2heavily abbreviated version will be recapitulated here. Reduced to its 
bare essentials the historical antecedents to the claim are as follows.
In 1877 Baron de Overbeck, operating as agent for the British firm of Dent 
Brothers, concluded an agreement with the Sultan of Brunei according to 
which the former was granted a portion of the territory of North Borneo 
by the Sultan. However, having learned that some of the territory referred 
to in this agreement had been ceded in 1704 to the Sultan of Sulu by the 
Sultan of Brunei, Overbeck concluded an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu
in January 1878 for the purpose of acquiring a clear title to the lands
3included in the 1877 agreement. In 1881 Dent and Overbeck received a
Royal Charter and in March 1882 the British North Borneo Company was
formed. The area became a British Crown Colony in 1946 when the North
Borneo Company sold its interests and gave up all its rights in North
4Borneo to the Crown. The essence of the dispute lies in the interpret­
ation of the January 1878 agreement which, according to the Philippines, 
merely provided for a lease of the territory and not, as argued by Britain 
initially and Malaysia subsequently, a transfer of sovereignty. ^
In the years after 1946 successive Philippine governments did 
nothing to pursue the claim. In late 1961, however, shortly after Diosdado
The origin of the Philippines' claim to Sabah (formerly
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Macapagal had been elected President of the Philippines there appeared in 
the Philippines Free Press a series of articles the main theme of which 
was that North Borneo belonged to the Philippines. About six months later, 
in June 1962, it was announced that the Philippine government, as the 
successor to the Sultan of Sulu, intended to claim North Borneo as a part 
of the Philippines.
The motives behind the Philippine claim would appear to be 
numerous. Firstly, there were the activities of the heirs to the Sultan 
of Sulu. As just mentioned, soon after the election of Macapagal to the 
Presidency, the Philippines Free Press carried a series of articles the 
crux of which was that North Borneo rightly belonged to the Philippines.
These articles would appear to have been instigated by the activities of 
Nicosia Osmena, an attorney to the heirs of the Sultan. The call for an
£
official claim was soon echoed in other newspapers. An initially hesi­
tant response on the part of the Government received encouragement by resol­
utions passed in the Congress of the Philippines urging the President to take 
the necessary steps to 'recover' North Borneo. Despite apparent disagree­
ments within the administration, Foreign Minister Pelaez being notably 
less enthusiastic about the claim, the Government in a note of 22 June 1962 
to the British Government made official what already had been evident but 
unofficial for some time, namely that the Philippines laid claim to British 
North Borneo. 7
A second factor was President Macapagal himself. Early in his 
public career he had taken an interest in the case, and after having been 
an official in his country's foreign service he entered the Congress where
6. Abell, op.cit.j p. 106; Gordon, op.cit. 3 pp. 17-18.
7. Abell, ibid. pp. 106-116. On the attitude of Pelaez, see also 
Gordon, ibid. p. 19.
he initiated a resolution in 1950 urging the then government to press the 
claim. Although this attempt to activate the claim was unsuccessful and 
he did not mention the matter publicly for another twelve years, Macapagal
g
had not forgotten it.
A third factor was the nature of the relationship between the
Philippines and the United States. Ever since the Philippines gained her
independence from the United States the relationship between the two
countries had been very close. In fact, the relationship was such that it
laid the Philippines open to accusations of being an American 'stooge' and
9still a virtual colony of the United States. Sensitive to such accusa­
tions the Filipinos have tried for this reason and others to do away with 
this image and to cultivate more intimate relations with other Asian and 
Southeast Asian countries. These relations such as they were have neverthe­
less on the whole been subordinate to her relations with the United States. 
However, notwithstanding the closeness of ties with the Americans numerous 
irritants and problems have occurred in the relationship from time to time. 
Not unexpectedly in such an unequal but close relationship the weakest 
party will now and then attempt to assert its independence vis-a-vis the 
stronger. During the first two years of the Macapagal Administration the 
relationship between the two countries was characterized by a degree of 
Filipino self-assertion and search for a separate 'identity' which expressed 
itself in disagreements with the United States over such issues as Laos 
where the Philippine Government supported the right wing elements and 
opposed Souvanna Phouma and the neutralists, latterly preferred by the 
Americans. ^  The Sabah question likewise became an issue in relation to
8. Gordon, ibid ., p. 18, note 15.
9. See Vellut, op.oit. 3 p. 69.
10. Abell, op. oit.y p. 128.
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which the Philippines could demonstrate her independence of the United 
States. In a communication to the Philippine Government in February 1962 
the Americans appealed to the Filipinos to maintain good relations with 
Britain, a 'mutual friend' and ally. At the same time the United States 
adopted the position that the Sultan of Sulu had indeed relinquished 
sovereignty over North Borneo and that the territory was now a British 
Protectorate. ^  As suggested by several observers this American dis­
approval of a Philippine claim to Sabah may have had an effect quite 
contrary to what was intended. ^
Linked to the idea of a separate Philippine identity was a 
fourth factor involving some more or less strong Pan-Malay sentiments 
among certain Filipinos. Submerged, but never far from the surface, these 
sentiments acquired a new significance as the Philippines sought to demon­
strate her independence from the United States by moving closer to Asia in 
general and Indonesia in particular. More importantly, the Pan-Malay 
sentiments could be exploited and made to work in the interest of the Sabah
claim. The scheme whereby this was to be done was the 'Greater Malay Con-
13federation' proposed by Macapagal in a press conference on 27 July 1962. 
Macapagal's proposal stemmed from a University of the Philippines study 
commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. The primary 
purpose of the proposal was 'to prevent the British from unilaterally trans­
ferring sovereignty over North Borneo to a federation which excludes the
Philippines' and 'to keep open the avenue to a negotiated settlement of the
14status of North Borneo'. In his press conference Macapagal depicted
11. Ibid ., p. 131.
12. Ibid. See also Gordon, o p . o i t pp. 19-24.
13. See Gordon, Ib id ., pp. 22ff for a detailed discussion of this scheme.
14. Ibid.j p. 23.
Malaysia as a colonial scheme concocted in B r i t a i n . A t  the time it was 
proposed that the participants in the confederation should be Malaya, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. However, after 
the revolt in Brunei in December 1962 when Indonesia came out strongly 
against Malaysia, Macapagal changed his proposal to include Indonesia as
n  16 well.
On 1 August 1962 representatives of Britain and Malaya reached 
agreement in London on the formation of Malaysia the official establishment 
of which would take place on 31 August 1963. On 7 August the British Gov­
ernment replied to the Philippines note of 22 June in which the claim had 
been officially made. In its reply the British Government flatly rejected 
the claim as well as the request for discussions on the matter. ^
In late 1962 this rather rigid British position softened some­
what. The immediate cause was the revolt in Brunei and on 29 December a 
joint communique between the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and 
the British Embassy in Manila announced that consultations would take place 
between the two governments. The talks began in London on 28 January 1963 
but did not reach any conclusive results. Follow on discussions in Manila 
in March proved equally fruitless and with that the door was for all prac­
tical purposes closed for further discussions between Britain and the
. 18 Philippines.
This did not mean that the Sabah question had disappeared. In 
March 1963 Manila had already embarked on another course of action the main 
feature of which was the attempt to pursue the claim within a Southeast
89.
15. Leifer, op.cit., p. 29.
16. Gordon, op.cit., p. 23.
17. Abell, op.cit., pp. 143-146.
18. Leifer, op.cit., pp. 40-45 and 47-48.
Asian context. In an aide-memoire of 2 August 1962 to the Malayan Govern­
ment the Philippine Government had directly involved the Malayans in the 
dispute. This aide-memoire was a response to the London agreement of the 
previous day, and in its reply, dispatched on 3 October, the Malayan Gov­
ernment made clear that it did not accept the idea of a claim and that
under any circumstances, the dispute over North Borneo was a matter between
19the Philippines and Britain. These communications, apart from involving 
the Malayan Government directly in the exchange about the claim, were sig­
nificant also in that both the Philippine and the Malayan notes contained 
references to ASA. The Philippine note thus ended:
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs requests the Malayan 
Ambassador to convey to his Government these views 
and considerations of the Philippine Government as 
well as the hope that the actions and decisions of 
his Government in regard to the disputed territory of 
North Borneo will in no way affect adversely the 
fraternal relations existing between the two countries 
as evidenced by the strong support they have given to 
ASA. 20
In this note Manila held up, indeed threatened, the possibility of the Sabah 
issue disrupting ASA if Kuala Lumpur did not behave in a more forthcoming 
manner.
The Malayan reply of 3 October was not dissimilar. After a 
reference to a public exchange of statements between the Tunku and the 
Philippine Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Lopez, in which the Sabah
19. Ib id ., pp. 31 and 34.
20. For the text of the aide-memoire, see Peter Boyce,Malaysia and 
Singapore in International Diplomacy. Documents and Commentaries. 
(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968), pp. 115-117.
issue and ASA were linked together by both , the concluding paragraph of
the Malayan note stated:
It may be pointed out that there has been no intention 
on the part of the Federation of Malaya to link the 
issue of the Philippine claim to North Borneo with ASA.
However in view of the fact that undue excitement has 
been aroused in the Philippines over this matter the Prime 
Minister of the Federation of Malaya does not consider it 
advisable for him personally to attend ASA Conference in 
which case the Federation of Malaya will be represented by
another Minister unless of course the excitement will have
22died down by then.
No less than the Philippine note, the Malayan served warning that ASA was a
possible casualty if the Philippines persisted with the claim. The meeting
referred to in the Malayan note was the ASA Ministerial Meeting scheduled
to take place in December in Manila. However, in the beginning of that
month an event took place which was to lend a new complexion, not to say
23complexity, to the situation. This was the revolt in Brunei.
Since 1888 Brunei had been a British Protectorate ruled by a 
Sultan who until 1959 was theoretically an absolute monarch. He was, how­
ever, by treaty bound to accept British advice on all matters other than 
religion and custom. In 1959 a new constitution was introduced which left 
Brunei self-governing but with Britain responsible for defence and foreign 
affairs. When Malaysia was first conceived the British were anxious that 
Brunei - rich in natural resources, especially oil - should join Malaysia. 
In December 1961 the ruler of Brunei, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin, announced 
a provisional decision to join Malaysia, although he would appear to have
21. See Abell, op.cit. 3 pp. 148-150 for this exchange.
22. For text of the Malayan note, see Boyce, op.cit. 3 pp. 117-118.
23. See Brackman, op.cit. 3 pp. 133-156 and Abell, op.cit . 3 p.166-176.
been less than completely enthusiastic about the idea. The main opposition,
however, came from the Party Ra'ayat and its leader A.M.Azahari. Founded
in 1956 by Azahari the Party Ra'ayat (Borneo People's Party) fought the
elections in August 1962 inter alia on a platform which opposed the entry
of Brunei into Malaysia and advocated the formation of Kalimantan Utara,
a federation which would consist of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. The
Party Ra'ayat won a landslide victory by capturing all the sixteen elected
24seats in the thirty-three-man Legislative Council.
The first meeting of the Legislative Council was scheduled for
5 December 1962 and the Party Ra'ayat announced that it would introduce 
motions which rejected Malaysia, requested the restoration to Brunei of 
sovereignty over Sarawak and North Borneo, and called for a British grant 
of independence to a Borneo federation. By this time the situation in 
Brunei had been growing increasingly tense and the meeting of the Council 
was postponed. As early as May the Borneo Bulletin reported that an Indo­
nesian led liberation army was hiding in the jungle near the border of
25Sarawak ready to advance into North Borneo. Azahari, who allegedly had
contacts with the communist parties in Indonesia, Singapore and Sarawak,
went to Manila in November where he sought support for Kalimantan Utara.
On 7 December he returned again to Manila where reportedly he told Philip-
26pine officials that a revolt was being planned. The same day the Party
Ra'ayat led a revolt against the Sultan, and from a Manila hotel Azahari
27proclaimed the new state of Kalimantan Utara. This proclamation was,
however, somewhat premature since only a few days later the rebellion was 
defeated by British troops sent from Singapore.
24. Ibid. 25. Brackman, op.cit. 3 pp. 140-141.
26. Abell, op.cit . 3 pp. 167-168. 27. Ibid.
As time passed by Azahari1s presence in Manila began to be an 
embarrassment to the Philippine Government. On 14 December he appealed for 
Philippine recognition of his Kalimantan Utara government but on 18 Dec­
ember Macapagal announced that his government was not ready to extend 
such recognition. This refusal was probably less due to any desire to
avoid antagonising Malaya than to the fact that Kalimantan Utara would
28include North Borneo. It is difficult on the whole to avoid the con­
clusion that the Philippine government in its fairly extensive, though 
unofficial, dealings with Azahari was out to embarrass Malaya rather than 
further the cause of Azahari and Kalimantan Utara. To argue the latter 
would be to overlook the glaring incompatibility between the Philippine 
claim and Azahari1s federation.
The Tunku requested a postponement of the ASA Ministerial
Meeting in Manila in January 1963, one of the likely reasons being irri-
29tation over the continued presence of Azahari in Manila. A contrib­
uting and perhaps more important factor may have been the possibility, 
indeed the certainty, that the Sabah claim would be raised at the meeting. 
Lopez had already expressed the intention to bring up the matter when he 
stated that the Philippines wanted to take advantage of the Malayan Prime 
Minister's presence in Manila by putting forward the Filipino point of
view, the basis of the claim, and asking him to take these considerations
30into account. In view of the Malayan aide-memoire of 3 October in
which the Malayans made clear that in their opinion no basis for a claim 
existed and that, under any circumstances, the dispute was one strictly 
between the Philippines and Britain , it would seem likely that the
28. Ib id ., p. 178. 29. Ibid.
30. Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 October, 1962, p. 138.
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Tunku wished to avoid a situation in which he may have been compelled by 
the circumstances to discuss the claim directly with the Philippines.
Although the revolt in Brunei had been a failure it had at 
least shown that genuine opposition to Malaysia existed. This served to 
harden the determination of the Philippines. It also had the result of 
provoking the active opposition to Malaysia on the part of Indonesia who 
until then had displayed a somewhat ambiguous, but not altogether hostile 
attitude towards Malaysia. The period which now follows is one during 
which there is increasing association between the Philippines and Indo­
nesia because of their common opposition to Malaysia.
In a speech in Jogjakarta on 20 January 1963, the Indonesian
Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio announced that Indonesia would 'pursue a
3lpolicy of confrontation against Malaya’. As reasons for this policy he
gave the hostile attitude of Malaya and her role as a tool of colonialism
32and imperialism. On 1 February the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff,
Major-General Jani, said the army was awaiting orders to move in support
33of the people 'struggling for independence in North Borneo'. The Indo­
nesian attitude was further underscored by the moral, political and eventual
34military support for Azahari and his state of Kalimantan Utara.
The Philippine attitude was at this time spelt out on two 
occasions in particular. These were the talks in London between the Philip­
pines and Britain which started on 28 January, and President Macapagal's 
State of the Nation address delivered before the Philippines Congress, 
also on 28 January. As it happened the talks in London derived their sig-
31. For the text of the speech see Boyce, op.cit., pp. 69-70.
32. Loc. ait. The speech was made public on 25 January and was 
reported in Straits Times on 26 January, 1963. See also
Far Eastern Economic Review3 31 January, 1963, p. 184.
33. Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 February, 1963, p. 236.
34. Frederick P. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy : 1960-1965",
Indonesia II (October 1966), p. 59.
they revealed about Philippine policy.
35In his opening statement Vice President Pelaez, the leader 
of the Philippine delegation, made it clear that the Philippine Government 
considered the settlement of the dispute basic to the stability and secur­
ity of Southeast Asia. After having spelled out the communist threat he 
argued that Malaysia was not the answer to the stability of the area and 
that North Borneo would be better protected from the communist menace if a 
part of the Philippines than of Malaysia. He then went on to propose a 
short-range and a long-range solution. The former would consist of an 
arrangement 'concerning the island of Borneo which Indonesia and the Philip 
pines, the two countries most directly concerned, would not actively oppose 
The long range solution would call for a more permanent accommodation among 
the three Malay countries, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, so that
together they may be able to achieve a better life in larger freedom for
36their peoples through a new found spirit of unity and cooperation'. For 
the first time the idea of a Malay Confederation had been extended to 
include Indonesia.
President Macapagal's address to the Congress the same day
37repeated much the same arguments contained in the statement of Pelaez.
Again the argument was that North Borneo was vital to the security of the 
Philippines, and consequently, the territory must not be placed under the 
sovereignty of a state on the Asian mainland such as Malaya, since should 
Malaya succumb to the communist threat, the Philippines would have a
nificance not so much from their results, which were negative, as from what
35. For the text of Pelaez' opening statement, see Philippine Claim 
to North Borneo3 Vol. 1 (Manila, 1969), pp. 8-20.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.j pp. 5-7 for the relevant parts of President Macapagal's 
address.
communist territory at her southern frontier.
If they had not been certain before, the London talks must have 
convinced the Filipinos that little or nothing was to be gained by dealing 
with Britain. This conviction coupled with the newly declared, strong 
Indonesian opposition to Malaysia combined to provide the necessary incent­
ive for a shift in Philippine tactics. In the months ahead increasing 
emphasis was put on the attempt to convene a tripartite conference between
Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines. The idea of such a conference had
39been raised even before the London talks and after initial discussions
40between Lopez and the Indonesian Ambassador to Manila in late February,
a subministerial meeting between Indonesia's First Deputy Foreign Minister
Suwito Kusmowidagdo, Malay's Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
Ghazali Shafie and the Philippine Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
41Lopez, started in Manila on 9 April. Only a few days before, from 2 to
9 April, the postponed ASA ministerial meeting had taken place, also in
Manila. The attendance of the Tunku and his meetings with Macapagal, served
42to pave the way for the subsequent sequence of meetings. Although the
basic position of the three countries did not change, the subministerial 
meeting agreed on a very general agenda for a ministerial meeting in May.
In fact, the communique after the meeting made no mention of the dispute
43between the countries.
In the subsequent weeks none of the parties changed their basic
44attitude. If anything Indonesia stepped up her campaign verbally, as
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41. Far Eastern Economic Review,25 April, 1963, pp. 215-216.
See also Abell, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
42. Far Eastern Economic Review, loc. cit.
43. Leifer, op. cit., p. 49.
44. Far Eastern Economic Review, op.cit.,
well as militarily, by making their first armed raids into North Borneo 
and Sarawak. As the tension grew between Malaya and Indonesia it fell to 
the Filipinos to step into the role as mediator in order to get the planned 
conference off the ground. In late May, when Sukarno made a brief stopover 
in Manila on his way to Tokyo for a vacation, Macapagal urged him to meet 
the Tunku who also was heading for the Japanese capital. Sukarno refused 
but when in Tokyo, he changed his mind. The result was more successful 
than the more skeptical observers had anticipated. The two leaders agreed 
that a ministerial meeting should be held in Manila on 7 June. They further
more decided to take steps to dampen and stop the acrimonious propaganda
45war between their respective governments.
The ministerial conference took place in Manila as planned and 
was attended by Pelaez for the Philippines, Tun Razak for Malaya and Sub- 
andrio for Indonesia. Pelaez stressed the determination of the Philippines 
to pursue the claim by peaceful means and again he put forward Macapagal's 
idea of a Malay Confederation as the means best suited to solve the dispute. 
As in the London talks he rested much of the Philippine case on the security 
and defence needs of the area. The final communique revealed that the con­
ference had accepted Macapagal’s confederation idea and to that end it 
recommended to the forthcoming summit meeting, which was to take place in 
Manila no later than the end of July, 'the establishment of machinery for 
regular consultations among their governments at all levels on problems of
common concern, such as security, stability and economic, social and
47cultural development . The Sabah claim received only a brief mention
45. Leifer, op. oit., p. 49, Abell, op. cit., pp. 201-202. See also
Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June, 1963, p. 576.
46. Leifer, Ib id ., p. 49.
47. Malay/Philippine Relations, (Kuala Lumpur, 1963), Appendix VII, p.26.
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agreement on how this problem should be resolved justly and expediatiously'.
The precariousness of this deceptively consensual agreement was
soon demonstrated when disagreement arose as to what had really been decided
by the ministers, especially as to what mechanism to be adopted in order
49to ascertain the views of the peoples of the Borneo territories.
The event that most seriously threatened to wreck the planned
summit was the Malaysia Agreement, concluded in London on 8 July, 1963
between Britain, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo. The
agreement stipulated that Malaysia would come into existence on 31 August.
Sukarno immediately condemned the agreement and characterized the Tunku as
’a man who does not keep his word’. The Indonesian position was that
the Malaysia Agreement should have come after the will of the peoples of
the Borneo territories had been ascertained. Again Sukarno reiterated the
Indonesian opposition to Malaysia and expressed doubts about the usefulness
52and success of the forthcoming summit meetings. The Tunku’s answer to
the Indonesian allegations was that ’I have done nothing to the best of my
knowledge, to break any word or promise I have given to President Sukarno
53in connection with Malaysia’. The exchange between Kuala Lumpur and
Djakarta became so heated that in order to rescue the summit meeting
President Macapagal felt compelled to send cables to the Tunku and Sukarno
54requesting both to use 'moderation' in their statements.
which stated that the ministers had arrived at ’a common understanding and
48
48. Ibid. 49. See Abell, op. cit., pp. 207-209.
50. For the text of the Malaysia agreement, see Daniel Wolfstone, "The
Malays Move In", Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 October 1963, p.192.
51. Ibid ., p. 190. 52. Ibid., 18 July 1963, p. 148.
53. Ibid ., 24 October, 1963, p. 192.
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The tension between the parties notwithstanding, on 30 July the 
summit conference commenced in Manila with Macapagal, the Tunku and Sukarno 
as the main participants. At the end of the summit three documents were 
released which summarized the results of the conference. These documents
55were the Manila Accord, the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement.
From paragraphs 4 to 7 of the Joint Statement, which dealt with the estab­
lishment of Malaysia, it was clear that the Tunku no longer insisted on 31 
August as the formation date of Malaysia. Sukarno’s contribution to the 
compromise consisted in the relinquishing of his demand for a referendum in 
the Borneo territories. Instead it was agreed that the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations or his representative should ascertain the wishes of 
the people of the Borneo territories prior to the establishment of Malaysia. 
The Malayans undertook to consult the British Government and to request from 
it the cooperation necessary for the UN mission to carry out its task, which 
was to be observed by representatives of the three governments. The Philip­
pine claim to Sabah was dealt with in paragraph 8 of the Joint Statement 
and paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Manila Accord. In calling for a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute these paragraphs did not go beyond what previously 
had been agreed to by the foreign ministers in June.
However, the summit gained added significance by another dec­
ision. Inspired by Macapagal’s idea of a Greater Malay Confederation the 
three leaders decided to establish an association to be known as "Maphilindo". 
Referred to in both the Manila Accord, and the Joint Statement and the Manila 
Declaration, Maphilindo was envisaged as a grouping of three nations which
55. For text of these documents, see Malaya/Philippine Relations, op.cit., 
appendices VII, IX and X, pp. 28-34. The documents are also 
reproduced in Wolfstone, 'The Malays', op. c it ., p. 189 and pp. 
192-193. See also Boyce, op. cit., pp. 70-74 for the text of the 
Manila Accord and the Manila Declaration.
would work 1 together in closest harmony but without surrendering any
5 6portion of their sovereignty*. To that end it was decided that each
country should initially establish a National Secretariat for Maphilindo 
affairs which would consult with each other until such time a more per­
manent machinery could be established. ^  Not much was said about the 
tasks to be performed by the association. Paragraph 9 of the Joint
Statement refers to frequent and regular consultations at all levels to
58be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo as did paragraph 6 and the last 
paragraph of the Manila Accord and the Manila Declaration respectively.
The Declaration states the determination of the three countries to 
strengthen cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields whilst 
all three documents state the primary responsibility of the three countries 
for the maintenance of stability, peace and security in the area.
Maphilindo was based on the assumed existence of a sense of
community among peoples of Malay origin which were thought to be bound
59together by ties of race and culture. However, the fragile nature of
these shared sentiments soon became evident, as did the apparent agreement 
on the establishment of Malaysia. The first difficulties arose between 
Britain on the one hand and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other.
The British Government had not liked the idea of a referendum and a delay 
in the formation of Malaysia, Duncan Sandys the Commonwealth Secretary, 
telling the House of Commons that both were a 'mistake1. British officials
56. The Manila Accord3 paragraph 6.
57. The Joint Statements paragraph 4.
58. See chapter 6 below on the concept of mushawarah 
as a method of diplomacy.
59. The Manila Accord3 paragraph 4 and 5.
were also dismayed that the Tunku had not extracted a firm date for Malaysia
and had agreed to the inclusion of Indonesian and Philippine observers on 
60the UN team. On the question of observers the British were not pre­
pared to allow more than two from each country whilst Indonesia and the 
Philippines requested many more. Difficulties also arose over the Indo­
nesian demand for landing rights and the status of the 'clerical assistants' 
of the Indonesian and Philippine observers. When all those difficulties 
had been resolved and the observers joined the UN team on 1 September the 
latter had already been at work for several days. But on 29 August the 
Malayan Government announced that Malaysia would be established on 16 Sept­
ember irrespective of the result of the UN mission's findings. The Malayans 
argued that this was fully consistent with the spirit and letter of the 
Manila Accord according to which the ascertainment would be done prior to 
the establishment of Malaysia. Since the UN Secretary-General had indicated 
to the parties concerned that the conclusion of this process would be made
known by 14 September the Malay Government considered it had acted in accor-
61dance with the Manila Accord. Apart from pressure exerted by the British
Government in the person of Duncan Sandys, who had come to Kuala Lumpur
62ostensibly to 'direct' the formation of Malaysia, much pressure would 
seem to have been put on the Malayans to set a date for Malaysia's inception 
by the political leaders of the Borneo territories and Singapore. Lee Kuan 
Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, showed his displeasure with what he con­
sidered the weakness of the Tunku, by declaring Singapore independent on 31
63August, the date of the original Malaysia day.
60. Wolfstone in Far Eastern Economic Review, op.cit . 3 p. 191.
61. Malay/Philippine Relations, op.cit. 3 p. 14.
62. Far Eastern Economic Review3 24 October 1963, op.cit . 3 p.194.
63. Ibid., 12 September 1963, p. 672 and 19 September 1963, pp.721-722.
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The Indonesian and Philippine reactions to this move on the 
part of the Malayan Government were not unexpected. On 3 September the
Indonesian Government deemed the Malayan decision 'reckless and premature'
and from Manila, Lopez, now Secretary of Foreign Affairs, expressed sim- 
65ilar sentiments. Three days later Subandrio declared that the UN
mission's findings would only be on the basis of a superficial survey in
the Borneo territories and his government dispatched a protest note to
66Kuala Lumpur only to have it rejected by the Malayan Government.
On his way to the United Nations, Lopez was also reported during a stopover
in Manila to have criticised the manner in which the UN team had carried
i 67 out its task.
The Secretary-General's report on the ascertainment was pub­
lished on 13 September used stated inter alia that
'it is my conclusion that the majority of the peoples of 
the two territories ... wish to engage with the peoples of
the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged
68Federation of Malaysia...'
The earlier hints by Subandrio and Lopez now assumed the status
of official policy when both the Indonesian and the Philippine Government
69refused to accept the findings of the Secretary-General's report. On
15 September the Malayan ambassador in Manila was called to the Foreign 
Office in Manila where he was informed that the Philippine Government had 
decided to defer action on the question of recognition of Malaysia. The 
Philippine ambassador in Kuala Lumpur would be recalled for immediate con­
64. Abell, op.cit.j p. 230.
65. Malaya/Philippine Relations, op.ait. 3 p. 14.
66. Far Eastern Economic Review3 12 September 1963, op.cit. 3 p. 672.
67. Malaya/Philippine Relations, op.cit. 3 p. 14.
68. See Boyce, op. cit. 3 pp. 77-78 for the text of the Secretary- 
General's report. The quote is from p. 76.
69. Ibid ., pp. 57 and 78-82.
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sultations until such time that the President made a decision about 
recognition. In the meantime the Philippine Government proposed that 
relations between the two countries be maintained at the consular level. 
This, however, was unacceptable to the Malaysian (previously Malayan) 
Government which proceeded to sever completely all diplomatic ties with 
Manila. When a similar attitude was adopted by Indonesia the Malaysian 
Government broke off diplomatic relations with her too. From now on the 
Thai Government looked after Malaysian interests in Indonesia and the 
Philippines.
The situation which in the eyes of the Philippine Government 
had to be avoided if the claim to Sabah was to be realized, had now been 
brought about. The last and only remaining measure at the disposal 
of the Filipinos was the threat of withholding recognition. On the very 
eve of the establishment of Malaysia this last card was played without 
success. Malaysia was now an established fact and Malayan and Filipino 
common membership in ASA and Maphilindo had done little or nothing to 
prevent the break or indeed solve the dispute over Sabah.
Relations between Malaysia and the Philippines, broken off on
17 September 1963, were not restored at the ambassadorial level for nearly 
three years. The Philippines demanded that Malaysia agree to a definite 
procedure for the settlement of the Sabah claim. This included a demand 
for a promise on the part of Malaysia to submit the case to the Inter­
national Court at the Hague, and the Philippines made this a condition 
for resumption of diplomatic relations. The Malaysians, on their part, 
demanded recognition of Malaysia in return for which they would see that 
the Philippine claim would be brought to a just and expeditious solution
70. Malaya/Philippine Relations¿pp. 14-15.
71. Leifer, op. cit . 3 p. 55.
104.
by peaceful means which was a euphemism for discussions and nothing
, 72 more .
By the end of 1963 the matter had reached a deadlock and in
the ensuing time numerous efforts were made by various mediators to bring
an end to the dispute. These efforts partly ran parallel with and partly
were mixed up with attempts to bring an end to confrontation between Indo-
73nesia and Malaysia which now rapidly escalated. The persons most
actively involved as mediators were Thailand's Thanat Khoman, Cambodia's
Prince Sihanouk, the United States' Robert Kennedy, the United Nations'
U Thant, Japan's Sato and finally even the Philippines' Macapagal.
Sihanouk arranged a meeting in Phnom Penh in February 1964
between the Tunku and Macapagal but not much progress was made on the
Sabah issue. However, the meeting eased the atmosphere somewhat and led
to an agreement between the two leaders to establish consular relations, a
74decision which came into effect the following August.
The most active of the mediators and in the end the most suc­
cessful was, however, Thanat Khoman of Thailand. Under his auspices several 
meetings were held between the parties to the Sabah dispute and confront­
ation. When full diplomatic relations were agreed to between Malaysia and
the Philippines in June 1966 this was in no small measure due to his efforts
75and consummate patience. Nonetheless, the main factors were the obvious
76failure of Macapagal's policies and the change in the leadership in the
72. Leifer, op.oit , 3  pp. 55-56.
73. For accounts of the various attempts to settle the conflicts between 
the three countries, see Leifer, op.oit . 3  passim; same author, 
"Indonesia and Malaysia: The Diplomacy of Confrontation", The World 
Today3 June 1965 and "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Changing Face of 
Confrontation", The World Today3 September 1966; Marvin P. Ott, 
"Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases", Inter­
national Organization3 Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 1972), Roger Hilsman,
To Move a Nation3 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967) Chapter 26.
74. Ott, Ibid., p.607 and Leifer, The Philippine Claim, op.oit.3 p. 58.
75. See Ott, ibid .3 pp. 609-610.
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Philippines brought about by the elections in 1965 ushering in Ferdinand 
Marcos as the new President. In his first State of the Nation address in 
January 1966, Marcos declared that ’we intend to set arrangements in 
motion for the normalization of our relations with Malaysia without, 
however, prejudicing our claim to North Borneo and impairing our friendship 
with other countries’. 77 When relations at the ambassadorial level were 
established some six months later it appeared that the new administration 
had relegated the claim to a more unobtrusive place on the list of prior­
ities, an act many hoped was only a prelude to its removal altogether from 
the list of Philippine foreign policy goals. This, however, was not to be 
the case.
THE SECOND SABAH CRISIS
During 1966 and 1967 Malaysian and Philippine interaction was 
dominated by the re-establishment of relations, the reactivation of ASA, 
and later, with the negotiations and preparations leading to the formation 
of ASEAN. These were developments with which Thailand and Indonesia also 
were closely associated and they have been dealt with in chapter 2.
The Sabah issue, which for some time had been absent from the 
scene, did, however, reappear. So little had been heard of the matter that 
until the elections in Sabah in April 1967 many thought the issue had died 
a quiet death. As a gesture to the Philippines the Malaysian Government' 
invited the Filipinos to send observers to the Sabah elections which had 
been promoted inter alia as a test of territory's desire to remain within 
Malaysia. Marcos was apparently at first tempted to accept but he did none­
theless in the end refuse the invitation. Instead the Philippine Government 
indicated that it would be willing to invite a Malaysian delegation to
77. Quoted in Leifer, op. oit. y p. 65.
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Manila to discuss possible inodes of settlement. Barely had this offer been 
made when the Philippine Consul-General in a letter to the Straits Times on 
1 April charged that free elections were not possible in Sabah. The Malay­
sian foreign ministry reacted immediately and asked for ’urgent clarifi­
cations’ while hinting that further public debate would adversely affect
78relations between the two countries.
The Sabah elections resulted in an overwhelming re-affirmation
of the state's wish to remain within Malaysia. This did not, however,
cause the Philippines to have second thoughts about the claim. As late as
June 1967 there would appear still to exist a measure of reluctance on the
part of elements within the Marcos Administration to give up the idea of
a revival of Maphilindo lest this would in some way weaken the Philippine 
79claim. In an early version of a charter for SEAARC the Philippines would
appear to have included a reservation related to the Sabah claim. However,
when Ramos went to Bangkok to attend the conference at which ASEAN was
established, the Philippine Government's position was then that the claim
was safeguarded by the Manila Accord of 1963 as well as the exchange of
notes normalizing relations between Malaysia and the Philippines the 
80previous year. Again, when Ramos later in August went to the ministerial
meeting of ASA, not yet dissolved in favour of ASEAN, it was reported that
he had been instructed by Marcos to impress on the Malaysian Government
the continued existence of the claim. 'We are pursuing the claim firmly
81and without let up' he was reported to have told Ramos.
78. See Far Eastern Economic Review3 11 April, 1968, p. 144. See 
also Gordon, East Asian Regionalism, op. c it .s p. 62.
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Despite these indications it would appear that the Philippine
Government throughout 1967 was intent only on avoiding actions that could
in any way jeopardize her claim rather than actively pursue the matter with
the Malaysian Government. This interpretation gained added credence as
a result of Tun Razak’s official visit to Manila in December during which
it was agreed that a date and place to settle the Sabah claim should be
82kept open. As a result of this attitude on the part of the Philippines
the Sabah issue did not play a significant role in the events and dis­
cussions leading to the formation of ASEAN.
In the following year, however, this rather tranquil situation 
was to change abruptly. The year began inconspicuously enough with a
state visit to Kuala Lumpur by Marcos in January 1968. According to
83Marcos himself, the Sabah claim was not discussed apart from re-affirming
previous understandings to the effect that talks should be held as soon as
84feasible on a date to be mutually agreed upon by the two governments.
It appeared that neither government was in a hurry to set a date for such 
talks.
Then, in March, the Corregidor affair all of a sudden broke 
into the open. Based on the testimony of Muslim recruit, Tibin Arula, who 
claimed to have participated, Manila newspapers carried reports that a
secret army’ had been in training on the island of Corregidor with the 
purpose of invading Sabah. Although government involvement was denied 
congressional investigations were set in motion to establish the facts of 
the case. Leaders within the opposition party accused Marcos of having
82. Asian Almanac3 2 March 1968, p. 2575.
83. See interview with Marcos in Far Eastern Economic Review3 23 May,
1968, pp. 382-383.
84. Asian Almanac3 2 March 1968, 1967, p. 2578.
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Only two days after the affair became public knowledge Malaysia 
dispatched a protest note to Manila on 23 March declaring that she regarded 
such activities as a most serious breach of good faith and friendly rel­
ations. The Philippine Government was asked for a full explanation in the 
interest of continued peaceful relations between the two countries. At
the same time Malaysia’s representative at the United Nations was instructed
86to bring the matter to the attention of the Secretary-General of the UN.
On 24 March the Philippine Government rejected the Malaysian note on the
87grounds that the Corregidor affair was an internal matter. Marcos also 
let it be known that he had instructed the Philippine representative at the 
UN to seek the good offices of the UN Secretary-General to persuade the
Malaysian Government to agree to a settlement of the dispute, preferably
88through the International Court of Justice. The relations between the
two countries rapidly deteriorated especially after the appearance of what
turned out to be inaccurate reports about a Malaysian seizure of a Filipino
motor boat and intrusions of Malaysian naval boats and aircraft into Phili- 
89ppine territory.
Thus, barely six months after the establishment of ASEAN the
Sabah dispute again raised its unwieldy head to threaten the existence of
yet another attempt at regional organization. To the Malaysians this was
certainly one important implication of the revival of the claim as can be
gauged from the Tunku’s comment 25 April that the situation between the
90two countries was tense and that the Sabah dispute could ruin ASEAN.
been behind it.
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'Tense' relations notwithstanding, on 18 April the Philippine 
Government accepted a Malaysian suggestion that talks be held in Bangkok in 
June. On the eve of tense talks, which started on 17 June, the leaders of 
the two delegations reiterated the position of their countries. The Fili­
pinos again argued that the dispute should be brought before the Inter­
national Court of Justice whilst the Malaysians came to Bangkok with the
intent of seeking clarification of the Philippine case and already rejecting
91the court in the Hague as a mode of settlement. The conference lasted
for nearly a month with numerous adjournments and interruptions due mainly
to the need of the Philippine delegation to obtain fresh instructions from
Manila. The results were in the end non-existent with the two delegations
not departing from their initial negotiating stand throughout the entire 
92month. In the end the Malaysian delegation rejected the Philippine claim
93outright and walked out of the conference. A few days after the collapse
of the conference on 16 July, the Philippines informed Malaysia that she 
would recall all but one of her embassy staff in Kuala Lumpur. The Malay-
94sians responded by recalling their ambassador in Manila for 'consultations'.
The Philippine embassy staff, however, remained in Kuala Lumpur and the Tun
Razak declared that the Malaysian move was not to be regarded as a break in
95diplomatic relations.
In August two opportunities arose for the two parties to come 
together. The first was the meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) 
in Canberra from 30 July to 1 August at the start of which the Japanese
91. Asian Almanac, 31 August 1968, p. 2892.
92. For developments during the falls see, ibid ., 7 September 1968, 
pp. 2900-2903.
93. For the concluding statement by the leader of the Malaysian delegation, 
see Malaysia's Stand on Sabah, (Department of Information, Malaysia n.d.)
94. Manila Bulletin, 25 July 1968. 95. Ibid.
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delegation announced the willingness of their Foreign Minister, Miki, 
to act as a third party to arrange a meeting between the two protagonists. 
Such a meeting did not eventuate however, and the Filipinos and the Mal­
aysians left Canberra without having discussed their dispute. The other 
opportunity was the second ministerial meeting of ASEAN in Djakarta which 
started on 6 August. On his arrival in Djakarta Ramos stated his willing­
ness to meet the Malaysians on an informal level to which Tun Razak res-
96ponded positively. During a meeting on 7 August the two leaders agreed
to a ’cooling-off* period after which a meeting of reconciliation could be
discussed. As a further concession Ramos declared that the decision to
withdraw the embassy staff from Kuala Lumpur would be reconsidered and on
14 August Marcos announced that 'on second thought' he had decided to
retain the Philippine ambassador to Malaysia. When asked about the length
of the cooling-off period, Tun Razak on his part, refused to be drawn
merely stating that this would depend on both countries keeping quiet on
97the dispute.
As it happened the cooling-off had been just declared when the 
relations again began to heat up. On 28 August a bill redefining the 
territorial limits of the Philippines to include Sabah was passed by the 
Philippine Congress. In reply to a Philippine note which deplored comments 
made by Tun Razak about the bill, the Malaysian Government said in a note of
4 September that the promulgation of the bill would bring about a new 
situation in Malaysian and Philippine relations. The note sought an affirm­
ation from the Philippine Government that the bill did not deny that Sabah 
was a constituent part of Malaysia and that the Philippines continued to
96. Straits Times, 6 August, 1968.
97.
Asian Almanac, 14 September, 1968, p. 2917.
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recognise and respect Malaysia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In its reply the Philippines Government refused to give such an affirm­
ation and deplored what it termed 'the highly abusive and provocative
98language used by the Malaysian Government in the note...' When on 18 
September Marcos signed the bill, the Malaysian Government decided to 
recall all its embassy staff from Manila. After a lengthy wrangle about 
how and when diplomatic relations were really broken the Philippine Gov­
ernment on 21 November ordered the withdrawal of the embassy staff in 
99Kuala Lumpur.
As though the inclusion of Sabah within the territory of the
Philippines had not been enough, insult was added to injury when the
Filipino delegation to the September 1968 ASEAN conference on commerce and
shipping declared that :
'The Philippine Delegation, mindful of the present 
situation in Philippine - Malaysian relations, is 
constrained to manifest and record its reservations 
on the authority or competence of the Malaysian 
Delegation to represent Sabah in this conference.
Prior to this meeting Marcos had on 24 September instructed 
Ramos to arrange a preparatory meeting with Tun Razak as a preliminary step 
to a summit meeting between himself and the Tunku. However, the Philip­
pine reservation now became the great obstacle in the way of renewed talks. 
On 12 October Tun Razak declared that he would be going to Tokyo to meet 
Ramos on 22 October to discuss ways and means of easing the tension and
98. Ib id ., 11 January 1968, p. 3118.
See also Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 October 1968, pp. 115-116.
99. Asian Almanac, ibid.
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the Filipinos had on 15 October requested the UN General Assembly to place
on record that pending settlement of the dispute the Philippines would not
recognise Malaysia's authority over Sabah or her right to speak for 
102Sabahans. On 16 October Tun Razak responded by declaring that he
would not go to Tokyo unless the Philippines recognised him as the Deputy
Prime Minister of Malaysia of which Sabah was a constituent part. The
same day the Acting Foreign Secretary of the Philippines declared that
his country could not affirm Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah since this
would be tantamount to abandoning the claim. The Philippine reservation
103was 'inflexible'. Then, finally, on 19 October Tun Razak declared
104that he would not go to Tokyo because no useful purpose could be served.
The dispute was not confined to a 'war of words' only. One of 
the casualties was the Anti-Smuggling Agreement between the countries which 
had come into effect in December 1967. On 19 September Malaysia abrogated 
this agreement and asked the Philippines to withdraw her custom officials 
she, according to the agreement, had stationed in Sabah.
The next step of some consequence in this increasingly acrimonious 
sequence of events was a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Bangkok in 
December. The meeting as such was not on the ASEAN calendar and the mini­
sters came to Bangkok to attend a ministerial conference of ECAFE. Their 
attendance at the meeting was brought about by an invitation from Thanat 
Khoman in an attempt to break the impasse which had developed in the wake 
of the severance of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines.
exploring the possibility of a summit meeting. In the meantime, however,
101. Asian Almanac3 11 January 1969, p. 3117.
102. Ibid. p. 3120. 103. Ib id ., p. 3118.
104. Ibid.
105. Ib id ., p. 3117.
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period. However, the precise content of this agreement soon became a
matter of further contention. In his statement in Bangkok Ramos had said
inter alia, ’I recognize Tun Abdul Razak as the Deputy Prime Minister of
Malaysia including Sabah, subject to the 1966 Philippines reservation that
the inclusion of Sabah in Malaysia does not prejudice the Philippines’
106claim to Sabah’. However, after meetings of the Foreign Policy
Council, the Philippines produced a draft counter proposal to the joint 
communique issued at Bangkok. This proposal provided for Philippine 
recognition of Malaysia’s de facto control of Sabah but not her sover­
eignty over Sabah. Predictably enough the Malaysians rejected this amend­
ment as contradictory to the agreement reached between Ramos and Tun Razak
. tj . , 107 in Bangkok.
This is where the dispute stood when 1968 came to an end. The 
parties were as far apart as ever without any hope of a resolution in sight. 
Throughout the following year the dispute lingered on but without engend­
ering the same animated and acrimonious exchanges it did the previous year. 
In March the Indonesian Secretary-General for ASEAN, Sunarso, travelled to 
Manila and Kuala Lumpur in an attempt to persuade the two governments to
again begin attending ASEAN meetings the last of which had taken place
108the previous October. Both governments responded positively and the 
Philippines gave an assurance that the Sabah issue would not be raised by 
her , a condition on which the Malaysians had insisted. This meeting
of the Secretary-Generals of the national secretariat of ASEAN took place
The result of the meeting was an agreement about yet another cooling-off
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Djakarta Times, 17 March 1969.
109. Bangkok World, 29 April 1969.
110. Djakarta Times, 7 March 1969.
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at the end of May and it was successful in that the Sabah issue was not 
raised.
Subsequent to this meeting a number of other conferences deal­
ing with various aspects of ASEAN activities took place with Malaysian and 
Philippine participation. Diplomatic relations between the two countries, 
however, remained severed. Although the Philippines refrained from raising 
the Sabah issue within the context of ASEAN, the matter had not receded 
entirely to the background. On 22 September the Philippines raised the 
Sabah issue in the UN General Assembly and again argued in favour of sub­
mitting the claim to the International Court. This renewal of the claim 
within an international context did not lead to any appreciable worsening 
of relations with Malaysia partly because the Philippine foreign secretary, 
Romulo, went out of his way to stress that the new approach would be 'very 
low key’. Since Malaysia had 'played it cool' during her general elections
and 'with an election here now, we don't want to put the heat back into
112it', Romulo was quoted as saying.
Due to the tense situation caused by the race riots which
followed in the wake of the general elections in Malaysia in May and the
pending presidential elections in the Philippines, the Ministerial Meeting
113of ASEAN, originally scheduled for August, was postponed until December.
After a visit of the Secretary-General of the Indonesian ASEAN secretariat,
114Rukmito Hendraninggrat , to Kuala Lumpur and Manila, Tun Razak declared
111. Ibid., 12 June 1969.
112. Asian Almanac, 21 February 1970, p. 3814. Presidential elections 
were held in November with Marcos being re-elected, the first 
Philippine president to be elected for a second term.
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would not be raised at the forthcoming meeting of the ministers.
On 2 December Marcos announced that he would send the former
Philippine ambassador to Malaysia, Romeo Busuego, to Kuala Lumpur to restore
116official contacts. At the ministerial meeting later in the month the
announcement was made that diplomatic relations would be resumed at once. 7 
Thus, for all practical purposes, the crisis was over.
The second Sabah crisis lasted from March 1968 to December
1969, if the time of the reactivation of the Philippine claim and the 
resumption of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines 
are used as the 'start and finishing lines' of the crisis. Looked at from 
the point of view of ASEAN qua organization it may be more appropriate to 
consider the period between October 1968 and May 1969 as the cut-off 
points since at these dates the association's activities were halted and 
resumed respectively. However, in the present context the period between 
March 1968 and December 1969 will be considered the proper time-span partly 
because it coincides with the actual period during which the dispute was an 
active concern of Malaysia and the Philippines, and partly because ASEAN 
activities aimed at influencing the dispute started soon after March 1968 
and only ended in December 1969.
Appeals to and hints about a possible role of ASEAN in the 
search for solutions to the dispute appeared soon after the Corregidor affair 
came into the open. On 24 March Marcos sought to allay fears about the con­
sequences of the dispute by stressing that close regional cooperation was
115. Djakarta Times3 17 October 1969.
116. Baltimore Sun, 3 December 1969. See also Asian Almanac3 
21 February 1970, p. 3814.
117. Straits Times3 17 December 1969; Djakarta Times, 17 December 1969.
that the Malaysian Government again had been assured that the Sabah issue
116.
possible through ASEAN , and sources in the Philippine Foreign Office
were reported to have expressed the belief that a solution to the dispute
119could be found within the framework of the association. The Foreign
Secretary, Ramos, said the Philippines would appreciate it if Indonesia
or Thailand would lend their good offices to the search for a solution
120within the framework of ASEAN. Similar hints also came from the
Malaysian side. The Tunku appealed to the other members of ASEAN to come
together to persuade the Philippines to give up its claim. He also made
121it clear that if the dispute was not settled soon ASEAN would suffer.
It soon became clear that the other members were concerned lest
122the dispute would lead to the collapse of the association. Their
initial response was couched in terms which referred to the importance of
the survival of ASEAN and to their belief in its ability to weather the
crisis. When the Indonesian ambassador to Malaysia arrived in Kuala
Lumpur to take up his post he said, 'I really don't think the problem will
result in the break-up of the association. Our aims are much greater than 
123this1. Indeed, much of this initial reaction of the other members
consisted in statements of this kind which sought to diminish the signif­
icance of the dispute especially in relation to the overall objectives of 
ASEAN. Suggestions about the possibility of mediation were rejected on
the grounds that Malaysia and the Philippines would and could solve the
124dispute themselves. This confident though attentive attitude was
118. Asian Almanac, 6 July 1968, p. 2790.
119. Manila Bulletin, 15 April 1968.
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primarily a cover for the increased concern of the other members. This 
was especially evident when the Thai Prime Minister, Thanom Kittikachorn, 
paid a surprise visit to Malaysia where he met the Tunku in Penang on the 
eve of the Bangkok talks between Malaysia and the Philippines. The meeting 
was arranged at the request of the Thais, and the Sabah dispute and the 
future of ASEAN were the main topics of discussion. The Thai Prime Mini­
ster declared his willingness to do everything in his power to solve the 
dispute without being directly involved in the matter. Although Bangkok
was offered as the venue for the talks between the two protagonists the
125Thais denied that they had offered themselves as mediators. It is
likely that this wait-and-see attitude on the part of the other members
was caused by the desire to await the outcome of the talks in Bangkok.
When these talks eventually broke down after nearly a month of
deliberations the dispute gradually escalated. Although there was growing
concern in the other ASEAN capitals over the turn of events both Malik and
Thanat Khoman continued to profess faith in the ability of the parties to
arrive at a solution. Expressing deep concern over the dispute Malik
stated that ’that we believe that this problem can be solved provided both
126states are sincere'. From Bangkok Thanat appealed to the parties to
127exercise restraint. On the eve of their departure for Djakarta to
attend the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in August both Thanat and Singapore’s
Foreign Minister, Rajaratham, expressed their belief in the possibility of
128isolating the Sabah dispute from the activities of ASEAN. The reluct­
ance of Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia to offer mediation was no doubt
125. See Straits Times3 8 June, 1968; Bangkok Posts ibid.;
Asian Almanac3 31 August 1968, p. 2889 and 14 September 1968, p.2920.
126. Straits Times3 23 and 24 July 1968.
127. Ibid.
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due in great measure to Malaysia's rejection of the possibility of mediation
129primarily on the grounds that there was nothing to talk about. In view
of the stated willingness of both Tun Razak and Ramos to meet to discuss 
130their relations , it is also likely that the other members staked their
hopes on this meeting and whatever combined pressure they could exert on
the two parties during their presence at the Djakarta ministerial meeting.
By August the fencing back and forth by both Malaysia and the
Philippines provided a more than confused picture. The Philippines had
suspended diplomatic relations with Malaysia after the failure of the
Bangkok talks but had not put this decision into effect. The Malaysians
threatened to abrogate the anti-smuggling agreement between the two 
131countries. Ramos went to Djakarta evidently hoping to discuss the
claim itself whilst Tun Razak went there, not to discuss the claim as such,
but to talk about the strained relations arising from it and the possibility
132of ’lowering the temperature between the two countries'. The other
members of ASEAN would appear to have gone to Djakarta intent on trying 
to isolate the Sabah issue from ASEAN activities. This meant in the first 
instance that a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries had 
to be avoided.
Given the rather inflexible position of thetwo parties their 
meeting in Djakarta was reasonably successful. The relief of the other 
members was well reflected in a statement by Thanat after the ministerial 
meeting was over. 'I think few even in this region (of Southeast Asia) 
realize the significance of this meeting. The fact that we can meet to 
talk about joint efforts is really a dramatic development, even if no
129. Straits Times> 18 July 1968.
130. Straits Times, 18 July and 6 August 1968.
131. Asian Almanac, 14 September 1968, p. 2914.
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spectacular projects have resulted so far’ he said. This apparent
optimism did not last long. As a result of the Philippines’ decision to
formally include Sabah within her territory, her reservations about
Malaysia’s right to sovereignty over Sabah, and the Malaysian retaliatory
action of revoking the Anti-Smuggling Agreement between the two countries,
their relationship plummeted to a new low point especially after the
threatened break of diplomatic relations finally was implemented.
In the middle of November Thanat Khoman suggested a meeting of
ASEAN foreign ministers to consider ways and means of getting ASEAN going
134again. The suggestion was welcomed in the other ASEAN capitals,
135except Kuala Lumpur. After this initial refusal the Malaysians agreed
to attend and at the meeting in Bangkok on 12 December the parties to the 
dispute agreed to restore the cooling-off period decided on in August. The 
Philippine Government’s belated refusal to accept the joint communique of 
the meeting and the subsequent Malaysian rejection of the Philippine amend­
ment, again threatened to make short shrift of the cooling-off period. 
However, the meeting in Bangkok would seem to have had some effect in that 
the strident and often harsh exchange of words which had characterised the 
months prior to this meeting was on the whole not resumed afterwards. There 
were other reasons for this as well. The Philippine election campaign 
started in earnest in the first half of 1969 and the Sabah dispute did not 
figure prominently in the campaign of either of the main Philippine political 
parties.
However, the dispute lingered on and diplomatic relations between 
Malaysia and the Philippines remained severed throughout 1969. Although 
pledging not to leave the association Malaysia refused to participate in
119.
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i • i-u 136claim as the reason.
ASEAN remained moribund during the first months of 1969. The
first signs of renewed activity came in March when the other members,
obviously concerned about the state of affairs, sought to influence
Malaysia and the Philippines. As already noted the new initiative this
time came from the Secretary-General of the Indonesian national secretariat,
137Sunarso. After having conferred with the Thais in Bangkok, Sunarso went
on to Kuala Lumpur and Manila where he extracted promises from the Malay­
sians and the Filipinos that they would attend a meeting of ASEAN
138secretary-generals at a date to be fixed. The Malaysians made clear,
however, that their participation was conditioned by an undertaking from
139the Philippines that the latter would not raise the Sabah issue.
140Such an undertaking was given and conveyed to Kuala Lumpur by the Indonesians. 
The meeting took place at the end of May, was successful, and was immed­
iately followed by a number of meetings of other ASEAN bodies. The mini­
sterial meeting, however, was postponed from August until December for
141reasons not related to the Sabah issue. After further efforts on the
part of the Indonesians to ensure that nothing would go wrong at the last
142minute, the ministerial meeting took place between 15 and 17 December,
at which the Philippines and Malaysia agreed to resume diplomatic relations 
forthwith. The second Sabah crisis was over.
any further ASEAN meetings giving the Philippine attitude to the Sabah
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142. This consisted in a renewed promise being extracted from the 
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ASA AND THE SABAH DISPUTE
ASA, and for that matter Maphilindo, contributed little or
nothing towards the resolution of the Sabah dispute or, indeed, towards
the prevention of the break in the relations between Malaysia and the
Philippines which followed from the dispute. The reasons for this failure
were several.
Firstly, in the pursuit of the claim the Philippines had to
deal not only with the Malayan government but first and foremost with the
British government which had no direct stake in ASA or Maphilindo and
whose main interest did not rest with the continued existence of either
of these bodies. Indeed, as far as Maphilindo was concerned the British
viewed it as a positive hindrance to their plans for the Borneo territories.
The second important factor was the low interest of the
Philippine government of the period in ASA. Although the previous admin-
143istration of Garcia had taken an active part in the formation of ASA,
his successor, Macapagal, was far less interested in the association.
Alone among the top leaders of the Macapagal administration, Pelaez would
144seem to have been genuinely committed to ASA. However, in the middle
of 1963 he resigned from his position as Vice-President and Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to be replaced by Lopez who, with Macapagal himself, had
pursued a policy of closer relations with Indonesia as well as the idea
145of a Malay Confederation. Contrary to the Philippine government, the
Malayan government retained its interest in ASA. As late as March 1963,
Tun Razak declared his belief in the survival of ASA during his attendance 
at the ECAFE meeting in Manila. However, throughout 1963 the waning
143. See chapter 2 above in the formation of ASA and the role of the 
Philippines.
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interest in ASA on the part of the Philippines was accompanied by her 
increasingly active pursuit of the Malay confederation idea, a scheme 
the Malayan Government for internal reasons could not but view with con­
siderable skepticism because of its implied anti-Chinese connotations.
When the Malay Government eventually went along with the idea and agreed 
to Maphilindo it did so mainly because it hoped fit would facilitate 
the acceptance of Malaysia by the other two states; whereas both the 
Philippines and Indonesia saw the venture as a means to forestall the 
new Federation .
The third important factor was, of course, ASA and Maphilindo 
themselves. The latter was no more than a loose machinery for consult­
ations between governments the practical necessity of which was doubtful.
It is difficult to see what specific functions this machinery could perform 
that the already established diplomatic institutions of the three govern­
ments - their foreign affairs departments and diplomatic services - could 
not already perform. In the relationship between the three governments 
there existed no clearly articulated, practical, inter-govemmental 
needs of a functional nature the performance of which called for a 
separate organizational machinery. Had it in fact been established 
Maphilindo would, as it were, have been an inter-governmental institution 
in search of tasks and functions to perform, and not the other way around.
Whatever value derived from Maphilindo was of a symbolic 
nature. Symbols play a role in all social intercourse but in the case of 
Maphilindo the symbolic value of a union of Malay peoples became closely 
associated with and exploited in the interest of the opposing national 
policies of the participating countries. In the end it evaporated under
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the pressure of these conflicting interests. Because Maphilindo was of 
little or no positive value to Malaya it could not serve the role in the 
Sabah dispute envisaged by the Philippines.
Contrary to Maphilindo ASA was not a child of the flurry of 
activity arising from the dispute over Sabah. Whilst whatever value could 
be attached to Maphilindo could not be separated from the Sabah dispute,
ASA possessed an intrinsic value which was not related to the Sabah dis­
pute. Formed in the middle of 1961 ASA had an established organizational 
machinery which performed specific functions. Its achievements were modest 
but held out promise for the future. During the first year of its exist­
ence it had given the appearance of an 'organization that was trying to
147accomplish everything at once1. As already noted it had a tendency
to accummulate ’projects under study’, numerous committees were established
and, as Gordon has remarked, as late as April 1962 'the very meaning of
co-operation had not lost very much of the vagueness it had in Rahman's
148early letters'. However, as a result of the second meeting of the
Joint Working Party in November 1962 some drastic changes were made based 
on the experiences accumulated over the first year. At the level of 
practical co-operation the machinery was revised so that it came to rest 
on three major committees where there had been seven or eight before; an 
economic committee, a social and cultural committee, and a technical 
cooperation and research committee. A rearrangement of the priorities 
attached to the goals of the association also took place. Realizing that
147. Gordon, op. oit . 3 p. 178.
148. Ibid.
123.
(
124.
some goals are more difficult to achieve than others deliberate attempts 
were made to define and identify those that could not be done in the 
foreseeable future and those that could. A general reorientation took 
place when the difficulties involved in the establishment of ventures 
such as an 'ASA shipping line' and an 'ASA airline' were appreciated.
Thus by late 1962 and early 1963 there would seem to have been a develop­
ing belief on the part of officials in the three ASA countries that
149benefits were to be had from continued cooperation.
Nonetheless, the shared membership and the cooperation which 
had developed within the association were not sufficient to prevent the 
Sabah dispute from bringing the activities of ASA to a rest. The second 
meeting of Foreign Ministers in April 1963 in Manila was the last meeting 
of any of the association's organizational bodies for nearly three years. 
Despite Thanat Khoman's warning at this meeting that the Sabah dispute 
could disrupt the unity of ASA and that unless wisdom and prudence were 
shown 'this meeting may prove to be the last one we shall attend together 
his words were apparently not heeded.
When confronted with a choice nations as well as individuals 
usually sacrifice that to which they attach lesser value. Both to Malaya 
and the Philippines North Borneo mattered more than ASA. To the Malays 
North Borneo and Sarawak were indispensible parts of a strategy which 
involved Singapore as well. In early 1961 the Tunku would appear to have 
swung around to the conviction that it was essential for the survival of 
Malaya that Singapore became a part of the Federation. However, only
149. Ib id ., pp. 178-187.
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to include Singapore would upset the delicate racial balance within the 
federation when Singapore's large Chinese majority was included in the 
enlarged federation. In order to counteract this possibility it was nec­
essary to include the Borneo territories with their non-Chinese majorities.
The lack of interest in ASA on the part of Macapagal and 
other prominent Filipino leaders has already been mentioned, as well as 
his enthusiasm for the idea of a Malay confederation. Apart from its 
role in the pursuit of the Sabah claim this idea also served as a symbol 
of the 'Asian identity' of the Philippines in a way ASA did not. To 
Macapagal and Lopez the possession of an 'Asian identity' also involved 
anti-colonialism, a strand of thinking more closely associated with 
Sukarno rather than any other of the neighbouring countries' political 
leaders. Hence to the Filipinos acceptance as an 'Asian' country meant 
closer association with Indonesia whose hostility towards ASA was well 
known.
Until late 1962 and early 1963 ASA had been little more than 
an educational experience for the participants. Involved in the more and 
more realistic outlook was a realization that no quick and easy benefits 
could be had. It involved having to shed the initial euphoria and having 
to lower the horizons. From the point of view of ASA itself this change 
in attitude was of doubtless benefit but it came at a time when the 
Sabah claim was well advanced. Moreover, nothing substantial in terms of 
concrete results had been achieved. Seen from this point of view the 
collapse of ASA did not mean the sacrifice of present benefits as much as 
a surrender of future hopes and profit.
Yet another point needs to be made. Relatively small and less 
developed countries such as Malaya and the Philippines have few assets with 
which to bargain in international affairs, even in their relations with
each other. Membership in a multi-functional organization such as ASA 
may have added to as well as detracted from such bargaining strength as 
the two states possessed. It added to their bargaining strength in hold­
ing out a promise of benefits even though these did lie in the future.
Both Malaya and the Philippines used their common membership in ASA as 
a lever, evidently in the hope that the other party's commitment to the
association was strong enough to make it change its position on the Sabah
152issue. However, participation in ASA may also have detracted from
their bargaining strength by foreclosing a more selective and incremental 
use of sanctions. By first threatening, say, trade sanctions to be 
followed by others if the initial threat failed, both parties would have 
been in possession of a more flexible bargaining strength. In normal 
inter-state relations it is possible to isolate in this way one set of 
relations between two states from others and to use this set in a bargain­
ing situation. Within a multifunctional organizational framework, however, 
it becomes very difficult to do this without appearing to strike at the 
very foundation and principles on which the organization is based. It 
is doubly difficult within an organization such as ASA from which no 
practical benefits had accrued at the time of the Sabah crisis and whose 
continued existence still rested on the largely symbolic commitment of its 
members in lieu of more tangible gains to prove that the initial commit­
ment had been worthwhile. Furthermore, at the time of the Sabah crisis the 
level of functional specificity of ASA was low, that is, apart from the 
stated goals of promoting cooperation within the economic, social and 
cultural fields and so on, little had been done in the way of defining more
152. See the Philippine aide-memoire of 2 August 1962 and the Malayan 
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precisely which areas of the relations between the members would fall 
within the functional scope of ASA. Hence, nearly the whole range of 
relations between the three member states was potentially an area of ASA 
concern. In these circumstances, for Malaysia or the Philippines to 
threaten interruption of any of the activities which fell within the 
actual and potential functional scope of ASA could not but result in 
considerable doubt being cast on their general commitment to the assoc­
iation. The use of sanctions came to be synonymous with abandoning ASA 
because few or no sanctions were available which could be isolated and 
divorced from the activities, real and potential, of the association.
Hence, once it was clear to them that Sabah mattered more, and given the 
narrow range of 'cards' with which to bargain, the sacrifice of ASA on 
the part of both parties may have been a foregone conclusion.
ASEAN AND THE SABAH DISPUTE
To make an assessment of the influence of ASEAN on the second
Sabah crisis it is necessary first to consider the reasons for which the 
Sabah issue was reactivated.
The Marcos Administration had not renounced the claim despite 
the fact that it had several opportunities to do so. The first time was 
when Marcos took over from Macapagal in late 1965. On that occasion the 
opportunity was there for Marcos to make a clear break with his predecessor 
policies. Although he quickly moved to restore relations with Malaysia he 
did not, however, renounce the claim which had not played a significant 
role in the presidential elections which brought Marcos into power.
During the two subsequent years the Sabah issue lived a quiet existence 
without the Philippine Government actively pursuing the claim. It was not 
raised at the meeting which established ASEAN and when Tun Razak visited 
Manila in December 1967 and Marcos paid a state visit to Kuala Lumpur in
matter rest. Yet barely two months after his last visit the whole issue
was again raised and threatened the existence of ASEAN as it had ASA
some few years earlier.
The spark that relighted the issue was the Corregidor affair.
The recruits at Corregidor were ostensibly there to receive training for
later infiltration into Sabah. Whether or not this was the true purpose
is not at all clear, and the Philippine Government denied the charges.
Whatever the truth of the matter, the affair created an uproar and proved
a great embarassment to the government. Some credence must, therefore,
perhaps be given to the interpretation that the Marcos Administration
153reactivated the claim to divert attention from the affair. The
trouble with this interpretation is, of course, that Marcos continued to 
pursue the claim for a considerable time after the Corregidor scandal had 
faded from the public and political arena.
V
A second explanation relates the reactivation of the claim
154to Marcos desire to be re-elected. No Philippine President had
ever been re-elected for a second term and Sabah’s claim provided a con­
venient issue in the field of foreign affairs for Marcos to establish 
his ’nationalist' credentials. This interpretation, however, suffers from 
the fact that Marcos was a little more than half the way through his term 
of office with the elections to take place in November 1969, more than a 
year and a half later. As it happened the Sabah issue did not play an
important role in the elections which were predominantly fought over
155domestic issues as they traditionally had been in the Philippines.
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January 1968 it would appear that both parties were content to let the
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A third explanation canvassed has rightly been considered too 
crude and advocates that a campaign of insurgency in Sabah was, indeed, 
what Marcos had in mind.
Finally, a fourth explanation may simply be that Marcos, as were 
other Filipinos, was convinced that the Philippines had a just and sound 
case and that for this reason he was unwilling to give it up. The object­
ion to this explanation is that, if this was so, why did Marcos choose to 
raise the matter in the rather clumsy manner he did, coming hard on the 
heels of the Corregidor affair and all the suspicions related to this 
incident.
Whatever the truth, and it may indeed be that it consists in a 
combination of all these explanations mixed with a considerable dose of 
miscalculation on the part of Marcos - the. reactivation was a sign that 
the Marcos Administration apparently put less value on the relations 
with Malaysia as well as its membership in ASEAN than on the Sabah issue.
After nearly two years of bickering and acrimonious verbal 
exchanges the Philippines decided to resume relations with Malaysia in 
December 1969. It is suggested that three main factors in particular 
contributed to this. Firstly, during the first half of 1969 it became 
quite clear that the Philippines was unlikely to extract any concessions 
from Malaysia, who especially after the collapse of the Bangkok talks of 
June-July 1968, stuck rigidly to her position that Sabah was not a subject 
of bargaining or negotiations. Hence, if the Philippines wanted any rel­
ations with Malaysia at all, the claim would have to take a back seat 
among her foreign policy objectives.
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The second important factor was the lack of international 
sympathy for the Philippine claim. Whatever support she could muster was 
related not to the merits of her case but to her policy of submitting the 
dispute to the International Court of Justice. Such as it was most of 
this support came from countries outside Asia which under any circum­
stances had little interest in the dispute. Among the big powers the 
Soviet Union supported Malaysia and the United States declared it did not 
wish to take sides. Nor did she receive much support for her claim
from any of her regional neighbours. If anything the support that was 
forthcoming went to Malaysia. This certainly was the case as far as 
Singapore was concerned and even Malik was reported to have said on 26 
October in Copenhagen that the Philippines' claim based on history was
destroyed by the fact that Sabah had voted to be incorporated into Mal-
158aysia. It should, however, be stressed that the other members of
ASEAN, including Singapore and Indonesia, on the whole studiously avoided 
airing their views on the merits of the Philippine claim publicly. Thus, 
the Philippines found herself isolated internationally as far as the Sabah 
claim was concerned, a situation very different from a few years earlier 
when she had Sukarno's Indonesia on her side.
The third important factor contributing to the removal of the 
Sabah dispute from the agenda of Philippine-Malaysian relations was the 
influence of ASEAN. It may be profitable to look at this factor from two 
angles, firstly in terms of what ASEAN meant to the Philippines and Mal­
aysia and secondly in terms of the pressure brought to bear by the other
157. Asian Almanac, 11 January 1969, p. 3122.
158. Ibid ., 3121.
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Following the reactivation of the claim there was an immediate 
appreciation on the part of nearly all ASEAN members that the dispute rep­
resented a threat to the existence of the association. As noted above the 
reaction in Manila was to refer to ASEAN as a possible framework within 
which the parties could seek a solution. There would, however, seem to 
have been considerable ambiguity in Manila as to what they expected from 
ASEAN. Sources at the Foreign Office were reported to have expressed the 
belief that ASEAN as a body could be made to exert pressure on both parties 
to settle the dispute in a manner at once peaceful as well as harmless to
the wider cooperation within the association. In this view it would appear
159that the other ASEAN countries were seen as possible mediators. How­
ever, in view of the fact that official Philippine policy was to submit the 
dispute to the International Court of Justice it is more likely that ASEAN 
was seen as a body through which pressure could be brought to bear on Mal­
aysia to agree to international adjudication. The action to bring the 
dispute to the attention of the UN General Assembly must also be seen in 
this light.
Malaysia’s expectations with regard to ASEAN were considerably 
more straight forward. Given her position that the Philippine claim had no
validity ASEAN was purely an instrument through which the Philippines might
160be persuaded to give up her claim. On the question of mediation Tun
Razak declared that he saw no need for it because ’there is nothing more to 
talk about. The Philippines has no case at all1 .
ASEAN countries, especially Thailand and Indonesia.
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Throughout the period March 1968 to December 1969 Philippine 
representatives expressed their belief that Sabah need not lead to the 
collapse of ASEAN and that the two were separate issues. The inference 
was that the Sabah claim could be pursued without damage to the cooperative 
framework within ASEAN which could go on undiminished. This was their pos­
ition immediately prior to the Ministerial Meeting of the association in
162 163Djakarta in August 1968 and it was repeated on subsequent occasions.
To the extent this was a sincerely held opinion it would tend to undermine 
the position of those who hold that the Philippine reactivation of the 
Sabah claim was evidence of her low interest in relations with Malaysia 
as well as ASEAN.
Though it may be that persons involved in the execution of the 
claim on the Philippine side initially were convinced that it could be 
pursued without damage to ASEAN, this was a position it became increasingly 
difficult to maintain in view of other Philippine pronouncements and 
actions. No less person than Ramos himself implicitly admitted the rel­
ationship in his address to the Ministerial Meeting in Djakarta when he 
inter alia said,
Nonetheless, we cannot close our eyes to existing realities, 
particularly the political stresses and strains which have 
lately developed between states in this region. While it is 
true that difficulties and disputes can and will arise 
between countries, as is natural in all societies whether of 
men or of nations, still, it behoves us all to labor, with 
all our strength, to resolve these without delay, lest they 
sap the vitality of our association and render regional 
cooperation amongst us a tragic impossibility.
The division became no easier to maintain when the Philippines
162. Straits Times, 23 July 1968.
163. See, for example, Manila Bulletin, 10 October 1968, and
Djakarta Times, 7 March 1969.
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165. See Asian Almanac, 19 October 1968, p. 2978.
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chose to introduce her reservations about Malaysia’s de jure sovereignty 
over Sabah at a meeting in October of a committee of the very association 
from which it had been argued Sabah could be isolated. In November 1968, 
shortly after the Thais had suggested a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers 
to discuss Malaysian-Philippine relations and shortly before the final 
break in these relations, Ramos was considerably more explicit than he had 
been in August. He said, ’ASEAN is falling apart with Indonesia and Singa­
pore fighting, and Malaysia and the Philippines fighting... The main
166objective should be to save ASEAN and restore good relations.’
Thus, although the Filipinos at the outset may have entertained
ideas about pursuing the Sabah claim without thereby damaging ASEAN, their
own handling of the claim inevitably led the Sabah claim and ASEAN to be
related in such a manner that the existence of the latter became dependent
on the outcome of the former.
As far as the Malaysians were concerned it had been their view
from the very beginning that the two issues were closely linked. It may,
indeed, be the case that the Malaysians to some extent forced the hand of
the Philippines by consistently arguing that the two issues were related.
The Malaysian Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, accused the Philippines of
having killed the prospects of a common market among the members of ASEAN
167by her attitude to Sabah, and the Tunku talked about the grave concern
168for the future of the organisation. Malaysia's position was further
underlined when she made it a condition for participation in ASEAN meetings 
that the Sabah issue was not raised and after October 1968, when the Phili- 
pine reservation was first introduced, Malaysia refused to take part in
166. Straits Times, 12 November 1968.
167. Ib id ., 12 July 1968.
168. Ibid ., 8 June 1968.
in December, at which the restoration of the cooling-off period was
agreed, was caused by the fact that the topic of discussion was ostensibly
the resumption of diplomatic relations between herself and the Philippines
rather than the merits of the Sabah issue. It is significant in this
context that apart from the participation of the other ASEAN foreign
ministers, the Australian Foreign Minister was also present thus giving
169to the meeting an appearance of not being an ASEAN affair.
Even though the Philippines refused to accept the joint com­
munique of the meeting and proposed amendments which proved unacceptable 
to Malaysia, the fact of her participation in Bangkok was an indication 
that she had begun to appreciate the full implications of further pur­
suing the claim. It did not only mean a break with Malaysia but also a 
halt to the cooperation within ASEAN. The latter was all the more signif­
icant because it tended to impair Philippine relations with Singapore, 
Thailand and Indonesia the last two of which were strongly committed to 
ASEAN.
In the period which ensued there was a marked reduction in 
acrimonious exchanges between the opposing parties and in May 1969 both 
participated in the first ASEAN meeting since the previous October.
There were, however, other factors which also induced the Philippines to 
reduce the fervour with which she pursued the Sabah claim and persuaded 
her to again participate in ASEAN.
The least significant of these was probably the failure of 
Marcos' plan for an 'Asian forum' to materialise. This was an idea he 
proposed in September 1966 in an address to the UN General Assembly and he
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further ASEAN meetings. Her participation in the meeting in Bangkok
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envisaged it as a kind of political ECAFE drawing its membership from the 
same countries as its economic counterpart. However despite all his 
efforts to promote this idea during 1966 and 1967, Marcos met with little 
success and by December 1968 the 'Asian Forum' was still merely an idea.
Hence, whatever wish the Marcos Administration had about more intimate 
participation in regional affairs could best be fulfilled through ASEAN, 
which remained the most available option.
Considerably more significant was the change taking place in 
the international situation and its effect on Southeast Asia. Even 
before the advent of Nixon as President there were signs that the United 
States was reconsidering its role in Asia. The election of Nixon in 
November 1968 and what was seen as the imminent change in American pol­
icies towards less emphasis on Asia, caused Marcos to emphasize the 
'independence' of the Philippines and its 'ties with its Asian neighbours'."^7^
Romulo expressed similar thoughts in January 1969 upon his official assump-
172tion of the position as foreign secretary. During his stay in the
Philippines on his world trip in July-August 1969, Nixon himself
reiterated the theme of self-reliance and 'independence' as goals towards
173which the Asian countries should strive. This change in the American
policy was doubly significant as far as the Philippines was concerned 
because of her long-standing reliance on and particularly close relation­
ship with the United States. In these circumstances ASEAN became an 
important option through which closer relations with other Asian countries 
could be cultivated.
170. For further details, see Abell, op.ait., pp. 312-317 and 345.
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and Malaysia to ASEAN was not very strong. In the case of the former
the argument is based on alleged inconsistencies in Philippine statements
and actions and on an ambiguous attitude towards Southeast Asia in general
and regional cooperation in particular. It is also alleged that there
exists a wide gap between rhetoric and reality in the Philippine attitude
towards ASEAN of which the reactivation of the Sabah claim and the attempts
to promote the Asian Forum idea are the main indications. In regard to
Malaysia her inferior commitment to ASEAN was due inter alia to Common-
178wealth ties, the Sabah dispute, internal troubles and so on.
Assessments of this kind and the kind attempted in this chapter
involve a methodological problem arising from the nature of the data employed.
Both studies mentioned above rely nearly exclusively on the fact that both
countries have spent time and energy on the promotion of ideas and relations
outside the framework of ASEAN. From this fact the inference is then drawn
that Malaysia and the Philippines cannot therefore be as committed to ASEAN
as others even though their verbal adherence to the aims and purposes of
the association left nothing to be desired. More specifically, the two
studies have argued that the Philippine pursuit of the Sabah claim and the
Malaysian reaction, especially her refusal to participate in further ASEAN
meetings until such time as the Philippine reservation about her sovereignty
over Sabah was withdrawn, constituted a clear indication that the commit-
179ment of both countries to ASEAN left a lot to be desired, especially
174It has been argued that the commitment of the Philippines
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compared to that of Thailand and Indonesia. It will be argued that the 
evidence for this conclusion is at best ambiguous and that such firm 
judgments must await information not yet available.
It was suggested above that the Philippines thought it pos­
sible to raise the Sabah issue without impairment to ASEAN. Initially 
they were encouraged in their belief by the continued participation of 
Malaysia in ASEAN meetings well after the issue again had been raised in 
March 1968. Between March and early October 1968, when the Philippines
introduced her reservation about Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah, there
180were no less than eleven meetings of various ASEAN bodies. Thus, for
a considerable time the Sabah question and ASEAN were kept apart although 
it is more than likely that the atmosphere of the meetings may have suffered 
as a result of the claim. It is significant nonetheless, that the Malay­
sians continued during this period to attend meetings of ASEAN despite their 
statements that the Sabah issue and ASEAN were closely linked. This is 
suggestive of a willingness on the part of Malaysia to isolate Sabah in 
order to keep ASEAN going as well as of a commitment not as weak as some 
observers have indicated.
The Malaysian refusal to participate in further ASEAN meetings 
after the Philippine reservation has also been used to substantiate the 
argument about her weak commitment. To assess this argument it is proper 
at this junction to stress that the Sabah issue was after all a dispute 
over territory. Any nation is likely to take strong exception to a reser­
vation which puts its territorial sovereignty in question whatever the 
strength of its commitment to a particular organization especially, as in
137.
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this case, when the reservation is made within the framework of the same 
organization. In other words, it is suggested that Malaysia had no other 
choice but to act as she did as long as the Philippines upheld her reser­
vation. In these circumstances it is therefore difficult to consider the 
Malaysian action an indication of her weak interest in ASEAN. Moreover, 
Malaysia immediately agreed to the resumption of ASEAN meetings after she 
had received assurances that the Philippines would not raise the Sabah 
question in subsequent meetings.
The introduction of the reservation about Malaysia’s sovereignty 
over Sabah into the ASEAN meeting in October, carries considerable weight 
as an indication of a measure of indifference on the part of the Philip­
pines to the fate of ASEAN. However, again one or two points need to be 
made. The first is that, though the claim may have been used in the dom­
estic political struggle in the Philippines, this does not by itself prove 
that Marcos and those who pursued the claim on behalf of the Philippines 
did not also sincerely believe in the justice of the claim. The second 
point is that, assuming the sincerity of the Marcos Administration, there 
may have been very few opportunities by October for the Filipinos to put 
their case before the Malaysians. After the July talks in Bangkok, when 
the bilateral negotiations over the claim broke down, the latter consist­
ently refused to talk about the merits of the case, only acceding to talks 
that might help to dissipate the general strain in their relations arising 
from the claim. Furthermore, contact through normal diplomatic channels 
was more or less impossible due to the state of flux in which these 
channels found themselves by early October.
In the end the Filipinos agreed to discontinue the pursuit of 
the claim and, although this decision was also influenced by factors 
essentially unrelated to the Sabah issue, it cannot be convincingly argued
These observations about the attitude of the Philippines and 
Malaysia to ASEAN suggest that the actions of the two countries in rel­
ation to the Sabah claim cannot by themselves be taken as evidence of a 
weak commitment. They suggest furthermore that perhaps the statements 
which emanated from both countries to the effect that they believed in and 
were committed to regional cooperation in general and ASEAN in particular 
may have to be taken at more than their face value. They finally suggest 
that the gap between rhetoric and reality is somewhat narrower than 
believed.
The fact that the survival of ASEAN was of some concern to the 
two disputants made the task of the other members, especially Thailand and 
Indonesia, easier. Nonetheless, considerable efforts were spent by these 
members to bring the two parties together.
Any attempts by a third party to bring about reconciliation 
between two conflicting parties will initially have to undergo what may 
be termed a legitimacy test, that is, the third party must be acceptable 
to the parties to the dispute. Some regional organizations have special 
machinery for the resolution of conflicts between member states through 
which the organization itself or another memberstate can intervene. ASEAN 
had no such machinery. The initiative thus lay with the individual 
member states and when Thailand and Indonesia were readily accepted this 
was in no small measure due to the fact that both had developed fairly 
close and friendly relations with both disputants for which their common 
membership in ASEAN was also responsible. The fact that both Malaysia 
and the Philippines appealed to the other ASEAN members at an early stage 
bears witness to this.
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that this was done without a measure of concern for the fate of ASEAN.
Equally important was the fact that the other members enhanced 
the legitimacy of their efforts by almost invariably declaring that they 
were undertaken in the name of or on behalf of the welfare and continued 
existence of ASEAN. Apart from the sincerity of these references, they 
also made it difficult for the two disputants to reject advice and appeals 
by Thailand and Indonesia in particular without appearing to have only 
scant regard for the fate of ASEAN to which after all both professed 
commitment. The Thai Prime Minister’s surprise visit to Malaysia just 
prior to the Bangkok talks in June-July 1968 was made in the interest of 
and by reference to ASEAN as were the appeals from Indonesia and Thailand 
to the two parties to show restraint in the tense period that followed 
the breakdown of the Bangkok talks. The same was the case prior to and 
during the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in Djakarta in August where it must 
be assumed that considerable pressure was brought to bear on the two dis­
putants. Similar references to ASEAN continued to be made throughout the 
latter part of 1968 when relations between Malaysia and the Philippines 
were at their worst, especially in connection with the Thai initiative to 
convene an unofficial ministerial meeting in Bangkok.
A third important point was the habit of Thailand and Indo­
nesia, as well as Singapore, to confer with each other before an approach 
was made to Malaysia and the Philippines by either of them. This gave an 
appearance of unity and solidarity to their efforts which made their rejec­
tion all the more difficult lest the two disputants were prepared to rebuff 
not only one but all three fellow members, in a case where no prior con­
sultations would appear to have taken place, such as the Thai suggestion 
that an unofficial ministerial meeting be held in Bangkok, Indonesia and 
Singapore did quickly agree with whatever proposals were made.
A prominent feature of the reconciliation attempts of the other
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ASEAN members was the concentration on efforts aimed at preventing bilateral 
relations between the disputants from breaking down. They would appear to 
have shunned any attempt to influence the merits of the respective parties' 
case. Given the inflexible attitude of both parties this must indeed be 
considered a prudent and wise tactic. When they failed in preventing a 
break in relations between Manila and Kuala Lumpur they concentrated their 
efforts on bringing the parties together under ASEAN auspices. In this 
they were successful, first in Bangkok in December 1968 and, later, in 
May 1969, when the Secretary-Generals of the national secretariats of 
ASEAN met in Indonesia. Indeed, Malaysia and the Philippines participated 
in ten meetings of various ASEAN bodies in the period May to December 1969 
during which time there were no diplomatic relations between them. Aided 
in their task by other factors as well, this was in no small measure due 
to the influence of the three other members.
Another prominent feature of the second Sabah dispute was the 
extent to which it remained a regional and indeed an ASEAN affair. Apart 
from a couple of sojourns to the UN General Assembly by the Philippines 
apparently in the hope of extracting from that body a resolution recommend­
ing submissions of the dispute to the International Court, no non-ASEAN 
country became involved in any reconciliation or mediation attempt. This 
may be attributable to several factors. Firstly, the other ASEAN countries 
'intervened’ thus to some extent pre-empting other attempts. Secondly, 
other countries tended to consider the dispute an ASEAN affair. In this 
context it is significant that no attempt were made to bring about a recon­
ciliation between the two parties at the ASPAC meeting in Canberra in 
August which preceded the ministerial meeting of ASEAN in Djakarta by a 
few days.
However, before too much significance is attributed to the
142.
existence of ASEAN it is well worth remembering that the Sabah dispute 
did not erupt into violence although at times belligerent and violent 
language was employed. Furthermore, the dispute was after all a rel­
atively less significant affair compared to other international disputes 
of which the war in Vietnam was the outstanding contemporary example. 
Nonetheless, ASEAN would seem to have played a role in isolating the 
conflict from outside interference.
ASA, ASEAN, AND REGIONAL PEACE AND CONFLICT
In the remainder of this chapter the efforts of ASA and ASEAN
in relation to the Sabah dispute will be discussed by reference to a
181recent study by Joseph Nye, in which he investigated the relationship 
between regional organization and peace and conflict. Nye asked, 'Have 
international regional organizations created "islands of peace" in world 
politics? Have they "encapsulated" conflicts and prevented them from 
becoming intertwined with insolvable global conflicts? Will they do so 
in the future?'
From among the many types of regional organizations, Nye 
examined the effects of two types on peace and conflict, namely what he 
termed micro-regional economic organizations (the European Community, the 
Central American Common Market and the East African Community) and macro- 
regional political organizations (the Organization of American States, the 
Organization of African Unity and the Arab League). These two types were 
selected 'because their alleged effects on integration and conflict control,
respectively, offer the most likely prospects for peace-making among the
183various regionalist doctrines.'
181. Peace in Parts. Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).
182. Ibid ., p. 3.
183. Ibid ., p. 10.
143.
and political, there is perhaps a need to repeat here the meaning of the
terms micro- and macro-regional. They refer to degree of geographical
contiguity so that in a micro-regional organization the distance between
the member capitals furthest apart is shorter than its equivalent in a
macro-regional organization. By a regional organization is meant an
organization based on formal agreement between the member-governments,
possessing diplomatic forums, and assisted by an associated international
185bureaucracy.
In relation to Nye’s definition ASA and ASEAN can be classified 
as micro-regional economic organizations. Objections may perhaps be raised 
as to whether ASEAN, as well as ASA before it, fulfils the last require­
ment to a regional organization. As was the case with ASA, ASEAN possesses 
no permanent headquarters with an international bureaucracy equivalent to, 
for instance, that of the European Community. Again as in the case of ASA, 
the most permanent and in a sense most ’international’ of ASEAN institut­
ions are the national secretariats of the members located in the various 
capitals, and the standing committee which coordinates the day-to-day 
activities of the association and is rotated between the various capitals 
on a yearly basis. However, a liberal interpretation would allow for the 
inclusion of the institutions peculiar to ASA and ASEAN within the accepted 
meaning of the term ’international bureaucracy’, and in the remainder it 
will be assumed that this is the case.
Then, have ASA and ASEAN contributed towards an ’island of 
peace’ in Southeast Asia as seen through their involvement in the Sabah 
dispute?
While it is not necessary in relation to the terms economic
184. Ibid.., pp. 8-10. 185. Ibid., p. 5.
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Nye argues that there are essentially three ways by which a
micro-regional economic organization can affect the propensity of states
to resort to violence. The first is by 1 'raising the price" of violent
186conflict through functional interdependence’. This may be brought
about partially by the creation of a degree of economic interdependence,
the jeopardizing of which may be considered too costly, the creation of
'groups in national societies with a strong vested interest in avoiding
violent conflict and, depending on the various domestic distributions of
power, raise the political cost to leaders of resorting to violence.
When disputes arise, functional interdependence may make them easier for
the two disputants to resolve. The higher each disputant's level of
interest in the other disputant's welfare, the greater the incentives to
187resort to non-violent forms of settlement of a dispute.'
When the Sabah dispute erupted neither ASA nor ASEAN had 
effected any appreciable level of economic interdependence between their 
members which did not exist prior to the formation of both organizations. 
No common projects of a significant value to any of the individual members 
had been implemented. Hence, neither ASA nor ASEAN could be said to have 
spawned the kind of economic relations the threat to which or the dis­
ruption of which represented a net loss in case these organizations 
collapsed. By this very fact it cannot be said that there existed in 
either country groups with a vested interest in avoiding violent conflict 
with a consequent rise in political costs to the leaders of resort to 
violence.
186. Ib id ., p. 109.
187. Ibid., p. 109-110.
However, there remains a sense in which the membership in 
ASEAN represented a 'raising of the price' to both countries. To its 
members ASEAN represented a future asset through which they could exer­
cise greater influence internationally. It had potential as an organ­
ization through which in the first instance their economic well-being 
could be enhanced, and, perhaps later, a greater measure of external 
security achieved. It also had a certain value as a symbol of their 
independence in international affairs.
These and others are themes which repeatedly appear in speeches 
and statements of ASEAN leaders and which cannot be dismissed as rhetoric 
alone. There can be little doubt that in the case of Thailand and Indo­
nesia these were hopes they entertained about the future of ASEAN. As 
already indicated the behaviour of Malaysia and the Philippines during 
the second Sabah crisis can be seen as an indication of the presence 
rather than the absence of such hop§§ among the leaders of the two 
countries. This investment of 'ideal' resources caused Thailand and 
Indonesia to exert pressure on the two disputants to refrain from actions 
which might prove fatal to the association. It similarly caused the Philip­
pines and Malaysia to refrain from actions from which there was no return.
As to ASA it is quite clear that in the sense of an 'ideal' investment or 
commitment, it meant less to the Philippines than ASEAN and it had there­
fore little or no effect on the course of the Sabah dispute. This is a 
point to which a return will be made shortly.
To the extent a micro-regional economic organisation through 
its activities and achievements can create a 'widespread sense of common 
identity or community among populations in a region' , this can have the 
effect of making 'recourse to violence seem illegitimate to leaders and
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important segments of the population’. This is, of course, essent-
189ially Karl Deutsch’s ’security community’ concept and neither ASA
nor ASEAN could be considered to have contributed much since their 
inception to such a state of affairs. Indeed, the Sabah dispute itself 
was a sign that such a level of common identity was far from being real­
ised. Though no violence was involved in the course of the dispute,
190belligerent language and threatening actions were undertaken. How­
ever, although the two organizations could not be said to have contributed 
much to a common identity and a sense of community during their short 
existence, their establishment in themselves was a sign that the polit­
ical leaders of the countries involved had come to realize that they had 
certain interests in common the perception of which is nothing but the 
first necessary step towards the creation of a security community. It
should, however, be added that this perception was something which extended
191only to a limited elite, mainly political leaders.
The 'existing or potential web of interdependence can facil­
itate a shift in the value images held by political leaders of the two
192parties in a dispute and make its "integrative solution" possible.' 
Furthermore, 'a micro-regional economic organization might serve as a 
symbol of a new integrative relationship on which each party would per­
ceive his welfare to be dependent. In principle, and in contrast to the 
previous argument about assertion of a sense of regional identity, it is 
the functional rather than the regional aspects of the organization which
188. Ib id ., p. 110.
189. See Karl Deutscb et al., Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area3 pp. 5-6.
190. See Asian Almanac3 6 July 1968, pp. 2791-2792.
191. See Bernard K. Gordon, "Rhetoric and Reality in Regional 
Cooperation", Solidarity3 July 1971, passim.
192. Nye, op. cit.
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The 'integrative solution' of the Sabah dispute was brought about when 
the Philippines terminated its active pursuit of the claim. As indi­
cated above this happened when the Philippines realised the full impli­
cations of continuing with the claim. She opted for ASEAN because it
served 'as a symbol of a new integrative relationship in which she per-
194ceived her welfare to be dependent . In other words, the Sabah
claim was downgraded in favour of the relationship within ASEAN.
This brings us to a point touched on above, namely the sig­
nificance of the international environment and the foreign policy options 
available to countries such as the members of ASA and ASEAN. It is 
important because it may throw light on the different roles ASA and ASEAN 
played in relation to the Sabah dispute. In 1962-63 the Philippines' 
commitment to ASA was by all accounts low. The Macapagal Administration 
was considerably more intent on promoting the scheme which later became 
Maphilindo and which figured prominently in the tactics she employed in 
her pursuit of the Sabah claim. In these policies the Philippines had 
the important support of Indonesia. Indeed, the Philippines had several 
options which otherwise would not have been open to her, had she not seen 
her interests best served by a close relationship with Indonesia under 
Sukarno. It is significant that the strength of her own pursuit of the 
Sabah claim diminished proportionately with her growing disenchantment 
with the violent methods used by Indonesia in the confrontation with Malaysia. 
This disenchantment was also fed by Indonesia's own increasing isolation 
caused by the conflict with Malaysia. As the Philippines began to consider
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193are the crucial factor in this model of conflict resolution.'
193. Ib id ., p. 111.
194. Ibid.
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her association with Indonesia a liability rather than an asset, she 
began to place higher value on former regional relationships.
In 1968-69 the Philippines found herself a part of an 
entirely different constellation of forces. This time she was a member 
of a regional organization with four other countries, including her 
former ally Indonesia, which now was under a different group of leaders 
with a completely different attitude towards regional cooperation and 
organization. The relationship with this ’new' Indonesia was cordial 
but the big difference now was that she no longer could count on Indonesian 
support for her claim to Sabah. Nor was there much support from other 
sources. In this situation the pursuit of the Sabah claim was consider­
ably more risky than it had been some five or six years earlier. Her 
foreign policy options, especially in relation to Southeast Asia, were to 
a considerable extent concentrated in ASEAN outside of which a few meaning­
ful regional options exigted. The extent to which this was realised in 
the Philippines is indicated by the frequent references to the Sabah claim 
as being possible to pursue without damage to ASEAN. And as argued above, 
an important reason for the termination of the pursuit of the claim was 
the reduction in value of another important foreign policy option, namely 
the relationship with the United States. As noted already the Philippine 
reaction to what was perceived as the imminent change in American policies 
away from Asia and herself, was to stress her ties with Asia. Hence, by 
late 1968 and early 1969 ASEAN appeared to the Philippines as well as 
Malaysia as the only viable alternative for closer regional relations.
The preceding analysis would seem to support at least one 
tentative conclusion of a more general nature. In a situation where 
membership in micro-regional economic organization is one among a very 
limited number of foreign policy options available to a country, this
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membership will tend to take on a value it otherwise would not have and 
will serve as a restraint on its behaviour in a conflict with another 
country despite the fact that membership in the organization has not 
yielded any tangible benefits. Apart from the "ideal" or potential 
value of membership, the scarcity of other options may serve the same 
purpose as an 'economic web of interdependence' in restraining the con­
flict behaviour of member states, essentially because of the risk of 
limiting further an already severely circumscribed number of options 
in the field of foreign relations.
There is one further point to be made which has special rele­
vance to ASEAN and less so to ASA. Although ASEAN is a micro-regional 
economic organization and as such would seem to have had a measure of 
influence on the course of the Sabah dispute, in some respects it nonethe­
less behaved in a fashion characteristic of a macro-regional political 
organization.
According to Nye the latter type of organization can play
essentially two roles in the control of conflict; '1 ) the organisation
can serve as a forum or place to meet and debate, and 2) the organisation
195can have an executive role in carrying out operations.' While ASEAN
did not possess the 'material resources' and the administrative machinery
to act in accordance with the latter of the two roles, it did possess some
196of the 'ideal resources' necessary to fulfil a function commensurate
to the first role. In particular ASEAN possessed an image of impartiality 
as 'personified' by Thailand and Indonesia and the two disputants could 
come together under the pretext of attending an ASEAN meeting. This was
195. Ib id ., p. 135.
196. See ibid., p. 133 for an explanation of 'material' and 'ideal 
resources'.
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the case in Djakarta in August 1968, and when diplomatic relations 
between them were ruptured they could still maintain contact by shifting 
the venue from bilateral channels to the 'neutral1 ground of an ASEAN 
meeting, as in the foreign ministers' meeting in Bangkok in December 
1968 and the secretary generals' meeting May 1969. Thus, it would seem 
that ASEAN in effect managed to play a part in the Sabah dispute which 
combined features of the roles usually ascribed to one or the other of 
the two types of organization. In a situation where no macro-regional ' 
political organization existed it was perhaps natural that ASEAN should 
fulfil some of the functions usually attributed to this type of organ­
ization. And therein lay perhaps some of the explanation for ASEAN's 
success, limited though it was. In making up for its deficiency as a 
micro-regional economic organization by partially 'usurping' the role of 
macro-regional political organization it was able to exert influences 
beyond what normally would have been the case. This suggests that the 
division between the two types of organizations is not all that clear 
when it comes to conflict resolution and control.
151.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND ETHNO^NATIONALISM
Among the many broad trends observable in the present day inter­
national system are two which, while being salient, would appear to be 
contradictory. On the one hand there has been in this century an increasing 
tendency for the peoples of the world to organize themselves to achieve 
shared goals. Governments and private groups have come together in organ­
izations and associations the functional scope and variety of which 
transcend international boundaries and go beyond anything seen before. ^
Looked at from the perspective of international integration this increased 
cooperation in its various forms constitutes the embryonic first step in a 
process of international integration and must as such be considered with 
favour by those for whom international integration is a desirable objective.
At the same time an increased fragmentation of the international 
system has taken place by the break up of large colonial empires brought 
about by the process of decolonization. Although this latter process has 
now largely petered out, new tendencies have become discernable. If carried 
to their logical conclusion these may, single or in conjunction with others, 
lead to a further fragmentation of the international system on an unparal­
leled scale through a process of disintegration and partition of states at 
present united, at least formally, under one government. These tendencies can
Chapter 4
1. For the growth in international governmental organizations, see 
Michael D. Wallace and J. David Singer, "Inter governmental 
Organization in the Global System 1815-1964. A Quantitative 
Description." International Organization, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 
(Spring 1970) pp. 239-287. As far as private international 
organizations are concerned, see Kjell Skjelsbeck, "The Growth 
of International Non-governmental Organizations in the Twentieth 
Century". International Organization, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (Summer 
1971) pp. 420-442.
be seen in states with a multiplicity of ethnic or national groups within
their boundaries and whose citizens may give their first loyalty to their
2ethnic or national group rather than to their country. Thus, while 
integration processes at the international level point to an international 
system with fewer states or members, disintegration at the national level, 
often directly traceable to ethnic identification and conflict, may point 
to a future system with a membership many times that of today.
This chapter will seek to examine the relationship between level 
of domestic or internal integration and the ability or capacity of the 
states of Southeast Asia to participate in processes of cooperation and 
integration at the international level, and it will be done through an 
examination of the special integration problems posed by the existence of 
numerous ethnic minorities in all the countries of the region. The analysis 
will in particular be related to an empirical generalization advanced by 
Ernst Haas to the effect that ’[countries] which are poorly integrated 
internally make poor partners in a regional integration process because of
3the reluctance of the leaders to further undermine their control at home’.
2. See in particular Walker Connor, "Self-determination: The New Phase", 
World Politics, Vol. XX, No. 1 (October 1967). See also by the same 
author, "Ethnology and the Peace in South Asia", World Politics,
Vol. XXII , No. 1 (October 1969), and "Nation-Building or Nation- 
Destroying", World Politics3 Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (April 1972). The 
last article contains a telling and instructive criticism of the 
confusing usage of the terms 'nation' and 'state' in the literature 
on political development as well as international relations, see 
pp. 332-336. In this chapter the terms ethnic groups and nation 
will be used interchangeably. However, since the meaning of the 
term nationalism, as conveying the idea of an emotion that 'makes 
the state the ultimate focus of the individual's loyalty', is so 
well established in the minds of laymen and scholars alike, this 
chapter will refrain from using this term however correct and 
logical such usage may be. More cumbersome though it may be, ethnic 
or national consciousness will be used instead to denote those 
loyalties directed toward the ethnic group or nation.
3. "The Study of Regional Integration", p. 619.
Before, however, proceeding to examine the role and influence of 
ethnic minorities in Southeast Asia in detail it is necessary to say a few 
words towards a clarification of the problem.
Myron Weiner has identified five different uses of the term inte-
4gration in the literature on internal or domestic development. Following 
his example national integration means that which ’...refers specifically 
to the problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality which over­
shadows - or eliminates - subordinate parochial loyalties' ; territorial 
integration that which '...refers to the objective control which central 
authority has over the entire territory under its claimed jurisdiction' 
elite-mass integration that which '...refers to the problem of linking 
government to the governed', of bridging the gap between the elite and the 
mass; value integration that which '...refers to the minimum value consensus 
necessary to maintain a social order' and integrative behaviour means 
that which '...refers to the capacity of people in a society to organize
g
for some common purpose'. All these definitions are attempts '...to
9define what it is which holds a society and a political system together'.
These definitions, however, have more in common than the last 
sentence would seem to indicate. Integration of any kind is, in the final 
analysis, about the attitudes, values and behaviour of human beings. It 
is difficult, therefore, to see how people can organise for a common pur­
pose, or how they can possess a sense of territorial nationality, or, indeed, 
how governments can exercise objective control over their territory without
15 3.
4. Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development", 
in Claude E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), Political Modernization (Belmont, 
California: Woolsworth Publishing Company, 1967) pp. 150-156.
5. Ibid ., pp. 150-151.
6. Ibid ., p. 151. 7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. 9. Ibid ., p. 152.
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there also being a minimum value consensus. Similarly objective territorial 
authority can hardly exist without a sense of territorial nationality 
unless, of course, oppression and violence are used in the pursuit of 
territorial control. If the latter is the case it is doubtful that one 
can talk about integration at all since violence caused by such endeavours 
may at best be a sign of non-integration and at worst a sign of disinte­
gration. Thus the various forms of integration are interdependent; they 
are different aspects of the same phenomenon.
As long as the commonalities are remembered it may nevertheless 
be fruitful to split in the above manner the concept of integration into 
components so that each reflects an emphasis on a particular 'integration 
problem'. Thus while one may have a relatively high degree of value inte­
gration, i.e., a minimum consensus with regard to, for instance, '...what 
constitutes desirable and undesirable social ends' ^  or '...the instrument­
alities and procedures for the achievement of goals and for resolving 
conflicts' one may at the same time have a relatively low degree of
territorial integration because the latter is to some extent dependent on 
physical capabilities which may not be available. Hence, integration is a 
multifaceted process consisting of a number of components interacting in 
an interdependent fashion.
To integrate ethnic minorities into the political, economic and 
social structure of a society is, of course, ultimately to find solutions 
to all these different integration problems. Thus ethnic integration 
clearly implies national integration according to the definition above. 
Ethnic integration also implies territorial integration to the extent the 
ethnic minorities in question can be said to be territorial, that is, show
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid ., p. 151,
a persistent attachment to a specific territory. Accordingly the inte­
gration of the overseas Chinese and Indian communities in Southeast Asia 
is much less a question of territorial than national, value, and elite- 
mass integration because the Chinese and the Indians are on the whole not 
territorial in the above sense. They have by and large settled in the 
towns and the cities where they are only two among many ethnic groups and
to which they cannot, reasonably or justifiably, lay any exclusive 
12claim. Other minorities are in the same situation. The Vietnamese in
Cambodia and the Khmer in Vietnam are also largely without any acknowledged
13'title' to particular territories.
Ethnic integration also implies elite-mass integration. Quite
14often this means establishing '...a pattern of authority and consent...'
between the elite, drawn and recruited from the dominant majority, and the
mass of which the minorities are but a part. Perhaps above all else
minority integration implies value integration, that is, that there exist,
at a minimum, '...acceptable procedures for the resolution of conflict'.^"*
Finally, ethnic integration also implies a certain amount of integrative
behaviour, that is, a '...readiness of individuals to work together in an
organized fashion for common purposes and to behave in a fashion conducive
16to the achievement of these common purposes...'
These integration problems are, of course, not solely connected 
to ethnic integration. They are present in the integration of all social 
entities. However, there remains a sense in which the integration of 
ethnic minorities poses problems different from those arising from the
12. Ib id ., p. 152.
13. The exception to this rule is, of course, Singapore.
14. Cf Michael Leifer, Cambodia (London: Frederick A. Praeger,
1967) pp. 95-96 about the quarrel between Cambodia and 
South Vietnam over certain off-shore islands.
15. Weiner, op. a it ., p. 160.
16. Ib id ., p. 158.
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integration of other social entities, and1, the consequences accruing from 
the non~integration of ethnic minorities may, indeed, be quite dissimilar 
to those which arise from the non-integration of other social entities.
An ethnic group, at least in the context of the developing 
countries, is by contrast with other social units often a fairly compre­
hensive and discrete entity whose existence as such is justified in terms 
of its dissimilarities to other units and its ability to fulfil certain 
needs of its members in a manner other entities cannot. A non-integrated 
multi-nation state is a collection of such discrete units each of which 
performs a set of functions primarily developed for the purpose of self­
maintenance. In the case of the majority groups these functions coincide 
with the functions of maintaining the political system of the state. Inte­
gration may be seen and often is considered to be the process whereby the 
various ethnic groups change their functions in such a way that state- 
maintenance rather than self-maintenance becomes the primary goal. As will 
be seen later state-maintenance is quite often indistinguishable from 
majority-maintenance. Hence, the onus for change is on the minorities.
These brief observations related to ethnic minorities and inter­
nal integration will be useful for the understanding of the minority sit­
uation in Southeast Asia to which the discussion now will turn.
BACKGROUND
In sharp contrast to Africa the political map of Southeast Asia 
bears some resemblance to the immediate pre-colonial state of affairs as 
far as geographical location and extent of the political units are con­
cerned. 17 However, today as distinct from then, a number of ethnic groups find 
themselves divided by rigidly drawn boundaries signalling the physical 
limits of the polities to which they are expected to give their loyalties.
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brought with them alien boundary concepts and arbitrary practices which
18paid little heed to local factors and considerations. Delimited or
demarcated boundaries did not exist but rather fluid frontiers or border
zones the territory of which was claimed now by one and now by the other
of the states according to their strength, power and intentions of the
day. These frontiers were zones of contact and occasional, sometimes
frequent, warfare and always subject to change. ’Though the essence of
sovereignty was of great importance the territorial aspect of sovereignty
19was in fact negotiable'. If for one reason or another they felt dis­
contented ethnic and tribal groups could move from the area of effective
control of one government to that of another without creating undue con- 
20cern.
However, even though the boundary concepts introduced by 
the colonial powers were alien to the region their rigidity compared to 
indigenous concepts was considerably eased by practice. Through the 
establishment of boundaries and by providing basic security in the border 
areas the colonial powers had signalled an end to further territorial 
expansion on the part of some pre-colonial political units. Cambodia, 
for example, was facing nearly certain extinction as an independent pol­
itical entity and was only saved by the intervention of France in Indo-China
and the resulting unwillingness of the Thai to face the consequences of a
21war with the French. But though the colonial powers thus introduced
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This is a heritage of the colonial era during which the imperial powers
18. Charles F. Fisher, "Southeast Asia: The Balkans of the Orient?
A Study in Continuity and Change," Geography3 Vol. XLVIII 
(November 1962) p. 354.
19. Robert L. Solomon, "Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast 
Asia," World Politicss Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (October 1970) pp.1-23.
20. Ibid, j p. 3.
21. Kunstadter (ed.), Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations,p.29.
warfare in many areas, they did not impose any strict border control.
The movement of people across the new boundaries continued in much the
same way it had across the previously more fluid frontiers. Admin-
22istratively these border areas were largely left alone. The colonial
powers, predominantly preoccupied with the coastal areas, the broad 
river valleys and deltas, and the regions immediately adjacent to these 
were not much interested in or found it very difficult to completely 
control the border areas which in most cases constituted the more remote 
parts. This situation still prevails in many areas of Southeast Asia 
today perhaps less because of lack of willingness than for want of capab­
ilities, administrative or otherwise, to enforce effective control and 
strong government right up to the boundaries. In fact today the govern­
ments of Southeast Asia have found that they have to pay attention to 
their ethnic minorities, especially those located on their borders,
because these areas in many cases have taken on a strategic importance
23they did not possess in colonial times.
In turning to examine specific cases of ethnicity and its 
significance in the Southeast Asian context a start will be made with a 
case altogether different in most respects from all the others.
THE SEPARATION OF SINGAPORE ^ROM MALAYSIA
It is not altogether easy to single out the ethnic component 
in a situation as complex as that which surrounded both the establishment 
of the Federation of Malaysia and Singapore's departure from it. The 
ethnic cleavages and especially those between the major ethnic groups, the
security against invasion and also put a stop to the almost constant
22. Alistair Lamb, Asian Frontiers3 pp. 180-181.
23. Solomon, op. oit . 3 p. 7.
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Malays and the Chinese, are the most persistent and important divisions in
24contemporary Malaysian society. Unlike the situation in all other
countries in Southeast Asia, these two groups, neither of which have an
absolute majority in terms of population, are roughly equal in size, the
Malays (in 1960) comprising about 49 per cent and the Chinese about 32
25per cent of the total population in Malaya. The ethnic cleavages are
not cut across by other divisions strong enough to somewhat 'defuse' the
impact of ethnicity as in so many other pluralist societies but rather
reinforced by having religious and linguistic cleavages superimposed on
26them thereby aggravating the effect. Nearly every political, economic
27and social question becomes also a question of ethnicity.
Historical developments took place in Malaya whereby the immi­
grant race, the Chinese, obtained through their efforts a predominant 
position in the territory's economic life compared to the Malays. The 
Chinese massed more wealth, acquired on the whole better education and 
concentrated to a large extent in the urban areas - all factors which 
gave them a decisive edge over the predominantly rural, less educated and
economically less prosperous and less industrious Malays when it came to
28the competition for political power and economic rewards. The Malays,
24. R.S. Milne, Government and Polities in Malaysia.
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1967), pp. 3-10.
25. Ibid., p. 4.
26. Ib id ., p. 228-229. 27. Ib id ., Ch. 13.
28. For a more detailed description of social and economic dev­
elopment in the last couple of decades preceding independence, 
see J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya (London: Macmillan, 1970,
2 ed.) esp. ch. 12; Wang Gungwu (ed.). Malaysias (Melbourne: 
Cheshire, 1964) esp. parts one, two and three; J.M. Gullick 
Malaya, (London: Ernest Benn, 1964, 2 ed), chs. 4-10. See 
also K.J. Ratman, Communalism and the Political Process in 
Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965) esp. 
ch. 1 for a detailed and valuable analysis of cleavages in 
Malaysian society.
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by virtue of being the indigenous race, had however, led a somewhat 
protected life under the British who gave to the Malays special political 
status by maintaining and ruling through the traditional Malay rulers
29and by excluding non-Malays from the civil service in the Malay states.
When Malaya became independent in 1957 her constitution
reflected a division of economic and political power between the major
ethnic groups which was in some respects the result of a determined
campaign on the part of the Malays in the years before independence to
hold on to their superior political position. While the Malays were
automatically citizens, only the Chinese and Indians born in Malaya were
able to claim citizenship. Thus the constitution in effect gave for a
considerable time into the future predominant political power to the Malays.
Islam was to be the official religion of the state and Malay was granted
status as the sole national language after 1967 until which time English
enjoyed equal status. In addition Malays were given certain privileges in
respect of land, tenure, entry to the civil service, education and the
30issuance of business permits and licences. The protection and advant­
ages given the Malays were meant to serve as the vehicle by which they 
would catch up with the non-Malays and join these on an equal basis in 
the competition for influence and rewards.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malay Prime Minister and other Malay 
leaders had for a long time been against a union with Singapore for basic­
ally three reasons. The two most longstanding ones were on the basis of 
economics and race. Economically it was believed that the two were too 
much in contrast Singapore relying nearly entirely on a free trade policy
29. Gullick, op. cit.y pp. 41-49.
30. Ibid ., pp. 120-1 2 1.
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in order to stimulate entrepot trade while Malaya was essentially a primary
and raw material producing country relying on revenues from export and
import duties. The most important argument, however, was the racial one.
A union would have upset the racial balance by resulting in a slight
31Chinese population majority over the Malays in the new entity.
The third and last reason entered the calculations in the 
second half of the 1950’s. This was what appeared to the Malayan leaders 
to be the basically unstable and leftward trend of Singapore politics.
In the eyes of the Malayan leaders political life in Singapore was increas-
32ingly coming under communist influence.
The turning point in the campaign for a closer relationship
between Singapore and Malaya came in May 1961 when the Tunku in a speech
before the Foreign Correspondants Association of Southeast Asia almost
casually suggested that Malaya sooner or later should have an understanding
with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, Bornoe,
33Brunei and Sarawak. Although he refrained from spelling out the nature
of the envisioned relationship in any detail the Tunku talked about '...a 
plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political 
and economic cooperation'. ^
The acceptance by the Tunku and other Malay leaders on the main­
land of the idea of a merger between Singapore and Malaya was a complete' 
reversal of previous policy. Such a reversal can only have come about if
31. Kennedy, op. cit. p. 283: Gullick, ibid. pp. 88-89; see also 
Willard A. Hanna, Eight Nation-Makers. Southeast Asia’s Charismatic 
Statesmen. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964) p. 114.
32. Milton E. Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia, New York; Ithaca:
Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 53,
1964, pp. 4-6 and 10.
33. Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger,(Singapore:
Government Printing Office, n.d.) p. 122.
34. Ibid.
the ethnic groups in Malaya had been superceded by some other immediate
and pressing problem. In fact such an issue had come up. What previously
had been considered an obstacle to a merger by the Kuala Lumpur leaders,
namely the unstable and leftwing nature of politics in Singapore, was now
seen as the most urgent reason for a closer relationship thus pushing
ethnic considerations into the background to the benefit of what the Tunku
saw as the only solution to the security problem of Malaya. Events in
35Singapore after 1959 with serious splits in the ranks of the ruling 
People1s Action Party of Lee Kuan Yew had cast doubt on the ability of 
the Singapore government to govern effectively and events during the 
first two or three months of 1961 had further served to increase the Mal­
ayan fears and anxieties about what the future might have in store in 
regard to both Malaya and Singapore once Britain granted independence to 
the latter. To the Malayan leaders who for twelve years had fought a
communist insurgency the thought of a possible communist ruled Singapore
36was a bleak one indeed. It was clear to the Malayan leaders that
Singapore’s independence would come sooner rather than later. Not only
would British control then be a thing of the past but so would also the
small amount of direct influence the Federation of Malaya had in Singapore
37through its membership in the Internal Security Council.
Although having been pushed somewhat in the background ethnic 
considerations had not been forgotten. Once the decision to establish 
Malaysia with Singapore as a member had been taken it became important to
35. Singapore obtained self-government in 1959.
36. Osborne, op. a it ., pp. 13-15, Gordon P. Means, "Malaysia - A New 
Federation in Southeast Asia". Pacific Affairs3 Vol. XXXVI,
No. 2 (Summer 1963), pp. 138-139.
37. This body was established under the 1958 Singapore constitution and it 
was composed of two British, two Singapore and one Malayan represent­
ative of ministerial rank who in the case of deadlock between the 
others on internal security matters, would have the casting vote.
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the importance the Tunku attached to the maintenance of the balance between
soften the impact of Singapore's large Chinese majority as much as 
possible, hopefully to the extent that the existing racial and political 
balance in Malaya could be maintained. To achieve this North Borneo 
(Sabah) and Sarawak were brought into the Federation scheme and gave it 
thereby an ethnic ratio fairly similar to that which had prevailed in
M i 38Malaya.
The second step in limiting Singapore’s influence in Malaya
was, what has been referred to as, the political 'insulation' of Malaya
39from Singapore. Two means were used to achieve this. Firstly, Singapore
was given only 15 seats of the 159 seats in the Federal Parliament in Kuala 
Lumpur although on the basis of her population she would have been entitled 
to nearly twice as many. By contrast Sabah and Sarawak with much smaller 
electorates were given 16 and 24 seats respectively. The reason for this 
apparent inequity was ostensibly the considerable degree of local autonomy 
retained by Singapore and her urban character as opposed to the pre­
dominantly rural territories of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak. Secondly, 
according to the constitutional provisions citizens of Singapore could 
neither vote nor stand for federal or state office in the States of 
Malaya, and, similarly, only Singapore citizens could be elected to office 
in Singapore.
Malaysia came into existence on September 16, 1963. The rel­
ationship between Malaya and Singapore within the Federation became
163.
38. Means, op. oit., pp. 139-140.
39. R.S. Milne, "Singapore's Exit from Malaysia: The consequences 
of Ambiguity", Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 3 (March 1966),
pp. 1975-184. See also Osborne, op. cit., pp. 40-42 and 
Nancy McHenry Fletcher, The Separation of Singapore from 
Malaysia, New York, Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast 
Asia Program, Data Paper No. 73, 1969, pp. 29-30.
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increasingly a battle between energetic Chinese leaders in Singapore 
holding political and economic ideas which in their opinion had applic­
ability not only to Singapore but to Malaysia as a whole, and the more
40conservative Malay leaders on the mainland whose political ideas
and perceptions of the situation in Malaya forced them to vigorously
oppose the attempts of the Singapore leaders to make political inroads
in Malaya. The issues involved were many and varied indeed. Some
41originated from the terms of the Malaysia agreement itself , others
were due to personal animosities among some of the principal personalities
42involved. But as time wore on the conflict became increasingly ethnic
in character. More and more of it centered around expressions of ethnic 
origin, loyalties, privileges, rights, relationships, etc. The political, 
economic and social issues that arose came to be seen increasingly through 
ethnic glasses.
Among the potentially important issues the economic very 
quickly became a matter of contention and stress. Apart from the direct 
bearing such issues had on the end result - they constituted indeed 
problems whose solutions could make or break any newly established 
federation - they became important also insofar as they contributed to 
and augmented the ill feelings and mistrust that came to exist.
40. See, for example, Hanna, op. c it ., the chapter on the Tunku.
See also Fletcher, ibid ., p. 3.
41. Several of the economic and political terms negotiated were 
rather general and vague in formulation leaving much room for 
interpretation. On this point see Osborne, op. c it ., pp. 60-61 for 
an anticipation of what happened later. See also Milne, "Singapore's 
Exit", passim and Fletcher, ibid, passim.
42. See the reference to this factor in Fletcher, ib id ., p. 11, Osborne, 
ibid, pp. 48-49, and Willard H. Hanna, The Separation of Singapore 
from Malaysia, American Universitites Field Staff, Southeast Asia 
Series, Vol. XIII, No. 21, pp. 3-9.
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events both in their direct role in the separation and in their role in
augmenting ethnic feelings and eventually putting these at the center of
43the dispute were the political.
Notwithstanding hopes and intentions, the insulation of Singa­
pore referred to above was not complete, as events were to show. There 
were no provisions prohibiting Singapore’s political parties from estab­
lishing branches in Malaya and recruiting locals to stand as candidates.
By the same token similar arrangements could be made by the political 
parties in Malaya in regard to Singapore. This had as a matter of fact 
been the state of affairs in Singapore since the 1950s when the Singapore 
Branch of the mainland Alliance parties contested the 1955 and subsequent 
elections in Singapore.
Thus the not-so-perfect 'insulation' provided ample opportunity 
for both actors to enter each other's territory. Both proceeded to do 
just that. In the Singapore state elections of 21 September 1963 the PAP 
emerged as the victorious party by capturing 37 of the 51 seats as against 
the 13 seats won by its chief opponent, the leftwing Barisan Sosialis.
More important still was the loss of all its seats, seven all told, suffered
by the Singapore People's Alliance. More humiliating even, in view of UMNO 
i 44Malaya s wholehearted backing of its Singapore counterpart, was the fact 
that in three of the constituences the majority of the electorate was
However, the most important issues to influence the course of
43. Fletcher, ibid . 3 p. 2.
44. United Malay National Organization, the party of the Tunku, and 
the senior partner in the Alliance in Malaya. The Alliance 
also have two other members basically ethnic in character, the 
Malay Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malay Indian Congress 
(MIC) .
45. Fletcher, op. oit. 3 pp. 31-37, Hanna, The Separation3 p. 10.
The PAP decision to enter the state and federal elections in
Malaya in April 1964 was perhaps the most crucial decision it made during
the entire period as a part of Malaysia. Ostensibly the PAP participated
in the election to oppose the MCA and the Socialist Front and thereby
prevent Malaysia from being drawn into the Indonesian orbit. According
to PAP calculations a party was needed which could attract the urban
Chinese votes now in danger of being lost to the Socialist Front, an anti-
Malaysia and pro-Indonesia party. The MCA had previously captured these
votes but now, according to PAP analysis, the antipathy for the MCA was
46strong among the urban Chinese. The PAP, however studiously avoided
attacking the UMNO. On the contrary, according to PAP propaganda its
primary purpose was to ensure the continued leadership of the Tunku and 
47Tun Razak.
The PAP emerged from the elections as the clear loser in most 
people's eyes. It gained only one seat of the nine it contested in the 
federal election. ^
To the MCA and the UMNO the PAP's intervention was inter­
preted not only as a challenge to the MCA but also to the entire Alliance 
Government. It threatened in their eyes to split both the Chinese and the
Malay votes and thereby overturn the carefully worked out balance between
49the MCA and the UMNO in particular.
The PAP participation in the Malayan election inspired a 
number of events which increasingly brought ethnic tension into the open.
45. Fletcher, op. cit . 3 pp. 31-37, Hanna, The Separation3 p. 10.
46. Fletcher, ibid. , p. 35, Hanna, ibid., p. 11.
47. Asian Almanac, 1964, p. 526.
48. Fletcher, op. cit . 3 p. 38-39. 49. Hanna, op. cit . 3 p. 12.
Malay . To the Alliance leaders this was indeed an alarming development.
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An example was the PAP decision to establish branches in all the Malay 
states where it had contested elections despite its defeat.
In July 1964, not long after the Malayan elections, the UNMO 
struck back at the PAP by calling a counter-meeting in Singapore to one 
called by the Singapore Government with a number of non-political, 
Singapore-based, Malay organizations to discuss the problems of the 
Malays. ^  When race riots occurred at the end of July and again in 
September they were blamed on the heated discussions with ethnic over­
tones that characterized and surrounded these meetings. The PAP and
52UMNO blamed each other for inciting to violence.
The tensions had reached such heights that the Tunku met
with Lee Kuan Yew in late September and they agreed on a two year embargo
on discussions of issues that could exacerbate ethnic feelings. This
53truce lasted about a month.
The next big issue arose in April 1965 when the Malaysian 
National Alliance Party was formed by a merger of all the Alliance branches 
in Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. This event speeded up the imple­
mentation of a proposal, discussed the previous year by the PAP, to form a 
united opposition front. Five Malaysian opposition parties met in Singa­
pore on May 9 and formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention. Ostensibly
non-communal in character the support of all these parties came nevertheless
54predominantly from the non-Malays, especially the Chinese.
50. Hanna, ibid ., pp. 12-13, Fletcher, op. o it .} pp. 40-41.
51. Fletcher, ibid ., pp. 40-42.
52. Ib id ., pp. 42-44; Hanna, op. o it .y pp. 13-14.
53. Fletcher, ibid ., p. 45.
54. Ib id ., pp. 49-50.
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six days after another event which brought tempers to near boiling point.
On May 3 Lee Kuan Yew in a speech to the PAP had said that none of the
three major ethnic groups in Malaysia - the Chinese, the Malays and the
Indians could claim to be more native to Malaysia than the others. The
reaction was swift and emotional. Tun Razak called the statement
mischievous and dangerous*. The Minister for Information and Broadcasting
in the Federation said Lee had humiliated the Malays. The UMNO Secretary
55General described Lee's statement as a 'slap in the face of the Malays'.
When UMNO held its annual general assembly in mid-May a
resolution was passed urging 'strong action' against Lee. There were also
5 6those who advocated Lee should be put in detention and Lee's effigy 
was burnt. 7
On August 9, 1965, after further arguments, Singapore separated
from Malaysia. The Tunku had decided this was the only solution. The
58fundamental reason given by him was the threat of communal violence.
Thus ethnic nationalism, pushed into the background to facil­
itate the formation of Malaysia, had again surfaced as the strongest force 
and served as the fundamental cause for the dismembering of Singapore 
from Malaysia.
ETHNIC MINORITIES IN BURMA
No central government in Southeast Asia has had so much diffic-
59ulty with its minorities as that of the Union of Burma . Her inter­
The formation of the Convention came unfortunately a bare
55. Asian Almanac3 p. 1218. 56. Ib id .s pp. 1216-1217.
57. The Australians 14 May 1965; see also Fletcher, op. c it ., pp. 62-66.
58. Fletcher, ib id .3 p. 6 6.
59. For a fairly detailed description of events involving ethnic minorities 
from 1948 to 1960, see Tinker, The Union of Burma3 esp. pp. 34-61, and 
Trager, Burma, pp. 95-139. For a description of the population and 
linguistic affiliations of ethnic groups in Burma, see Kunstadter,
op. c it .3 pp. 73-146.
national boundaries with Bangla Desh, India, Laos, China and Thailand, 
situated in mountainous regions, are occupied by a multitude of ethnic 
minority groups such as the Chin, Kachin, Wa, Shan, Ka en and Mon who 
are non-Burmese speakers and who also differ from the majority group, 
the Burmans, in other aspects of culture. The Burmans never exercised firm 
political control over these minority groups, a task made more difficult 
by the fact that some of them rivalled the Burmans in terms of cultural 
development and political influence. This was recognized by the British 
who gave groups like the Shan and the Kayah (Red Karen) special adminis­
trative status within which traditional patterns of leadership were 
maintained and sometimes reinforced. ^
When the Union of Burma was formed as a result of Britain's 
granting of independence in 1948 some of these ethnic groups formed their 
own states within the Union. Much of Burma's life since 1948 has been 
marked by a long and violent struggle on the part of various ethnic 
minorities to assert their political and cultural independence. ^
While this struggle nearly caused the Union to break up in
6 2the first couple of years after independence the Central Government,
never in complete control of the situation, has had ever since to learn
6 3to live with the various forms of insurgency and rebellion.
60. Kunstadter, ibid., p. 75. 61. Ib id ., pp. 75-76.
62. It was not until the end of 1951 that the various rebel groups 
ceased to constitute an alternative to the government and that
a certain measure of security returned. See Tinker, op.oit . 3 pp.49-5
63. In late 1957 a new threat appeared in the shape of Chinese Nation­
alists in the Kengtung area of the Shan states. These were troops 
which, after Chiang Kai-Shek*s collapse on the main-land and sub­
sequent withdrawal to Taiwan, had withdrawn into Burma where they 
in the years that followed and even today constitute a problem, 
albeit today much less so than in the years immediately following 
1951. See Tinker, op. cit . 3 pp. 50-55. See also William C. 
Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Potioy (Cambridge and Harvard University 
Press, 1963) for an assessment of the effect of the KMT Troops 
issue on Burma's foreign relations.
communist. It has not always been easy to distinguish the two from each
other since there have on occasions been cooperation between various
ethnic and communist groups and also since there are in the communist
ranks a considerable number of ethnic minorities.
The basic and most salient feature of the rebel movements in
Burma has been their lack of common purpose and inability to cooperate.
Not only are there divisions between the various ethnic groups but also
within the groups themselves. Thus the Karens, for example, were organized
in the early stages into at least two different groups with partially
conflicting policies. One group, the Karen Youth Organization, remained
loyal to the Government in the time after independence while the other
group, the Karen National Union, broke with the Government and launched
64their insurrection in mid 1948 . The Communists are also split. One 
group, the smaller of the two, exists under the name the Communist Party 
of Burma, also called the 'Red Flag' communists, and the other under the 
name the Burma Communist Party (BCP), also called the ’White Flag’ com- 
• - 65 munists.
The rebellions in the years 1948-51 were dominated to a large
66extent by the communists and the Karens. The fact that they did not
manage to defeat the Union Government in those years may be attributed
to a number of factors among which weaknesses within the insurgent movements
themselves were among the most important. Personal rivalry and ideological
differences hindered the various groups from ever launching a concerted and
coordinated campaign although the overthrow of the Government was the
67immediate goal shared by all.
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The rebellions in Burma have been of two kinds, ethnic and
64. See Trager, Burma, op. cit. 3 pp. 103 and 105.
65. Ib id., p. 97. 6 6. Ibid., p. 106. 
67 . Ibid. y p. 120.
1951. Throughout the 1950s the Government was forced, however, to be
on the alert. Military operations of some scale were conducted against
the Karen National Union, and the communist groups, especially the White
Flags, in 1953, 1954 and 1955. 69
Among the ethnic groups it was mainly the Karens who were in
rebellion against the Union government in those early years. Other
groups like the Kachin, Chin and Shans remained on the whole loyal to the
Union. However, in the early 1960s also elements within these groups
rebelled and particularly the military government of Ne Win has had to
contend with a multitude of insurgent ethnic movements. Indeed one of
the main reasons for Ne Win's coup in 1962 was precisely the rise in
insurrectionary activity and what was seen as UN's leniency towards minority
72demands for autonomy and the right to secede. But in the time since he
has not been successful in his attempts to put down the rebellions, neither
the ethnic nor the communist variety.
Various means have been used in these attempts. In April 1963
the Revolutionary Council of Ne Win offered amnesty to all rebels if they
73laid down their arms before 1 July. On 11 June the Council proposed
unconditional negotiations with guarantees for safe passage for those
6 8. Ibid., p. 115.
69. Tinker, op. cit . 3 pp. 54-60.
70. Träger, op. cit. 3 p. 107.
71. In March 1962 the military under General Ne Win staged a coup 
against the government of U Nu. The country was led from then 
on by a Revolutionary Council, exercising absolute power under 
the leadership of Ne Win. See Träger, op. cit . 3 pp. 190-211.
72. Träger, ibid. > pp. 191-198.
73. The Nation3 2 April 1963. See also Far Eastern Economic Review3
22 August, 1963, pp. 529-530.
The main thrust of the insurgent movements faltered during
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groups who accepted this offer. Over the next few months delegates from
the communist groups and the various ethnic rebel groups came forward.
In November however it became clear that all the talks, except those
with the KNDO which dragged on, had failed. The talks with the Karen
went on until March 12 1964 when an agreement was signed that ended all
74the Karen rebellions.
Thus by March 1964 the Government had achieved a limited
success but the communist groups were still active, and after the Karens
had laid down their arms, the Shans and the Kachins were the significant
ethnic groups in rebellion.
Throughout the 1960s various alliances were reported to have
been formed between different rebel groups. Thus in early 1963 an alliance
between the KNDO, Shan insurgents and the Kachin Independence Army was
76supposed to have established. However, immediately afterwards came
the Government's offer of amnesty and its subsequent agreement with the 
KNDO.
Again in 1965 a 'Council for National Liberation' was formed
by some Karen leaders not already jailed by the Government. This group
was reported to be considered by the military the single most important
77threat to their regime. Negotiations were also started with the Shans
and the Kachims to have them join the Council which in 1967 was reported
78still to be in existence.
74. Träger, op. c it ., pp. 203-204.
75. Ibid. 76. The Nation, 20 February, 1963.
77. Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 March 1966, p. 404.
78. Ibid.j 10 September 1967, p. 400.
Events took a slightly new turn in 1967 when the rift in
79Sino-Burmese relations occurred in June of that year. The White Flag
communists stepped up their activities with Chinese encouragement and 
80approval. The Chinese also took steps to elicit the support of
ethnic minorities, especially the Kachins which occupy the northern part
81of Burma, and they appear to have had some success.
The year 1967 also saw the release of many of the civilian 
political leaders of the pre-coup era, among them former Prime Minister 
U Nu. In 1969 U Nu left Burma upon the publication of the recommendations 
of the National Internal Unity Advisory Board. This body had been set up 
by Ne Win to recommend means of preserving the threatened unity of Burma.
It consisted of some 33 former leaders, among them U Nu. A few months 
after being handed the report Ne Win rejected its recommendations. This 
convinced U Nu that a return to democracy and constitutional rule in 
Burma which the report had advocated, was impossible without direct action 
and resort to arms.
U Nu’s first step was to try to induce the various ethnic 
minorities in rebellion to cooperate and coordinate their fight against 
the Government. This certainly could be no easy task. It was reported 
however that he was successful in getting Mon and Karen leaders to sign 
an agreement to join in an anti-Ne Win Group, the National United Liberation
79. On this see Peter Boog, "The China - Burma Rift: An Analysis", 
Current Scene, 17 October 1967, pp. 5-11. Frank N. Trager,
"Sino-Burma Relations", Orbis, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Winter 1968) 
pp. 1034-1054 and Robert A. Holmes, "The Sino-Burmese Rift",
Orbis, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 211-236.
80. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23rd November 1967, pp. 371-377.
81. Ibid ., 7 December 1967.
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Front. This took place in late June 1970. He could only have succeeded
83in this by meeting some of the demands of the minorities. By all accounts
all these activities had little outward effect on the situation in Burma as 
84a whole. Apparently U Nu and his allies were building up their strength
85and biding their time.
Thus rebel activities ebbed and flowed during the 1960s, strong
86enough to keep the Burmese Army, numbering around 130,000 men occupied 
most of the time, but not strong enough to really threaten the government 
nor the Union itself.
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ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THAILAND
By consulting Thai census figures one is left with an impression
of an overwhelmingly homogeneous country which for all practical purposes
may be termed a nation-state in the true sense of this term. Some 97
percent of the people speak Thai, about 98 percent is of Thai 'national
origin, and some 93 percent are Buddhists. But this apparent homogeneity
87is deceptive. There are important regional and cultural differences 
pronounced enough to have brought some groups into direct confrontation 
with the Thai government. Important intra-ethnic differences are not
82. See reports in ibid.. , 28 August 1969, p. 530, 20 August 1970, 
p. 9 and 7 November 1970, p. 37.
83. See ib id ., 20 August 1970, p. 29 for an account of U Nu's 
changed attitude towards ethnic minorities and 7 November 1970 
for minority demands.
84. See for example, reports in New York Times, 3 September 1970, p.
14 and Times of India, 5 September 1970, p. 21 on the general 
security situation in Burma. See also John Badgley, "The Army 
Vows Legitimacy", Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 2 (February 1972), 
p. 180 for the situation in 1971.
85. The New York Times, 31st January 1971.
86. The Military Balance, 1968-69 and 1971-72, (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies).
87. Kunstadter, op. c it ., pp. 369-372. See also the table on pp.370-71.
Thais, among whom there are significant cultural differences, are simply
classified as Thai. Similarly not even all the peoples classified as
Thais are really ethnic Thais like, for example, the Khmer minority in
the eastern provinces. They have been classified so because nominally
88they are Thai citizens.
What follows will concentrate on three groups which in later 
years have proven to be sources of considerable difficulty for the author­
ities in Bangkok, namely the Meo of the North, the Lao-Thai of the North­
east and the Malays of the Southern provinces among whom much opposition 
to Thai rule have surfaced over the last years and instances of armed 
revolt have increased, especially in the North and Northeast.
Of the three the North was the latecomer in terms of 
rebellious activities. The region comprises about one fifth of the 
territory of Thailand and it consists of a number of mountain ranges
varying in height from 2000 to 8000 feet and extending south from Burma
89and Laos with ridges covered with valuable teak forest.
There were only few and scattered signs of trouble brewing 
in the North prior to 1966-67. Some Meo had been recruited by the 
communists as long back as 1957-59 to serve with the Pathet Lao but only 
for the purpose of being used against the authorities in Vientiane rather 
than against the Bangkok authorities. They returned to Thailand in 1962 and 
took no part in any further military activities. Recruitment of hill 
people to take part in insurgent activities in Thailand got under way in 
1962 and continued in the years after. On their return to Thailand from
reflected in the figures where, for example, the various types of ethnic
88. Ib id ., p. 374.
89. Jeffrey Race, "The War in Northern Tailand", pp. 87-97.
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training, mostly in Laos and North Vietnam but also in China, they confined
90their activities basically to low-key propaganda in Meo villages. They
were under the direction of the Communist Party of Thailand which operated
91mostly from Laos, North Vietnam and China.
The first armed skirmish took place in early 1967 when one 
member of the Thai Border Patrol Police was killed. This was the first
92casualty directly due to organized anti-government forces in the north.
Further violent incidents followed, not all of them, however, attributable
to communist insurrection. Corruption and extortionate behaviour by local
93Thai officials resulted sometimes in violent reactions from the Meo.
As the incidents increased and the Thai army, untrained and ill-equipped
for this type of warfare, took heavy casualties, napalm and bombing became
a part of the tactics used by the Thais. They did, however, have a tend-
94ency to make enemies out of hill people who had not been so before.
The clashes between Government forces and hill people, con­
fined in 1967 to only a part of the North, soon spread to the other regions 
as well where a familiar pattern became discernable.
1... once limited violence was begun ... the pattern ... 
repeated itself: a convential army deployment, accompanied 
by bombing and napalming of tribal villages: depopulation 
of large areas and the creation of a substantial number of 
refugees: the driving of the young members of the tribal 
communities into the forests where they co-operated with 
communist-led activists in operations against Thai troops: 
aggravation of pre-existing lowlander-uplander conflicts: 
and the stabilization of violence and social disruption at 
a high level. 1
90. Ib id ., pp. 92-98. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid.
94. See ibid., passim for an account of the socalled Opium War and 
its part in the deteriorating situation in the North. See Far
Eastern Economic Review,
95. Race, Ib id ., -p. 108.
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The number of violent clashes in the North increased from 19
96in 1967 to 108 in 1968 and 112 in 1969 and during the first two years
of military operations the number of hill tribe people armed against the
97Government increased somewhere between five and twenty times. A fur­
ther result of the escalation of violence was an increase in hill tribe 
refugees from about 6000 to June 1968 to 9000 in January 1969 and more
qo
than 10000 in mid 1970.
The northeast region of Thailand has, contrary to the North,
a history of political opposition to the Thai government stretching back
at least to 1932 when the constitutional regime was introduced. The North-
easterners have usually justified their opposition in terms of the economic
neglect shown the region. An expression of their discontent would show
itself in the National Assembly where the representatives of the region
99usually would side with the opposition.
The Government's high level of preoccupation with the region 
dates back to the period 1958-61 when the significance of the Northeast 
was redefined from being a minor provincial irritant to one of a potential 
danger to the existence of the Government and Thailand itself. In
the eyes of the Government a number of factors combined in the Northeast to 
make it an especially sensitive area. Firstly, the region was close to 
Laos and Vietnam where the communists, most notably the Viet Cong, had 
stepped up their pressure. Secondly, the population was ethnically Lao
96. Ibid. 9 p. 104, note 42.
97. Ibid., p. 110.
98. Ibid., p. 109. For an assessment of the situation in 1971, see 
Morell, "Thailand: Military Checkmate", pp. 159-160.
99. Wilson, "introductory Comment on Politics and the Northeast", p.350.
100. Keyes, Isccn: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand, 
p. 51.
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even if it considered itself culturally Thai. Thirdly, what was seen as
the appeal of Lao separatism. Fourthly, its economically undeveloped state
made it fertile ground for subversion. Fifthly, the existence of relatively
large Khmer and Vietnamese minorities, and finally the history of the region
and other evidence suggested that parts of the political leadership were
involved in communist activities.
In 1961 the Government took steps which resulted in numerous
102arrests among political leaders in the Northeast. There was and is
also a tendency for the Thai leaders to regard any political opposition
103emanating from the Northeast as being insurrectionary in character.
The number of troops employed in the region increased partly, according to
the authorities, because of the need to combat insurrection and partly to
103protect against a possible invasion of Thailand from or through Laos.
There was a slight increase in clashes resulting in killings in the first 
half of the 1960s. At the same time the Thai authorities have also
put a great deal of emphasis on developing the Northeast economically.
Throughout the second half of the 1960s communist activity 
appeared to be on the increase both organizationally and militarily.
In 1971 they had extended their hold to the degree of controlling over 150 
villages in the Northeast. Each village now had a 'Village Military Unit', 
a novelty compared to previous years. The number of armed guerillas was
101. Ib id ., pp. 50-53, Wilson, op. a it ., p. 349.
102. Keyes, ibid ., p. 53.
103. Ib id ., p. 55. 104. Ib id ., p. 54.
105. Far Eastern Economic Review3 19 May 1966, p. 326.
106. Ib id ., pp. 329-330, Keyes, op. cit . 3 pp. 55-57.
107. See for example Darling, "Thailand: Stability and Escalation", 
and Neher, "Thailand: The Politics of Continuity", and Morell,
op. cit.
In regard to the South two problems in particular caused 
difficulties for the Government. Firstly there is the problem of Malay 
irredentism and secondly the communist threat.
The overwhelming majority of the population of the four south­
ernmost provinces are Thai Muslims. Culturally they are Malay rather than 
Thai and most of them have little or no knowledge of the Thai language. 
Periodic violent opposition to the Thais dates back several decades at 
least. As early as 1923 a movement started which developed into a full- 
fledged independence movement. This and similar phenomena have been 
suppressed by severe military actions by the Thais. After World War II 
a movement developed which among other things drafted a petition to the 
United Nations asking for secession from Thailand and a union with Malaya. 
Encouragement has been given to the Muslim separatists from sympathisers 
in Malaysia although probably not with Malaysian Government blessing.
The communists operating in the region are basically remnants 
of the fighting force of the Malayan Communist Party from the Malayan 
Emergency 1948-60. They are using the rugged frontier area between 
Thailand and Malaysia as a sanctuary and for some years there existed bet­
ween the communists and the Thai government what seemed to be a tacit 
understanding of live-and-let-live. Recently, however, this understanding 
broke down largely because of pressure exerted by the Malaysian Government
108. Morell, ibid. t p. 159.
109. Fraser, Jr., Fishermen in South Thailand; the Malay Villagers3 
pp. 100-102. See also Suhrke, "The Thai Muslims: Some Aspects of 
Minority Integration", pp. 531-547.
110. Far Eastern Economic Review3 3 July 1971, p. 11.
estimated to be about 1700.
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on the Thais to take action against the communists who were directing their 
operations against Malaysia. A border agreement was signed in 1971 pro­
viding for joint border patrols and permission for Malaysian troops and 
police to pursue the communists over the border into Thai territory.
MALAYSIA, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES
In Malaysia, besides the problems involved in the relationship 
between the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians in the west there are also 
minorities in Sabah and Sarawak. During confrontation strenuous attempts 
were made by the Indonesians to induce these minorities to side with Indo­
nesia against Malaysia. However, this proved to be a futile exercise.
112If anything, confrontation strengthened solidarity within Malaysia.
However, as on the Thai border, Malaysia had problems with-communist
insurgency also on the Sarawak-Indonesia border, and again the communist
geurillas are predominantly Chinese. The problems in Sarawak are of less
proportion than on the Thai border and are, according to reports, being
113reduced in magnitude.
Indonesia has over 350 ethnic groups each with its own cultural 
114identity. However, her problem is not so much a matter of ethnicity,
although it is present, as it is a problem of regionalism. A number
of regional rebellions have occurred in Indonesia, for example the 
establishment of the Republic of South Maluku in 1950 was crushed only after
111. Suhrke, op. cit . 3 p. 540.
12 March 1970, p. 8 .
112. Tom Harrisson, "Tribes, Minorities, and the Central Government in 
Sarawak Malaysia", in Kunstadter, op. oit . 3 pp. 339-340.
113. See reference to the Sarawak situation in Jerome R. Bass,
"Malaysia: Continuity or Change", Asian Survey3 Vol. X, No. 2 
(February 1970), p. 155. See also J.M. Van der Kroef, "Communism
in Sarawak", Asian Survey3 Vol. VI, No. 10 (October 1966), pp.568-579
114. Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Culture and Communities", McVey (Ed.),
Indonesia3 p. 24.
115. Mohammad A. Nawawi, "Stagnation as a Basis of Regionalism: A 
Lesson from Indonesia", pp. 934-945.
a month of bitter fighting. Then came the rebellion in South Sulawesi 
in 1951-52 and the Atjehenese rebellion in 1953. Of these only the
first was secessionist in intention. Another regional challenge
took place in 1957-58 when the so-called PRRI rebellion took place in
118 119Sumatra and Sulawesi. With the exception of West Irian , however,
regionalism has not been given violent expression in recent years 
although regionalism as a phenomenon involving strong loyalties con­
tinues to exist.
Apart from the communist insurgency, the problems related to 
the Muslim minority, numbering about 1.8 million people, in the south of
121Mindanao are one of the most urgent ones facing the Philippine Government. 
Clashes between Muslims and Christians have become frequent with losses
121of lives. A secessionist movement has been under way for some years now.
Demands from ethnic and national groups for political,
economic and cultural autonomy and in some cases, secession, have been
122heard with increased frequency. Moreover, from the survey of the
situation in Southeast Asia it should be clear that the question of ethnic 
minorities and their integration into the larger society are ones on which 
hinge the existence and territorial integrity of most states as presently 
constituted. Thus, while some trends may seem to point towards the
116. Ib id ., p. 939. 117. Ibid., p. 945.
118. Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in McVey, 
op. a it ., pp. 344-347.
119. John M. Allison, "Indonesia: The End of the Beginning",
Asiccn Surveys Vol. X, No. 2 (February 1970).
120. Aprodicio A. Laquian, "The Political Integration of the Muslim 
Filipinos", pp. 357-380.
121. John M. Adkins, "Philippines 1971: Events of a Year, Trends of 
the Future", pp. 78-79.
122. Connor, "Self-determination", op. cit . 3 passim.
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disintegration ol some states there are, however, other factors which may 
mitigate against these trends. These factors are internal as well as 
external to the countries concerned, and they need to be discussed in 
order to arrive at a fuller assessment of the minority situation and 
its relations to processes of cooperation and integration at the 
regional level. Some of these factors are primarily related to features 
of the minorities themselves while others are concerned with the relation­
ship between majorities and minorities. Still others are operating at the 
international level and are not confined to Southeast Asia.
SOME NUMERICAL AND TERRITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The question of minority aspirations for separation and self- 
determination is to some extent a matter of numbers as well as a matter of 
territory. Several aspects of these factors need attention.
Firstly, there is the ethnic ratio, that is, the numerical
relationship between majority and minority. From the point of view of the
majority group the smaller the minority group(s) the better. Should the
minorities, in the name of a right to self-determination, resort to armed
struggle it is an advantage to have as large a numerical superiority as
possible. In Burma, for example, the dominant ethnic group, the Burmans,
constitute about 56 percent of the total population while the largest
123minority group, the Karen, account for about 5 percent. It seems
reasonable to suppose that the failure of the various separatist groups to 
achieve their goal in some measure can be attributed to Burman numerical 
superiority.
123. Calculated from table A in Kunstadter, op. c it .y pp. 87-88.
All population figures and percentages appearing in this part 
are quoted or calculated from tables in Kunstadter unless 
otherwise indicated. Reference will be made to which tables 
are consulted.
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Similarly, it would not be unreasonable to attribute part of 
the great concern with which the Thai authorities seem to view the sit­
uation in the northeast to the sheer size of the largest minority group,
the Lao-Thai. This group numbers some 9 millions or about 36 percent of
124the total population. Should separatist sentiments increase in the
future and a separation attempt be made their numerical strength would be
one of their main assets.
The supreme example of the importance of ethnic ratios is, of
course, the situation in Malaysia and the separation of Singapore. As
suggested above ethnic considerations lay at the root of the separation
and an important factor in this connection was the fear of the Malays of
being outnumbered by the Chinese although they already were outnumbered by
the combined non-Malay population, including the Chinese, by a ratio of 2:3.
It is conceivable that the Tunku might have chosen a course of action well
short of separation had the challenge to Malay political domination come
from segments of a group less numerous than the Chinese in Malaysia. In
other words, if the ethnic ratio had been much more decisively in favour
of the Malays the separation of Singapore might not have happened. But,
then, of course, the Chinese in Malaysia, as in the rest of Southeast Asia,
possess culturally determined qualities both as individuals and as a group
which set them apart from all other minority groups in the region. These
qualities make the Chinese a more serious competitor to the majority groups
and have possibly caused governments in Southeast Asia to pay them attention
125beyond that allotted other equally numerous groups.
124. Ib id ., table 17, pp. 397-398.
125. See Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia>
(London: Oxford University Press, 1951), esp. pp. 656-672.
There is also another advantage from the point of view of the 
majority in having to deal with small ethnic groups. In any armed conflict 
there is a residual, non-fighting element. In the kind of conflicts we are 
talking about here, often insurrectionist in character, this residual 
element is particularly important. Not only does a small ethnic group 
mean a comparatively small fighting force but also a correspondingly small 
residual element from which the combatant element can receive the necessary 
supplies and support, and the background against which to blend and merge 
when hard pressed.
From the point of view of the majorities what we have argued 
so far favour small minorities. Of course, from the point of view of the 
minorities themselves the reverse is true.
However, all this should not lead us to the conclusion that 
a relatively small minority group always represent a minor threat. The 
Meo, which appear to have caused the Thai government trouble out of pro­
portion to their numbers, total only about 45-50000 which is less than
1260.2 percent of the entire population of Thailand.
Nor should we conclude that, at least up to a certain point, 
it is always an advantage for a minority to be as numerous as possible 
vis-a-vis the majority. A numerically large ethnic group usually occupies 
more territory than a smaller. The larger the ethnic minority is the more 
population and territory a state stands to lose which in turn may increase 
its resolve to prevent separation.
Likewise, numerical strength need not be an advantage from the 
point of view of unity of purpose. Large ethnic minorities usually display 
greater cultural diversity than smaller minorities and they are frequently
126. Kunstadter, op. cit. 3 table 17.
divided into a large number of subgroups. The cultural diversity has its 
roots in historical experiences and harbours more potential for differ­
ences with regard to policies, actions and so on.
All states with minorities attempt in some way or other to 
accommodate their minorities on terms which fall short of secession. 
Integration, assimilation, autonomy, cultural pluralism and so on, are 
just a few labels often attached to majority policies towards the minor­
ities. Different governments have applied different policies and it is 
not uncommon that the same government has resorted to a variety of 
different policies vis-a-vis the same minority group. Whatever the 
nature of these policies, size plays an important role in this context too, 
because the larger the minority group the more difficult it may be to make 
a success of such policies.
Because of its size and cultural diversity the integration or 
assimilation of a large minority group demands more resources, ideas and 
imaginative thinking than normally would be the case. This is perhaps 
even more the case where the majority is faced with the task of integrating 
not only one but many minority groups each of which may need separate con­
sideration, treatment and policies. The ethnic minority component of the 
population varies a great deal from country to country in Southeast Asia.
In Malaysia it is as high as 60 percent while in Cambodia it is about 14 
percent. All the countries are, however, multi-ethnic with Indonesia harbour­
ing more than 300 different ethnic groups within her boundaries each with 
its own identity. The magnitude of the problem is easily grasped.
We mentioned one aspect of the territorial factor above.
Another and perhaps more important one in this context is the tendency of 
the minorities in Southeast Asia to occupy territory the size of which is 
out of proportion to the numerical strength of the minorities. In Burma
and Laos the dominant groups - the Burmans and the Lao - comprise somewhat 
more than half the population. Yet more than half the territory is occu­
pied by minorities. The extreme case is Vietnam. The ethnic Vietnamese 
in North and South Vietnam constitute about 85 and 87 percent of the 
population respectively but in both cases they occupy a mere 30 percent 
or less of the territory. In such circumstances separation may mean a 
disproportionately large territorial loss, something which states in general 
not willingly suffer.
MAJORITY - MINORITY DIFFERENCES IN LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT
Long before the arrival of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia 
majority groups like the Burmans in Burma, the Central Thai, the Khmer, the 
Lao, the Vietnamese etc. had all reached levels of political, cultural and 
economic development which went beyond, sometimes far beyond, similar 
developments among the surrounding minorities they dominated or sought 
to dominate. Culturally they were characterized by fairly widespread 
literacy, a standardized language, the cultivation of arts and crafts, high 
levels of specialization and the existence of a national religious hierarchy 
within the 'great tradition' religions, Buddhism and Islam. Politically 
they were organized into kingdoms and nation-states with a relatively 
highly organized bureaucracy. Economic activities were organized with a 
view to both self-sufficiency and commercial sale, and trading, both over 
land and sea, was a part of economic life.
Among the minorities, generally located in the more remote or 
isolated lowland areas or in the hills and the jungles of the interior, 
literacy was only marginal or non-existent; the language was sometimes a 
dialect of the same language family as the majority but they were often 
mutually unintelligible; their political organization only rarely extended 
beyond the village level and their economy was dominated by subsistence wet
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and dry rice fanning and small-scale trade. Especially the minorities
located in the hills remained different from the majority group because of
128their isolation from influence of a cultural or commercial kind.
With the colonial era the 'modern culture', Western in origin 
and outlook, started to make itself felt throughout Southeast Asia. The 
degree to which this culture has been imposed, absorbed, adapted or inte­
grated into the different societies varies appreciably throughout the
129region. However there is not only inter-area but also intra-area
variations. It is the latter that are important in this context.
The development of Southeast Asian societies has not done away 
with the political, economic and cultural gap between the majority groups 
and most minorities. Indeed in some cases the difference has become even 
more pronounced. It has been and still is important in providing legitimacy 
to majority group control of government and state. This gap enabled the 
majority groups to establish a dominant position in pre-colonial times, it 
made them the obvious groups through which the colonial powers chose to rule, 
directly or indirectly, and it also made them the natural groups from which 
leaders emerged in the struggle against colonialism. In the era of inde­
pendence it has enabled them to maintain and sometimes even extend their 
domination over the machinery of the state if not over society at large.
It is a noticeable feature of Southeast Asian societies that by and large it 
is among the members of the majority groups that 'modernization' has taken 
place to any considerable extent either because of necessity or because of 
the receptiveness and adaptability of their traditional culture. The 
majority groups, by being for so long near or at the center where outside
127. Ib id ., table 2, pp. 15-17. See also David Joel Steinberg (ed.) In 
Search of Southeast Asia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971) pp. 11-91.
128. Ibid ., pp. 23-24.
129. John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1964) , p. 588.
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cultural influences were introduced and concentrated, thereby became the
main, in some cases the sole, recipients of the modern culture as it was
transmitted by the colonial system. Most minorities, often located on the
geographical periphery of the colonial territories, had at best only
130spasmodic contact with the modem culture.
The introduction of the modern culture had some very important 
consequences for the relationship between majority and minorities. Firstly, 
it served in some cases to actually widen the gap between them. Politically 
this meant that where they existed well established relationships were up­
rooted. In Thailand, for instance, headmen of the Lua tribe used to report 
to the Northern Thai Prince in Chiengmai or Lamphun while Karen headmen used 
to occupy the posts as district headmen, positions now lost to Central Thai 
civil servants. Tribal village headmen now deal with civil servants mainly
concerned with administration. Previously they used to deal with princes
131who were also concerned with the general welfare of their subjects.
The flexibility which was part of this system of relations has been lost
132with the introduction of a system of uniform administration and standards.
Likewise, modernization has also meant a breach in economic
relations. Functions traditionally carried out by tribesmen are taken over
by, for instance, modern transport and modern products are substituted for
traditional thereby making products on which the tribes depended for their
133living obsolescent.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that in terms of ethnic 
minority integration modernization also has had serious dysfunctional con­
sequences.
130. See Kunstadter, op. oit. 3 pp. 3066.
131. Ib id ., p. 52.
132. Ibid., p. 673.
133. Ib id ., p. 52.
In the era of independence the majority groups have become 
nearly the sole agent of change and modernization. Through their control 
of the machinery of state they have what amounts to a near monopoly on the 
transmission and dissemination of the modern culture. However, the kind 
of change and modernization sought and initiated are often tailored to 
needs and special features of their own culture without adaptations 
being made in regard to the minorities and their special cultural and 
other needs.
The majorities also use the modern culture in their efforts to 
effectively bring the minorities into the fabric of the larger society. 
Hence, by the minorities modernization is seen as another means by which 
the majorities seek to pursue age-old policies of domination and subord­
ination. Among the minorities this has led not so much to a rejection of 
modernization as such as to opposition to the version disseminated by the 
majority. The minorities often prefer modernization introduced by others 
than members of the majority group. Highland minority groups in South 
Vietnam demanded that foreign aid be channeled directly to the highlands 
rather than through Saigon. Early demands were even for direct highland 
representation abroad.
Through modernization the majority have increased its coercive 
capability to an extent rarely matched by the minorities. They have thereby 
also increased their own ability to peacefully or violently control the 
minorities.
Some minorities have put themselves in a position in which it 
may turn out to be difficult to catch up with the administrative, organ-
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izational and other capabilities of the majority. While they on the one 
hand need and desire modernization in order to be able to compete with or 
eventually separate from the majority, the staging of rebellions have on 
the other hand had the unintended effect of cutting them off from nearly 
all available sources of modernization. This would seem to be the case 
with minorities such as the Shan, the Karen and the Kachin in Burma.
Although only segments of these minority groups are in rebellion, they have 
considerable support from their ethnic kinsmen thereby making these areas 
occupied by these minorities virtually inaccessible to government authority 
and administration. While this indeed has been the purpose, it has also 
had the effect of hindering one of the main agents of modernization, the 
government, from having much impact. When thus the domestic sources of 
modernization are denied them because of majority group or self-imposed 
actions the only sources available to any minorities are often to be found 
outside the borders of the country of which they are formally a part. 
However, these sources are unstable and not always forthcoming, a question 
to which a return will be made later.
MINORITY UNITY-DISUNITY
The failure of those groups which have attempted to achieve 
separation or self-determination to reach their goals must in part be 
attributed to their inability to cooperate and coordinate their policies 
and actions. This has been a feature of inter-group as well as intra­
group relations.
The most determined efforts by ethnic minorities to change 
their status have taken place in Burma. But Burma also provides the 
clearest examples of ethnic disunity at both the intra-group and inter­
group levels. In 1965 there existed no less than seven different ethnically
based rebel organizations. Indeed, throughout the 1960s an outstand­
ing feature of the situation in Burma has been the multiplicity of ethnic
136rebel organizations. The attempts to unify the groups in their struggle
against the government have all been short-lived and of no lasting effect.
From the point of view of individual ethnic groups intra-ethnic
disunity must appear to be even more serious. In the 1948-51 crisis the
government was mainly facing rebellious communists and Karens both of whom
were split on questions of policy. Some Karen advocated and fought for
secession while other Karen were working for autonomy within the Union.
Still others were passive or neutral because they did not believe anything
137could be achieved by force. And two of the seven rebel organizations
just referred to, the Shan Independence Army and the Shan National United
138Front, were recruited from the same ethnic group.
Cooperation and concerted action at both the intra- and inter­
group levels require the simultaneous existence of a number of factors.
It cannot come about without a common outlook with regard to goals and 
objectives, something which is, admittedly, perhaps less easy obtained at 
the inter-group level. It also requires agreement as to what tactics and 
strategies are to be followed in the pursuit of these goals. It further­
more requires strong leaders who are not only clever and perhaps charis­
matic but also able and willing to subordinate personal ambitions and 
rivalries to the common cause. Effective cooperation may in addition 
require previous experience in cooperative efforts and where such experience
135. Christian Science Monitor, 18 August 1965.
136. See section on Burma above.
137. Trager, Burma, op. c it ., p. 121.
138. Christian Science Monitor, op. cit.
139. Tinker, op. c it ., p. 48. Kunstadter, op. c it .,p . 26.
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Again to take the case of Burma it would seem that none of
these requirements have been present all the time nor have all of them
been present at any one time. There would for example seem to have been
considerable differences with regard to both ends and means between the
various segments of Karens, Chin and Kachin in the 1948-51 crisis. The
Karens constituted one of the dominant military forces pitted against
the government while Chin and Kachin troops played a prominent part in
139the repulsion of the assault on the government. In 1963 there was a
similar situation. Following the Ne Win government's offer to all rebel­
lious forces of amnesty and negotiations part of the Karens signed an 
agreement - admittedly shortlived - with the government while rebellious
elements within the Shan, Kachin and Chin minority groups continued their
. , . . .  140insurrectionist activities.
Although the various minorities, in particular the Karen, 
would appear to have had many able leaders none of them would seem to have 
been in possession of the qualities and the stature needed to unite their 
respective groups and to forge lasting links of cooperation with other 
groups. The latest effort was that of former prime minister U Nu - signif­
icantly enough a Burman. In late June 1970 he signed an agreement with 
Mon, Karen and Shan leaders in which the common objective was defined as
the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Burma and a federalist sol-
141ution for the minority problem. However, April 1972 U Nu resigned from
the leadership of the National United Liberation Front apparently because
is lacking it may take some time to acquire.
139. Tinker, op. c it ., p. 48. Kunstadter, op. c it ., p. 26.
140. See section on Burma.
141. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 August 1970.
he disagreed with the minority leaders over their demand for right of
142secession of the ethnic minorities from the Union. What this episode
illustrates is, firstly, the difficulties the minority groups have in 
finding leaders among themselves with sufficient qualities and stature 
and an ability to rise to the occasion. And, secondly, it points to the 
difficulties inherent in having as leader of an ethnic minority rebellion 
not a person drawn from these groups but rather a representative of the 
majority group against which the rebellion is directed. U Nu is first 
and foremost a Burman and his primary goal has been the overthrow of 
the regime of Ne Win while at the same time to preserve the territorial 
integrity of the Union. The goal of the minorities has also been to get 
rid of the Ne Win regime but only as a first and incidental step on the 
way to their ultimate goal, secession. For U Nu to have agreed to such 
objectives would have been to go against the fundamental interests of not 
only the state but also the majority group of which he is, after all, a 
prominent representative.
The factors mentioned so far would appear to be important to 
any explanation of disunity among and within ethnic minorities. But they 
are perhaps better considered symptoms of a relative lack of another, more 
important quality, namely ethnic consciousness. Or, alternatively they may 
be symptoms of an uneven distribution of ethnic consciousness within and 
between groups. Whatever the case may be, the factors discussed so far 
in connection with ethnic disunity can probably themselves be explained, 
at least partly, in terms of a relative lack of ethnic consciousness or 
awareness.
142. Japan Times, 2 May 1972. See also Richard Butwell, "Ne Win's
Burma: At the End of the First Decade", Asian Survey, Vol. XII,
No. 10 (October 1972).
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ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS
When the Hungarian Serbs confronted Kossuth with demands for
recognition of their language - in their view an essential part of the
Serb ’nation' - Kossuth asked,
"What do you understand by 'Nation'?"
"A race which possesses its own language, customs and culture
1A 3and enough self-consciousness to preserve them", was the reply.
Although elements like language, customs and culture, to mention
a few, are indeed found to characterize ethnic or national groups none of
144them are essential to the existence of nationality. What is essential,
however, is the existence of a consciousness and a will strong enough to 
preserve whatever common characteristics the group possesses. Nationalism,
r • , 1^in short, is a state of mind.
This state of mind does not come into existence in a vacuum.
It emerges as a result of inter-ethnic contacts. This contact produces, 
firstly, the well-known 'we-they' syndrome, that is, a heightened awareness 
among the groups of their distinctiveness. Secondly, it also produces among 
the members of the group an increased awareness of each other.
The level of ethnic consciousness among the minorities in 
Southeast Asia is difficult to assess and does under any circumstances 
vary considerably from one area to another and from one group to another.
It is also unevenly distributed within individual groups. The villager in 
Central Java, for example, who never has been in contact with a non- 
Javanese Indonesian is less aware of being Javanese than his ethnic kin
143. C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 117.
144. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 
pp. 14-15.
145. Ibid ., p. 18.
who migrated to other islands or who lives in an area of Java which has
146frequent and extensive contacts with other islands. In Burma some
segments of the minorities had more contact with the majority, the
Burmans, than others. It is noticeable that most of the rebel leaders
in Burma were or are persons who at one time or another have been close
to the centres of power and exposed to Burman ways for a considerable
time. Rarely, if ever, does one hear of leaders who are unknown and
147inexperienced with majority culture and policies.
One can say with reasonable certainty, however, that inter­
ethnic contact is increasing and, more importantly, is bound to continue 
to do so. To the extent that ethnic awareness and its growth are depend­
ent on contact it follows that awareness will also be increasing in 
strength. That this is so is very much in evidence.
In Indonesia ethnic loyalties have been increasing in strength
148throughout this century both under Dutch rule and after. It is^more­
over, noticeable that it is those ethnic groups whose members have been most
mobile and most exposed to the ways of other groups which harbour the
149strongest ethnic loyalties.
The same would seem to be the case in northeast Thailand as 
far as the Lao is concerned, particularly Lao villagers who temporarily 
migrated to cities like Bangkok where they quickly became aware of their
146. C. William Skinner (ed.), Local3 Ethnic and National Loyalties 
in Village Indonesia3 New Haven: Yale University, Cultural 
Report Series, 1959, pp. 7-8.
147. See Tinker, op. cit. 3 Ch. 2. See also biographical notes on 
’Men and Women of Burma’, pp. 389-400, for the careers of some 
of the rebel leaders mentioned in Chapter 2 of Tinker’s book.
148. Skinner, op. cit. 3 p. 1-11. R. William Liddle, Ethnicity3 Party 
and National Integration. An Indonesian Case Study (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970) p. 207.
149. Skinner, ibid. 3 p. 7.
own distinctiveness. Indeed urbanization in general seem to serve
as a particularly effective catalytic agent in the development of ethnic 
151awareness.
However, growing ethnic consciousness resulting from increased 
interaction does not necessarily lead to a desire for secession and self- 
determination on the part of the minorities. Much depends on the content 
of the interaction between the majority and the individual ethnic minor­
ities. In this respect Indonesia would seem to be in a different situation 
from most other countries in Southeast Asia in that a measure of identity 
with the country as a whole have been created which has cut across the
152ethnic and regional sentiments that threatened the unity of Indonesia.
RELATIONS BETWEEN MAJORITY AND MINORITIES
Ethnic consciousness develops as a response to the degree and 
nature of inter-ethnic contacts. In the case of majorities and minorities 
such contact often results from migratory movements and policies initiated 
by the majorities with the aim of influencing and/or controlling the min­
orities. Notwithstanding occasional attempts in the past, it is only 
recently that the lowland (majority) civilizations in Southeast Asia
seriously have set out to exercise effective control over the hill areas
153and the minorities living there. Relations in the past were on the
whole characterized by a live-and-let-live attitude sometimes interspersed 
with majority feelings of superiority and contempt for minority culture 
and style of living. The application of terms like 'slave* and 'savage'
150. Charles F. Keyes, "Ethnic Identity and Loyalty of Villagers 
in Northeast Thailand", Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 7 (July,
1966), pp. 362-369, esp. pp. 364-365.
151. Skinner, op. c it .3p. 48.
152. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), esp. 
sections on 'regionalism'. See also the same author, "Indo­
nesia's Political Symbols and their Wielders", in Henry S.
Albinski, Asian Political Processes: Essays and Readings 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971) pp. 48-63.
153. Kunstadter, op. cit. 3 pp. 7-9.
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The new interest in the minorities started in the beginning 
of the 1950s and it received stimulation from two novel developments
in particular, namely the achievement of independence among many minorities. 
Starting with the Philippines in 1946 the territories in Southeast Asia 
obtained their independence one after the other. Political power and the 
control of government passed over to the majority groups which now were 
charged with the responsibility of transforming into modem what to a 
large extent still were traditional societies. This entailed also the 
assimilation or integration of the minorities into the larger political, 
economic and social structure, a task toward the fulfilment of which the 
colonial powers, for a variety of reasons, had taken no or only a few and 
rudimentary steps.
The new interest in the minorities was also stimulated by the 
pressure of increased communist activities and influence. The ascent to 
power in China and North Vietnam of communist regimes, both willing and 
able to exploit indigenous discontent and resentment by providing material 
assistance and ideological guidance, began to make themselves felt. In 
many cases the efforts of the communists were concentrated on and directed 
at the ’soft underbelly’ of these countries, namely the minorities among 
whom communist cadres were now recruited.
Nevertheless, the understanding of the importance of coming to 
terms with the minorities has been unevenly comprehended by the various
to some minority groups bears this out.
154. Race, op. cit., Kunstadter, ibid., pp. 241, 260 and 528.
155. Kunstadter, ibid., p. 8.
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the Viet Minh - predominantly Vietnamese - was at an early stage acutely
aware of the importance of winning the minorities over to their side in
156the struggle against the French in Indo-China, and the policies since
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as regards the minorities would
appear to enjoy a measure of success not rivalled in many places elsewhere
in Southeast Asia. The Burmese would likewise seem all along to have
been conscious of the significance of the minorities although their
policies in this regard have been largely unsuccessful. The Malays have
also had a keen sense of the importance of striking a balance especially
in their relationship with their Chinese 'minority', a message which was
brought home to them in unmistakeable terms during the Emergency in the
period 1948-60 when communist elements among the Chinese in Malay rebelled.
However, Malaysia is still far from solving the problem of the relation-
158ship between the Malays and the Chinese in particular. The Thais, on
the other hand, in spite of not having been colonized, have been rather
slow in recognizing the significance of the minorities within their
borders, especially those in the north and northeast of the country.
Not until about 1955 did the government begin to involve itself with these
groups when a relatively modest start was made with the establishment of
159the Border Patrol Police program. In Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam
the problem has either been largely ignored or officially denied exist-
160ence.
majority groups in Southeast Asia. Some like the communist leadership of
156. See ibid., pp. 771-884.
157. See, for example, Connor, "Ethnology", op. cit. 3 passim.
For some more recent information, see George McT. Kahin, 
"Minorities in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam", Asian 
Survey3 Vol. XII, No. 7 (July 1972), pp. 580-586.
158. See Means, op. cit., p. 418. Communist guerilla activities are 
still continuing on the border between Malaysia and Thailand, 
and in Sarawak, on the border between Malaysia and Indonesia.
159. Hans Manndorff, "The Hill Tribes Program of the Public Welfare 
Department, Ministry of Interior, Thailand", in Kunstadter, 
op. cit.j pp. 529-530.
160. Kunstadter, ibid. 3 pp. 23024.
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instituted in regard to the minorities and what success, if any, have they
had? As already indicated the political leaders in Burma realized the
importance of striking a balance between the Burmans and the various
minority peoples. To that end the constitution of Burma of 1947 provided
for the establishment of three subordinate states - Shan, Kachin and Karenni
(later renamed Kayah) - and two special districts - Chin and Karen (which
161in 1953 became the Karen State). In spite of this apparently liberal
policy secession has been a right the exercise of which has been strongly 
opposed by the government although the constitution gave such a right to 
some minorities. Moreover, the government has through various other pol­
icies made it clear that no less than a homogeneous population is the 
ultimate goal. The hope is to achieve this through the extension of 
Burman language, Buddhism and Burman cultural characteristics in general
to the minority groups. This was the policy in the 1950s and the early
1621960s and it would appear still to be so.
Of the minorities in Thailand the ethnic Malays in the four 
southern provinces bordering on Malaysia represent the only ones among 
whom the demand for secession has been raised, and over the decades 
sporadic revolts have taken place against Thai rule. Secession from 
Thailand has sometimes been envisaged as ending in an independent Malay- 
Muslim state, while on other occasions the secessionists have advocated
What kind of policies have the various ruling majority groups
161 John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1958), pp. 563-564.
162. See Tinker, op. cit. , p. 76 and pp. 165-190. See also 
ibid., pp. 637-640.
union with Malaysia. The strength of these sentiments has varied over
163the years and largely m  response to Thai government policies.
Contrary to Burmese policies which are on the whole assimilationist in
character the Thai government's policies toward the Malay minority are
largely integrationist, although not always consistently so. For example,
steps have been taken by the government to meet demands for the preser-
164vation of cultural characteristics like religion , but Malay Muslims
who want to join the government bureaucracy can do so only after having
gone through a process of acculturation and education - Thai in character
that requires significant adjustments in terms of conduct and social norms
In the north and the northeast the government attention given
to the hill tribes is of a recent date. Although a beginning was made in
the mid 1950s it is under the impact of increased communist activities
that the authorities really have begun to realize the full magnitude of
the problem. A variety of government initiated programs exist but they
166would appear to lack a clearly stated goal. The authorities' response
to what they consider communist influence would appear also to have 
rendered void much of the positive work carried out by government agencies
1 c~i
like the Border Patrol Police.
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163. For a detailed study of a Malay village in southern Thailand, 
see Thomas M. Fraser, Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing Village in 
Southern Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960).
See also the same author, Fishermen, op. cit. For an assessment 
of Thai government policies towards the Malay minority, see 
Suhrka, "The Thai Muslims", op. cit. For a brief reference to 
these policies, see Lee W. Huff, "The Thai Mobile Development 
Unit Program", in Kunstadter, op. cit., pp. 480-481.
164. Fraser, Fishermen, op. cit., p. 103.
165. Suhrke, op. cit., p. 545.
166. Kunstadter, op. cit., p. 24. This is also the conclusion Suhrke 
came to after having examined the special case of the Malay 
muslim minority.
167. See Race, op. cit.
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In the northeast a tradition of political dissent from govern­
ment policies has been in existence for a long time. This dissent had 
previously been expressed through the parliamentary channels and it had 
been largely unrelated to communist activities and influence. However, 
with the advent of communist supported insurrection the Bangkok authorities 
have tended to view all dissent as subversive activity and a considerable 
amount of suppression of political expression has been the result. In 
effect this has led for long periods to the closure of legitimate political 
channels as far as the northeasterners are concerned.
A similar situation would seem to exist in the north as regards 
the hill people, especially the Meo. The difference here is that the hill 
peoples have always been outside of the Thai political system proper. The 
situation changed in the 1960s with the communist supported insurrection but 
the status of the hill peoples within the state remains ambiguous.
Increased governmental attempts largely motivated by the fear of communist 
influence, to assert authority and bring the hill peoples under the effect­
ive jurisdiction of the state have met with considerable resistance from 
the hill tribes. The government has responded with heavy handed military
tactics which to a considerable degree have been counter-productive and
169lead to a growing alienation of these minorities from the majority.
In Laos it is significant that the communist Pathet Lao 
derives its support mainly from the minorities. Apart from a few Lao like 
Prince Souphanouvong most leaders of the Pathet Lao are also tribal. This 
came about chiefly as a result of two factors. Firstly, a realization at 
an early stage in the struggle against the French of the importance of
168. See Keyes, Isan, op. cit. s esp. pp. 50-58.
169. Race, op. cit., passim.
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the tribal peoples, and secondly, the allotment to the Pathet Lao by the 
Geneva agreement of 1954 of two provinces in northern Laos - Phong Saly 
and Sam Neua - for the purpose of regrouping, pending integration of the 
Pathet Lao into the political and military structure of Laos. Both these 
provinces were, however, nearly exclusively populated by tribal peoples 
among whom the Pathet Lao now started intensive recruiting.
Although not entirely due to neglect only, the Laotian 
government in Vientiane has proved itself less astute in its dealings 
with the minorities than have their political opponents, the Pathet Lao.
The government attitude towards the minorities has been one of official 
non-recognition of cultural and other differences between the dominant 
Lao and the minorities, and the pressure is on the latter to learn the 
official Lao language and to assimilate with the Lao through the shedding 
of tribal customs and culture and the adoption of Buddhism and the majority 
171culture.
The South Vietnamese have dealt with their minorities in a 
fashion similar to the Lao. The tribal peoples have in theory been con­
sidered citizens subject to the same laws and rules as the ethnic Vietnam­
ese. Tribal custom and culture are threatened by the Vietnamese centred 
education system and this insensitivity to cultural differences has met 
with considerable resistance by the minorities. Rebellions going back to 
1958 have been staged by the highlanders against what they perceive as a
170. See Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1964) pp. 53-57 on the Geneva agreement of 1954 and 
pp. 69-84 on the origin of the Pathet Lao.
171. Kunstadter, op. cit.y p. 23. Joel Halpern and Peter 
Kunstadter, nLaos: Introduction", in Kunstadter3
pp. 241-250.
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The Cambodians have taken the view that a minority problem
does not exist because Cambodia does not have minorities, only foreign- 
173ers. A policy of assimilation in regard to the tribal peoples has
174been instituted.
In Malaysia the central government has recognized the problem 
of the minorities - not only the Chinese but also the many indigenous 
minority groups that exist especially in the states of Sabah and Sarawak. 
By not pressing the religion and language questions too hard the govern­
ment has been able to establish a relatively satisfactory relationship 
with the various minority peoples of East Malaysia. The government has 
at the same time been greatly extending programs designed to improve 
education, health and agriculture among these groups.
An important cleavage in Indonesian society is the division 
between Java and the Outer Islands of which Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo) 
and Sulawesi (Celebes) are the largest. This division between the center 
and the periphery follows roughly the ethnic cleavage between the majority 
group, the Javanese, on the one hand and ethnic minority groups like the 
Sudanese, the Madurese, the Minangkabau (in West Sumatra) and the 
Buginese (in south estern Sulawesi) on the other. The Javanese are by far 
the most numerous accounting for nearly half the population of about 120
172threat of cultural and economic extinction.
172. See in particular Hickey, The Highland People, passim in 
South Vietnamese policies and highland reactions to them, 
and Hickey, "Some Aspects of Hill Tribe Life in Vietnam", 
in Kunstadter, op. cit., pp. 745-769.
173. Kunstadter, ibid., p. 24.
174. Frederick P. Munson et.al., Area Handbook for Cambodia (Washington 
D.C. US Government Printing Office, October 1968) pp. 55-56.
175. Harrisson in Kunstadter, op. cit., pp. 317-352.
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million. However, in spite of accusations of Javanese domination of 
government and bureaucracy the Javanese have nevertheless not played a 
dominant role comparable to that played by majority groups elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia. Another feature of the situation in Indonesia is that 
ethnic loyalties, although very much in existence, are in most cases over­
shadowed by national loyalties the development of which can be traced back 
to the struggle for independence from the Dutch. Furthermore, such an 
important factor as language with much potential for arousing ethnic 
tension has played a role quite different from what it has elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia. Bahasa Indonesia, the national language developed 
from Malay, is the property of no single ethnic group and it is the 
medium of instruction at all levels in the education system. The various 
ethnic groups have on the whole not objected to learning Bahasa Indonesia
a situation which might have been different had Javanese been elevated to
176the status of national language.
In the Philippines the Muslim minority in the Sulu Archipelago 
and on the island of Mindanao has defied all attempts ever since the 
Spanish started their colonization of the Philippines in 1564, to become 
assimilated with the rest of the population although nearly every con­
ceivable means, including force, have been employed in the endeavour.
The government of the Philippines seemed to have realized the futility of 
such policies and had on the whole opted for a policy of integrating the 
Muslims into the national structure while at the same time allowing them 
to retain their cultural identity. Even though a degree of integration, 
particularly into the political structure, has been achieved this never-
176. See Skinner, op. cit. Liddle, op. ait., and Gerald S. Maryanov, 
Decentralization in Indonesia as Political Problem, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 1958, esp. ch. 5.
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theless has not resulted in the disappearance of certain basic tensions 
and conflicts emanating primarily from cultural differences between the 
Muslim minority and the Christian-hispanized majority. Lately events 
would seem to have caught up with parts of government policies. As a 
result of population pressure and land shortage large numbers of Christians 
from the northern islands migrated, with government encouragement to Min­
danao where they came into conflict with the Muslims who found themselves 
squeezed out of land traditionally considered theirs. Violent clashes 
erupted and they increased in frequency throughout 1971-72 also involving 
the Philippine army. As yet no solution is in sight.
THE EXTERNAL FACTOR
As far as the situation in Southeast Asia is concerned the
various minorities have on the whole as yet not reached a stage of con­
sciousness, unity of purpose and level of development at which these 
factors have crystallized into demands for secession and separate state­
hood. Nevertheless, in Burma such demands are just beneath if not actually 
on the surface, and in the Philippines they are already part of Muslim 
minority goals. Moreover, there is a trend toward increasing ethnic aware­
ness as far as a number of groups are concerned, and in most of these cases 
this trend is facilitated and provoked by a tendency of majority group 
policies to alienate the minorities. Whether or not this trend will
177. See Aprodicio A. Laquian, nThe Political Integration of Muslim 
Filipinos", pp. 357-380 for an account of the degree of Muslim 
integration. Note the observation that the Muslim University 
is increasingly becoming aware of their separate identity, pp. 
379-380. See also reports on the issues involved and the 
clashes between Muslims, Christians and the army in the Sulu 
Archipelago and Mindanao in New York Times, 24 November 1971 
and 25 November 1971; The Age, 19 July 1972; Djakarta Times,
6 January 1973. See also Asia Research Bulletin, January 1973, 
pp. 1488-1489 and Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1973.
ultimately lead to more demands for separation in Southeast Asia is, 
of course, still a matter for conjecture.
Nevertheless, in those instances in which minorities in 
Southeast Asia have resorted to armed revolt they have largely been 
unsuccessful. Among the causes of this failure the question of external 
assistance is of the most crucial.
Although assistance from without on the whole has been 
rather modest in scope and magnitude it has helped some ethnic insur­
gents in Southeast Asia to survive and sustain a level of activity 
sufficient to resist and even repulse government or majority attempts 
to crush them. In Thailand most of the aid to the insurgents in the 
north and northeast has come from China and North Vietnam. In Burma 
most of the ethnic rebellions have sustained themselves on weapons 
and equipment captured from government troops, depots and so on. Some 
arms have come from external sources often bought with money raised from 
the cultivation and sale of opium. This is especially the case in the 
Shan states of Burma. However, if any of the ethnic insurgent movements 
are to succeed the level of outside assistance must probably be raised
considerably. While very few insurgencies of any kind have succeeded in
178this century without such external assistance it is not contended that 
external support is necessary under all circumstances; it is, however, 
likely to be more important to ethnic separatism than to most other 
forms of revolutionary movements.
The degree to which ethnic separatists are dependent on 
external assistance is partly a function of the size of the country and
178. Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defence 
Policy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1964), table 1.3, 
pp. 24-26.
the size of the minority. An insurgent movement in a large country can 
more easily maintain itself with indigenous resources than can a movement 
in a small country. Likewise, an insurgent movement based on a large 
ethnic group has less difficulty in keeping up its activities with 
indigenous resources than one based on a small minority. But whatever 
the size of the country and the minority, the outstanding difference in 
this context is that in most other types of insurrection the insurgents 
can consider the entire population as a potential source of recruits, 
supplies and support, and the whole country as a potential territory 
within which bases, depots, headquarters can be located. As a result 
of the ethnic or national appeal of the movement, ethnic insurgents can under 
the most favourable circumstances expect only to be able to recruit among 
members of their own ethnic group. Similarly, they can reasonably only 
count on the active support of their own ethnic group in terms of shelter 
and supplies necessary to maintain themselves, and only the territory 
occupied predominantly by their own ethnic or national group can be con­
sidered suitable as location for bases. Indeed ethnic insurgents, even 
under the most favourable circumstances, have to count on the active 
hostility of the majority since the whole rationale of their rebellion is 
based on inter-ethnic hostility and conflict. Hence the greater depend­
ence of ethnic revolt on external sources of support as compared to other 
types of rebellion. This is so even though the minorities enjoy the 
advantage of superior knowledge of terrain and commitment to their cause.
In the following the factors will be considered which might decide whether 
such assistance is granted or denied ethnic separatist movements.
At the outset it is important to stress that there are other 
significant differences between ethnic separation movements and such other 
types of revolutionary movements as liberation movements of the kinds
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usually supported by communist governments. A major difference exists in 
terms of goals and it is important because it often determines the identity 
of the various sources of external support.
Ethnic movements aim at the establishment of a new, independ­
ent state, that is, the goal is the separation from the state of origin of 
a distinctive group of people and the territory it occupies. This involves 
an assault on the territorial integrity of this state. A war of liber­
ation in the communist sense, on the other hand, usually aims at the total 
overthrow of the political and social system of the state without, however,
dismembering part of its territory. In fact, preservation of the territor-
179ial integrity of the state becomes an important secondary goal . Contrary 
to communist liberation movements their ethnic counterparts are not concerned 
with the overthrow of governments or political and social systems as such 
but may aim to do so insofar as no other option is perceived to exist in 
terms of the achievement of the primary goal - secession. This factor 
makes ethnic revolt a less attractive force to support as far as communist 
governments are concerned.
As far as ethnic separatism is concerned there are two primary 
external sources of support to take into account. Firstly, there are 
private groups or organizations which for some reason or another have an 
interest in extending support. Prominent among these are members of the 
same ethnic group living in another country. People of Irish descent in 
countries like the United States and Australia have given extensive material 
and moral support to the IRA in Northern Ireland. In Southeast Asia some 
support for the Malay minority in southern Thailand and the southern
179. See Connor, "Ethnology11, on Chinese and North Vietnamese 
attitudes and practices towards ethnic minority groups.
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community in Malaysia. The Kachin in Burma have depended to some degree
on support from their ethnic brothers on the other side of the border in
180China. Shan rebels often slip over the border to Thailand where
they find shelter among the ethnically related Thai. However, it is
important to remember that the overall level of material assistance received
by ethnic separatists is probably low. While this may be a function of the
separatists1 limited capacity, among others, to absorb and utilize material
assistance it is perhaps even more a result of the limited capacity of
external groups to provide such assistance. If these sources of active
support are to have an appreciable impact a great increase in their
capacity to supply assistance must take place. But it is difficult to
see how such an increase can come about without the active participation
or, at least, the passive connivance of governments. There are, of course,
governments whose authority and control over territory and population are
lacking and many governments in Southeast Asia find themselves in this sit-
181uation, but few are so powerless that they are not in a position to 
seriously hamper, even to the extent of rendering ineffective, any 
activities emanating from their own territory in support of separatist 
movements in other countries.
Thus the policies of governments towards secessionist movements 
become the crucial factor and, in fact governments are the second of the 
primary sources of external support referred to above. But governments 
are not free to choose policies entirely as they see fit and in this area 
even less than others. Should a government view with sympathy a particular
Philippines would appear at times to have come from segments of the Malay
180. See, for example, reports in Far Eastern Economic Review,
7 September 1967, p. 462 and 7 December 1967, p.428.
181. Laos and Cambodia are obvious examples in Southeast Asia.
are powerful constraints circumventing such sympathies which may cause
governments to abstain from acting in support of thè secessionists and
even actively discourage them. It is these constraints, not confined to
Southeast Asia but ubiquitously present in the international system,
which may determine the fate of ethnic secessionism now and in the
foreseeable future.
The first of these constraints concerns the multinational
character of the overwhelming majority of contemporary states. As noted
182above only 12 states, or about 9 percent, can be said to be essent­
ially homogeneous in ethnic terms, and in nearly 30 percent of the 
states the core ethnic group fails to account for an absolute majority 
of the population. This means that potentially nine out of every ten 
states are as vulnerable as their neighbours to demands for secession 
from one or more of their constituent ethnic groups. The possibility of 
opening up a Pandora’s box may then prove a decisive consideration for 
most states. The African states, faced with the threat of an eruption of 
multiple claims and conflicts over territory and peoples, realized this 
danger and consequently decided, with two exceptions (Morocco and Somalia)
to abstain from territorial claims and pledged themselves to preserve the
183boundaries bequeathed them by the colonial powers.
The second constraint is related to the contemporary meaning 
of self-determination in its role as the paramount criteria of inter­
national legitimacy. By international legitimacy is meant ’the collective 
judgement of international society about rightful membership of the family
secessionist movement in another, perhaps neighbouring, country there
182. Connor, "Nation-Building”, op, cit., p. 720.
183. African Research Bulletin, July 1964, pp. 107-108.
of nations, how sovereignty may be transferred, how state succession should
be regulated, when large states break up into smaller or several combine
, 1 8 4  into one .
Since its first recognition in the peace settlements after
World War I the meaning of the principles of self-determination has
undergone some important changes. Initially the principle referred to
the rights of national groups to self-determination. The League of
Nations devised an elaborate system for the protection of minorities and
their rights, by the creation of a number ’of instruments whereby the
particular state accepted provisions related to the treatment of the
minority groups and the recognition of the League of Nations as 
185guarantor’. The attention given the minorities under this system was
largely inspired by the concern for the peoples in Eastern Europe, the
Balkans and the Middle East who were affected by the collapse of the
186German, Russian, Austo-Hungarian and Turkish land empires.
The end of World War II marked the beginning of a period
during ’...which a new rule of legitimacy began to be worked out, or
rather a modified version of the popular rule, making it simpler in theory
and easier to practice. It asserted two rights; territorial integrity
187and majority rule.’ This change was precipitated as well as facil­
itated by the much reduced concern given the minorities and their rights 
after World War II. The Charter of the United Nations made no explicit
184. Martin Wight, "international Legitimacy", International 
Relations, Vol. VI, No. 1 (May 1972) p. 1.
185. Inis L. Claude, National Minorities, An International Problem 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 16.
186. Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination", The American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 65, p. 463.
187. Wight, op. cit., p. 8.
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Charter 1... was drafted without recognition of the minority problem as
188a significant item on the agenda of international relations.' Not
being mentioned, minority rights were only acknowledged to the extent
they coincided with the human rights provision of the Charter. 'The
189result was to leave the individual confronting the state.'
Preceded by this diminished interest in the minorities, the 
shift in the interpretation of self-determination was also a consequence 
of the decolonization. It can perhaps best be seen as a recognition of 
the changed character of the membership of the international system 
reflecting the interests of the new states without on the whole going 
contrary to the interests, as these came to be interpreted, of the older, 
established members of the system.
The colonial territories justified their demands for inde­
pendence by basing them on a claim to the right of self-determination. 
However, the organisation of political activities to achieve this aim 
was not focused on any national or ethnic group in particular but rather 
on all the peoples living within a certain territory whose borders had 
been more or less arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers. Thus self- 
determination was claimed on behalf of an administrative and territorial 
unit and the peoples which happened to reside within the confines of this 
unit rather than on behalf of any particular national or ethnic group.
Once independent, these new states, the great majority multinational, were 
faced with the task of preserving the territorial unity of the entity 
they had inherited from the colonial powers. In order to do so success­
fully it became necessary to restrict the application or alter the meaning
reference to minorities or the protection of their rights as such. The
188. Claude, op. cit. 3 p. 113.
189. Wight, op. cit.y p. 14.
of self-determination as a basis of rightful membership in the inter­
national system.
Firstly, self-determination was denied to national or ethnic 
minorities and applied to the inhabitants of territories as a whole.
This is the intended meaning of several resolutions of various United 
Nations’ organs such as this passed by the General Assembly. ’Any attempt 
at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purpose and principles of
190the Charter of the United Nations.’ Such a conception of the prin­
ciple is, of course, contrary to that which emerged in the wake of World 
War I and implied as well a denial of the right to secession on the part 
of any national group. ’[Once] the newly created or newly independent
state is in existence, no resort to further self-determination is 
191tolerable.1 This principle was made even more explicit by Secretary
General U Thant when he said in 1970, 'So, as far as the question of 
secession of a particular section of the Member State is concerned, the 
United Nations’ attitude is unequivocal. As an international organ­
isation, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I
do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of
192its Member State.1 Moreover, the right to self-determination is only
given to territories considered or defined to be in a colonial situation. 
And here one should be aware that a colonial situation has been construed 
to exist only in relation to overseas empires. The imperialist adventures 
of the Soviet Union in her eastward thrust, and, for that matter, the
190. U.N. General Assembly, 15th Session, Official Records,Supp. No.
16 (A/4684), p. 66, quoted in Emerson, op. cit., pp. 460 and 463.
191. Emerson, ibid., p. 464.
192. Quoted in Emerson, ibid.
United States as well in her expansion towards the west, were not considered
193to have led them into a colonial situation , although the main factor
of this condition - the subjugation of ethnically different peoples to
alien rule - was no different in their case. 'it ...became a tenet of
the anti-colonialist cause that maritime contact was malignant, since it
was by sea that the European colonialists arrived. Territorial continguity
194had a superior legitimacy.
The selective application of the principle of self-determination 
has also resulted in it being abandoned altogether when it would appear to 
conflict with the objective of dismembering the overseas possessions of 
colonial powers. British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and 
Gibraltar has not prevented the United Nations from urging Britain to 
relinquish these two possessions to Argentina and Spain respectively, not­
withstanding the fact that the population in both territories are over­
whelmingly in favour of retaining their present ties with Britain. In 
both cases the relevant U.N. organs defined the relationship between these
two territories and Britain as being colonial in character and at the same
195time opposed the holding of referenda.
Lastly, self-determination is not thought to have anything to 
do with democratic or representative institutions. The logical relation­
ship that existed between self-determination and the democratic concept 
that popular opinion should determine political allegiance has dissipated. 
Rhetorical adherence to self-determination has not produced any corres-
193. Wight, op. cit., p. 9.
194. Ibid. See also Walker Connor, "Myths of Hemispheric,
Continental, Regional and State Unity", Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 4 (December 1969).
195. See Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1-8 June 1968, p. 22730,
12-19 April 1969, p.23294, 17-24 January 1970, pp. 23777-23778 
on the Falkland Islands and 16-23 September 1967, p. 22264,
15-22 February 1969, p. 23194 on Gibraltar.
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ponding willingness to let democratic processes decide the question of the
196ultimate fate of minorities.
None of these ’applications' of the principle of self-
determination offer much support for ethnic or national minorities bent
on secession and self-determination. The right to self-determination
does no longer belong to the national groups but becomes the exclusive
prerogative of the state. Within such a conception secession has no
place and self-determination ceases to be a revolutionary principle and
197becomes a principal supporting the status quo.
The third constraint concerns the relationship between govern­
ments themselves. Governments will hesitate to support movements in 
another country whose strength they are seldom able to assess accurately, 
whose future is unknown and whose activities are directed against the 
authority of a neighbouring government with which they may have a wide 
range of friendly and advantageous relations. This, of course, becomes 
a less powerful argument the more governments are removed from each other 
both in terms of geography and relations, and it may even be irrelevant 
to governments which are fundamentally hostile to each other. However, 
in so far as present actions may prejudice future relations this constraint 
may have some effect even in the latter case. And for most states the 
ability to extend effective assistance decreases rapidly with increasing 
geographical distance between themselves and the object of assistance.
The fourth constraint concerns the willingness of the inter­
national system to accept as new members a number of entities, which 
inevitably will be small in size and population and whose likely viability
196. See Wight, op. oit., esp. pp. 13-15, Connor, "Self-Determination11, 
op. cit., pp. 50-51.
197. See Harold S. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community
of Nations (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1967), pp. 55-58 on discussions 
within the UN on the scope of self-determination.
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and ability to survive as independent entities must be seriously questioned. 
It may be, however, this is a potential rather than an actual constraint 
since it is doubtful that there exists any consensual attitudes, let 
alone policy, among the existing members of the international system to 
the effect that an increase in the membership by the inclusion of such 
'unviable' entities is undesirable. Indeed, until now the evidence would 
seem to support the opposite contention insofar as the system would appear 
to have willingly accepted a number of new states, especially the socalled 
’micro-states’, whose population and size are as small or even smaller 
than those of the potentially new states. However, the circumstances 
under which these states entered the system were different since with 
few exceptions nearly all these states were the creations of the colonial 
powers, and they came into existence as a result of the decolonization 
process. The emotional power of this process has been such that it made 
nearly every demand for independence a valid one as long as it was just­
ified in terms of casting off the colonial yoke. Furthermore, for the 
metropolitan power to grant independence did not mean dismembering parts 
of their own territory proper. At most it represented a decline in their 
global power and role which on the whole they had come, however reluct­
antly, to accept as inevitable. The decolonization process is now largely 
over and demands for independence cannot convincingly be formulated in 
terms related to this process, unless the term ’colonization' is given 
a new meaning more in keeping with the situation ethnic minorities find 
themselves in.
An awareness of the problem of micro-states is not totally 
absent as seen in the words included in the annual report of Secretary 
General U Thant in 1967, ' ...it appears desirable that a distinction be 
made between the right to independence and the question of full membership
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obligations which are too onerous for the 'micro-states' and, on the
198other hand, may lead to a weakening of the United Nations itself.'
Should there, however, exist an attitude of opposition to 
'unviable' candidates among the members of the system there still remains 
the problem of implementing policies based on such sentiments. States 
are more prone to unilateral than joint action, and since would-be members 
are not likely to knock on the membership door all at the same time we 
may see some of them individually and at different times stumble willy- 
nilly through the doorway because of a lack of collective action on the 
part of existing members.
As a final constraint, statehood in the international system 
requires a number of essential characteristics among which are a stable 
population, a reasonably well-defined territory and a stable political 
community. Apart from being the principles of recognition they are 
attributes the existence or non-existence of which serve as criteria for 
the formulation of policies between states. The existence of ethnic 
minorities demanding secession, perhaps even rebelling in pursuance of 
this goal, is a sign that the stability of the population and the extent 
of the territory are in doubt. Not only that, they tend to cast a shadow 
over the viability and equilibrium of the entire political and social 
order in the state concerned. Peaceful relations between states - at 
the governmental as well as the non-governmental level - thrive and grow 
best in a climate of at least minimum intra as well as inter-state 
stability and order. From this point of view it is not strange that
in the United Nations. Such membership may, on the one hand, improve
198. Quoted in Emerson, op. oit., p. 469.
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governments on the whole treat ethnic rebellions none too kindly and set 
a high premium on stability and order.
There may also be a connection between stability, order and 
status in the international system in the sense that a state enjoying 
high status and prestige does so inter alia because it displays certain 
characteristics which are indicative of a highly stable and ordered 
political and social system. Stability and order become ends in them­
selves. Ethnic secessionism is therefore something to avoid or 
eliminate.
Taken together these five factors or constraints of a general 
nature add up to a formidable barrier against successful secession.
Nonetheless, a qualification must be made. Political
principles, including rules of international legitimacy, ’...are guides
not masters. There are occasions when it is prudent to subordinate them
199to overriding interests.' India's intervention on the side of Bangla
Desh (then East Pakistan) in the internal affairs of Pakistan is such an 
instance. The opportunity to destroy the territorial integrity and dis­
member a part of the territory of an enemy and rival and thereby drastic­
ally weaken it could not have been met with regret in India.
It has been argued that ! [the] general antipathy of govern­
ments toward self-determination of nations (peoples) as a general prin­
ciple should not be confused with their common practice of supporting 
specific movements.' The reasons for extending such support are many
of which internal pressures are among the most important. But more often, 
as perhaps in the case of India, '...the explanation lies in strategic
199. Wight, op. oit.j  p. 27.
200. Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism",
Journal of International Affairs3 Vol. 27, No. 1 
(1973), p. 14.
opportunism and the inability to resist the temptation to ride Trojan
201horses that graze within another's gate.’ There is no doubt more
than a kernel of truth in this observation. However the most remarkable 
aspect of the support given is not that it has taken place at all but 
rather its limited magnitude. Few countries have been in a better geo­
graphic, strategic and material position to extend support than China in 
relation to the ethnic rebellions in Burma. China would appear to have 
given only very limited material support and it is likely that the bulk
of this assistance went to the communist rather than the ethnic
202rebellions. The actual support, such as it is, can probably be more
accurately considered the minimum price a strongly ideological regime 
has to pay to preserve its ideological credibility.
The case of Biafra raised the possibility of intervention 
based on humanitarian considerations. However, in humanitarian intervention 
as in all other types of intervention it should be remembered that the 
burden of proof usually lies with the intervening state. Intervention 
represents a violation of state sovereignty and the state usually takes 
precedence over individuals and groups. Hence, one suspects that human­
itarian factors must be so strong as to overshadow all others before being 
the real cause of effective intervention in support of ethnic rebellions. 
Humanitarian intervention comes as a result of strongly repressive, often 
brutal, actions by the majority against the minorities. It would seem, 
then, that it will depend on the ruling majorities to what extent an ethnic 
minority can base its appeal for external support on humanitarian consider­
ations. But the minority groups are not entirely powerless. By itself
219.
201. Ibid., p. 15.
202. See Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia, op. oit 
esp. the chapters on Burma’s relations with China.
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resorting to cruel and brutal actions against members of the majority 
group it may provoke the kind of oppression against itself needed to 
stir world opinion and governments sufficiently. Given the tendency of 
people and even governments to attribute moral superiority to the weak, 
the ethnic separation movement may, if determined enough, in this manner 
and largely by its own initial action, provoke external intervention in 
its own support.
These are some of the factors at the international level 
which may influence events and be instrumental in preventing a great 
influx of new states into the international system. Taken individually 
they do not mean that we may not have to welcome the occasional new 
member into the system - political expedience has its own ways independent 
of accepted rules and principles - but rather that we are unlikely to see 
a massive extension of the membership of the international system suggested 
by the ubiquitous presence of national minorities and rising national 
consciousness.
Nonetheless, the strength of the social forces involved is 
such that secessionism cannot be lightly dismissed. In the past peoples 
have shown themselves capable of sustaining great sacrifices in pursuance 
of separate state and nationhood, and there is no reason to believe that 
this will not continue to be the case. It may well be, therefore, that in 
the not too distant future the choice will be between an international 
system with a membership many times that of today on the one hand, and 
the application of a much higher level of violence and suppression than 
today to prevent this from eventuating on the other.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND MINORITIES
The discussion of the minority problem in Southeast Asia has 
revealed two important conclusions. Firstly, there would seem to be a
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rising awareness on the part of many minorities of their own distinctive­
ness. Furthermore, to the extent the governments in the region have 
been able to cope with this problem their success has on the whole been 
imperfect and modest. Whatever the final solution, it would take time 
to accomplish. The second conclusion is that secessionism is unlikely 
to be the answer to the problem for reasons outlined above. Hence it 
would seem a safe bet to assume that the minority problem will continue 
to cause difficulties for the governments of Southeast Asia for a long 
time to come. Some of these governments are, however, at the same time 
involved in processes of cooperation and integration at the international 
level. Is there a relationship between the two phenomena? If there is 
what does it consist in?
Based on some evidence Haas has advanced the hypothesis that
'[countries] which are poorly integrated internally make poor partners in
a regional integration process because of the reluctance of leaders to
203further undermine their control at home'. If this argument is accepted,
the states of Southeast Asia would on the face of it have to be placed 
within this category of 'poor partners' because they would, as the exam­
ination of the minority situation indicated, seem to be poorly integrated 
internally. However it will be argued that on closer examination the 
relationship between quality of participation in integration processes at 
the international level and the state of internal integration will reveal 
itself to be more complex than indicated by Haas.
Although the hypothesis as formulated is ambiguous its signif­
icance is nevertheless fairly evident. Should it be true it would render 
futile all attempts among developing countries to enter into arrangements
203. "The Study of Regional Organization", p. 619.
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which in any w?y would involve a surrender of state sovereignty or parts 
thereof. However, the hypothesis calls for closer scrutiny.
It consists of two parts. There is, firstly, the link between 
the power of the leaders and the state of internal integration, that is, 
the less integrated a state is the less power its leaders presumably 
possess. Secondly, there is the posited link between leadership power and 
the quality of participation in regional integration schemes. In this 
regard the hypothesis would seem to say that the quality of participation, 
insofar as it means surrender of any part of state sovereignty, would 
suffer because the leaders are reluctant to detract from their already 
limited domestic power.
The hypothesis does not make clear if the reasoning in con­
nection with the latter of the two links applies to leaders of countries 
already engaged in regional integration schemes or to leaders still 
pondering whether or not to engage their countries in such schemes. If 
the former is the case the hypothesis does not explain the paradox whereby 
political leaders, unwilling to give up powers in the first place, still 
have involved themselves and their country in processes in which the sur­
render of power is a significant element unless, of course, the same 
leaders were unaware of the full implications of their country's involve­
ment .
If, on the other hand, the reasoning implied in the second 
link refers to a pre-involvement situation it would seem that the question 
of whether or not to join a regional integration process is a foregone 
conclusion. The leaders will decide not to do so because of the conse­
quent loss of power. But if they nevertheless decide to involve their 
country it must again be because they do not know what they are doing or, 
alternatively and more likely, they do indeed understand the implications
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of their move and by taking the step are willing to suffer a loss of 
personal and state power. Since there are developing countries presently 
engaged in integration processes at the international level one must assume 
that there are leaders in some internally less integrated countries who 
are ultimately willing to surrender at least some power - perhaps for the 
sake of sharing (greater) power at the regional level.
On the basis of the analysis of the minority situation in 
Southeast Asia the examination of the link between leadership power and 
state of internal integration will be centred on three types of situations. 
In the first two cases or situations the minorities are not integrated and 
in the last case they are partially integrated. The obvious fourth case 
in which the minorities are fully integrated can be dismissed as uninter­
esting in this context since should there in this case be weak leadership 
power, this cannot per definition be due. to lack of integration.
The first case is one in which the minorities are not inte­
grated according to any of the meanings of the term identified by Weiner. 
They are outside and uninvolved in the functions of maintaining the state 
and the political, economic and social system on which the state is 
primarily based. Their status is at best ambiguous and at worst unrecog­
nised, and they are usually not represented in the political system in 
any other than perhaps an informal way as when a person or a group take it 
upon itself to be their spokesman. 'We should do something for these 
people', is a statement indicative of the attitude. There is little or no 
attempt on the part of the government to mobilize the minorities nor is 
there much attempt on the part of the minorities themselves to gain partic­
ipation in the system. The country is split into two camps, so to speak - 
the majority and the minorities, the former constituting both the government 
and the governed, the elite and the mass, while the latter is neither. The
two social units, as they were called at the beginning of this chapter, 
function largely, though not entirely, independently of each other.
Under these circumstances the powers of the leaders emanate from within 
the majority group itself. Appeals for the support of the leadership are 
directed at the members of the majority and especially at those members 
who are mobilized and who participate in the political processes. The 
minorities, passive and excluded from participation in the political system, 
are irrelevant to the processes which generate leadership power. Whatever 
powers the leaders possess are dependent on factors internal to the majority 
group. The minorities in this situation neither detract from nor add to 
the power of the leaders because they are not perceived by the leaders, 
nor indeed by the majority group as a whole, to be a part of the political 
equation. Hence, whether the leaders have ’poor' or 'strong' control and 
power at home is not dependent on the fact that segments of the population - 
the ethnic minorities - are not integrated. The quality of the participation 
in international integration schemes might well be poor because the leaders 
are afraid of undermining their power at home but this will have to be 
attributed to factors other than poor domestic integration of the kind 
dealt with here.
The first case is exemplified by the situation which prevailed 
in Thailand before the mid 1950s when the Thai government of the day 
started the first programs directed at bringing the hill peoples under 
the effective jurisdiction of the state. There is no evidence to suggest 
that the non-integrated state of the various ethnic minorities like the hill 
peoples influenced in any appreciable way the power of successive Thai 
governments either in the period of the absolute monarchy immediately 
before 1932 or in the constitutional period after 1932 up to the mid
224.
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ially on the geographical fringes of the majority group and was mainly 
due to contact through trading and so on. A similar situation existed in 
Cambodia where the issue of the minorities was one which on the whole was 
denied existence. Sihanouk would at times appear to have encouraged some 
of the minorities straddling the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam 
to unite in a common cause but his actions in this regard were at least 
partially meant as an embarrassment to the government of South Vietnam.
The minorities would not appear to have played a role in the internal 
politics of Cambodia or to have affected Sihanouk's own position. The 
only possible exception was the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia but this 
was again an issue which primarily affected Cambodian-South Vietnamese 
relations.
The second example of non-integration of minorities corresponds 
essentially to the first in all but two respects. Firstly, the government 
is pursuing a policy of integration in regard to the minorities. This 
implies inter alia bringing them under the jurisdiction of the state. 
Secondly, this policy is met with resistance and opposition by the minor­
ities. An important difference between the two cases is, therefore, that, 
unlike the first example, the question of the place and the status of the 
minorities is now an issue within the political system even though the 
minorities themselves still are outside the system. As any other political 
or economic issue it is a potential source of controversy and conflict and 
may as such influence the power of the leaders. The extent to which this 
is the case will depend on the magnitude of the problem itself and on its
1950s. Such awareness of the minorities as there was existed essent­
204. This is the conclusion to be drawn from Wilson, Potiti.cs in 
T h a i l a n d in which the ethnic minorities, with the exception 
of the Chinese, are not mentioned.
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magnitude relative to other political problems in the system. In Burma 
the sheer size of the problem has been such that it has loomed large 
among the political issues which have preoccupied the majority group, the 
Burmans. One of the main reasons for the Ne Win takeover in 1962 was 
ostensibly the U Nu government's policies towards the minorities. In 
this case it obviously has been an issue capable of making the power pos­
ition of the leaders vulnerable.
The situation in Thailand after the mid 1950s may also serve
as an example of the second case. The policies towards the hill tribes
in the north and the northeast have served as a means by which one segment
of the Thai power equation, the army, has been able to further strengthen
its power and hold over the government vis-a-vis another contender, the
205police.
The minority issue need not, of course, have the effect of 
reducing the power of the incumbent nor need it make the power base more 
unstable. The introduction and the existence of the minority issue in the 
political system may, indeed, have the effect of unifying the majority to 
a degree previously not possible. This may happen when the government 
formulates policies towards the minorities which play on the latent and 
overt hostile feelings often entertained by the majorities towards the 
minorities. It is not unlikely that the relative harder line towards the 
minorities adopted by Ne Win in Burma may have won him considerable favour 
with the Burmans. The issue of the overseas Chinese would appear to have 
been a factor in some countries which at times has strengthened the 
position of those who favoured a hard line towards this minority.
The third case is different from the previous two in one 
crucial respect. Not only has the minority issue been introduced into
205. See Race, op. oit. > passim on the rivalry between army and police.
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the political system but the minorities themselves are participating in 
the system through their own representatives. This means that they are 
not only in a position to influence the question of their own status and 
position but they also have the opportunity to affect in one way or other 
all other issues within the system. Within this third case two different 
patterns of relations can be distinguished, namely what may be termed a 
stable and an unstable pattern.
The relatively stable pattern is exemplified by Indonesia 
where the minorities have taken their place in the scheme of things much 
in accordance with government policies. The minorities are not on the 
whole mobilized in opposition to integration as witnessed by the extent 
to which the population of Indonesia has acquired a measure of identity 
with the country as a whole that tends to overshadow ethnic loyalties.
This would seem to be the state of affairs in Indonesia especially in the 
time after the rebellions of the late 1950s which were predominantly staged 
on a regional basis but also contained an ethnic element. Nonetheless, 
the relative non-integrated state of some minorities in Indonesia would 
seem to be an issue which does not have the capacity of influencing the 
power position of the present leadership.
The unstable pattern is exemplified by the Philippines where 
large elements of the Muslim minority in the south are in open rebellion 
against the government. Some elements of the Muslim minority have become 
integrated whilst other elements, probably the great majority, though a 
part of the political system are not integrated. It is an unstable sit­
uation because the integrated members of the minority group as well as 
members of the majority group itself may turn against the government 
because of its policies towards the minority. Hence, apart from the 
issue itself and its potential for creating dissension and conflict within
228.
the majority group there are now minority members within the political 
system who may serve as further catalysts of dissension.
The case of Singapore’s stormy relations with Malaysia during
the two years between September 1963 and August 1965 cannot be said to fit
either of the categories above. Although the problem again was the status
and position of a minority group within the political system (assuming the
Chinese can be considered a minority within the meaning of this chapter),
the sheer size of the Chinese community and the nature of the policies of
the Chinese leaders in Singapore did not only threaten to upset whatever
harmony and balance had been achieved on the mainland, but also posed the
question of which ethnic group would be the dominant in the new federation
in the future. The case of Singapore and the federation can be said to
involve most of the various types or aspects of integration identified by
Weiner. But perhaps more than the others it was a matter of value
integration, that is '...the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain
206a social order'. In this respect it is noticeable that the Chinese
community in Malaysia was divided mainly between the Singapore Chinese 
and the Chinese on the mainland with the policies of the former not only 
being a threat to the Malays but also to the leadership of the Chinese 
community on the mainland.
The expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia was in a sense a 
departure of one part of an ethnic minority from the political system.
In another sense it was also the departure of a modern political system 
which had already considerable experience in functioning as such. Thus, 
when the Tunku decided that Singapore had to go he did not only expell a
206. Weiner, op. oit.3 p. 15.
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troublesome ethnic minority but also a political system and a set of 
political ideas which may have had considerable appeal to the rest of 
the federation.
It has been assumed throughout the discussion that the 
majority groups themselves are well integrated. This is of course a 
severe limitation but it need not necessarily change the conclusions.
The discussion has been concerned with showing that there are situations 
in which leadership control or power may be largely independent of the 
fact that the state may not be well integrated and the example of non­
integrated or partially integrated ethnic minorities have been used 
to show that this may be the case.
This does not mean that Haas’ hypothesis which was cited 
above has been invalidated. By specifying under what conditions it may 
hold true it will increase its explanatory value. Hence, it would seem 
that on the basis of the discussion above and in regard to ethnic minority 
integration, three conditions in particular are important, namely the 
extent to which the issue of the minorities is important in the political 
system, the extent to which the minorities are formally represented or 
participate in the political system, and the extent to which the minor­
ities are mobilized, inside or outside and for or against the political 
system and the state of which they are formally a part. The political 
power of the leaders are least likely to be influenced by the state of 
integration at the beginning of the process, that is, when the minorities 
are least integrated. This is when there is little or no representation, 
participation and mobilization of the minorities. Between this state of 
affairs and the end of the integration process, that is, when the minorities 
have ceased to exist as an issue of integration, there are several 
possibilities in which leadership power may be influenced by degree of
There remains one possibility which ought to be mentioned. 
Through their countries’ participation in integration processes at the 
regional level minorities may eventually direct their loyalties towards 
a regional entity of some kind. The pull of Pan-Africanism is an 
example. However, nothing comparable has as yet emerged from regional 
cooperation in Southeast Asia and for the moment integration into their 
respective societies seems the only available option. In this respect 
much will depend on the terms they are offered.
integration.
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REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL THREATS
The attainment of a reasonable level of security is the first 
consideration of the foreign policy of every country. Foreign policies 
include, of course, additional goals such as economic and social welfare 
but these are subordinate to the overriding concern for security. This 
does not necessarily imply that statesmen spend all or even most of their 
time thinking about and acting directly in relation to the security of 
their country. There are many countries in which security considerations 
at certain times and on a day-to-day basis are relegated to a relatively 
unobtrusive position in the hierarchy of foreign policy concerns. This 
may be the case, for example, when a country considers its security 
requirements adequately fulfilled or when it considers there to be no 
immediate threat to its independence and sovereignty.
Security is also the primary goal of the foreign policies of 
the Southeast Asian countries. But contrast with the situation in some 
other parts of the world the issue of security has rarely receded to the 
background in the minds of the political leaders. It has instead been for 
long periods a daily preoccupation of the same leaders, sometimes to the 
exclusion of nearly all other business. The balance between the feeling 
of security and the feeling of being threatened has on the whole tended 
to tip strongly in favour of the threat end of the scale.
These feelings of threat have contributed perhaps more than 
any other single factor to the flavour of international relations in South­
east Asia. More specifically, they have strongly influenced the processes 
of cooperation and integration by determining the membership and the
Chapter 5
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participation in these processes thus placing in relief the problem of 
the extent to which Southeast Asia can be considered one region.
In the first part of this chapter some observations will be 
made about the notion of threat. The second part will deal with the 
specific security and threat problems of the various countries in Southeast 
Asia, and the third and last part will consist of a discussion of the ways 
in which perceptions of threat have tended to preserve and even exacerbate 
the fragmented nature of Southeast Asia.
THE NOTION OF THREAT
In order to more fully understand the situation in Southeast 
Asia it is necessary to make a few observations about the concept of threat.
Most definitions of threat have built into them an explicit act
%
on the part of one party, the threatener, designed to convey to another
party, the threatened, that unless the latter does or does not do certain
things he, the threatener, will take some actions which involve a certain
risk or cost to the threatened greater than the risk or cost to himself.
This conception of a threat as an overt act or an issuance of an explicit
conditional warning is, for example, contained in Schelling's definition
when he says, ’The distinctive character of a threat is that one asserts
that he will do, in a contingency, what he would manifestly prefer not to
do if the contingency occurred, the contingency being governed by the
second party's behaviour'. ^ Boulding's definition also sees a threat
'...as an act that creates a conditional expectation of damage, conditional
2on the performance (or, perhaps, the non-performance) of some other act.'
1. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960) p. 123.
2. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense. A General Theory 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963) p. 253.
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The purpose of a threat thus conceived is to instill in the threatened a 
feeling of insecurity such that in the end he will comply with the 
threatener’s demand(s) or will.
The purpose of a tacit threat, as contrasted with an overt 
threat, is basically the same and it is similar in that it too requires 
an act of some kind on the part of the threatener except that this act 
is more in the way of a hint than a deliberate assertion of intent. 
Richardson, for instance, when giving an example of a tacit threat, talks
3of a '...veiled menacing reference to overwhelming power’.
A prerequisite for a successful threat in the conception of
Schelling and the others is that it is credible, that is, the threatener
must somehow convince the threatened that he has both the means and the
will to execute the threat if necessary. This can be done in various ways
4which need not concern us here.
However, these definitions of an overt as well as a tacit threat 
are too dependent on a specific 'threat structure' to adequately cover a 
number of situations which also imply the existence of threat, threatener 
and threatened and in a general sense may be described as a 'threat sit­
uation' or 'threat environment'. The definitions are similar in that they 
all depend on that initial act, overt or tacit, on the part of the threat­
ener to imbue in the threatened the feeling of insecurity which would seem 
necessary if the threatener is to succeed (without having to carry out the 
threat, we might add - in line with Schelling). While the Schelling- 
Boulding-Richardson conceptions certainly have relevance to a great number
3. James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. The 
Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 249.
4. See Schelling, op. cit. 3 p. 123ff.
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of situations and relationships in Southeast Asia there are, however, 
other situations which require that one go beyond their notions. It 
is argued that situations or ’threat environments' may exist in which 
one party may feel threatened by another party and consequently change 
his behaviour in such a way as to take account of this fact without the 
latter actually having issued a threat, overt, explicit, tacit or other­
wise.
To give an illustration, one may perhaps refer to the vague 
feeling of threat and impending danger a person, forced by circumstances 
to take that route, has when he is walking through a dark and deserted 
street in a city area he knows to have a high rate of crime. He adjusts 
his behaviour and becomes unusually careful and alert so as not to provoke 
the 'enemy'.
A similar phenomenon - tangible or intangible - with the ability 
to imbue fear or a feeling of threat or insecurity by its very existence 
or presence in certain situations may also be found in the international 
system. We are referring to superior power or strength, the largest con­
centrations of which are found in individual states, and are controlled by 
governments. There is something intrinsically menacing or threatening 
in great strength which may make a less strong or weak power change its 
behaviour in ways it thinks will please the powerful. But although an 
element of fear or insecurity may exist on the part of the weaker in all 
superior-inferior relationships based on power we would not argue that 
the weaker therefore always or even most of the time changes his behaviour 
in a direction dictated by the stronger. To do so would be to overlook 
the fact that there exist a number of factors which can be used by the 
weaker to circumvent the compelling strength of the stronger and thereby 
avoid the change in policy or behaviour. For example, the weak may be
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able to call upon the protection of a third party whose power is equal to 
or greater than its superior opponent. However, the weaker is in a much 
more difficult situation when he encounters a superior power with, at 
best, only equals and, at worst, no equals among third parties. The 
range of choice in terms of partners, allies, protectors and so on is now 
effectively much narrower. Such superior powers are usually referred to 
as big powers or super powers, and it is in the relationship between them 
and the weaker powers that one is most likely to find that the mere 
presence of superior strength may cause the small and weak to adjust its 
behaviour and policies in ways thought amenable to the big power, and this 
without the latter having issued any threat as envisaged by the Schelling- 
Boulding-Richardson definitions.
A further point of qualification needs to be made. The fre­
quently repeated observation that the globe is becoming ever smaller due 
to the revolution in communications and that therefore every nation is 
every other nation's neighbour, although in some senses correct, neverthe­
less does not dispense with the fact that there is a certain degree of 
insulation in the international system related to what is often vaguely 
referred to as spheres of influence centered around specific big powers. 
This relative insulation of one sphere from another leads to partly - in 
some cases even strongly - curtailed opportunities for the weaker powers 
to seek allies and so on in other spheres. In an age in which survival is 
at stake the big powers are inclined to reduce to as few as possible the 
number of conflict points between them which in this case means leaving 
each other's spheres of influence alone.
5. The concept of spheres of influence is now the subject of a 
dissertation by a fellow research student, Paul Keal, in the 
Department of International Relations, the Australian National 
University.
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In the light of such conditions it seems natural to suggest 
that the phenomenon under discussion is most likely to occur in relation­
ships between big and small powers within somewhat defined spheres of 
influence.
At this juncture another problem must be discussed. Is it 
really enough to say that the existence of superior power in itself is 
enough to alter a nation's behaviour even with the qualifications already 
introduced in mind? Must not the small power which feels threatened also 
have to be convinced that the superior power in a contingency possesses 
the will to take some kind of hostile action? From where does this con­
viction on the part of the smaller power derive?
Firstly, a big power has, of course, no incentive to convince 
anybody of the will behind a threat it has not issued. Consequently when 
another weaker power is convinced that negative repercussions may result 
if it does not adjust its behaviour this cannot result from some specific 
or general effort by the big power to plant such convictions in the mind 
of the weak.
Secondly, however, the will to carry out a threat is not so 
much a feature of the threat as such as a characteristic of the agent 
issuing the threat, that is, the threatener. Thus the will may in a 
sense exist independent of specific threats and threat environments.
This in turn means that one has to look to characteristics, or at least 
what the small power consider to be characteristics, of the big powers to 
discover from where the small derive their convictions concerning the will 
of the big.
At this point the phenomenon under discussion may perhaps be
referred to as a lingering threat, and it can be defined as a belief on 
the part of the weak power that the strong has both the means ands at
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least3 a latent will to take measures which may be detrimental to the 
weak. From the standpoint of the weak the means are obviously there.
They derive from the superior-inferior power relationship, and they are 
easily observed by the weak without efforts on the part of the big to 
persuade the small of their existence.
When it comes to the will there are two observations to be 
made, one of a general and the other of a specific nature.
In the general sense there is probably a belief, or perhaps 
a suspicion, on the part of all weak states that the strong and power­
ful sooner or later is ready to do harm to the weak in one way or another, 
under one or another pretext, for example, under the guise of pursuing 
its 'national interest'. Although we have no evidence readily at hand, 
it may be that this is a phenomenon which is socio-biologically inherent.
In the specific sense many small powers situated on the rim of 
some big power may derive their belief in the will of the big power to 
injure them from particular historical experiences, even of a fairly 
ancient vintage, in which they were both involved.
Where these two beliefs exist simultaneously in a small power 
one may expect them to reinforce each other so that the net effect is 
particularly strong.
By way of a final comment the geographical aspect of this 
type of threat or feeling of threat should be emphasized. It is most 
likely to occur in the relationship between big powers and specific 
smaller neighbouring powers. It should also be emphasized that this 
type of threat is not of a transient nature but rather something which 
lingers on and which stays with the powers in which it exist for long 
periods - frequently decades, some times even centuries. Its existence 
over time does, of course, also depends on the fate of the big power.
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In what follows it will be argued that this type of threat is very prom­
inent in many Southeast Asian countries, and that it has been instrumental 
in shaping the cooperative and integrative processes in the region to a 
significant degree.
THREATS AND FOREIGN POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The threat to the security of the various countries in South­
east Asia has been perceived by the governments as being predominantly of 
three kinds. Firstly, there is the internal or domestic threat often in 
the form of insurgencies of various kinds. Secondly, there is the 
regional external threat, that is, the threat thought to emanate from 
another, often neighbouring, regional power. And thirdly, there is the 
extra-regional external threat, that is, the threat supposed to originate 
from without the region, often from one or another of the big powers. In 
terms of the individual countries this means there are basically one inter­
nal and two external sources or types of threat. The reason for the latter 
division - into two external sources - is simply that they often are seen 
by the various countries as being different both in kind and magnitude.
The division is also relevant as and when we wish to look at the question 
of threat and security from a regional point of view as is increasingly 
happening in Southeast Asia itself.
All the countries in the region entered the 1960's feeling 
that they had a more or less serious security problem arising from one or 
a combination of the three sources of threat just mentioned. However, 
the intensity of the insecurity experienced and the conclusions drawn and 
the policies adopted to counter the threat varied considerably from country 
to country depending on circumstances, historical factors, the direction 
from which the most serious threat was thought to come, and so on.
BURMA
The neutralist foreign policy of Burma revolves around the 
fact that she has a common border with China longer than any other 
country in Southeast Asia. The awareness of China displayed by the 
Burmese leaders is well reflected in the following remark -
Back of all our public statements about ’non- 
alignment’ , ’friendship with all countries',
’positive neutralism’, and the like, is a constant 
awareness of our big and powerful neighbour in 
the north. We do not fear communism as an ideology 
so much as we fear the day when China's masses must 
find living space in our under-populated country. ^
Similar sentiments are reflected in another remark, 'Burmese
foreign policy is founded on the immutable axiom of 700 million Chinese
to the north'. 7 The general tenor of these remarks is, of course, one
often expressed by the small and the weak with regard to the big and
powerful. It could have originated in any small country in similar
circumstances. However, the specific content of these remarks conveys
the idea of China, if not as an overt or manifest, at least a potential
or latent threat to the sovereignty and security of Burma. In fact the
distinction between latent and manifest is especially convenient in the
case of Burma because one can appropriately regard her foreign policy as
primarily a design meant to prevent the transformation of China from a
predominantly manifest threat to Burma. The fact that Burma up to 1967
on the whole enjoyed relatively harmonious relations with China is not,
of course, solely attributable to this 'design* but neither can it be
6. Quoted in Johnstone, Burma’s Foreign Policy, p. 158.
7. Quoted in Robert A. Holmes, "Burma's Foreign Policy Toward China 
Since 1962", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Summer 1972),
p. 240.
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stripped of merit altogether. 8
As had been the case in regard to the Chinese nationalist 
government Burma set out at the first opportunity to create good rel­
ations with the new rulers of China by being the first non-communist
country to recognize the Chinese People’s Republic in December 1949.
In the ensuing years to 1960-61 especially three issues were of vital 
importance to Burma in her relations with China. Two of these - the 
ethnic and communist rebellions, especially the latter, and the presence 
of Kuomintang troops on Burmese soil - provided China with possible 
grounds for direct or indirect intervention in Burmese affairs. The 
third issue - the border dispute - concerned the territorial integrity 
of Burma in so far as she may have had to face the loss of substantial 
parts of her territory to China.
However, after some tense periods which reached a peak in 
late 1956 and early 1957 with reported incursions of Chinese communist 
troops into Burma's northeastern territory the border dispute was 
resolved in January 1960 when a treaty was signed according to which 
China abandoned large territorial claims for some minor modifications 
of the old British boundary. ^  The reasonable attitude of the Chinese 
in regard to the border issue did much to allay fears in Burma and the 
agreement ushered in a period of better relations than ever between the 
two countries.
The issue of the border was to some extent related both to
9
8. With regard to the evolution of Burma's policy towards China, 
see Johnstone, op. cit. 3 esp. pp. 158-200. See also Gurtov,
China and Southeast Asia3 esp. ch. 4.
9. See Johnstone, ibid., pp. 52-57 on Burma's recognition of the CPR.
10. For the development and resolution of the border dispute, see
ibid., pp. 187-197. See also Lamb, Asian Frontiers3 pp. 150-157.
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that of the Kuomintang troops and the internal rebellion. On the one 
hand the refugee Kuomintang troops could have been used as an excuse by 
the regime in Peking for incursions on a large scale into Burmese terri­
tory and once there the communist troops could not easily, if at all, 
have been evicted by the Burmese. On the other hand, an occupation of 
the claimed territory by the Chinese could have been used as a pretext 
for extending more effective help to the internal rebellions in Burma, 
especially the communist rebellion. As it happened these fears on the 
part of the Burmese leaders were never really fulfilled. The Kuomintang 
troops issue was largely resolved by actions initiated by the Burmese 
government within the context of the United Nations. ^  The Chinese
leaders on their part early indicated that they considered the issue a
12matter to be dealt with by the Burmese themselves. Hence by 1960 the
issue was no longer of much significance in Sino-Burmese relations even 
though some Kuomintang troops still remained in eastern Burma principally 
preoccupied with opium smuggling.
The internal rebellions in Burma have proved to be a more
complicated question since they are still not eliminated as a potential
issue of conflict in Sino-Burmese relations. However, throughout the
1950’s the Chinese communists showed little interest in their ideological
brethren in Burma. As one scholar has observed, between 1950 and 1963
China's support for and contacts with the Burmese communists ’...were more
symbolic than subversive. At the most, they indicated that Peking had only
a residual interest in the Burmese Communists' cause, an interest that
could be activated, however, if Burma's foreign policy turned hostile
13toward Peking.'
11. Johnstone, op.ait. 3 PP* 225-233 for the actions taken by Burma in the UN.
1 2. ibid., p. 178.
13. Gurtov, op. cit., p. 92.
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Thus by 1960 the most dangerous issues in Sino-Burmese rel­
ations had on the whole found a satisfactory solution as far as the 
Burmese government was concerned. Only the ethnic and communist rebel­
lions simmered on as a potential issue of conflict but even here the 
Burmese government’s fears had been largely dissipated by the restraint 
and relative lack of interest of the Peking regime.
This attitude of the Chinese - so beneficial from a Burmese 
point of view - was probably also a result of steps taken by the Burmese 
government simultaneous to the search for solutions to the issues just 
referred to, steps which reflected Burma's general desire to assure 
China of her peaceful intentions. Initiated by the abovementioned early 
recognition of the CPR,Burma in 1954 followed up by declaring her adher­
ence to the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’ during a visit of
the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to Rangoon. On several subsequent
14occasions she reaffirmed her adherence to the principles. Burma's
attempts to placate the Chinese in this period up to the 1960's was
crowned by the signing of a 'Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression'
in January 1960 in Peking on the same occasion the border treaty was
signed. ^  The most significant clause in this treaty was the third
which stated that 'Each Contracting Party undertakes not to carry out
acts of aggression against the other and not to take part in any military
16alliance against the other Contracting Party'.
Thus Burma began the 1960's quite satisfied her relations 
with China were never better. Her relations with her other close
14. Johnstone, op. oit., pp. 166-176.
15. Ibid. , pp. 193 and 196. See also Gurtov, op. cit.s p. 95.
16. See appendix II, pp. 307-308 in Johnstone, op. c i t for the 
text of the treaty.
243.
point of view of Rangoon - satisfactory. Although minor problems
existed in her relations with India over the Indian minority in Burma,
and with Pakistan and Thailand over their common border these were either
solved or never allowed to assume the proportions of major disputes. ^
Sino-Burmese relations were now extended into other fields.
The Chinese promised large credits for trade promotion and in 1963 a
number of technical assistance and other aid projects were launced.
The Burmese, on their side, supported in general, though sometimes
rather vague, terms many Chinese policies on international issues not
18directly related to Sino-Burmese relations. The apparent Chinese
desire to maintain good government-to-goverament relations was put to a 
test in 1963 when the Burmese government in April of that year declared 
a general amnesty and called for unconditional negotiations between 
itself and all insurgent groups, including the communists. The negotia­
tions lasted for about two months and a half before they broke down in
mid-November. If anything the Chinese appear to have urged the Burmese
19communists to come to an agreement with the government. This generally
20moderate stand of the Chinese in regard to the communist rebellion 
lasted to 1967 when the relations between the two governments abruptly 
changed.
Due to the greatly intensified American involvement in 
Vietnam from 1964-65 Burma found it more difficult to practise her brand
neighbours, India, Pakistan, Thailand and Laos, were also - from the
17. Ibid., pp. 255-256.
18. Gurtov, op. oit. 3 pp. 96-97 and 99-100.
19. Ibid., pp. 97-101.
20. See, for example, the conclusion reached in Peter Van Ness, 
Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy. Peking’s support for 
Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley, California: University 
of California Press, 1971), pp. 97-98 as far as the year 1965 
is concerned. See also Gurtov, op. oit. 3 pp. 102-105.
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of neutralism without offending China. Burma's general, rather non­
committal, stand on the conflict in Vietnam may not have been entirely 
to the liking of China who probably would have liked to see an outright 
Burmese condemnation especially of the American involvement. Some 
pressure would seem to have been brought to bear on the Burmese govern­
ment in this regard but without much success. The independent line of 
Burma in this and other questions would not, however, seem to have been
interpreted in China as hostility toward Peking nor as a departure from
21the Burmese policy of neutralism.
However, all this changed in June 1967 when the convulsions 
of the Cultural Revolution in China spilled over into Burma. The rel­
ations between the two countries - so cordial prior to June 1967 - quite 
suddenly turned hostile, sometimes even vitriolic, primarily due to
actions and conditions over which the Burmese had very little influence
22and no control. In short the rift that occurred grew out of the
Burmese refusal to let the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung be disseminated, 
particularly among the Chinese minority in Burma. Inspired by and 
directed from the Chinese embassy in Rangoon attempts were made to spread 
the thoughts of Mao and encouragement was also given to activities sim­
ilar to those of the Red Guards in China, all in open defiance of the 
clearly expressed disapproval of the Burmese government. Riots followed 
in which a Chinese aid technician was killed and the relations between 
the two countries deteriorated rapidly. On June 30 an editorial in the
21. Gurtov, ibid •, pp. 105-111.
22. We shall not here rehearse all the detailed events which led to 
the rift. For such details, see Frank N. Träger, "Sino-Burmese 
Relations: The End of the Pauk Thaw Era", pp. 1034-1054 and 
Peter Boog, "The China-Burma Rift", pp. 5-11.
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Burma in the strongest terms calling it 'reactionary', 'fascist' and
'counter-revolutionary'. The day after, on July 1, a statement by the
Communist Party of Burma was broadcast by the New China News Agency and
given official Chinese support. In it the Burmese government was once
more attacked in strong terms and the NCNA exhorted the Burmese people
23to support the communist insurrection in Burma. Diplomatic relations
between the two countries were suspended. The Chinese indicated that
their ambassador would not return to Rangoon after having been recalled
earlier in the year before the dispute started. The Burmese ambassador
was withdrawn in September. During November the Chinese aid technicians
returned to China. These and other developments during 1967 and 1968
brought relations to a breaking point. The Chinese press campaign
against Burma in general and Ne Win in particular continued unabated
throughout 1967 and well into 1968 when in addition large scale fighting
between Burmese and Chinese troops was reported to have broken out along
24the common border in the north.
However, 1968 also produced the first sign of a change in 
China's extremely belligerent stand. Although the press campaign con­
tinued Peking, nevertheless, initiated moves which indicated a desire to 
move towards improvement in the relations. China donated typhoon relief
aid to the Burma Red Cross and Burmese officials were invited to Peking
25to attend national celebrations. In 1970 high ranking Burmese offic­
ials began to attend functions they had previously boycotted. Later 
that year the Burmese ambassador returned to Peking while the Chinese
Jen-Min-Jih-Pao (People's Daily) in Peking attacked the government of
23. Ibid. See also Robert A. Holmes, "China-Burma Relations Since 
the Rift", Asian Survey_, Vol. XII,No.8 (August 1972), p. 687 
and Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
24. Holmestibid. t p. 689.
25. Ibid., p. 694.
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ambassador returned to Rangoon in March 1971 thus re-establishing normal 
diplomatic relations. In August 1971 Ne Win went to China at the
invitation of Premier Chou En-lai, the first such visit since July 1966.
26Relations continued on the whole to improve in 1971 and 1972.
The rupture in Sino-Burmese relations did not bring about 
any significant change in Burma's relations with other countries. The 
threatening posture of China after June 1967 did not induce 
Burma to look around for other powers with which to align herself and 
thereby perhaps ward off the threat from China. Such change that has 
taken place in Burma's foreign policy refers more to range than content 
and started before the conflict with China. She had become increasingly 
assertive in her conduct of foreign relations expressing interest in
extended diplomatic and economic contacts with her neighbours and with
27the major powers. This new assertiveness, which continued after 1967, 
did not, however, compromise her basic policy of neutralism. She studiously 
avoided establishing such contacts with other powers which could be inter­
preted as hostile to China while at the same time adopting a moderate, 
even conciliatory, but nevertheless firm stand against hostile Chinese 
actions. What up to 1967 had been the cornerstone of Burma's foreign 
relations - to avoid irritating or provoking China - was never lost from 
sight in the period after.
Whether or not Sino-Burmese relations will again return to 
the same level of intimacy at which they were conducted prior to 1967' 
will depend not only on the actions of both parties but also how they 
interpret these actions. The sudden crisis of 1967 and subsequent events 
obviously caused great alarm in Burma and must have reawakened the Burmese 
to the potential of China as a threat.
26. TbicL. , pp. 695-698. 27. Ib id .
The events of 1967 have been interpreted in basically two 
ways. One interpretation maintains in the words of one of its pro­
ponents '...that China's frustration over the lack of success of its
policy vis-a-vis Burma led to the actions precipitating the Sino-Burmese
28rift'. In this view the events of 1967 were but a part of a continuous
Chinese policy aimed at bringing Burma within a distinctly Chinese orbit
- to entice, as it were, Burma to give up her policy of neutralism in
favour of a much more pronounced pro-China policy.
The other interpretation sees the same events as a break or
discontinuity in Chinese policy brought about by ultra-leftist elements
in the Cultural Revolution. In the words of one of its advocates '[the]
Cultural Revolution has been an internal phenomenon, and its seepage
abroad to become a factor in China's relations with other countries seems
29to have been an uncalculated though perhaps inevitable by-product'.
According to this view the Chinese leaders, inter alia Mao Tse-tung and
Chou En-lai, lost control over the conduct of foreign affairs and, for a
30period, even the foreign ministry itself. Accordingly, the rift in 
China's relations with Burma and other countries during the Cultural Rev­
olution represented an unintended discontinuity in policy which would be 
rectified by relations being brought back to a substantially similar, if 
not entirely identical, course with the passage of time.
28. Robert A. Holmes, "The Sino-Burmese Rift: A Failure for China", 
p. 211.
29. Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during 
the Cultural Revolution", The China Quarterly, Vol. 40 (October- 
December, 1969), p. 102. A similar view is expressed in Daniel 
Tretiak, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution and Foreign Policy", 
Current Scene, Vol. VIII, No. 7, (April 1, 1970).
30. See Mao's conversation with Edgar Snow in December 1970 to the 
effect that he (Mao) was not in control of the Foreign Ministry 
in 1967 and 1968. Reported in James Chieh Hsiung, Lau and Policy 
in China’s Foreign Relations. A Study of Attitudes and Practice 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 169. See also 
Gurtov and Tretiak, ibid.
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Neither of these two interpretations - and the evidence at 
the time of writing seems to favour the latter of the two as most likely - 
would seem to be capable of laying to rest Burmese anxieties vis-a-vis 
China. Those Burmese who lean towards the first alternative must ask 
themselves what there is to prevent China from again resorting to 
similar or perhaps more forceful tactics in her pursuit of her foreign 
policy goals.
To other Burmese the second alternative may appear only
slightly less disturbing especially if they take seriously Mao's own
statements about the continuing revolution and the necessity for more
31Cultural Revolution type upheavals in the future. How can one be
sure that such future upheavals, were they to occur, would not produce 
consequences similar or even more serious to Burma than those flowing 
from the first Cultural Revolution?
For still other Burmese the events of 1967 may have caused 
them for the first time to view China as a potential, even an actual, 
threat to Burma. To these people experiences of a traditional and histor­
ical nature, reinforced by the largely harmonious relations between the 
two countries in the post-independence period up to 1967, had led them
32to consider China a friendly neighbour not to be particularly feared.
However, Burma has had to face also a more manifest or overt 
threat stemming from domestic ideological and ethnic conflicts. Ever 
since 1948 the Union government has had to combat secessionist rebellions 
by segments of the numerous ethnic minorities. In addition the government
31. Mao himself has advocated the need for future Cultural Revolution 
type changes in China.
32. John H. Badgley, "Burma and China. Policy of a Small Neighbor'1, 
in A.M. Halpern (Ed.), Policies Toward China. Views from Six 
Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), pp.
304-305.
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has had to handle the rebellions by the communist Red and White Flag 
factions. Although the communist and ethnic rebellions cannot be 
easily separated in that they to some extent overlap it is possible 
to say that the former has been viewed the most seriously by the Burmese 
government. This is not due so much to the strength and size of commun­
ist insurrectionist activities which would appear to at much the same 
scale and level as the ethnic rebellions as to the possible and actual 
links between the communists and the regime in Peking.
As already indicated at the actual level the Peking regime 
was rather lukewarm in its support of the communists in Burma at least 
until 1967. Its support, more symbolic than subversive, had not influ­
enced the internal situation to any significant degree apart from such 
influence as Mao's writing on guerilla warfare had on the tactics adopted 
by the White Flags in particular. After the breakdown of the talks 
between the Burmese government and the various rebel groups in the autumn 
of 1964 the White Flags adopted a more outright 'war-line' in their
struggle against the government. Still, little more than low-key moral
33support would appear to have been forthcoming from Peking.
The rift of 1967 could have provided a turning point in 
China's support of the communists in Burma and to some extent it did.
The change could, however, have been much more drastic than was the case.
To be sure, the verbal support for the communists in the Chinese media was 
greatly increased. However, for a variety of reasons no significant mat-
3 Aerial assistance would seem to have been given the White Flags by China.
33. Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia, pp. 102-103.
34. Ibid., pp. 150-152.
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As government-to-government relations have gradually improved since 1968 
Peking’s verbal support of the Burmese communists has decreased though not 
ceased.
It is rather the level of the possible or potential that will 
cause the Burmese to continue to keep a wary eye on China. They cannot be 
certain that should the leaders in China deem the conditions favourable 
they will not extend far more than verbal and low-level material support to 
the Burmese communists. As we shall see this is a fear they share with 
the leaders in many other Southeast Asian countries.
THAILAND
No less than in the case of Burma the close presence of China
has figured prominently in Thai foreign and security policy after World War
35II. But whilst the Burmese have been careful and reticent the Thai have 
on occasion been outspoken in naming China a threat. Likewise, the actions 
taken and the policies adopted vis-a-vis China have been widely different.
The Burmese moved early to remove any cause for Chinese military or other 
intervention by adopting a policy of neutralism in the East-West conflict 
while they at the same time and within this framework attempted to cultivate 
as warm and friendly relations with China as possible. Only after some 
initial hesitation Thailand, on the other hand, opted for a strongly 
partisan policy in favour of the west the cornerstone of which was her 
relations with the United States.
Traditionally Thailand was part of the tributary system the 
center of which was China and the last tributary mission, which had averaged 
between one and two a decade, went to Peking in 1853. A variety of commercial 
and cultural links had existed and from about the 14th century onward a
35. Badgley, op. cit., p. 306.
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steady trickle of Chinese migrants entered Thailand until in the mid 1950s
an estimated 10-11 percent of the population was Chinese, a percentage
which has been fairly steady since. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia this
. . .  36Chinese minority dominates commercial and other economic activities.
The Thai policy towards China was one of avoidance rather
than involvement, a policy facilitated rather than hindered by the trib- 
37utary system. From the mid 19th century, however, the relations at the
official level were broken off when Thailand, by the force of circumstances
more than by choice, became part of an international system dominated by
the colonial powers. In fact, with the exception of the four years between
1946 and 1949, and then only as a result of the postwar settlements,
Thailand, for the last 120 years, has not had diplomatic or consular rel-
38ations with any of the regimes ruling mainland China.
In the post World War II years this insulation, especially at 
the official level, has not prevented China from looming large in Thai 
foreign policy. It may indeed be that China occupied so large a place in 
Thai thinking precisely because of the near total absence of relations 
between the two countries. The largely unknown and the distant (and we 
are talking about social rather than geographical distance) sometimes have 
a tendency of assuming qualities in the minds of people which in fact do 
not exist while those qualities that do exist, be they good or bad, tend to 
become enlarged out of all proportions.
36. George Modelski, "Thailand and China. From Avoidance to 
Hostility", in Halpern, op. cit. 3 pp. 348-349.
37. Ibid., p. 350.
38. Ibid., p. 351.
The shift in Thai foreign policy towards a reliance on the 
West and the United States was precipitated by the army coup d' etat in 
November 1947 when the then leading political figure and former Prime Minister 
Pridi Panomyong was ousted. In April 1948 Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram 
became Prime Minister again, a position he had previously held from 1938 
to 1944 and which he this time was to hold until 1957 when another coup 
removed him from office.
By 1950 the constellation of forces in Asia, previously some­
what fluid due mainly to the civil war in China, had crystallized so much 
that the Thai leaders felt the time had come to make the choice. They were 
convinced that communist China was a threat and that she would be hostile 
to Thailand, that she would inspire subversion and also would extend mili­
tary aid to the Vietnamese and Laotian communists who in turn were ready 
to aid separatist elements in the largely Thai-Lao populated northeast of 
the country. With such convictions the choice was fairly clear.
The first steps on the pro-Western road were taken when 
Thailand recognized the newly proclaimed independent Vietnam under the 
Emperor Bao Dai and the governments of Laos and Cambodia to be followed a 
month later in March 1950 by the recognition of South Korea. Support for 
these regimes was also United States and British policy and Phibun thought 
that by doing so he would invoke the gratitude of the United States and 
concomitant large amounts of economic and military aid. In this he was
39
39. A number of books describe this phase of Thai history. The 
exposition which follows is based on the following works if 
nothing else is indicated; Wilson, Politics in Thailand3 
and the same author, The United States and the Future of 
Thailand (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970); Frank C.
Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1965); Modelski (Ed.), SEATO, Six Studies, 
and same author in Halpem, Policies Toward China; and Donald 
C. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965).
greatly helped by the outbreak of the Korean War which was to change com­
pletely the size and the complexion of the United States involvement in 
Asia, which until then had been largely economic and cultural and relatively 
small compared to what was to come.
In September 1950 an Economic and Technical Cooperation 
Agreement was concluded with the United States and the following month a 
Military Assistance Agreement was also signed. The latter, however, did 
not go beyond equipment and training. The Americans made it quite clear 
that the United States was not prepared to give Thailand a security 
guarantee although the Thai leaders had very much wanted such assurances.
As is natural in a situation of near 'non-relations* such 
as existed between Thailand and China there were not many issues that 
directly concerned only the two of them. One such issue, however, was the 
establishment by China in 1953 of the Thai Autonomous People*s Government 
in the province of Yunnan, one of a number of similar administrative units 
for minority groups in China. This event caused much excitement and even 
more consternation in Thailand particularly since the Thai government sus­
pected former Thai Prime Minister Pridi, now an exile in China, of being 
involved. To those who believed in the hostile motives of the Chinese this 
was only further confirmation. To many who had been less convinced of the 
evil intentions of China it was the event which tipped the scale.
Thai government support for SEATO has fluctuated mainly 
according to Thai perceptions of the security situation in Indo-China and 
the gap between the policies advocated by the Thai in this regard and those 
of her SEATO partners, especially the United States. To the Thai the events 
in Laos during 1960-62 appeared particularly ominous for Thailand espec­
ially when it became clear that the policies favoured by her, intervention 
on behalf of the right wing forces in Laos, did not meet with the desired 
response from the rest of the SEATO members. Britain and France in particular
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were opposed. This caused Thailand to renew her attempts to bring about 
at least such changes in SEATO that would permit individual states to 
act without the prior agreement of all the other members. Short of a 
bilateral alliance, which throughout had had first priority, Thailand wanted 
in particular an arrangement which permitted and ensured that the United 
States would act independently of her other SEATO partners in case of 
a communist attack on Thailand. In March 1962 the Thai received the 
assurances they had been seeking off and on since at least 1954. In a 
joint statement by the United States and Thai foreign ministers in 
Washington the United States pledged full support for Thailand’s inde­
pendence and security and promised to meet any attack on Thailand if nec­
essary independently of SEATO.
The doubts which had existed in the minds of the Thai leaders 
as to the willingness of the United States to stand up to what the Thai 
considered the expansionist communism of China and North Vietnam were fur­
ther dissipated in the years which followed. The United States became 
increasingly involved in Vietnam and with the bombing of North Vietnam in 
1964 and the arrival of large numbers of American troops beginning in 1965 
this commitment was drastically extended. The Thai responded to United 
States requests for active Thai support in the fight against North Vietnam 
and the Viet Cong by permitting the Americans to build several large air 
bases in Thailand from which bombing raids against Vietnam and Laos were 
conducted. In 1967 the Thai even committed ground forces which at their 
peak numbered about 12,000 infantry and support troops.
With the partial rapprochement between the United States and 
China and the American military disengagement from Indo-China and conse­
quent reduction of forces in Thailand, much of Thai foreign and security 
policy has been left substantially without a firm base. The heavy reliance
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on the United States and the latter’s responsiveness had made Thailand’s 
strongly anti-China and outspokenly anti-communist policies possible.
The reorientation of United States policy removed much of the rationale of 
Thai policy leaving her with basically two options in regard to China. 
Either she could continue her strongly anti-China policy in spite of the 
likelihood of diminishing United States support. Or she could attempt to 
come to terms with China in one way or another. On present evidence it 
would appear that Thailand is moving in the direction of this latter 
alternative.
In addition to the extra-regional external threat from China 
the Thai have also been preoccupied with the regional external threat posed 
by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam). To the 
extent the Thai have considered direct military invasion a possibility it 
has been thought most likely to come through Laos from either China or 
North Vietnam. Seen from Bangkok,Thai anxieties may not have been totally 
without foundation. As the 1962 international agreement on Laos deter­
iorated and as the conflict in Vietnam, escalated North Vietnamese troops 
reached on more than one occasion the east bank of the Mekong and thus 
directly faced the northeast region of Thailand. It is also evident that 
Thai authorities never have cherished the thought of a united Vietnam 
especially under communist rule. In this they have not, of course, been 
alone in Southeast Asia.
Nearly as important for Thailand as an understanding with 
China is some kind of modus vivendi with North Vietnam. It may indeed 
be that the latter can best be arrived at through the prior establishment 
of the former, that is, the way to Hanoi goes through Peking as far as 
Thailand is concerned. However this may be, Thailand has been given some 
breathing space in which she can reformulate and change her policies 
towards both China and North Vietnam.
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The importance of better relations with these two countries is 
further underscored by the links between them and the third threat to 
Thailand, namely the internal or domestic insurrection or subversion.
This threat, not particularly prevalent in the 1950’s, has become per­
haps the major security problem facing the Thai government, especially 
after 1964.
Until that year Chinese support of the Thai communists had on
the whole been on a very small scale and Thailand would not seem to have
rated high on the Chinese priority list. The Chinese assistance was in the
form of low level training and propaganda support of the Thai communist
40exiles. A kind of division of labour may indeed have existed between
China and North Vietnam in regard to the Thai communist movement. China
appears to have taken care of the training of a small number of relatively
senior Thai cadres while the North Vietnamese - primarily at the Hoa Binh
School outside Hanoi - trained a larger number of ordinary soldiers and
low level cadres of which possibly some were not even sent back to
41Thailand but rather included in Pathet Lao units in Laos. However, as
far as China was concerned it would appear that her '...early involvement
with the Thai Communists ... provides little evidence of a meaningful
42Chinese effort to foment trouble in Thailand.
Starting in late 1964 a change took place in the attention paid 
the Thai communists and the situation in Thailand by both the Chinese and 
the North Vietnamese. After many years,during which not much at all was 
heard of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) Peking published a National 
Day message from the CPT on November 1. This message also contained an 
appeal for the formation of a united front aimed at the overthrow of the
40. Gurtov, op. ait.,pp. 15-16.
41. Ibid., p. 17.
42. Ibid., p. 16.
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Thai government and was followed in the next few months by the establish­
ment of front organizations such as the Thai Independence Movement (TIM) 
with a programme compatible with the CPT programme, and the Thai
43Patriotic Front (TPF) which at the end of 1965 merged with the TIM.
This re-emergence of the organized Thai communist movement 
coincided with increased Chinese and North Vietnamese support. But in 
the case of China this increase would not appear to be impressive. It 
is indicative that Chinese propaganda material surfaced much more fre­
quently than Chinese arms and equipment in the north and the northeast of 
44Thailand.
The North Vietnamese involvement, on the other hand, was more
significant although not on a scale which would suggest that the DRV
45considered the rebellion in Thailand a matter of priority. From 1962
to 1965 the number of guerillas trained at the Hoa Binh school each year
46would seem to have doubled from about 70 to 130. The increase in
guerilla activity in the late 1960’s in the north and the northeast of 
Thailand cannot, however, with any certainty be attributed to the com­
munists alone. Considerable non-communist anti-government sentiments 
exist among the hill tribes and the attempts by the Thai to bring them, 
especially the Meo and Yao, under effective government control met with 
considerable resistance.
Some of the increase in guerilla activity in Thailand in the 
second half of the 1960's was nevertheless in some degree undoubtedly 
due to increased Chinese and, especially, North Vietnamese support.
The reason for this increase at that particular time may not, however,
43. ibid•> PP* 12^14.
44. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
45. Ibid•, p. 18.
46. J.L.S. Girling, "Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow’s Viet Nam", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (January 1968), p. 396.
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be found so much in a desire to create in Thailand 'another Vietnam' as 
in the strong links between Thailand, the United States and the conflict 
in Indo-China. Thailand's role in this conflict had, as we have already 
indicated, increased in step with the escalating United States involvement. 
By providing bases for the United States Air force Thailand played a 
crucial role in the conduct of the war on the part of the United States.
It is more likely than not that China's and North Vietnam's stepped up 
support in 1965 and 1966 was a reminder to Thailand of what might happen 
if she did not reconsider her foreign policy in general and her involve­
ment in Indo-China in particular. '... [the support] was staged in
careful phases during 1965 and 1966, apparently to give Thailand time to
47reconsider her foreign commitments'.
CAMBODIA
Considered as both a potential threat to and a potential pro­
tector of Cambodia,China was assigned a part in Cambodia's (or Sihanouk's)
foreign policy quite unlike in many respects the one that she occupied in
48the foreign policies of Burma and Thailand. The seemingly contradictory
expectations Sihanouk had in regard to China - as at once both a potential 
threat and the immediate benefactor - led him actively and deliberately to 
exploit her existence for foreign policy purposes in a manner not paral- 
elled elsewhere in Southeast Asia. While the Thai have sometimes been
47. Gurtov, o p . c i t p. 45.
48. The section on Cambodia has been based mainly on the following 
works; Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia; Roger M. Smith, 
Cambodia's Foreign Policy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1965); Leifer, Cambodia. The Search for Security3 
Donald Kirk, Wider War (London; Pall Mall Press, 1971)f Michael 
Leifer, "Cambodia and China: Neutralism, 'Neutrality', and 
National Security", in Halpern, op. cit.
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accused, rightly or wrongly, of having quite cynically used the presence 
of China and communism to extract additional military and economic 
assistance from the United States, Sihanouk has, in quite a different 
fashion, used China herself and her presence in his attempts to extract 
from the world community - and especially the big powers and her own 
immediate neighbours - what he considered his most important foreign 
policy objective, namely an international agreement guaranteeing 
Cambodia's independence and territorial integrity.
Partly as a result of the influence of Prime Minister Nehru
of India, Sihanouk began in the mid 1 9 5 0’s - in the aftermath of the
1954 Geneva Agreement - to redirect Cambodia’s foreign policy towards
’neut ralism’. As in the case of Burma, Sihanouk sought security in
friendly relations with China rather than risk her hostility arising
from too close a relationship with the western powers and the United
States in particular. But perhaps more than fear of the immediate
presence of a big power, S i hanouk’s rejection of a Western oriented
foreign policy as a viable alternative for Cambodia, was based on his
gradually emerging belief that communism was the strongest and most
dynamic force in Asia. Not a communist himself he nevertheless saw
communism as the social force which would dominate Asia in the not too
49
distant future. It therefore became essential to the survival of
Cambodia to be on good terms with this force and especially its most 
important Asian repository - China. The considerable apprehensions he 
harboured with regard to China's ultimate motives and intentions were 
pushed into the background in favour of an attempt to enlist her assist­
ance in containing what he considered more urgent threats to Cambodia.
49. See Bernard K. Gordon, "Cambodia: Where Foreign Policy 
Counts", Asian S u r v e y Vol. V, No. 9 (September 1965), 
pp. 435-436.
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Although he never moved to an overall foreign policy position completely 
identical with that of China, Sihanouk in the late 1 9 5 0’s and early 
1960's gradually identified Cambodia very closely with Chinese policies 
on many international issues. This he did,not only on the basis of 
whatever convictions he had about the wisdom and efficacy of these pol­
icies, but also because he calculated that Chinese friendship could be 
valuable whenever he had to cope with what he saw as the more urgent and 
overt threat to Cambodia from her nearest neighbours, Thailand, Vietnam 
(North and South) and, to a lesser degree, Laos.
Cambodia’s suspicions - even bitterness - towardsher neighbours 
have long historical roots and have in recent times been nurtured by 
incidents and issues which have served only to further increase Cambodian 
suspicions of successive Thai and Vietnamese governments and political 
m o v e m e n t s .
The prolonged dispute with Thailand over the ancient Khmer 
temple of Preah Vihear, finally settled in favour of Cambodia by the 
International Court of Justice in 1962, added to the already strained 
relations between the two countries. Dissatisfaction among certain Thai 
circles with the verdict of the Court and the somewhat reluctant Thai 
acceptance of it, led the Cambodians to believe that Thailand had not 
really given up the claim so that the issue of the temple continued to 
linger on after 1962. Sihanouk also suspected the Thai of wanting to 
recover the Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap annexed by 
the Thai in the 19th century and again granted the Thai by the French under 
the auspices of the Japanese in 1941, but returned to Cambodia in 1946.
Then there was the question of Cambodian exiles in Thailand, especially 
Son Ngoc Thanh and the Khmer Serai (Free K h m e r ) , w h o m  Sihanouk accused 
the Thai of supporting in alleged attempts to overthrow him.
261.
Cambodia's relations with South Vietnam were, if anything, 
worse. The Vietnamese were alleged to have territorial interests in 
Cambodia especially in regard to certain off-shore islands in the Gulf 
of Siam. The Saigon regime, in fact, called on Cambodia to renounce 
possession of seven of these islands in 1960. It did not, however, 
back up its claim by military means. Another factor in their relations 
is that Cambodia, on her part, never gave up her claim to Cochinchina, 
the most important part of South Vietnam which had been part of the 
Khmer kingdom until late in the seventeenth century. As late as 1958 
the Cambodian government brought this claim to the attention of the 
United Nations;although it is unlikely that she entertained any hopes 
of ever realizing the claim. Another issue which served to poison the 
relationship between the two countries was the question of the Khmer 
minority in Vietnam and the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. This gave 
rise to numerous charges and counter-charges of ill treatment and 
intimidation. Repeated South Vietnamese violations of the Cambodian 
border while in pursuit of the Viet Cong, coupled with Saigon charges 
that the Viet Cong used Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and base camp, 
did not improve relations either. Nor did the much earlier 'Dap Chhuon' 
plot of 1959 in which, according to Sihanouk, the South Vietnamese, the 
Thai and the Americans have been in collusion with the governor of Siem 
Reap province to overthrow him. The significant aspect of all these 
charges and counter-charges, disputes and conflicts and so on, is, of 
course, that they are not without substance.
The different ideological complexion of the regime in North 
Vietnam did not do much to allay Cambodian suspicions of Hanoi. The 
most significant feature of the Hanoi regime is not, as far as the 
Cambodians are concerned, that they are communists but that they are 
Vietnamese. The relations were, however, considerably tempered by
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Sih a n o u k’s apparent belief in the ultimate dominance of communism and his 
consequent desire to be on as good terms as possible with China and North 
Vietnam. Wary of possible North Vietnamese support for the Khmer Viet 
Minh or Khmer Rouge (the Red Khmer) and apprehensive of what a united 
Vietnam under the communists might have in store for Cambodia, he con­
tinuously tried to extract from the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong 
written agreements guaranteeing the borders of Cambodia. His success in 
this respect was, however, qualified. In 1964 the government of North 
Vietnam finally acknowledged Cambodia’s right to the off-shore islands but 
not in a formal agreement. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam 
and the Pathet Lao likewise offered only verbal, not written, recognition 
of the existing borders.
As far as the Saigon regime was concerned the situation in 
Vietnam rapidly deteriorated and by 1964 Sihanouk was further convinced 
that it was only a matter of time before South Vietnam would fall to the 
communists. South Vietnamese unwillingness to talk about the border and 
other outstanding issues between the two countries, previous Chinese 
economic and military aid and pledges of support to Cambodia in case of 
foreign armed aggression - all this strengthened his belief in the wisdom 
of Cambodia moving still closer to China if there were to be any hopes 
of coming to terms with North Vietnam.
Sihanouk’s disenchantment with the western powers and the 
United States in particular was complete by 1964. The Americans had 
shown themselves to be uninterested in providing Sihanouk the guarantee 
he wanted, and in May 1965 he broke off diplomatic relations with them, 
perhaps as much out of a desire to please the Chinese as in disappointment 
with Washington's policies.
During 1965 Sihanouk began to realize, however, that China's 
interest in his neutralization scheme for Cambodia was secondary to both
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Peking and the Vietnamese communists as long as the war in Vietnam was 
not settled. At the Indochinese People's Conference, convened by 
Sihanouk in Phnom Penh in early 1965 primarily to discuss his scheme, 
the situation in Laos and Vietnam had priority.
In late 1966 and 1967 Sihanouk had another problem to handle. 
Radical-leftist politicians brought about a government crisis over the 
selection of a right-of-center cabinet under General Lon Nol. While 
Sihanouk was in France radical dissension in Phnom Penh merged with 
agrarian revolts in Battambang province causing Lon Nol to dispatch 
troops to the province to stop anti-government violence allegedly inspired 
by the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk put the blame on external influences. 'The 
masters of the Khmer Viet Minh are the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong' , 
he alleged.
In the midst of this internal upheaval the cultural revolution 
or its spill-over reached Cambodia. Inspired by the events in China the 
Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh became, as it had been in Rangoon, the 
center for the distribution of Maoist propaganda directed especially at 
the local Chinese population. Sihanouk took countermeasures by cracking 
down on the Chinese school system in particular, although he carefully 
attempted to maintain a distinction between Peking and local subversion 
in order not to provoke Chinese hostility. In this he was only partially 
successful, since in June 1967 the Chinese ambassador was recalled. 
Contributing to the ever worsening relations was Sihanouk's now more 
outspoken criticism of China for not making clear her attitude in regard 
to the frontiers. Only after the Soviet Union had issued a formal statement 
recognizing the present borders in early June, did the Chinese do the
50. Quoted in Gurtov, op. oit.3 p. 76.
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same, first in a statement of 13 June which merely indicated respect for 
the borders, and finally in a declaration of 31 July which fully recognized 
the existing borders. The NLF and the DRV did the same just after the 
Soviet Union. Sihanouk's response was to grant de jure recognition of the 
DRV and to permit the NLF to establish a permanent representation in 
Phnom Penh.
Sihanouk's reliance on the Soviet recognition to extract the 
same guarantees from China may not have pleased the leaders in Peking.
In August-September relations deteriorated to the breaking point mainly 
because of opposite views as to the propriety of local Chinese activities 
in Cambodia. Sihanouk announced on 22 August the withdrawal of Cambodian 
embassy personnel in Peking and only after a personal apology by Chou 
En-lai himself did he retract his decision.
The events of the summer of 1967 had considerable impact on the 
foreign policy thinking in Cambodia. Although the policies did not them­
selves change substantially, Sihanouk himself began to have doubts about 
the real influence of China on the communist forces both inside and out­
side Cambodia's borders. While assuring Peking of Cambodia's continued 
friendship,Sihanouk began to show willingness to improve relations with 
the United States.
Speculation in this regard was touched off by the ostensibly 
unofficial visit by Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy late in 1967, followed in 
January 1968 by the visit of then United States ambassador to India,
Chester Bowles. By these visits Sihanouk, among other things, may have 
wished to demonstrate to the Chinese and the North Vietnamese that there 
was after all a channel open to the United States.
Under the pressure of the threat of an American military move 
into Cambodia the first explicit Cambodian admission about the Viet Cong 
presence in Cambodia was made. When new internal disturbances occurred
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during the first half of 1968, Sihanouk in strong terms related these to 
external communist sources like the Pathet Lao, the Viet Cong and even 
Thai communists, all of whom he accused of aiding the Cambodian rebels. 
These accusations went beyond any previous proportioning of blame and may 
have been a result of what Sihanouk felt was a shift in the balance of 
forces especially in Vietnam. The Americans had shown themselves deter­
mined to honour their commitments, and the Viet Cong seemed to be further 
from victory than they had been three or four years earlier. It is indeed 
possible that Sihanouk used the Americans by appearing to move closer to 
them to extract further guarantees from Peking and Hanoi to refrain from 
intervening in the internal affairs of Cambodia.
If this was the case Sihanouk would seem to have had more success 
with the Chinese than the North Vietnamese. In March 1968 the Chinese 
reiterated their support for Sihanouk and his policy of non-alignment.
Hanoi and the NLF were less responsive insofar as they would seem to have 
continued their build up in Cambodian border areas in spite of continued 
professions of respect for Cambodia's territorial integrity.
Throughout 1968 and 1969 Sihanouk continued his dialogue with 
the Americans. In April 1969 the United States recognized Cambodia's 
existing borders, and in June he agreed to a reopening of the American 
embassy with a charge d'affaire as its head. Simultaneously he continued 
to cooperate with the communists, and in May he announced that the NLF 
mission had been upgraded to embassy level, and in June he recognized 
the NLF dominated Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam 
(PRG).
In March, when on a tour of Europe and Asia and on the way from 
Moscow to Peking, Sihanouk was overthrown. Lon Nol became Premier and 
Prince Sirik Matak his First Deputy Premier. Those who until then had 
been enemies became friends, and friends, prior to March 1970, became
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enemies. The result was that Cambodia became part of the Vietnam 
battlefield and within a short period of time Cambodia was engulfed 
by the whole fury of war.
LAOS
In no country in Southeast Asia have the circumstances of 
geography played such a crucial not to say cruel role as in the case 
of Laos. Landlocked and surrounded for the most part by much stronger 
neighbours her independence and sovereignty has been a matter over 
which she herself has had little influence. Instead her state of sur­
vival as an entity, very much a part of the broader East-West conflict, 
has been a contentious issue the outcome of which all along has been 
mainly in the hands of her neighbours and their allies and still 
essentially remains so.
Laos has a common border with Thailand, Burma, China, Cambodia
and North and South Vietnam. Her misfortune lies in the fact that of
her immediate neighbours, especially Thailand, China and the two Vietnams
each in its own way has considered her a vital part of their own security
52
To China, always sensitive about her security and especially
53
the security of her borders , it has been important to prevent the 
emergence of a regime in Laos hostile to China. Of equal importance has 
been the aim to prevent other powers with a commensurate capacity, most
51. This brief summary of the situation in Laos is based on the 
following books and articles; Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in 
Laos. The Politics of Neutralization (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1964); Kirk, Wider War•, J.L.S. Girling, "Laos - 
Falling Domino", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 3 (Fall 
1970)', Stanley G. Langland, "The Laos factor in the Vietnam 
Equation", International Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (October 
1969); Arthur J. Dommen, "Laos, Politics under Souvanna 
Phouma"; and Joseph J. Zasloff, "Leadership and Organization 
of the Pathet Lao", in Joseph J. Zasloff and Allan E. Goodman 
(Eds.), Indochina in Conflict (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. 
Heath and Company, 1972).
52. • Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston;
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 107-111.
53. Ibid., p. 395.
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notably the United States but also the Soviet Union, from establishing 
a lasting influence in areas adjacent to herself including Laos. To 
achieve this the most obvious alternative for China was to support those 
factions within Laos most friendly to her. More or less simultaneously 
with the clarification of the situation in China herself resulting in the 
complete dominance of the communists over mainland China,the situation 
among the Laotian forces struggling for independence from France had 
begun to crystallize leading to the formation of the communist dominated 
Pathet Lao in 1950. In the ensuing domestic struggle of the post­
independence era the Pathet Lao has been China's main ally in Laos.
They have also been the principal ally of the North Vietnamese.
In fact the Viet Minh was one of the main forces behind the formation of 
the Pathet Lao back in 1950. And as the conflict in Vietnam escalated in 
the 1960's Laos became more and more important to North Vietnamese strategy.
As the Thai saw it it was imperative to stop Laos from falling 
completely into the hands of the communists, because of her own exposed 
northeastern provinces. Thailand's principal allies within Laos were the 
various right-wing factions especially centered around General Phoumi 
Nosavan.
To the Americans the objective in Laos was not only to protect 
Thailand but also South Vietnam and ultimately to stop the spread of 
communism in Asia. To them Laos was part of the front line in the global 
struggle. The Americans, disinclined in the 1 9 5 0 's to trust the neutralist 
and centrist Prince Souvanna Phouma, came in the 1 9 6 0 's and especially 
after the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos which proclaimed the neutralization 
of the country, mainly to rely on him as their principal ally.
The Laotians, weak and divided among themselves, have been little 
more than pawns in a game in which the principal actors were these external 
forces. Except for brief periods when the Pathet Lao according to the
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stipulations of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements were to be integrated 
into the larger body politic of the Kingdom of Laos, the country has been 
divided into mainly two opposing camps waging war at each other.
Whatever apprehensive and ambiguous feelings the Lao may have 
had in regard to their various neighbours, especially the Vietnamese and 
the Thai but also the Chinese, these have been to a degree circumvented 
by ideological divisions. The Pathet Lao through the common bond of com­
munism may have come to trust and certainly to rely on the North Vietnamese 
and the Chinese more than they otherwise would. The centrist forces around 
Prince Souvanna Phouma and the rightists based on certain traditionally 
powerful families in their turn may also have come to trust and equally 
rely on the Thai and the Americans through their shared anti-communist 
sentiments. All factions, in order to survive, were compelled by the cir­
cumstances to depend on one or the other of the external forces, especially 
after 1964-1965 which brought about the dramatic escalation of the war in 
South Vietnam.
In the post-Vietnam war era, if we indeed can call it so, 
attempts at some kind of reconciliation of the various factions, com­
munist and non-communist alike, have taken place through the formation 
of a coalition government in Vientiane.
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE
There are two factors in particular which stand out in the con-
54
sideration of Malaysia's and Singapore's security policies. Each in
54. This review of the policies of Malaysia and Singapore has drawn 
extensively on the following books and articles; Brackman,
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China. Partner or Barrier?", in Halpern, o p . c i t J.M. Gulli ck, 
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1967), same author, Malaysia (Londoni Ernst Benn, 1969); Wang 
(Ed,), Malaysia; Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (New York:
Harper & Row, 1969); Chiang Heng Chee, Singapore. The Politics 
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The Future Role of Singapore (London: Oxford University Press, 1972),
269.
its own way has had a fundamental impact on the orientation of their 
external relations. The first factor is the unique experiences both 
countries have had with communism and the second is the racial com­
position of their populations.
For about 12 years Malaya (as she then was) and, to a lesser 
extent Singapore, were subjected to a communist insurgency during the 
period commonly referred to as the 'Emergency* stretching from 1948 until 
it was officially declared terminated in 1960. As far as Malaya is con­
cerned this period straddled the last years of her colonial existence 
and the first years as an independent country. In Singapore the communist 
insurrection had repercussions which in a fashion similar to that in 
Malaya came greatly to colour her post-independence external policies.
The insurgency, fought with the decisive assistance of Britain, 
left the Malayan leaders with the conviction that for the sake of security 
Malaya would have to depend on the west, especially Britain. The concrete 
result of this conviction was theAnglo-Malayan Defence Treaty of 1957 which 
provided for the presence of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve force in 
Malaya made up of troops from Britain, Australia and New Zealand. At 
the same time Malaya refused to have diplomatic relations with any com­
munist country, especially China, who would appear to have been the main 
supporter of the insurgents. Her anti-communist stand in the 1 9 6 0 's also 
gave itself expression in support of the United States involvement in 
the Vietnam conflict. Only at the end of the 1 9 6 0’s did her attitude 
towards official relations with the communist countries change when she 
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1968 followed 
by similar relations with a number of other European communist regimes. 
After Prime Minister Tun R a z a k’s visit to Peking in May 1974 Malaysia 
established diplomatic relations with the Chinese P e o p l e’s Republic.
Since her withdrawal from Malaysia in 1965 Singapore has followed
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a similar policy toward the communist camp, that is, strongly anti-communist 
but with diplomatic relations between herself and some communist countries, 
notably the Soviet Union, but not China. As in the case of Malaya (from 
September 1963 Malaysia) Singapore depended on the British for military 
security. This was the case during the emergency in the 1950's and it 
again was the case during the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia 
between 1963 and 1966. ^
It is clear that China occupies a prominent place in the planning 
and policy making of security both in Malaysia and Singapore. The fear of 
China is, as in so many other Southeast Asian countries, closely related to 
the CPR's actual and potential support for communist insurgency movements.
In this connection it is worth remembering that the insurgents in Malaya 
during the emergency were mainly Chinese. Malaysia still has an insurgency 
problem on her borders with Thailand where the remnants of the emergency 
insurgents are active, and in Sarawak on the border with Indonesia. Now, 
as then, the insurgents are mainly Chinese and now, as then, they receive 
some material and more propaganda support from China.
However, what makes the relations between Malaysia and Singapore, 
on the one hand, and China, on the other, more delicate than similar rel­
ations between China and other Southeast Asian countries, is the fact that 
in no other countries in the region is the Chinese component of the pop­
ulation so big as in Malaysia and Singapore. In 1970 about 34 percent of 
the population in Malaysia were Chinese while the corresponding percentage 
in Singapore in 1972 was about 74, which for all practical purposes makes 
the latter a ’Chinese' state.
Perhaps more threatening to the leaders in Malaysia and Singapore 
than China-supported insurgency as such, is the possible attraction a
55. See Brackman, op. cit.s on confrontation.
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vigorous, united and self-respecting China may have for the Chinese pop­
ulation in the two countries. Although the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai 
repeatedly has urged the overseas Chinese to settle down and assimilate 
in their respective countries, suspicions linger on in Malaysia and Singapore 
as elsewhere in Southeast Asia as to the intentions of the CPR. In the case 
of Singapore there is an additional difficulty in the concern sometimes 
voiced about the possibility of Singapore herself becoming a center of 
attraction for the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.
Both in Malaysia and Singapore the memory of the confrontation 
with Indonesia between 1963 and 1966 continues to exist. This suspicion 
and anxiety is more prevalent in Singapore than in Malaysia. Common racial 
bonds exist between the Malay population and the Indonesians, which in 
addition to the conservative orientation of both governments, have tended 
to have a softening effect on the bitter memories of confrontation.
While Malaysian-Indonesian relations improved fairly rapidly after the 
fall of Sukarno relations between Singapore and Indonesia were much 
slower in improving. Only in May 1973 did Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
pay his first visit to Indonesia, a visit which may have helped remove 
some of the mutual suspicion between the two countries. ^
INDONESIA
Indonesia, the largest of the Southeast Asian countries both 
in terms of population and area, has perhaps less than any other country 
in Southeast Asia harboured any strong fears of China. This is partly due 
to her size and geographical location fairly far removed from China. Her 
Chinese minority is also relatively small, only about 2.6 percent of the
56. Asia Research Bulletins Vol. 3, June 1973, pp. 1830-1831.
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total population. In fact, from about 1960 until the autumn of 1965
57
China was Indonesia's principal ally in Asia.
Foreign policy received scant attention in Indonesia in the 
first couple of years after independence in late 1949. The first Indo­
nesian governments practised a mild pro-western policy reflected in the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with all the major western powers 
and the neutralist powers before similar relations were inaugurated with 
the communist bloc countries. It was on the whole a policy of restrained 
involvement in international affairs based on a desire for independence 
from undue encroachments from without.
From about 1953, however, a more active foreign policy was 
pursued beginning with the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo, which staged 
the first Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955. Sukarno himself now 
became increasingly influential in foreign policy making and throughout
the late 1950's the policy shifted towards a more militant anti-colonial
58
s t a n d .
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58. Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 45.
Relations between Indonesia and China, initially rather cool, 
began slowly to improve especially after the signing of the Sino-Indonesian 
Dual Nationality agreement in 1955 pertaining to the legal status of the 
Chinese minority in Indonesia. This agreement signified the start of a 
decade of good relations between China and Indonesia which became espec­
ially cordial between 1960-61 and 1965. It came about through a combination 
of international and domestic Indonesian developments in the late 1 9 5 0’s 
eventually resulting in the socalled 'Djakarta-Peking axis'.
The international development stemmed from the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. The controversy over the Asian policies was related in partic­
ular to the issue '...of whether the CCP offered a unique model for 
revolution in the developing world and whether this model should be 
oriented primarily towards Asian governments or Asian communist parties. 
Although no clear-cut abandonment of the former for the latter occurred 
it became apparent in the late 1950's that China was devoting more 
attention to 'wars of national liberation' against incumbent governments
than to its earlier strategy of cooperation with anti-imperialist
59
bourgeois leaders'. This and other differences led to the increasing
isolation of China within the world communist movement.
In Indonesia Sukarno had substantially increased his influence 
to the extent that by 1960 he had made himself the outstanding political 
figure. Through pursuing the claim to West Irian, and also through the 
strengthening of the central government resulting from the suppression 
of the socalled 'outer islands revolt' of 1957-58, which also served to 
discredit the Muslim political party, Masjumi, and the parliamentary system,
59. Simon, op. oit.3 p.-16.
Sukarno, with the support of the army, introduced the 1945 constitution 
by decree in mid 1959, Under the powers of this constitution he was 
able to introduce a number of changes which inter alia greatly reduced 
the role of the political parties, while at the same time amassing 
decision-making power in his own hands. Considerable power rested, 
however, also with the army which had assumed a new prominence both 
in the administration and the policy making institutions of government 
after the imposition of martial law.
In order to maintain his own position at the apex of the 
political structure Sukarno increasingly used the Communist Party of 
Indonesia (PKI) as the force with which to counter the pretensions of 
the army. The party claimed the largest membership of any Indonesian 
political party and was at the same time the largest communist party 
outside the communist bloc. It had a well developed grass-roots organ­
izational structure. The situation was thus one in which a triangular 
balance of power existed between the army, the PKI and Sukarno within 
which Sukarno would sometimes ally himself with one and then the other, 
while mutual hostility between the army and the PKI did never permit 
their alliance against himself. ^
As Sukarno's influence increased so did the international in­
fluence of Indonesia. The revival of revolutionary nationalism - very 
much due to Sukarno himself - had expressed itself in the campaign against 
the Dutch to wrest West Irian from their control. This had been a major 
concern of foreign policy in Indonesia ever since independence and her 
view of many other countries came to rest on these countries' attitude to
60. Reinhardt, op. oit.9 pp. 52~54.
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the West Irian question. Indeed, her foreign policy as such, at
least in the period when Sukarno reigned supreme, was much influenced 
by her anti-colonial confrontation with the Dutch. Moreover, it is 
probably fair to say that Indonesia's foreign policy from about 1960-61 
was Sukarno's foreign policy.
Increasingly anti-colonialism and related sentiments came to
occupy a prominent place in Sukarno's thinking. At the Belgrade non-
aligned conference in 1961, instead of attempting the traditional
neutralist view of the world as divided into three main blocs with the
non-aligned serving as a mediator between the two cold war blocs, he
62
adopted a view similar to the Marxist 'two waring camps' thesis , a 
view which largely coincided with that of Peking, and which in fact 
came to form the basis of Sino-Indonesian friendship, at this time 
already well under way. The new formula was based on a different dist­
ribution of world power; now was the era of the clash between the New
£ O
Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO).
To China, more and more isolated, Indonesia emerged as an 
attractive alternative ally. The anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist 
policies of Sukarno were very much in line with China's own ideas and 
policies. China had strongly supported Indonesia's struggle for West 
Irian. But what must have made Indonesia even more attractive and 
important as an ally was the fact that China in Indonesia could openly 
work through and support the only legally existing communist party in
61. For a review of this problem, see Reinhardt, ibid., pp. 67-74 
and Brackman, op. cit. , pp. 91-100.
62. Reinhardt, ibid., p. 78.
63. S i m o n , op. oit.} p . 23.
2 76.
disapproval or wrath of the government.
In Southeast Asia, China and Indonesia came to share certain
objectives including the removal of British and United States influence
in the region, the fragmentation of Malaysia, the elimination of forces
in Indonesia dangerous to the communists and the Sukarnoists, and the
division of Southeast Asia into spheres of influence centered around
64
Peking, Hanoi and Djakarta. The Sino-Indonesian axis became something
of a dogma and Chinese verbal support for Indonesia was followed up so
much so that in the three years leading up to the October 1965 coup
Indonesia had become China's largest aid recipient.
After the successful completion of the campaign to gain control
over West Irian in 1962 Indonesia began to turn her attention to the
Malaysia proposal. In May 1961 the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul
Rahman had dropped the first hint about the desirability of a merger
between the North Borneo territories - Sarawak, North Borneo (Sabah)
and Brunei - and Malaya and Singapore. At first received with cautious
approval in Indonesia the mood in Djakarta was soon to change. In
August 1961 came the first attack on the Malaysia proposal in the Indo- 
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nesian press. When the Brunei revolt occurred in December 1962
Sukarno and the PKI declared their support for the Brunei people's 
'struggle for independence'. The revolt crushed after only four days 
by British troops brought in from Singapore proved to Sukarno that the
Southeast Asia outside the communist world without thereby inviting the
64. Sutter, op. cit. _, pp. 531-532.
65. Simon, op. cit. , p. 27.
66. Sutter, op. cit., p. 525.
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Malaysia proposal was unstable because of lack of support from the 
people of Borneo. Furthermore, to Sukarno the Malaysia proposal was 
another attempt of t h e ’neo-colonialists’ and the 'old established 
forces' to maintain and expand their influence. In this view he was 
strongly supported by the PKI as well as the army, although for 
different reasons. For the military also shared Sukarno's vision of 
Indonesia exercising hegemony over Malay archipelago - something less 
likely to happen should Malaysia be established. ^
"r
In February 1963 Sukarno formally declared Indonesia's 
opposition to the Malaysia scheme and in April the same year the military 
phase of ’Confrontation’ began with a guerilla raid on a border village 
in Sarawak. For the next three years or so raids and attacks followed 
both in Borneo and Malaya carried out by Indonesian units. Eventually 
Confrontation was officially ended in August 1966 when an agreement was 
signed between Indonesia and Malaysia. However, by that time Sukarno 
was a spent political force, the PKI had been virtually eliminated, and 
the army was in full control of the situation in Indonesia.
The Gestapu affair,so called, signalled the eclipse of Sukarno
and the demise of the PKI from the political scene in Indonesia. It
also signalled the end of the Djakarta-Peking axis proclaimed by Sukarno
68
to be in existence only a couple of months before. In contrast to
the axis was substituted a strong anti-China policy on the part of the 
new leaders in Indonesia.
67. Simon, op. a i t p. 35, Reinhardt, op.oit. 9 p. 127.
68. Sutter, op.oit. p pp. 533^534.
69. See Simon, op. oit.f pp. 111-150 for an account of the deterioration 
in Sino-Indonesian relations after October 1965.
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THE PHILIPPINES
Although the Philippines ^  has considered and still does 
consider communism the greatest threat she has on the whole been relatively 
less sensitive to the actions and policies of China than her SEATO partner 
Thailand. In the 1950's China was considered just one among many communist 
powers. Aggressive though she was, China, in the Filipino view, was 
nevertheless weak and without the means to carry out direct aggression 
against the Philippines. Moreover, the Philippines was largely insulated 
from China by the South China Sea.
With the passage of time this Filipino view of China under­
went a change. Partly due to the split in the communist camp between the 
Soviets and the Chinese the latter has gradually come to be considered 
independent and sufficiently strong to stand her own among the big powers. 
This change in the image of China has been brought about by the expansion 
in China's power and influence. The vague references of the 1950's to 
international communism have in the 1 9 6 0 's tended to become more directly 
identified with Chinese communism. Chinese nationalism and communism com­
bined became the primary external threat.
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Still, protected by the presence of the United States Seventh 
Fleet and large American bases in the Philippines the Filipinos did not 
feel too alarmed. Growing out of the colonial relationship with the 
United States and the experiences of World War II the security guarantees 
extended to the Philippines by the Americans have no paralell elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia. Through a number of agreements the United States com­
mitted herself firmly to the defence of the Philippines. In 1947 the 
Military Assistance Agreement and the Military Bases Agreement were con­
cluded to be followed in 1951 by the Mutual Defence Treaty. Finally, in 
1954 the set of guarantees was rounded off with Filipino membership in 
SEATO. All these agreements have amounted to a pledge on the part of the 
United States to come to the defence of the Philippines if she is attacked 
by external forces and also to contribute to her defence against internal 
subversion. This commitment has been reaffirmed by consecutive American 
administrations.
Developments within the Philippines throughout the 1960's in 
particular have tended to loosen some of the strong bonds between the 
Philippines and the United States. The pervasive American presence has 
led many people to question the reality of Filipino independence. Situated 
in Asia but wit h  a western outlook not found elsewhere in the region she has 
been torn between her natural inclination to side with the western world and 
her desire to participate more actively in the part of the world she belonged 
to geographically and racially. 71 The growing nationalistic feelings
71. See report in Asia Research Bulletin> Vol. 2, August 1972, 
p. 1090 and Vol. 3, June 1973, p. 1842.
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which have given themselves expression in a desire to be less dependent on
the United States in particular have led to demands for a review of the
72
entire relationship , and for a new role for the Philippines in world
73
affairs in general and in Asian and Southeast Asian affairs in particular.
As elsewhere in Southeast Asia the partial detente between China and the
74
United States has precipitated this search.
SOURCES OF THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The threats thought to emanate from various extra-regional powers 
have been the most constant and pervasive feature of the international rel­
ations of Southeast Asia over the last decade or so. To the governments of 
most countries in the region China has been and would still seem to be the 
main extra-regional threat. To North Vietnam this dubious role has both in 
the actual and potential sense been occupied by the United States through­
out the entire period. However, Sukarno also professed to feeling threatened 
by the United States as well as by Britain in their roles as the main imper­
ialist and neo-colonialist powers. In the post-Sukarno era these two 
countries have been replaced by China who to the present Indonesian leader­
ship appears a much more potent threat than any other power in an otherwise 
basically hostile international environment.
For the most part conspicuously absent as an extra-regional threat 
is the Soviet Union. She has on the whole not been considered a direct 
threat except as a member - admittedly the leading one - of the inter­
national communist movement. Since the split in this movement came into the
72. Vellut, The Asian Policy of the Philippines 1954-1961.
73. See, for example, the article by the former Philippine Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, Salvado Lopez, "The Philippines in Search of a 
New Role", Pacific Community3 Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 1970).
74. See Asia Research Bulletin3 Vol. 3, No. 1 (June 1973), p. 1842 for 
Filipino overtures towards China.
75. See Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia".
281
open in the late 1950's the attention in Southeast Asia has come to focus 
on China and to a lesser extent North Vietnam as the repository of a 
specific communist threat. The relative absence of the Soviet Union 
from this picture reflects the rather scant attention she has shown the 
countries in the region except North Vietnam to whom the Soviets hardly 
seemed a threat.
Japan is also largely absent from this picture. There are, 
however, strong signs of growing apprehension, most notably in Indonesia 
and Thailand, related to the increasing Japanese economic penetration of 
the region which in the view of many may lead to or has already led to undue 
dependence on Japan economically. This is a question which is dealt with 
in more general terms in chapter 7. However, as a security threat Japan does 
not as yet figure prominently. 77
The external regional threats have been numerous. Possibly with 
the sole exceptions of the Philippines and Burma all countries in the 
region have at one time or other perceived of some degree of threat from 
one or more of their neighbours. The outstanding case in this context is 
Cambodia whose fears of the Vietnamese and the Thai have tended to over­
shadow her apprehensions of China both qua big power and communist power. 
Indeed a main reason for seeking China's friendship was precisely the value 
Sihanouk put on China as a deterrent against possible and actual encroach­
ments of Cambodian territory by the Vietnamese and the Thai.
Another significant regional source of threat has been Indonesia 
under Sukarno. Confrontation in particular established the perception in
76. See Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia (Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1973).
77. See Weinstein, op.ait., in regard to Indonesia. In regard to 
Thailand, see the report on demonstrations in Bangkok directed 
at Japanese economic influence, in Asia Research Bulletin3 
Vol. 2, December 1972.
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the minds of the Malaysians and the Singaporeans that Indonesia was an 
expantionary power, a belief it has taken many years to dissipate 
especially as far as Singapore is concerned. Some doubts about Indonesia's 
ultimate motives still linger on, a question on which some further consider­
ations will be made in chapter 7.
Threats of the domestic or internal variety have been and are of 
many kinds. In Burma ethnic rebellions with secessionist overtones have 
been in progress at various levels of intensity ever since independence. 
Indonesia has experienced regional rebellions also with secessionist 
overtones and in the southern Philippines an ethnic-religious rebellion
is at present going on of which segments are advocating separate statehood
7 8
for the Moslem south.
Serious though these kinds of rebellions are they are nevertheless 
considered on the whole less threatening or menacing than the rebellions 
directed, led and manned by communists. The reasons are many and some of 
them were discussed in the last chapter. Suffice it here to mention two. 
Ethnic rebellions do not as a rule aim specifically at the overthrow of 
government and society as such. As a rule communist rebellions do, and 
this fact alone makes them intrinsically more dangerous to the established 
elites and governments. Another reason is that communist rebellions, by 
virtue of belonging to a movement with ideological connotations of a revol­
utionary and international kind, are much more prone to receive external 
assistance. In terms of Southeast Asia this assistance has mainly come
from China and North Vietnam although in the case of Laos and South Vietnam
79
also from the Soviet Union. Elsewhere we argued the considerable, if not
78. See chapter 4 above.
79. Ibid.
decisive, importance of external support for the success of internal reb­
ellions, apart from exceptional circumstances. It is chiefly communist 
insurgencies that are in a position to count on such assistance in their 
struggle. This does not mean that in each and every case of a communist 
insurgency these conditions have been present. As the review of the sit­
uation in the various countries have made clear, China has for various 
reasons been restrained in her support of insurgencies materially and even 
verbally. The only exception is the case of South Vietnam and possibly 
Laos. In some cases like the Philippines Chinese material support would 
seem to have been virtually non-existent. While external support has been 
on a scale sufficient enough in some cases to keep a low level communist 
insurgency going, it is rather the thought of the consequences was China 
in the future to increase her support that tends to instill a measure of 
trepidation in the minds of the leaders of many Southeast Asian countries.
Perhaps more than that of any other state in Southeast Asia, 
Burma's foreign policy would seem to reflect an attitude towards China based 
largely on a feeling of threat and impending danger resulting in a care­
fully formulated policy designed to avoid acts and relations which could be 
interpreted as provocative. The following remarks amply illustrate the 
feelings of the Burmese.
Small nations always mistrust bigger ones, especially those 
close by. For years past, every Burman mistrusted China, 
whether under Mao or Chiang. They also mistrust India; for 
that matter they also mistrust Soviet Russia and even America.
We do not consider China menace, but we accept a possibility 
of China one day invading us. We are entering into close 
relations with India, Pakistan, Indonesia and w e  are trying 
to find a formula for peaceful co-existence in this part of 
the world. We don't want to do anything that will provoke 
China, but if she does invade, I am confident that the 
national spirit of our people will stand firm against her...
Being a small nation, we must find ways and means of 
avoiding embroilment in power blocs. ^
The Burmese desire to placate the Chinese has given itself many 
expressions. As had been the case in regard to the Kuomintang when it 
dominated the mainland, Burma set out at the earliest opportunity to 
establish good relations with the new rulers in Peking by being the first 
non-communist country to recognize the recently established Chinese P e o p l e’s 
Republic. To the Burmese the essential thing was the quality of relations 
with whoever were the rulers of China. Their identity or ideology was, if 
not irrelevant, at least a secondary consideration.
In 1960 she signed a 'Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression' 
with China which according to the letter of the treaty pledges both parties 
to refrain from participating in aggressive alliances against each other but 
which by the Burmese has been interpreted as effectively stopping Burma from 
participation in any kind of military alliance.
The rift of 1967, caused predominantly by factors over which the 
Burmese had little if any influence, is a further case in point. It 
provided her with an excuse to reorientate her foreign policy away from 
China, something which under the circumstances would not have been unreason­
able. The Burmese leaders, however, counselled caution and avoidance of 
provocative acts in the face of a virulent anti-Burmese press campaign 
from China. Although a considerable element of intimidation was present, 
the 'shadow of Ch i n a’ proved the more pervasive. Thus with an obvious eye 
to the future Ne Win in a speech in November 1969 said.,
I wish to stress that we want friendly relations with 
our neighbours... With regard to China, we would like 
to restore the cordial and friendly relations that
80. Quoted in Trager, Burma, pp. 231-232.
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previously existed. This will require efforts by both
sides. For our part, we only wish to heal the wound of
the 1967 incidents. Despite the clashes at the borders
and the present situation, we shall do whatever we can
on our part to restore the old friendship and keep the
situation from getting worse. We regard the 1967 incident
as an unfortunate one. We would like to heal its wounds
81
and forget the whole ugly incident.
The shadow of China has, however, had a more telling and in this 
context more significant effect on Burma’s foreign policy. The perceived
threat from China has on the one hand served as the yardstick by which rel­
ations between the two countries have been conducted. But this threat has 
on the other hand also served as a basis for B urma’s particular brand of 
neutralism and as such set the limits to what the Burmese leaders have 
felt was permissible in regard to contacts and relations with other, third 
parties. This is, for example, evident in the case of her relations with 
the United States. Relations with the Americans have been correct but cool.
In mid 1971 the aid program to Burma virtually ceased on Burmese initiative,
82
and she turned down further offers of aid on very favourable terms.
In our context it is, however, more important to note that China's 
presence also has set limits to Bu r m a’s participation in Southeast Asian 
affairs. Although she maintains diplomatic relations with all the countries 
in the region except the two Vietnams, and is in general on good terms with 
the various countries, she has refused to participate in any efforts at 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia despite repeated invitations.
In late 1959 the Tunku issued an invitation to seven countries 
in Southeast Asia to meet to discuss the formation of a region-wide organ-
81. Quoted in Holmes, "China-Burma Relations”, p. 695.
82. New York Times3 18 August 1971.
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ization for economic cooperation. Burma, however, declined as she
84
would on all later occasions. Thus in May 1967 when Adam Malik visited
Rangoon he again suggested Burmese participation in what was to become
85
ASEAN but was met with a refusal on the part of the Burmese. When Ne
Win visited Malaysia in April 1968 the subject was apparently again dis-
86
cussed and again rejected by the Burmese leader. The same happened in
March-April 1972 during a visit of the Burmese foreign minister to Malaysia
and Indonesia. 87
On all these occasions the Burmese position has been based on
essentially two considerations; firstly, what she thinks is acceptable to
China and, secondly, the character of the proposed or existing regional
organization. Although Ne Win is reported to have wished aloud that he had
’...an atomic scissors so that I could cut this country off from Asia and
88
have it towed out to the sea away from those...up n o r t h’ , he has never
been willing to take the risk of invoking the wrath of China by joining any
of these organizations. At the official level the Burmese would maintain
that 'true cooperation' cannot be achieved as long as any of the participants
89
are allied to or influenced by great powers , as is the case in regard to 
most members of ASEAN. At the unofficial level, however, some Burmese would
83. Times of Indonesia, 1 January 1960. See also chapter 2 above.
84. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict, pp. 166-167.
85. Asian Almanac, Vol. 5, p. 2199.
86. Ibid., Vol. 6 , No. 22.
87. Ibid., Vol. 10, No. 22.
88. New York Times, 7 May 1967.
89. Ibid., 2 May 1967.
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explain that 'Burma has no friends and wants none. Friends have enemies... 
and their friend's enemies might take offence at Burma because of her 
friendship'. ^
Similar attitudes on the part of Sihanouk provided a basis for
Cambodia's foreign policy. He,as well, had considerable respect for China's
power and presence which caused him to orientate his foreign policy in a
direction he thought would win favour with her. Contributing, too, was of
course Sihanouk's apparent belief in China's ability to influence and
restrain the communists in Indo-China in general and the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong in particular, and China's value as a deterrent against
the South Vietnamese and the Thai. The United States could have served the
same purpose as China in Sihanouk's scheme of things but she had disqualified
herself by her close alliance and support for Cambodia's two arch enemies,
South Vietnam and Thailand. Besides, Sihanouk took a rather gloomy view
of the sincerity of the United States' commitments in Southeast Asia which
he thought would not last long in the face of the near-invincible communist
strength. Shortly before he was removed from power in 1970, however, he
came as far as publicly to express the hope of a continued American presence
in Southeast Asia to serve as a shield behind which the peoples and the
governments of Southeast Asia would prepare themselves to face the onslaught
91
of the communist forces.
Sihanouk was nevertheless adamant in his opposition to Cambodian 
participation in regional cooperation lest it compromisedhis policies in the 
eyes of China. The Tunku's invitation of 1959 to participate in the planned 
economic organization was turned down ostensibly because of the 'political'
90. Ibid.. , 30 August 1967.
91. See Sihanouk's article, "How Cambodia Fares in the Changing 
Indo-China Peninsula", Pacific Community, Vol. 1, No. 3 
(April 1970), pp. 341-352.
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ASEAN in 1967 the question of Cambodian membership in the organization was
raised. Attempts by Malik and others to have Cambodia included were how-
93
ever met with refusal by Sihanouk. On a number of subsequent occasions
94
Cambodian membership was sought but the answer was always the same.
Other countries in Southeast Asia with an equal awareness of 
China's power and presence and with deep-rooted apprehensions about her 
intentions reacted, however, differently. Not imbued with the determinism, 
even fatalism, implied in Sihanouk's belief in the inevitable victory of 
communism and with their thinking fashioned and informed by Thailand's own 
pragmatic ability to survive in the face of adverse conditions, her leaders 
decided that a viable foreign policy alternative existed in a close relation­
ship with the western powers, especially the United States. To countries 
such as Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines the choice was more or less 
self-evident. The earliest Philippine-American treaties, which had in mind 
a possible future threat from Japan as much as anything else, soon came to 
be considered a shield against the communist threat, especially after the 
experiences with the socalled 'Huk' rebellion in the late 1940's and early 
1950's. Malaysia and Singapore, to whom communist insurgency was a part of 
the national experience, started their existence as independent countries 
allied to the west, notably Britain. Indonesia's foreign policy, as it 
evolved after the October 1965 coup, represented a sharp break with the 
policies of the Sukarno era. China replaced the United States and Britain 
as the main threat while relations with Malaysia and Singapore, the former
character of such a grouping. During the prelude to the formation of
92. Gordon, op. cit. 3 p. 167, Leifer, Cambodia3 pp. 138-139.
93. Bangkok World3 11 August 1967.
94. See, for instance, Straits Times3 22 March 1968 and Bangkok 
World3 6 July 1969.
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It is among this latter group of states - Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines - that the various attempts at 
functionally inclusive regional cooperation have originated.
It was argued in chapter 2 that the formation of ASA was undoubt­
edly motivated by a genuine desire to promote economic and cultural cooper­
ation. But some more or less well defined and articulated perceptions of 
threat were nevertheless important as a precipitating agent in the estab­
lishment of the association. To the Tunku, with whom the idea of ASA 
originated, one way of stopping the dissemination of communism in Southeast 
Asia was to attack the conditions on which it fed, namely social deprivation 
and poverty. To be able to do so the countries of Southeast Asia had to 
pool their resources through cooperative arrangements. Similar anti­
communist sentiments were part of the motivations of the Filipinos and the 
Thai. 97
When ASEAN was formed in August 1967 the avowed purpose was
98
economic, social and cultural cooperation. The only reference to sec­
urity questions was a paragraph in the ASEAN Declaration which stated that
'...all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed con-
99
currence of the countries concerned...1. This brief reference, however,
95
enemies, were re-established.
95. See Weinstein, op. cit.
96. Ideas such as these were frequently expressed by the Tunku. See 
chapter 2 as well as Manila Bulletins 5 January 1959, Far Eastern 
Economic Review> 15 January 1959, Straits Times, 10 February 1961. 
See also Gordon, op. cit. _, p. 166.
97. Manila Bulletin, 2 January 1959.
98. The Association of South East Asian Nations. ASEAN 
(Djakarta, Indonesia), pp. 12-13.
99. Ibid. j p. 15.
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only obscured the importance of security considerations in the formation 
of the organization, a point partially borne out b y  the fact that at the 
meeting in Bangkok it was the topic which led to the most time-consuming and 
protracted discussions.
The close association between the objectives of ASEAN and the 
imperatives of security was also reflected in the closing speeches at the 
Bangkok meeting. Narcisco Ramos of the Philippines expressed it in this 
fashion.
The Declaration establishing ASEAN poses more than just 
another challenge to make this organization a living, 
dynamic vehicle for bringing about material progress 
within our region. It also implies an urgent respons­
ibility to harness all our natural resources, our 
acquired technical skills, our political experience, our 
diplomatic acumen to the goals we are determined to 
achieve. For now the time has come for a truly concerted 
struggle against the forces which are arrayed against our 
very survival in these uncertain and critical times.
Adam Malik of Indonesia was no less explicit.
Indonesia's thinking regarding the regional cooperation is 
well known. It is not necessary to elaborate, but I would 
like to avail myself of this opportunity to recall that 
Indonesia always wants to see Southeast Asia develop into 
a region which can stand on its own feet, strong enough
to defend itself against negative influence from outside
. i d  
the region.
Similar sentiments were also part of Tun Razak's attitude.
Unless...we are all conscious of our responsibility to
100. Foreign Affaivs Bulletin (Bangkok), Vol. 7, No. 1 (August- 
September 1967), p. 31.
101. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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shape our common destiny and to prevent external inter­
vention and interference, our region will continue to be 
fraught with danger and tension...The vacuum left by the 
retreat of colonial rule must be filled by the growth and 
consideration of indigenous powers - otherwise our future, 
individually and jointly, will remain dangerously threat­
e n e d . . .  The key to peace and stability of our respective 
countries and of our region and the success of our resist­
ance to external forces of intervention and interference 
lie in our ability to surmount the backwardness of our 
people and to promote their welfare and their well-
u • 102being.
After having declared that ASEAN was not directed against anything or any­
body, Rajaratnam of Singapore went on to say,
If there are people who misunderstand the proposed 
regional grouping, or manifest hostility towards it, 
let us explain that it can only be because as in Europe 
and in many parts of the world, outside powers have 
vested interests in the balkanization of this region.
We ourselves have learnt the lessons and have decided 
that small nations are not going to be balkanized so 
that they can be manipulated, set against one another, 
kept perpetually weak, divided and ineffective by out­
side forces.
Finally, Thanat Khoman of Thailand said,
[...millions of men and women in our part of the world]
... are, and want to remain forever, free me n  and women, 
unchained by the shackles of bondage. In seeking to 
attain these objectives they must free themselves from 
the material impediments of ignorance, disease and 
hunger which reduce their possibility to enjoy this 
earthly life. At the same time they must prevent
102. Ibid. , pp. 34-35.
103. Ibid., p. 37.
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attempts to deprive them of the right to lead a free 
and sovereign national existence. Alone such a two­
pronged task may prove to be too weighty. By joining 
together and cooperating with those who share the same
aspirations, it may become lighter and easier to
• i ,1 0 4  implement.
A striking characteristic of these speeches is the tendency of threats to 
their national existence to occupy the entire content of remarks about and 
references to the extra-regional environment. It is not possible to bring 
out this feature without reproducing the full text of the speeches. The 
quotations above are nonetheless indicative of the extent to which this is 
the case as well as demonstrations of the degree to which perceptions of 
threat from the extra-regional environment served as strong underlying 
motives in the formation of ASEAN.
The link between participation in regional cooperation and per­
ceptions of threats to the security of the member states did not cease 
once the meeting in Bangkok was over. To Malik, for example, the way to 
stop the advance of communism continued to lie in strengthening the peoples 
of Southeast Asia politically and economically. By cooperating in the
economic field,in particular, the ASEAN countries would be less vulnerable
105
to subversion through the improvement in living conditions. At the
ministerial meeting of ASEAN in the Cameron Highlands in Malaysia in Dec­
ember 1969, Tun Razak reiterated what has been a consistent theme of ASEAN 
leaders.
We in Malaysia have always believed strongly in regional 
cooperation and we see no other choice for newly developed
104. Ibid. , p. 39.
105. See interview with Malik in Far Eastern Economic Review,
5 September 1968, pp. 568-570.
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countries of Southeast Asia but to shape our own destiny 
together and to prevent external intervention and inter­
ference.
Most of us have been dominated by colonial powers either 
directly or indirectly and even today we are not entirely 
free from the struggle for domination by outside forces.
Therefore, unless we are conscious of our responsibilities 
and ready to take decisive and collective actions to prevent 
the growth of inter-regional conflicts, our nations will 
continue to be manipulated against one another.
On the same occasion Thanat Khoman expressed it even more directly when he
said, "The ultimate goal of ASEAN - namely a Southeast Asian Community,
blessed with peace, freedom, happiness and balanced prosperity - is therefore
unavoidably linked with our success in ensuring our stability and security’."^7
Such thoughts as these have been part and parcel of the thinking
of the leaders of the ASEAN countries, and they are similar, even to the
extent of being nearly identical, to the ideas of the Tunku which prompted
him to propose the formation of what became ASA in 1961.
Sometimes ASEAN is also seen as possibly playing a more direct
role in the security of the member states. Thus president Marcos of the
Philippines in January 1968 proposed a collective security arrangement under 
108
ASEAN. Ideas of converting ASEAN into a security organization of sorts
have been aired on other occasions as well. In 1970 the Deputy Commander
of the Indonesian army, General Panggabean, declared that Indonesia would
109
extend help to her heighbours if they were attacked , a suggestion which 
was quickly denied as a misrepresentation by Adam M alik who made light of it
106. Foreign Affairs Bulletin, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), Vol. 2,
No. 1 & 2 (December 1969), p. 45.
107. Foreign Affairs Bulletin, (Bangkok), Vol. 9, No. 3 (December 1969- 
January 1970), p. 249.
108. Manila Times, 14 January 1968, The Times, 15 January 1968.
109. Djakarta Times, 7 December 1970.
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thought. ^  Other leaders had also rejected the notion of an ASEAN
111
security arrangement as impractical. But the idea is not ruled out
altogether as far as the future is concerned. Only a few days after the
formation of ASEAN Tun Razak said, 'A mutual defence alliance is always
possible once we have become very close with a common interest and 
112
destiny*. Malik expressed similar thoughts in early 1968. 'Our
posture is low. When we succeed in some economic v e n t u r e s . ..we will think
113
of other things like political cooperation and defence'. Some of the
member states have, however, concluded bilateral security arrangements.
These are directed at communist insurrection in the border areas between
114
Thailand and Malaysia, and between the latter and Indonesia in Borneo. 
Although the conversion of ASEAN into a multilateral security arrangement 
would seem to be ruled out for the present, to many leaders - the Indo­
nesians in particular - the organization is often seen as a catalyst which 
through positive cooperative experiences may lead to closer defence and 
security cooperation and coordination short of military alliances. ^
THREATS, SECURITY AND PROCESSES OF COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION
In the first part of this chapter a notion of threat different 
from the conventional one was suggested as more suitable when it comes to
by himself suggesting Indonesian assistance in the form of a prayer and a
110. Ibid. 3 8 December 1970.
111. See, for example, the remarks by Thanat Khoman reported in
Bangkok World 3 21 March 1968.
112. Straits Times 3 12 August 1967.
113. Economist3 23 March 1968.
114. See Pace et.al., Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The 
Two First Years of ASEAN. 1967-19693 p. 59.
115. See interview with Malik in Far Eastern Economic Review,
op. cit.
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describing many situations and 'threat environments' in Southeast Asia. It 
was proposed that situations exist in which the mere presence of superior 
power may lead to policies or changes in policies on the part of the 
inferior power beneficial to the superior power without the latter having
6
issued any explicit threat in the conventional sense. But on the basis of 
the examination above of aspects of the foreign policies of some countries 
in Southeast Asia, it would appear that the existence of such superior 
power may indeed have the opposite effect, that is, the weaker power may 
through its policies remove itself further away from the superior power 
than otherwise would have been the case.
The most significant result of the perception of an extra-regional 
threat has been to split the non-communist part of Southeast Asia into 
essentially two camps. As we have seen in the case of Burma, China's close 
presence led her to eschew any participation in cooperative processes which 
she either knew to be or thought to be unacceptable to China, Burma's 
policies in this regard may be seen as a withdrawal from regional processes 
in the hope of avoiding entanglements risky to her security. In fact with­
drawal has served as a method of buying more security. Similar consider­
ations can be made in relation to the case of Cambodia under Sihanouk. Here, 
however, the threat from outside the region was overshadowed by threats from 
within, particularly from the two Vietnams and Thailand. Sihanouk used 
withdrawal to buy deterrence from China to be used against Cambodia's regional 
e n e m i e s .
Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines initially, and Singapore and 
Indonesia later, used increased participation in the region - the opposite 
of withdrawal - as a means of enhancing their security. Thus as far as this 
group of countries is concerned, the threat from outside the region has been 
a significant catalyst in getting cooperative processes started.
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When one asltsw hy these two groups of states reacted so differently 
to what all of them considered the main extra-regional threat, one has to 
look to historical circumstances for part of the answer.
C.P. FitzGerald has informed us that 'Chinese influence, Chinese
culture and Chinese power have always moved southward since the first age
116
of which we have reliable historical evidence'. The countries most
affected by this southward movement were in order of magnitude firstly, 
Vietnam, north and south, who, as far as the north was concerned, at times 
was under direct Chinese control; secondly, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and 
Burma, who in varying degrees came under the influence of and acknowledged 
Chinese power; and thirdly,the southern parts of Southeast Asia, that is, 
present day Malaysia and Indonesia who experienced the influence of Chinese 
culture and occasionally her political power too. Thus, the closer to
China, the more awe and respect for Chinese power and influence.
It is in relation to these historical circumstances that the 
notion of threat introduced before may be of relevance. The closer to 
China, the more likely the simultaneous occurrence of the two types of 
belief in the latent will of China to harm, that is, the simultaneous occur­
rence of the 'socio-biologically' inherent belief in the will of the strong 
power, in this case China, and the belief based on memories of occasionally 
unfortunate historical experiences. In the present these perceptions or 
beliefs have been reinforced by the ideological nature of the regime in 
Peking, as well as the strength and apparent unity this regime has displayed 
in the period after the ascent to power by the communists, despite the
116. C.P. FitzGerald, The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972), p. xiii.
117. Ibid., p. xiv.
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turmoil of the cultural revolution. It has also been reinforced by what 
the non-communist Southeast Asian countries have seen as the propensity of 
China to support 'people's war' within the region. In this view, therefore, 
it is no mere accident that the attempts at regional cooperation with its 
implied anti-China bias have on the whole originated with the states furthest 
removed from China. In other words, the strongest resistance to Chinese 
power and influence has occurred at the periphery of her potential ’sphere 
of influence’, where historical experiences and geographical proximity have 
had less opportunity to produce the same despondancy and deference to her 
power and strength as in those countries situated more or less on her borders.
In this context Thailand’s position and attitude deserve separate
comment. Although not being far removed geographically from China as well
as historically having been a nominal tributory, her relations with imperial
118
China, though of long standing, were nevertheless slight. This, taken
together with the fact that Thailand alone among the countries in Southeast 
Asia was never colonized, have instilled in the Thai a confidence in their 
own ability to weather the international climate which has been conducive to 
the inclusion of foreign policy options other than deference and accommo­
dation to China.
There is also another aspect to the ’shadow of C h i n a’. The 
conspicuous presence of Chinese minorities, whose commercial and entrepreneurial 
abilities have been the subject of envy and suspicion on the part of the indig­
enous populations, has also had a considerable impact in that these minorities 
have often been seen as the extended arm of China herself through which she 
has worked to achieve her aims.
118. C.P. FitzGerald, China and Southeast Asia sinoe 1945 
(Camberwell: Longman Australia, 1973), p. 61.
119. Ibid., pp. 81-94. See also Hinton, Communist China in 
World Politics, pp. 397-416.
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A state situated within, but on or near the periphery of a big 
power's potential or actual sphere of influence, is, of course, that much 
nearer the potential or actual sphere of influence of another big power.
This fact brings the discussion to one more factor which has significantly 
influenced the reactions to China and the propensity to participate in 
regional cooperation. A prominent feature of the international relations 
of Southeast Asia in the period under discussion has been the competition 
resulting from the opposing views of China and the United States as to the 
proper limits of their respective sphere of influence. For most of the 
period after World War II the United States has had the strength and will to 
define her national interest in such a way as to permit the countries of 
Southeast Asia to ’shelter under her umbrella'. Again it is noticeable that 
the countries which have tacitly or openly availed themselves of this 
opportunity by embarking on regional cooperation with anti-China basis, 
are all more or less to be found on the rim of the potential Chinese 
sphere of influence.
When seen in these terms, regional cooperative processes are 
essentially attempts on the part of the countries involved to avoid being 
included in the sphere of interest of China. This should not be construed 
to mean that these states have been willing to suffer the inclusion into the 
sphere of influence of the United States or any other big power, for that 
matter. But it does mean that they on the whole have seen the most imminent 
danger in this respect to emanate from China. As will be seen in chapter 7, 
apart from the perceptions of a common enemy dealt with here, there is a 
set of more or less commonly held perceptions of the international environment 
in general, which also has profoundly influenced, not only the initiation, 
but also the course of regional cooperative and integrative processes. 
Economically strong states, such as the United States and Japan, form very 
much a part of this general international environment.
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Besides the perceptions of a ’lingering threat’ from China dealt 
with above, there also exist perceptions of a more concrete type of threat.
Few of Southeast A s i a’s political leaders would appear to believe that 
China is ready, even given the opportunity, to launch a direct campaign of 
conquest and invasion, at least not in the short term. There is, however, 
a more immediate aspect of the fear of China which has been mentioned on 
several occasions already, and which is all the more significant as far as 
these leaders are concerned. This is the actual and potential internal 
threat from communist insurgency movements which are seen by these leaders 
as part of the threat from China herself. In other words, the internal and 
extra-regional threats blend in such a way that the former is seen as the 
extension of or the long arm of the latter. Not only do the various countries 
face the same enemy from without the region, but they also have the same 
internal enemy. Moreover, the common internal enemy is seen as feeding and 
depending for its success on a cluster of social conditions that are 
essentially the same, or at least, very similar in the various countries, 
namely poverty and social deprivation. From this point of view regional 
cooperation is seen as an instrument which will enable the countries involved 
to more effectively strike at the roots of these conditions and therefore at 
the very base of the most crucial support of their shared internal enemy.
These remarks on the role of the ’common e n e m y’ in the initiation
of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia call for some observations of a
more general nature. Karl Deutsch has argued in relation to foreign military
threats that their effects were never very strong and not always positive.
Even in those cases when they were positive, the effects were not lasting once
120
the threat had disappeared. As well as arguing the ability of foreign
120. Deutsch et.al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area3 
pp. 44-46.
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threats to influence cooperative practices and political unions, other 
writers have, however, also argued the durable and lasting effect of such
T- «■ 121threats.
The failure to arrive at more firm conclusions about the role of
external threats lies in some degree in a failure to specify the conditions
under which they have or have not a positive influence. It also lies in a
tendency to see foreign threats in isolation, without reference to the
international environment in general, as well as in a failure to distinguish
between various types of threat. Deutsch, for example, argues that no
’unusual foreign military threat played any important role in the adoption
122
of the Swiss federal constitution in 1848'. I f , by this remark, Deutsch
meant an external enemy poised for attack or threatening attack, he may 
indeed be correct. But such an interpretation overlooks the accumulated 
effect on the eventual formation of the Swiss federation of the existence 
over several centuries of strong perceptions among the Swiss of a general 
threat emanating from the European states system. These perceptions among 
the Swiss of a general external threat are similar to the perceptions
121. Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems",
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1968), 
pp. 28-29, and same author, "Consociational Democracy", 
World Politics3 Vol. XXI, No. 2 (January 1969), p. 217.
For a call for more attention to the influence of external 
threats in particular and the international environment in 
general, as well as some suggestions in this respect, see 
Karl Kaiser, "The U.S. and the EEC in the Atlantic System: 
The Problem of Theory", Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 5, No. 4 (June 1967), pp. 388-425, and same author, 
"The Interaction of Regional Subsystems", World Politics, 
Vol. XXI, No. 1 (October 1968), pp. 84-107.
122. Deutsch et.al., op. cit., pp. 44-45.
existing in Southeast Asia in relation to China. In Southeast Asia, how­
ever, the nature of these perceptions has, as well, been strongly influenced 
by the ancient superior-inferior relationship formalized in the tributory 
system of China to which most of Southeast Asia for long periods belonged. 
Moreover, in Southeast Asia the effects of a general or ’lingering threat’ 
from China were circumscribed by the imposition of colonial control over 
most of the region, and the more or less simultaneous decline of the power 
of imperial China from the early nineteenth century. The return of China 
in recent decades to the status of a strong extra-regional and big power, 
coupled with the emergence within China of a regime which is seen as 
ideologically aggressive, have reawakened in a strengthened form the 
ancient respect and fear of her strength and power.
A political and military situation so full of complexities as that 
which has prevailed in Southeast Asia during the 1 9 6 0’s and early 1 9 7 0’s, 
does not easily lend itself to analysis. If, however, the two Vietnams and 
Laos are excluded, and 1970 is taken as the cut-off point, that is, when 
Sihanouk was ousted and Cambodia became directly embroiled in the conflict 
in Indo-china, one might be able to isolate certain conditions or factors 
which would appear to have been important in determining the extent and the 
nature of the membership in the regional cooperation dealt with here.
As mentioned above, the condition to be explained is the different 
reactions, as judged by the propensity to participate in regional cooperative 
processes, to the perception of a common extra-regional threat with the 
potential capacity to overthrow the incumbent regimes by chiefly military 
means.
In Southeast Asia one can, firstly, isolate the existence of an 
extra-regional power who, in relation to the regional powers, possesses 
overwhelming strength not readily, if at all, countered by collective mili­
tary efforts on the part of the regional powers. As suggested above, this
may be referred to as the 'lingering threat' thought to emanate from the 
closely situated extra-regional state qua big power.
Although to an unequal degree, the regional powers have histor­
ically stood in a relationship of inferiority to the extra-regional power, 
the unequal strength of dominance exerted by the latter had been largely 
a function of geographical distance. In other words, the further removed 
from the dominant power, the more room for self-assertion and the less 
objects of attempts at direct control. The significance of this factor lies 
in the historical memories it has produced.
Geographical distance, historically so important in creating a 
feeling of deference, has not been completely dissipated in the present, 
despite developments in technology and communications. This fact has 
allowed for the influence of other big powers to make itself felt. In 
other words, the geographically peripheral states have been able to take 
advantage, tacitly or openly, of the 'protection* provided by other big 
powers.
The ideological factor should not be forgotten. By professing 
adherence to an ideology which is seen by most regional powers to imply a 
relationship of undue dependence, if not formalized subservience, to the 
extra-regional power, communist China is seen to stand in potentially much 
the same relationship to the regional powers as did imperial China. In 
this view, the status of a 'satellite' is not m u c h  different from being 
a tributary state. To be a satellite or a tributary is something which 
goes against the main spirit of the present age with its emphasis on 
independence and national self-assertion.
Lastly, the existence of 'direct aggression' in the form of support 
and encouragement of internal subversion and military insurrection on the 
part of the main extra-regional power, has prompted the states less vulner­
able - the peripheral states - to combine in an effort to counter this
.
threat to their national existence.
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REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL DIPLOMACY
Cooperation and integration may be conceived as developing 
along a continuum in stages of increasing complexity. In the early 
stages these processes are but a part or extension of such relations 
which exist between sovereign states at peace with each other and which 
derive from a realization of mutual dependence and a need for at least 
a modicum of intercourse. As a part of normal interstate relations they 
take place within and are subject to the modes and conduct of convent­
ional diplomacy as practised by the states concerned.
In the advanced stages, which begin with the first effective 
transfer of functions from the state governments to the regional 
decision-making bodies, these processes, by virtue of this first and 
consecutive transfers, cease to be a part of normal inter-state rel­
ations, and they are consequently no longer a subject of conventional 
diplomacy. Depending on the degree of transfer of functions and powers, 
the success or failure of these processes depend now on the bureaucratic 
structures and decisions at the regional level in much the same way 
similar processes at the domestic level depend on domestic institutions.
Cooperation and integration processes in Southeast Asia have 
as yet plainly not effected any transfer to regional bodies of functions 
and powers which previously rested exclusively with the individual 
states. In Southeast Asia these processes must therefore still be con­
sidered to be in their initial stages and subject to the modes and 
conduct of diplomacy as practised by the countries of the region.
When in this chapter consideration will be given to the
CHAPTER 6
relationship between the conduct of diplomacy and processes of cooper­
ation and integration in Southeast Asia, there are essentially two 
reasons. Firstly, at least in the initial stages the progression of 
cooperative and integrative efforts depend ultimately on conscious 
policies and decisions on the part of governments. This is so even 
if all possible, favourable preconditions are present and combine in 
such a wa y  that the relevant elites and populations conceive of few 
or no other alternatives. In the final analysis the signal to go 
ahead is but a transformation of preconditions into a conscious dec­
ision of policy. The chief instrument of implementation of the 
policy is, as already alluded to, diplomacy. The second reason flows 
from the first. Since these processes are in their infancy as far as 
Southeast Asia is concerned, and very much a preserve of diplomatic 
intercourse, this is the stage at which one would expect diplomacy to 
exert maximum influence on the direction in which they are going.
Although it is implicit in what has been said already, there 
may nonetheless be a need to make the meaning of the word 'diplomacy* 
more explicit. Harold Nicolson ^ identified five different usages of 
the word of which diplomacy as being synonymous with foreign policy is 
perhaps the most frequently encountered. As in the case of Nicolson, 
the definition of the Oxford English Dictionary will be used here. 
According to this diplomacy is '[the] management of international rel­
ations by negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted
1. Harold Nicolson, Diptanaoy (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1950, second edition), pp. 13-15.
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and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business and the art of the 
diplomatist’.
The concern will mainly be with what may be termed the ’style' 
and the 'technique' of diplomacy, and only to the extent it is necessary 
for the discussion of these aspects will the foreign policies of the 
various countries be introduced. The analysis will start with some 
salient features of the foreign policy establishments of Southeast Asia.
FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Statehood is a status or quality conferred on a country by 
the international community. All states need contact with the rest of 
this community if for no other reason than to initially receive the stamp 
of statehood and subsequently to protect it from possible encroachments 
from without. Hence the need for a machinery for the conduct of rel­
ations with other states and for the formulation of policies relevant to 
the task of protecting independence and sovereignty. As a justification 
for establishing a foreign ministry and a concomitant foreign service, 
this is the bare minimum beyond which there are numerous other legitimate 
reasons. As a description of the way many states in Southeast Asia 
entered the international system as sovereign states it is not far 
removed from the actual state of affairs.
The achievement of independence and the conferment of state­
hood on the countries of Southeast Asia left most of them with little in 
the way of experience, personnel and institutions as far as relations with 
the outside world were concerned. Never a colony, Thailand alone among 
the countries of the region could point to and rely on a diplomatic and 
foreign policy tradition of its own. In the other countries the instit­
utions hastily set up either just before or upon the achievement of
307.
independence were often staffed with such surplus personnel as could be 
dispensed with by other parts of the civil service. The qualifications 
and experience they had were often grossly lacking. The size of the 
foreign policy establishments varied according to many factors such as 
the position of foreign policy on the respective governments scale of
priorities, the ideological convictions of the leaders, the general
2
orientation of the foreign policy, and so on.
In most countries foreign policy has been the preoccupation of
a few members of the political elite, some of whom had no or only a narrow
3
institutional and popular base. The reasons for this are many of which 
some, like the lack of qualified and indeed interested people and the 
scant importance attached to questions of foreign policy, have been 
mentioned. These two latter reasons are no doubt important in certain 
settings and in certain situations. The number of qualified people 
however has increased and foreign policy has taken on more importance 
over the years without in any fundamental way changing the elitist 
nature of the foreign policy making processes. Hence, an explanation 
must be sought elsewhere.
An important factor in this connection would seem to be the 
nature of the regime in question. Let us consider the case of Cambodia 
under Sihanouk and Indonesia under Sukarno. In Cambodia political 
power, at least in the field of foreign affairs, was concentrated in the 
hands of Prince Sihanouk in a manner described by Leifer as characteristic
2. For a description of the early foreign policy establishments 
in Southeast Asia, see Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast 
Asia: 1945-1958., Ch. 3 and Ch. 9 as far as Malaya is concerned.
3. See Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia3 ch.IV and 
Werner Levi, The Challenge of World Politics in South and 
Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968) ch.l.
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of an omnipotent ruler. His power rested partly on the support of 
elite groups but even more so on his own personal popularity w i t h  the 
people in general, especially the peasants, and certain other factors of 
a traditional nature such as the force of the monarchy as a unifying 
symbol. His continued stay in power '...resulted from his astute 
manipulation of those who would disagree with him at the same time as 
he... capitalized on his status as a former king. Manipulation ... 
neutralized opponents within the elite while charisma ... rallied the 
peasantry’. ^ In foreign affairs his position was dominant for more 
than a decade. Sihanouk's foreign policy was Cambodia's foreign 
policy. Centered around traditional Cambodian fears of the neighbours, 
it identified with dominant feelings within Cambodia itself. By 
relying now on one faction and then on another for s u p p o r t , he was 
able to dominate the conduct of foreign affairs to a degree which 
justifies the characterization of it as a 'one m an band'.
Sukarno's position in Indonesia was not unlike that of 
Sihanouk in Cambodia. He too owed his position at the apex of the 
political system partly to widespread popularity among the masses 
especially in Java. His balancing act between the army and the PKI 
(the communist party) gave him too the necessary freedom in the form­
ulation of the foreign policies. However, as in the case of Cambodia 
it is important to note that Sukarno's policies likewise were based on
4. Leifer, Cambodia, p. 109. See also Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy3 
pp. 224-225 and Milton E. Osborne, "Beyond Charisma; Princely 
Politics and the Problem of Political Succession in Cambodia", 
International Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (Winter 1968-69) pp.109-121.
5. Osborne, ibid., p. 121.
6. Ibid,, p. 117.
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and conformed to deep-seated feelings within Indonesian society and 
elites. There was enough in his policies to satisfy both the army and 
the PKI and to enable him to appeal successfully to the masses when he 
found this necessary and opportune. In short, by neutralizing the main 
opposing forces and by playing one against the other he created consid­
erable latitude for himself in terms of foreign policy. 7
In terms of Burma and Thailand it is more difficult to assess 
the influence on foreign policy of others but the top leadership. The 
persistent occupancy by General (now President) Ne Win of the country's 
top position suggests a strong and unchallenged leadership, based prim-
g
arily on his position within the armed forces.
The Thai Government, also dominated by military m e n  until the 
events of October 1973 removed them from the top positions of power, 
undoubtedly formulated the country's foreign policy in its essential 
outlines. It is however likely that the professionals of the Foreign 
Ministry have exerted influence to an extent not matched in other pre­
dominantly autocratic or authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia due 
mainly to a long tradition and considerable expertise.
Even in relatively democratic or quasi-democratic countries 
such as Malaysia and Singapore, foreign policy has been confined to a 
small number of people. In Malaysia the formulation of foreign policy
has been nearly exclusively the preserve of a group consisting of no
9
more than four or five persons. A  similar situation persists in Singa-
7. See J.D. Legge, Sukarno, A Political Biography, esp. ch. 14
and Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia".
8 . See Leo E. Rose, "Nepal, Burma and Ceylon", in Wilcox et.al. (Eds.),
Asia and the International System, pp. 234-235.
9. Marvin C. Ott, "Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia", Asian 
Survey, Vol. XII, No. 3 (March 1972), p. 225ff.
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pore where two or three people of the top leadership of the People's 
Action Party mak e  all important decisions.
Only in the Philippines, before the imposition of martial 
law in 1972, could one reasonably argue that foreign policy has been 
the synthesis of varied influences and interests insofar as the 
executive branch, the President and the Government, has had to take 
into consideration congressional views and the views of interest 
groups outside the institutionalized political establishment.
Apart from the factors already mentioned, the narrow base 
and the elitist nature of the foreign policy formulation in the countries 
of Southeast Asia can best be explained in terms of the relative absence 
of pluralism, except perhaps in the Philippines. By absence of pluralism 
is not meant a lack of racial and cultural diversity which plainly is not 
the case, but a lack of political, economic, cultural and professional 
pressure groups with an articulated interest and stake in foreign policy 
and with a somewhat well-defined power base in their respective societies. 
This does not mean that, for example, economic factors have not been 
considered worthy of attention when foreign policy has been made. Malay­
s i a’s move towards recognition of China has partly been justified in 
terms of export markets for her most important commodity, natural rubber. 
It has meant, however, that foreign policy has been left to the top level 
of the political hierarchy. Not being subject to any substantial domestic 
constraints of the kind mentioned, the political leadership, in itself 
fairly narrowly based, has been given a latitude in foreign affairs it 
would otherwise not have enjoyed both in terms of content and form.
The political base of the elites does also play a role in this 
context. In countries like Indonesia and Cambodia where Sukarno and, to 
a lesser extent, Sihanouk kept their positions by balancing forces of
equal or near equal strength, the leaders may have created additional 
latitude for themselves. In countries such as Burma and Thailand, until 
relatively recently, where the leaders formed the apex of one dominant 
force - the military establishment - the latitude may be less since the 
leaders cannot stray too far from the prevailing majority attitudes 
within this dominant force without running the risk of losing their pos­
itions.
STYLE O F  DIPLOMACY. PERSONALITIES AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The elitist nature of the foreign policy processes in most 
countries in the region has already been mentioned. A  corollary of this 
is the wide scope for personalities and personal characteristics to exert 
themselves. Not infrequently relations between the nations of Southeast 
Asia have to an extreme degree hinged on personal qualities, and the 
likes and dislikes of particular leaders for each other. This is partic­
ularly evident in the relations of Sihanouk and Sukarno with other 
leaders.
Sihanouk's sensitiveness and highly developed self-esteem and 
concern with position and status were the direct, though not the basic 
underlying, causes of the break in diplomatic relations between Thailand 
and Cambodia. It followed immediately upon a remark by Thailand's Prime 
Minister Sarit Thanarat at an official reception, where in an ill- 
disguised reference to Cambodia he suggested that Thailand show restraint 
and patience in the face of Cambodian accusations 'by taking consolation 
in the old proverbial tale of the pig challenging a lion to a fight'. ^
To Sihanouk this was tantamount to an insult to himself as
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10. Leifer, op. ait., p. 89.
well as Cambodia and on 23 October 1961 Cambodia broke off diplomatic
relations ^  which were not to be restored before Sihanouk’s fall from
power in 1970. In the view of Thai officials Sihanouk himself and his
personality was in the ensuing period the single most important obstacle
12
in the way of a resumption of Thai-Cambodian relations.
Sihanouk's personal style expressed itself in ways considered
by diplomats reared in the more unobtrusive tradition of western diplomacy
to be less than conducive to good relations. According to Leifer 'he is
capable of treating ambassadors like lowly messenger boys and has been
known to subject them out of their hearing to periodic torrents of verbal 
13
abuse'. Confidentiality, considered in normal diplomatic intercourse
essential and a matter of course, is a principle for which he showed 
scant respect. '[An] ambassador who tries to communicate with him takes 
the risk that his demarche will become public property within a few hours, 
possibly even broadcast to the world over Phnom Penh Radio. Sihanouk has 
small regard for secret diplomacy, preferring a more open, and even 
spectacular, style of communication'. ^
Sukarno's style was similar to Sihanouk's and equally flam­
boyant. His behaviour in connection with Confrontation with Malaysia was 
as frenetic as it was unpredictable. In Legge's words, 'From April to 
September [1963] the story is one of erratic fluctuations of mood as 
Sukarno, with apparent deliberation, adopted a strategy of alternating 
aggression and conciliation which seemed calculated to reduce the Tengku to 
a state of nervous confusion with regard to Indonesia's ultimate intent­
ions.'^“* In attempting to explain Indonesia's confrontation policy Legge
312.
11. Ibid., p. 89. 12. Gordon, op. oit.3 p. 124.
13. Leifer, op. oit.3 p. 111. 14. Ibid., p. 112.
15. Legge, op. oit.3 p. 366.
puts inter alia major emphasis on the influence of Sukarno. '[Though] 
confrontation was not the invention of Sukarno alone, the distinctive 
character of the President's personal diplomacy became a major factor in 
the gradual crystallization of Indonesia's attitudes'. ^  An important 
feature of Sukarno's diplomacy was his personal style. According to 
Legge Confrontation as
'... an assertive foreign policy was related not 
just to the content of Sukarno's domestic policy - 
to his goal of preserving a balance between 
opposing forces - but to the 'mechanics' of 
policy - to the modes and procedures by which 
he pursued that goal. Essential to his domestic 
political style was the element of constant move­
ment - the sudden, unpredictable manoeuvres, 
catching opponents or doubters off their guard 
and the resourceful responses to potential 
challenges. The maintenance of a mood of crisis 
and agitation helped him to keep the initiative 
always in his own hands. This style had its 
foreign policy counterpart - boldness of posture, 
readiness to take risks, swiftness of adaptation 
to setbacks or challenges and, once again, 
unpredictability. Such a style of revolutionary 
diplomacy could indeed achieve occasional suc­
cesses, but it was also related to Sukarno's 
constant need to hold the initiative at home.
Sudden switches of policy thus had a systematic 
function to fulfil, and the whole apparatus of 
negotiation, detente, demarche, confrontation, 
the sudden advances and retreats, was an integral part 
of his political method'. ^
The circumstances under which individuals such as Sihanouk and 
Sukarno can exert a dominant influence on the formulation and conduct of
313.
16. Ibid. 17. Ibid.j p. 373.
foreign policy to the degree they did, and the circumstances under which 
personal characteristics of the leaders are permitted to dominate and 
direct both the substance and the method of foreign policy, are largely 
the same, and they will therefore be considered together.
In the first section of this chapter it was argued that the 
nature of the foreign policy processes is closely related to the relative 
absence or presence of pluralism in the society concerned, that is, the 
more pluralism, the less elitist are the foreign policy processes likely 
to be and the less scope there is for the influence of single individuals 
and personal characteristics. We shall in the following expound this 
argument and in the process take it a step further.
In pluralist societies such as the West European and the North 
American,foreign policy formulation is a process involving numerous forces. 
By its very nature this process leads to policies which are the synthesis 
of many pressures and interests originating from within as well as from 
without the political institutions. The relative lack of such pressures 
and influences in non-pluralist societies, especially from without but 
also often from within the political institutions, it was argued, led to a 
foreign policy based predominantly, though not entirely, on the rather 
narrow interests and attitudes of the political leadership of the day. 
Another salient feature of many non-pluralist societies is the limited 
membership of the leadership group especially the part w ith influence on 
and interest in foreign policy. As w e  have seen such groups contain fre­
quently no more than four or five persons, sometimes even less, as in the 
case of Cambodia and Indonesia. In such circumstances the beliefs and 
attitudes of the persons at the top of the hierarchy are given a scope for 
realization not usually found in pluralist societies where foreign policy­
making normally is a more complex process.
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A  consequence of this situation is that alternative policies 
may not be considered at all or rejected out of hand simply because they 
do not conform to the beliefs of the dominant political leader. Sihanouk's 
foreign policy, for example, was centered around his strong feeling of 
threat from Cambodia's nearest neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. His 
control over foreign policy excluded other, perhaps less security and 
threat oriented views or security-oriented views with an emphasis differ­
ent from his, from playing a modifying influence on his own beliefs.
That such different views existed in Cambodia was demonstrated, if not 
before, when the switch in the country's foreign policy took place after 
the fall of Sihanouk. Whether or not subsequent events have shown 
Sihanouk's policy to have been the right one for Cambodia in her partic­
ular situation, is a moot and irrelevant point in this context.
As far as regional cooperative efforts are concerned, Sihanouk's 
perception of where Cambodia's security interests lay precluded Cambodian
participation in any of the regionally based and initiated cooperative 
18
ventures. It is not unreasonable to speculate that should there among
politically concerned elites have been strong sentiments in favour of
Cambodian participation in such ventures these would not have been
reflected in official Cambodian policy. Hence, favourable elite attitudes,
given primary importance as a precondition for the successful initiation
19
of integrative processes, may under the circumstances have been without 
effect.
18. See chs. 2 and 5 on Sihanouk's policies in this regard.
19. See for example Haas in International Organization, Vol.XXIV, No. 4 
(Autumn 1970) and Deutsch, Political Community.
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Sukarno's position in Indonesia. Indonesia’s foreign policy came
increasingly to reflect the personal beliefs and attitudes of Sukarno.
He,too,defined his country’s foreign policy interests so as to preclude
participation in regional organizations although for different
20
reasons. A  nearly complete switch in these policies took place with
the decline and fall of Sukarno from positions of power. Indonesia in
the post-Sukarno era has become perhaps the force behind a regional
organization such as ASEAN.
There is a second important consideration. Since in non-pluralist
societies there is no or only a very limited foreign policy constituency
there is considerably less or no need for the ruler to answer for his
21
policies. Mistaken and harmful policies may pass unchallenged.
A corollary of the dominant position of individual leaders is the 
latitude for the individual characteristics of these leaders to exert 
themselves. In countries such as the West European and North American 
the foreign policy practitioner is often reared within a highly instit­
utionalized process. The crucial institutions, in this context the foreign 
affairs department and the foreign service, have often a long tradition within 
which some well established 'rules of the game' and modes of behaviour, 
written or unwritten, have been formed. Rules of diplomatic conduct, in 
most important respects similar in the various countries, have become 
internalized and form part of the principles according to which these 
institutions are run and relations with other countries are pursued. In 
order to reach the top of the foreign policy establishment a person must 
to a substantial degree conform with accepted rules and principles of
Similar observations may be made in relation to the case of
20. See chapters 2 and 5 on Sukarnofs attitude to regional cooperation.
21. The term ’constituency' in this context corresponds to Dahl's 
'political strata1, Robert A. Dahl, M o d e m  Political Analysis 
(Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1963) pp. 56-71.
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conduct. Or put differently, a person with a highly eccentric or idio­
syncratic mode of behaviour, that is, idiosyncratic defined in relation 
to the accepted rules of the particular institutional setting, has a much 
reduced chance of finding himself at the apex of the structure. The 
number of checks and constraints on the way to the top usually prevent such 
a person from reaching it. Should he, however, in spite of these con­
straints still manage to reach the top the likelihood is high that he will 
not remain there long. If the processes that promote a person up through 
the ranks are well defined, the processes that will demote him are equally 
well defined and often much shorter.
These rules of conduct, although particularly noticeable in the 
foreign office and the foreign service, also extend, perhaps in a modified 
form, to other governmental and non-governmental institutions so that a 
person not reared and experienced within the specific foreign policy 
institutions is nevertheless subject to the pressure to conform.
Modes and procedures of diplomatic conduct, to the extent they 
have been accepted by the countries of Southeast Asia, are however less 
internalized in the institutional structures dealing specifically with 
foreign policy. This is mainly but not exclusively a function of the 
short existence of these institutions all of which have been established 
after World War II except in Thailand. Apart from lacking internalization 
the function of these procedures and modes of conduct as a constraint on 
individual behaviour is also limited by the fact that the institutions 
within which they are most strongly promulgated - the foreign ministries and 
the foreign service - have a less established and prestigeous position com'- 
pared to their counterparts in the West. This is probably true of the 
position of the bureaucracy in general and again this is largely due to 
its short existence and consequent lack of tradition and proven experience.
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In such circumstances the bureaucracy, including the foreign policy 
institutions, to a greater extent functions as a tool of the political 
leadership and less as a center of independent authority exerting 
influence in its own right. In Southeast Asia, Thailand and the Philip­
pines are possible exceptions.
To the extent that the domestic foreign policy generating 
processes, and indeed the policy processes in general, will continue 
to depend on fairly narrowly based political forces, the conduct of 
foreign policy will continue to be vulnerable to political leaders with 
highly idiosyncratic behaviour. Although it may be true that ’charismatic1 
leadership of the Sihanouk and Sukarno varieties is eschewed at p r e s e n t , 
some of the conditions which produced them, such as those just discussed, 
are still existing.
NEGOTIATIONS SOUTHEAST ASIAN STYLE.
Apart from the influence and latitude of certain individuals
and individual characteristics, it is perhaps the style of negotiation,
and the part played in it by the notions of musjawarah and mufakat,
which most clearly distinguishes Southeast Asian diplomacy from its
counterpart elsewhere, or so it is alleged.
Musjawarah as a style of negotiation was introduced into South-
22
east Asian diplomacy especially by Sukarno and the Indonesians. The
notion itself has its roots in traditional village society in Indonesia
as well as in other parts of the Malay world - in Malaysia and the Philip-
23
pines. At the village level musjawarah meant 'that a leader should not
22. Peter J. Boyce, "The Machinery of Southeast Asian Regional 
Diplomacy”, in Lau Teik Soon (Ed.), New Directions in the 
International Relations of Southeast Asia, p. 176.
23. Estrella D. Solidum, The Nature of Cooperation Among ASEAN 
States as Perceived. Through Elite Attitudes, a Factor for 
Regionalism, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Kentucky, 
1970, pp. 135-136.
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act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather make gentle suggestions
of the path a community should follow, being careful always to consult
all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into
24
consideration before delivering his syntheses-conclusions’.
Mufakat means consensus or unanimity and as such is no more
25
than the aim toward which the process of musjawarah is working.£
At the core of musjawarah is a ’psychological disposition on 
the part of the members to give due regard to the larger interests.
26
Musjawarah goes on as long as mufakat, or consensus, is not achieved. 
Furthermore, negotiations in the musjawarah spirit take place ’not as
between opponents but as between friends and brothers', to use the words
27
of the former Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio.
The apparent emphasis of the ASEAN states and in particular the 
Malay members - Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines - on musjawarah 
and mufakat in their deliberations raises questions about the suitability 
and the significance of these processes to inter-state relations in 
Southeast Asia.
The transposition of musjawarah as a practice from its original 
village setting to the international arena involves necessarily some 
drastic adaptations. Firstly, to participate in deliberations at the 
international level means facing problems and opposing interests of a 
vastly increased intricacy and magnitude from what is the case at the 
village level. Even if interstate negotiations take place within a group 
of people who are psychologically disposed to give due regard to each 
other's views and interests, such sentiments will inevitably be much
24. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p.40.
25. Solidum, op, cit,, p. 136. 26. Ibid,, p. 100 note 58.
27. Ibid,, p. 135.
320.
tempered by the magnitude of the problems and interests involved. The 
obstacles in the way of mufakat are simply so much higher and difficult 
to remove at the international level. Although a psychological disposition 
favourable to consensus building is an advantage it simply is no sub­
stitute for overlapping or identical interests.
Secondly, and perhaps even more important, when transposed to 
the international level musjawarah loses the element of authority usually 
invested in the person of the village leader or elder which is an integral 
part of it at the village level. Although the onus is on extensive consult­
ation and compromise of opposing interests, the authority and prestige of 
the leader will necessarily have a great deal of influence. In inter­
national deliberations no one participant can legitimately claim the pos­
ition of leadership. It is, on the contrary, most likely that each 
participant will jealously protect his own status as an equal vis-a-vis 
the others. Indeed, the recognition and acceptance of the principle of 
equality - at least in its formal sense - are reprequisites of all inter­
national negotiations but the most exceptional such as take place between 
the victor and the defeated.
With these points in mind it is difficult to escape the conclusion
28
that the claims to uniqueness occasionally made on behalf of musjawarah 
are largely exaggerated. Similar modes of negotiations are part and parcel 
of many western international organizations in which they to a great 
extent have been institutionalized. After all, mufakat, or unanimity, was 
an established part of the procedures of the League of Nations and in fact 
haunted the organization throughout its existence. The Council of Europe,
28. See ibid., , p. 133ff, Boyce in Lau, op. cit., p. 175 and Michael 
Haas, "The 'Asian Way' to Peace", Pacific Community9 Vol. 4,
No. 4 (July 1973), pp.498^514.
to take a contemporary example, requires unanimity in respect to some
cases, and the Council of NATO works on the bases of the same principle.
30The much celebrated ’community spirit’ or ’method’ of the EEC with its 
long all night sessions is essentially a musjawarah in which mufakat is 
sought at the expense of the lost sleep and frayed nerves of the partici­
pants.
Yet, a residue of goodwill based on feelings of brotherhood and 
kinship may serve the same purpose as oil on rough sea. They take the 
edges off the waves and make for smoother sailing. Even this factor how­
ever is not something unique to musjawarah diplomacy. Similar or identical 
sentiments have been manifest in the relations between the countries of 
the Anglo-Saxon world, between the white Commonwealth countries, perhaps 
even within the Commonwealth as a whole, and they have been prominantly 
present within such groups of countries as the BE-Ne-Lux and the Scandi­
navian.
The significance of musjawarah as a mode of conduct in inter­
national negotiations, therefore, lies not in its unique or peculiar 
features,because there are none which are not known or practised else­
where, but rather in the emphasis and the position it has been given as
31the mode of conduct in the relations between the ASEAN group of states.
To the extent the style of negotiation exemplified by musjawarah 
is preferred, this implies a corresponding rejection of other modes of 
negotiation. The significance of this will become apparent as we consider 
another aspect of musjawarah which did not receive attention above.
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29. For various styles of negotiation, see Philip C. Jessup, "Parlia­
mentary Diplomacy", ReoueiZ des Coup s, 1956 I, pp. 185-318.
30. Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate_, (New York; Harper and 
Row, 1964), pp. 118-121.
31. Boyce, in Lau, op. oit,3 p. 176, Solidum, op. cit., pp. 99-100 
and 133-139.
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projects or ventures will be launched without the support of all the
members. Usually unanimity is sought and voting on specific proposals
is avoided. When a particular view or policy is not acceptable to a
country, no decision is made. Michael Haas attributes this practice to a
’...belief that no majority has the right to shame anyone. Everyone is
32entitled to the dignity of his own position'. While such considerations 
may indeed be involved it is suggested that the practice derives much more 
from an assessment of what may realistically be achieved and of what is 
acceptable or not acceptable to the individual countries. As such it 
may be more significant as an indicator of the existing level of community 
than many other.
The frequent references to kinship and to common traditions of 
a cultural kind are indicative of the existence of communal sentiments but 
their strength and significance can only be assessed in the light of 
evidence other than verbal pronouncements. In this context the absence 
of institutionalized procedures providing for majority decisions as well 
as the actual absence and the positive avoidance of such decisions within 
the cooperative institutions of ASEAN, point to a realization that such 
procedures would be unacceptable to the member states, and that majority 
decisions would more likely than not be felt not to be binding on those 
states which did not concur in them. Thus the higher level of community 
and indeed integration which the existence of such procedures and practices 
would be an important indicator of, do not exist among the ASEAN states.
Most of the decisions taken so far within ASEAN and the cooper-
Cooperation within ASEAN proceeds along the assumption that no
32. Michael Haas, op. oit. _, pp. 504-505.
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ation they have given rise to have by and large been less than momentous. 
The decisions and the compromises they reflect have been of the type Ernst 
Haas has described as "accommodation on the basis of the minimum common
denominator’, that is, on the basis of what the least cooperative partner
33is willing to accept. Musjawarah diplomacy with its emphasis inter alia
on the equality of the participants and its absence of institutionalized
mediatory services is geared to accommodation along these lines, and much
less to accommodation based on what Haas has called 'splitting the differ-
34ence’ or ’upgrading the common interest’.
There is a last aspect of this style of negotiation which 
deserves attention. Musjawarah and mufakat were adopted at an early 
stage as the principal mode of negotiation and as such they fairly 
accurately reflected the limits and the possibilities of ASEAN cooperation 
and level of community. However, as time has gone by musjawarah and 
mufakat may have come to serve as both cause and effect in relation to 
the level of cooperation and integration within ASEAN. As the only or 
principal mode of negotiation it may have become internalized to the 
extent that the calculations the members make with regard to what is 
possible are limited or circumscribed by what they can adapt to the prev­
alent style of negotiation. In other words, the members come to meetings 
with plans and proposals which are deliberately or otherwise geared to the 
limits set by the mode of negotiation. To the extent this is the case 
mode of negotiation is a causal factor in relation to level of integration.
33. Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration. The European and the 
Universal Process", in International Politicai Communities. An 
Anthology (New York; Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 95.
34. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
324.
Mode or style of negotiation may also result from or be the 
effect of the level of integration. The expectations of member states 
in regard to cooperation and actual level of cooperation may be such 
that the need for other more demanding modes of negotiation and decision­
making does not arise. Hence, the continued position of musjawarah as 
the dominant style of negotiation is ensured by the level of expectations 
and integration. In this way mode of negotiation and level of expect­
ation and integration may serve to preserve each other unchanged.
SUMMITRY
Another aspect of Southeast Asian diplomacy noted by some
35observers is the extensive use of ad hoc summit meetings. However,
36this is a part of diplomacy everywhere and it is difficult to see 
that Southeast Asian practice in this regard is in any significant sense 
exceptional. It has been suggested that summit diplomacy in Southeast 
Asia 'are reinforced and, at the same time, are a product of the authorit­
arian principle in the value system of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian
societies, from the national to the village level, recognize the leader-
37ship of an authority in the hands of an elder'. Although this
observation seems to be somewhat at variance with what the same writer 
has said in relation to musjawarah (above, note 23), it is suggested that 
summit diplomacy can be better understood if viewed as a response to 
domestic and international conditions. It is arguable that summit con-
35. Boyce in Lau, op. c i t p. 176, Solidum, op. cit.¿p. 138.
36. For an analysis of the usage of summit meetings in the East-West 
context, see Johan Galtung, "Summit Meetings and International 
Relations", Journal of Peace Research, 1 (1964), pp. 36-54.
For the involvement of the United States in summit diplomacy, see 
Elmer Plischke, The Conduct of American Diplomacy (Princeton: D. 
Van Nostrand Company, 1967, third edition), pp. 43-55.
37. Solidum, op. cit., p. 138.
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such as the two Roosevelts and Kennedy, would seem to have enjoyed the
38personal involvement entailed in summit meetings , and in Southeast 
Asia the same would seem to have been the case with such persons as 
Sukarno and Sihanouk. However, to carry this argument any further and 
attempt to explain the propensity of some states to utilize summitry in 
their diplomacy exclusively or mainly in terms of individual character­
istics would amount to reducing much of international politics to a 
theatrical play in which some star actors perform only for the sake of 
performing.
This is not to say that vanity, a yearning for personal glory, 
or whatever other individual 'attributes’ are involved may not play a 
part, but when political leaders embark upon summitry they respond 
primarily to more fundamental conditions. One way to approach the 
question is provided by a study of Howard Wriggins. As the starting 
point of an illuminating analysis of political leadership in Asia and 
Africa he asked inter alia the following question. 'How can [a ruler] 
best use his person, his trusted associates, and whatever political or 
governmental assets he has to strengthen his own influence and achieve 
his ends, beyond mere survival in the president's or prime minister's 
office?'
One of the things he can do is to make use of foreign policy. 
In this context summit meetings are significant events. They are highly 
'visible' and highly publicized events which may serve to enhance a
38. Plischke, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
39. W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, Strategies for Political 
Survival in Asia and Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1969), p. 3.
ferences may be a result of individual characteristics. Some leaders,
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leader's position at home as well as abroad. To the leaders in many less 
developed countries they are especially valuable since the options open to 
such countries tend to be limited. Under such conditions summit meetings 
have a high symbolic value. Viewed from this angle summitry is form sub­
stituting for content.
Beyond the symbolic value, however, the propensity to resort
to summit meetings derives more importantly from the absence or relative
weakness of a foreign policy and diplomatic tradition. As far as foreign
policy is concerned many less developed countries have not formed 'a
40consistent and long-term perspective on their interests' save perhaps 
in the negative sense of wanting not to be embroiled in 'big power', 
'power', 'East-West', 'bloc', etc. politics. The search for a leitmotif 
other than mere denial has led to shifts, not seldom of a drastic kind, 
in the policies of some countries. The world community at large needs 
some kind of affirmation of new policies which the ruler alone, be he 
president or prime minister, in view of his dominant position and his 
often exclusive control over foreign policy, may be able to provide.
In this context summit meetings become a useful instrument through 
which such affirmative assurances are given.
Even in the absence of great shifts in policy the lack of a 
foreign policy tradition in itself introduces an element of uncertainty 
into the diplomacy of many countries which can best, although not 
entirely, be overcome through summit diplomacy.
An additional condition is the relative weakness of the dip­
lomatic tradition as such. This weakness may consist in a lack of 
experience as well as in the limited size of the foreign service, both 
of which may force the ruler to shoulder more of the diplomatic burden
40. Ibid .j p. 222.
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Where some or all of these conditions exist simultaneously 
one might expect a higher recourse to summitry as a diplomatic tool.
There is another side to the propensity for summitry worth 
noting especially when one talks about summitry in terms of aggregates 
or on a regional basis. A seemingly 'summit-happy' group of countries 
may not be that at all. Instead it may only be one or two countries in 
the group which frequently or more or less regularly resort to summitry 
in their diplomacy. To the others, their involvement in summitry may be 
no more than a polite, perhaps even reluctant, acceptance of the diplomatic 
practice of the one or two. In other words, when a country invites to a 
summit meeting it may be difficult for those who have received an invit­
ation to send other than the head of the state or the prime-minister, 
whichever is the most important, although the agenda of the conference 
did not warrant a gathering at such a level.
To the extent that the conditions discussed above change one 
would expect the propensity to resort to summit diplomacy of the countries 
most affected by them to decline. This does not mean that the individual 
countries necessarily become less involved in summitry primarily because 
of inter alia the situation mentioned in the last paragraph. It does, 
however, mean that individual countries will become less inclined to 
resort to and themselves initiate summit diplomacy. The relative paucity, 
as opposed to the prior frequent occurrence, of such initiatives may there­
fore serve as a sign of the advent of a society and a political system 
more diverse, self-assured and 'mature' than previously was the case.
The direct involvement of heads of states and governments 
through summitry and otherwise in the actual conduct of foreign relations 
has also certain drawbacks which have been amply illustrated in Southeast
than otherwise would have been the case.
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Asia. The personal animosity existing between the Tunku and Sukarno was
41a well known fact and could but have a detrimental effect on Malaysian- 
Indonesian relations especially since both took a very active hand in the 
conduct of their country's policies. During confrontation mutual rel­
ations reached a low point and in 1963 '...angry verbal exchanges con­
tinued between Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur, with Sukarno and the Tunku
apparently vying with each other in their search for the most offensive
42epithets to hurl across the Java sea'.
Such public displays of personal animosity were not confined
to these two. Sihanouk construed an allusion to the proverb about the
pig challenging a lion to a fight as an insult to himself, claiming that
he had been called a pig by Thailand's Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat.
On receiving the news of Sarit's death in December 1963, Sihanouk in
retaliation proclaimed a public holiday to celebrate the passing of the
43Thai Prime Minister.
Apart from the destructive influence at the highest level of 
such personal relationships, the participation of top leaders such as the 
Tunku and Sukarno in the enunciation and conduct of foreign policy 
through summit meetings tend to lend an aura of finality to the policy 
position of their countries at any one time. Whatever views or policies 
the top leaders are putting forward are accorded a superior status, so to 
speak, which makes it difficult to reverse or change specific policies 
should circumstances so demand. Such changes are all the more difficult 
because the integrity and sincerity of the leaders tend to be called into 
question too. In conflict situations, when flexibility is more needed
41. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia3 pp. 129-132.
42. Legge, op. cit.3 p. 366.
43. Leifer, Cambodiay p. 89.
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rigidity into the policies which makes the resolution of the conflict all
the more difficult. Much distrust emanated from the meeting between
Macapagal and the Tunku in Cambodia in February 1964 at which, according
to the Filipinos, the Tunku gave a private undertaking to let the Sabah
44crisis be submitted to the International Court in the Hague. The
Malaysians denied that such an undertaking had ever been made but the 
alleged promise proved a considerable irritant in subsequent relations 
because it ostensibly had been given by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
and therefore acquired a status as policy it might not otherwise have, 
had it been given by some lesser official. Indeed, the participation of 
the Tunku and Macapagal may have served to postpone the resumption of 
relations between the Philippines and Malaysia precisely because both 
were so closely identified with the policies which led to the break in 
the first instance. This was especially so with regard to Macapagal who 
was the main force behind Philippine policies in relation to Sabah and 
Malaysia. Similarly, the link that came to exist between the Sabah dis­
pute and Konfrontasi may also have contributed to postpone the improvement 
in Philippine-Malaysian relations. Through various summits between the 
Tunku, Sukarno and Macapagal, the last of which took place in Tokyo in 
June 1964, the less serious dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia 
became entangled with the more intractable conflict between Malaysia and 
Indonesia.
Some policies would in all likelihood have been more difficult 
to carry out had the top leaders been more actively involved in their
than ever, top leader participation may therefore introduce a measure of
44. Ibid ., and same author, The Philippine Claim to Sabahj 
p. 58.
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execution. The Tunku had considerable reservations about ASEAN prior to
45its formation primarily because of his distrust of Indonesia. The
fact that the Malaysian participants in the negotiations and discussions
which led to the formation of ASEAN for the most part were persons such
as Tun Razak, Tun Ismail and Ghazali bin Shafie, who were not saddled with
the same suspicions vis-a-vis Indonesia, facilitated the successful
46outcome of these negotiations. Neither is it unlikely that the Sabah 
issue may have figured more prominently had Marcos himself rather than his 
Foreign Secretary, Ramos, conducted the Philippine part of these nego­
tiations. The latter was apparently not enthusiastic about the revival
47of the Sabah claim , and he may indeed have been instrumental in 
causing the relative absence of this issue from the ASEAN negotiations.
Extensive resort to summitry and top leader involvement in 
the conduct of foreign policy imply a corresponding exclusion of the 
traditional channels from the execution of these policies. At one level 
it may lead to the relative 'underdevelopment1 of the foreign affairs 
departments and the foreign services in terms of experience and know-how 
relevant to solving disputes and conducting relations in general. At 
another level it makes the relations between countries peculiarly vulner­
able to the vagaries of personal relationships between top leaders, some­
thing which has been a feature of relations between the states of Southeast 
Asia. These two consequences are related in the sense that if sub-leader 
or sub-ministerial contacts and relations are poorly developed, they are 
unable to maintain the overall relationship in the face of personal dis­
likes and animosity between the top leaders of their countries. In other
45. See chapter 2 on this point.
46. Mahathir bin Mohamad, op. ozt.y p. 37.
47. Abell, op. oit.y p. 365.
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words, if one channel of contact is closed or functions poorly, there are 
few or no alternative channels through which relations can be maintained 
and conducted. To the extent such alternatives exist their weakness 
renders them unable to carry the entire burden of the strained relation­
ship between the top leaders. Hence, a cut in the latter relationship 
may cause a complete or nearly complete break in all inter-governmental 
relations.
METHODS OF DIPLOMACY
Nations have various means at their disposal with which to 
pursue their objectives. Hans Morgenthau has suggested these means can 
be grouped into three categories, persuasion, compromise and the threat 
of force. ^  The art of diplomacy, according to Morgenthau, 'consists in 
putting the right emphasis at any particular moment on each of these
. 49three means at its disposal , and a diplomacy which relies on only 
one or two of them deserves not to be called intelligent. These means,
however, are clearly not available in equal proportions to all states and 
the question of 'right emphasis ... on each of them' becomes largely 
academic in most situations many countries find themselves in. Depending 
on their own power and position, absolutely and relative to that of others, 
many states may have only one or perhaps two available to them in nearly 
all situations.
Threat of force3 or alleged threat of force, has not at all 
been unusual in Southeast Asia. Apart from the conflict in Indo-China 
such threats have been present in the relations between Cambodia and her
48. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York; Alfred A.
Knoph, 1967, fourth edition), p. 521.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
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they failed to deter Malaysia from pursuing her chosen course and led
to the actual employment of force by Indonesia. ^  During the second
Sabah crisis in 1968 the Philippine Government deployed troops to the
52southern islands bordering on Malaysia. Nonetheless, with the except­
ion of Indo-China, threats of force, and indeed force itself, have been 
used relatively sparingly in recent years. Among the ASEAN states it has 
been absent altogether with the possible exception of the Philippines 
during the last Sabah crisis. The relative paucity in their employment 
does not mean that threats of force may not be used in the future. As 
long as conflicts and suspicions exist, the conditions and environment 
within which threats of force arise also exist. When they nevertheless 
have been relatively absent from the tool kit of ASEAN diplomacy this is 
due to some particular and general conditions which it is worthwhile to 
take note of.
Firstly, although disputes have arisen which at times have 
strained relations between individual countries none of them have been 
on a scale in relation to which threats of force would have been warranted. 
Again, the only possible exception was the Sabah dispute of 1968-1969.
The second point to note is the obvious one of lack of mili­
tary capabilities largely making the threat of force an empty gesture.
The military forces of the ASEAN countries do not on the whole possess 
the strength, structure and mobility necessary to lend credibility to the 
use of threats of force. The only exception would be Indonesia whose
neighbours, and in the relations between Malaysia and Indonesia where
51. Gordon, op.cit., p. 64 and pp. 68-119 and Leifer, Cambodia, pp.84-100.
52. Asian Almanac, 6 July 1968, and Straits Times, 18 July 1968.
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her immediate neighbours with some success. But even in her case it is
doubtful that the credibility of such threats would extend to Thailand in
part because of the strength of the latter1s own military forces and partly
53for reasons of geography and distance.
The third point is that in their relations with each other the 
ASEAN countries have stressed peaceful resolution of conflicts and eschewed 
force and threats of force as a tool of diplomacy. This emphasis on non­
violent means do no doubt have as a basis a genuine desire to avoid force
54and threats of force in their mutual relations. This attitude is, of
course, not only based on ulterior motives. The dictates of the inter­
national and domestic environment also play an important role in this 
context. Most of the ASEAN countries perceive the greatest threat to their 
existence to emanate from internal subversion and extra-regional sources 
such as China. Only Singapore's suspicions and apprehensions vis-a-vis
Indonesia would seem to match her fear of communist subversion and other
55sources of threat. This more or less shared perception of internal and 
extra-regional threats have served to suppress whatever fears the countries 
have of each other and led to the stress on pacific settlement of disputes. 
There is, of course, also a realization that in terms of the stated goals 
of ASEAN threats of force and force itself are highly dysfunctional methods 
of diplomacy.
armed forces could conceivably enable her to use threats of force towards
53. See The Military Balance, 1972-73 (London: Institute of Strategic 
Studies) for data on the quantitative strength of the military 
forces of the countries of Southeast Asia.
54. For expressions of such sentiments, see, for example, the speeches 
made by the foreign ministers at the ASEAN inaugural meeting in 
Bangkok in August 1967, in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Vol. 7, No. 1 (August-September 1967), 
pp. 30-39.
55. See chapter 5 above.
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With threat of force by and large eschewed as a diplomatic 
tool for reasons of expediency and perhaps conviction, the ASEAN 
countries are left with compromise and persuasion as the chief diplomatic 
tools with which to influence each other. However, compromise or 
bargaining have certain limitations which once again are a function of 
the capabilities of the countries concerned. This method or technique 
of diplomacy is much dependent on the capacity of the countries involved 
to exchange tangible benefits, to offer rewards and to threaten to 
withhold or withdraw such rewards or benefits. Most often such rewards 
are of an economic nature such as aid, trade, tariffs and so on. How­
ever, most of the Southeast Asian countries are not in a position to 
offer each other much in this regard due to the weakness and structure 
of their economies as well as the structure of world trade. The 
extent to which ASEAN countries have limited bargaining capabilities in 
relation to each other is vividly illustrated by intra-ASEAN trade data. 
Between 1963 and 1968 the portion of Indonesian exports going to other 
ASEAN countries fell from 22.2 to 17.8 percent, Malaysia's from 24.6 to 
23.9 percent, Singapore's from 16.6 to 14.8 percent and Thailand's from 
as much as 34.2 to 18.7 percent. If the figures for 1968 are adjusted 
to exclude entrepot trade in rubber and tin, Indonesia's exports to the 
rest of ASEAN amounted to 8.5 percent, Malaysia's to 14.3, Thailand's to 
16.2 while Singapore's remained the same. As far as the Philippines was
concerned her exports in 1968 to the rest of ASEAN amounted to a mere
571.8 percent of her total export trade.
56. For some problems within the ECAFE region in this respect, see 
Horisho Kitamura, "Economic Components of Regionalism",
Solidarityy January 1969, pp. 35-41.
57. UN Research Project on ASEAN Economic Cooperation, The Trade of 
ASEAN Countriesy A Review of the Structure and Trends with Special 
Reference to Intra-ASEAN Trade (Preliminary Draft), table 2.
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of ASEAN exports is taken into consideration. The structure of exports
is similar not only in its high degree of concentration on a few primary
commodities but also in the commodities which it includes. Rubber and
tin are among the major export products of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand,
copra, oilseeds and kernels and vegetable fats and oil among those of
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and wood and wood products are
important export items in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.
Major export commodities in relation to which the countries are not in
'competition' with each other, include crude petroleum and coffee from
Indonesia, sugar and copper from the Philippines, and various foodstuffs 
58from Thailand. As far as imports are concerned, in 1968 Indonesia 
received 4.9 percent of her total imports from the other ASEAN countries, 
Malaysia 19.6 percent (14.6 if adjusted to exclude entrepot trade in 
rubber and tin), the Philippines 2.5 percent, Singapore 26.2 percent (17.8 
if adjusted to exclude entrepot trade in rubber and tin) and Thailand 3.0 
percent. The only countries whose trade with each other was of such pro­
portions relatively and absolutely that it could conceiveably have been 
used with a measure of success in a bargaining process are Singapore and 
Malaysia. Nearly half of all intra-ASEAN trade (48.5 percent) consisted
in trade between these two countries, and another 45.2 percent of intra-
59ASEAN trade between them and the rest of ASEAN. These facts can but 
lead to the conclusion that even bargaining or compromise is a method of 
diplomacy which is of severely limited usefulness to the countries of 
ASEAN in their relations with each other as well as with the rest of 
Southeast Asia. It may indeed also be that the existence of ASEAN itself
The point is further underlined when the commodity structure
58. Ibid., p. 9.
59. Ibid., table 2.
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has restricted the bargaining power of its members in much the same way 
ASA did in relation to the Philippines and Malaysia in an earlier 
period. ^  By, as it were, 'monopolizing' those inter-state relations 
of its members which are most relevant to bargaining, namely trade and 
other economic relations, ASEAN has further restricted its members' 
scope for bargaining in the sense that economic factors cannot be used 
as a sanction with the same freedom as before without running the risk 
of undermining or destroying the entire rationale for ASEAN's existence. 
This places a high premium on economic factors qua rewards3 but as noted 
above there are many limitations to what the ASEAN countries can offer 
each other in this respect.
With bargaining being of somewhat limited usefulness persuasion 
remains the chief method with which to pursue most foreign policy object­
ives, even those which would have benefited from a bargaining process or 
the use of threat of force. Persuasion is 'an effort to show the other 
person that a certain course of action would be in agreement with that 
other person's values so as to give him what could be referred to as 
"good conscience". Usually this would be accompanied by an effort to
61show that any other course of action would give him "bad conscience"'.
As a technique of diplomacy persuasion operates mainly in the spheres 
of values and symbols and is dependent on experienced and skilful 
practitioners, be they diplomatists or political leaders. In this context 
the observations made above about summit meetings and the involvement of 
heads of states and governments in the conduct of foreign policy have 
relevance. The successful application of persuasion as a technique of
60. See chapter 3 above.
61. Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, "Patterns of Diplomacy",
Journal of Peace Research, No. 2, 1965, p. 104.
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diplomacy is dependent on practitioners with fairly extensive knowledge
of other countries and their leaders, of their mores and values, and of
62their weak and strong points. In only rare cases are heads of states
and governments in possession of such knowledge or indeed in a position 
to acquire it. Their sojourns into the actual conduct of foreign policy 
through summit meetings and state visits, though frequent, tend none­
theless to be brief and superficial and are mostly taking place under 
circumstances which are not conducive to the acquisition of knowledge and 
understanding of the kind dealt with here. There are, of course, also 
numerous commitments other than foreign policy which demand their time 
and attention. Their participation in the conduct of foreign policy may 
therefore achieve considerably less than had the professionals of the 
foreign affairs departments and the foreign services with their presumably 
greater knowledge and skill in manipulating values and symbols, conducted 
relations and negotiations. There are, for example, strong indications 
that Macapagal misjudged the ideology, policies and intentions of Sukarno 
and was to some extent misled by his personal encounters with Sukarno to 
put particular stress on what he and his advisers perceived to be the
'nationalist’, 'anti-communist' and 'anti-Chinese' elements of Indonesian 
63foreign policy. Indeed a prominent feature of Philippine-Indonesian
relations at the time was the extent to which the two countries' knowledge
64of each other was very limited , a factor which makes persuasion a
62. Without having extensive data to support such a conclusion, it 
would seem that the diplomacy of Southeast Asia is still what 
Galtung and Ruge have called ’elite-oriented’ as opposed to 
’structure-oriented’. See ibid., passim.
63. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, pp. 24-36 
and Abell, op. cit., esp. pp. 156-166, 183-225, 241-251 and 263-285 
for accounts of Macapagal’s and his advisers' attitudes and 
policies in regard to Indonesia.
64. Gordon, ibid., pp. 28 and 31-32.
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difficult techniques with which to pursue relations in the absence of 
other methods.
If on the one hand membership in ASEAN has led to a curtail­
ment of bargaining as a method of diplomacy, this same membership may, 
on the other hand, have enhanced the value of persuasion as a method of 
diplomacy. In greater measure than ASA before it, ASEAN have added 
persuasive weight to those arguments which oppose policies that are seen 
as having a negative effect on the existence of the organization. A 
clear example was the pressure brought to bear on Malaysia and the 
Philippines during the Sabah crisis of 1968-69. The efforts of the 
other members were accompanied by frequent references to the link between 
the existence of ASEAN and the overall security and welfare of its 
members. In this regard the words of Singapore's Rajaratnam at the 
ministerial meeting in Djakarta in August 1968 are a representative 
example. He said,
...I am convinced of the inevitability of regional 
cooperation because the alternative to it is 
increasing economic difficulties leading ultimately 
to political chaos and economic disintegration of«national units in the region ... In fact it was 
because we were convinced that the only alternative 
to regional cooperation was economic stagnation and 
political disaster that we decided to the support 
the concept of ASEAN.
Coupled with international realities which promoted ASEAN to a position 
where it emerged a much more attractive foreign policy option, such
appeals referring to the intrinsic value of ASEAN added weight of an 
essentially persuasive nature to the pressure on the Philippines and
65. Straits Times, 8 August, 1968.
Malaysia. Indeed, in their attempts to modify or change each other's 
position, the two disputants themselves used the goals and purposes of 
ASEAN as a lever.
THE INSTITUTIONS OF ASEAN
The institutional structure of regional organizations con­
sists of mainly two types, the supranational and the intergovernmental 
varieties within each of which there are a number of sub-varieties. A 
supranational structure has as its core a regional centre of power 
invested with a measure of authority, however modest, which previously 
rested with the member states. A regional intergovernmental structure, 
on the other hand, usually possesses no such independent authority and 
it functions as a coordinating body for its members. Due to the lack of 
transfer from the members to ASEAN bodies of any independent powers, the 
organization clearly falls within the second category. Moreover, the 
extremely 'decentralized* character of ASEAN's institutional structure 
even more firmly places it within the intergovernmental mode as well as 
within the purview of the traditional diplomatic machinery of the members. 
In this regard a few observations are in order. ^
The highest decision-making body of ASEAN is its ministerial 
meeting which takes place once a year and rotates between the member 
countries. Special or extra-ordinary meetings may also be held upon
66. See chapter 3 above.
67. We have no extensive information and data available which would 
permit us to say with confidence that the observations which 
follow are substantially correct. They are based on impressions 
interspersed with occasional items of fact. While the reader 
should keep the speculative nature of the remarks in mind they 
may nonetheless be worthwhile making with a view to future 
research based on more extensive data.
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request of any member. The second most important body is the standing 
committee which coordinates and reviews the activities of the assoc­
iation between ministerial meetings. It too may meet upon the request
of any of the members. Between the ministerial meetings in August 1967
68and 1968, for instance, the standing committee met five times. It
rotates on a yearly basis between the member states and is chaired by 
the foreign minister of the host country with the accredited, resident 
ambassadors of the ASEAN states as members. The association has no 
central secretariat. Instead there is in each member state an ASEAN 
national secretariat which services all other bodies. They are part 
of and function within the foreign ministries of the members. The 
secretariats operate mainly as coordinating bodies for the ASEAN-related 
activities of their countries and they are headed by a secretary-general 
who occasionally meets his counterpart in the other countries. The great 
bulk of the practical work is carried out by ad hoc and permanent com­
mittees each of which deals with cooperation within specific functional 
areas such as transport and communication, tourism, shipping, finance and 
so on.
The significance of the observations to be made about this 
institutional structure lies in what they may reveal about the possible 
development of a regional, as opposed to a national, outlook on the part 
of the relevant elites. The first concerns the degree of involvement of 
the various institutions in the affairs of the association. As already 
noted the ministerial meeting normally meets once a year and it acts 
mainly on the recommendations worked out at a lower level. At the minis­
terial meeting in the Cameron Highlands of Malaysia in December 1969 some
68. Pace, et.al., Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 
table B2, p. 56.
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would seem to indicate that the standing committee in its capacity as a 
body of coordination and review would have had its hands full during the 
year preceding the Cameron Highlands meeting. Yet it met only twice.
Even allowing for the fact that a great number of the recommendations 
were fairly simple and straight-forward this suggests that the standing 
committee's involvement and exposure to ASEAN affairs are at a low level.
It furthermore suggests that the bulk of the work related to ASEAN is 
done by the national secretariats and the ad hoc and permanent committees.
Of these two the national secretariats are the institutions which are 
most involved and exposed to ASEAN activities on a permanent and continuous 
basis. The permanent committees, on the other hand, are not permanent in 
the sense of being continuously and on a full-time basis occupied with 
ASEAN affairs. Any committee may meet as seldom as once a year. During 
1968-69, for example, the committee on food production and supply 
met twice as did the committees on shipping and tourism, whilst the 
committee on finance met once. This very modest frequency no doubt
reflected the influence of the Sabah crisis as well as the fact that the 
association was only formed in August 1967. These facts nonetheless 
bring out the extent to which the permanent committees are not 'permanent' 
in the sense referred to above.
The second point of relevance to the development of a regional 
outlook concerns the turnover rate of personnel in the various institutions.
69. Ibid., pp. 62-83.
70. Ibid., table B2, p. 56. The relevant meetings took place in Kuala 
Lumpur in November and December 1969.
71. Ibid.
98 recommendations were approved by the ministers. This high number
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As noted before the standing committee rotates on a yearly basis thus 
every year having a different group of individuals as members, that is, 
the persons who happen to be ambassadors to the country acting as host. 
This membership is also subject to changes of ambassadors as well.
With the possible Exception of the foreign ministers the rest of the 
members of this body are therefore infrequently exposed to ASEAN affairs 
and then only for a year. The ambassadors of the ASEAN countries to 
Malaysia, for example, participated only in two formal meetings during 
the year the standing committee was located in Kuala Lumpur. A similar 
situation would seem to prevail in regard to the membership of the ad 
hoc and permanent committees, although perhaps not quite to such an 
extent. Depending on the functional area of a particular committee, the 
members are usually drawn, not from the national secretariats, but from 
the relevant government ministry in the various countries. Thus the 
committee on finance will usually have as members officials from the 
finance ministries or treasuries of the members. The length of the 
period of service on the committee is not known. Nor is it known to 
what extent, for example, the Indonesian representative on the committee 
is dealing with ASEAN affairs and projects within the ministry when he 
is not attending committee meetings. However, it is not at all unlikely 
that much of the time of these officials is taken up with matters other 
than ASEAN business. The only institutions within which the personnel 
are in a sense 'ASEAN officials', are the national secretariats. Their 
daily job is concerned with ASEAN activities and projects as long as 
they serve in the secretariats. Lacking information again prevents a 
firm assessment of the turnover rate of personnel in the secretariats 
but there are indications that in some countries the rate is rather high, 
for example, in Singapore. Factors which tend to influence the turnover
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the extent to which ASEAN positions are given as rewards for services
rendered. This would to some extent seem to be the case in Indonesia
where the position as secretary-general of the national secretariat has
72been given to high ranking officers of the armed forces.
The third point of relevance concerns the fact that the over­
whelming bulk of the work related to ASEAN is carried out within firmly 
national environments. The most 'permanent1 and continuous of all the 
institutions are national secretariats located within the institution 
most responsible for the conduct of 'national' foreign policies. Similarly, 
the most important policies related to ASEAN are conceived, discussed, 
planned and formulated within national settings without opportunity for 
distinctively 'regional' viewpoints to have a modifying influence.
Taken together the three points made in regard to institut­
ional structure and practices of ASEAN mean that there are few opportunities 
for a transnational elite with a regional rather than a national outlook 
to develop. The officials working within ASEAN remain the agents of 
governments which continue to pursue their own national goals within the 
framework of ASEAN in much the same way they did before the advent of the 
association.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL DIPLOMACY
The point has been reached at which it is possible to relate 
in a more explicit fashion the style and techniques of regional diplomacy 
as practised by the ASEAN states in particular to processes of cooper­
ation and integration.
rate include career patterns, especially in the foreign ministries, and
72. It is not implied that these persons are any less competent 
or dedicated than others.
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discussion is the central role of elite groups in the conduct of diplomacy
and, therefore, in the processes of cooperation and integration. This in
itself is not a very startling revelation since, if anything, it is but
further confirmation of a phenomenon that already is a well documented
feature of numerous political systems. The Southeast Asian variety of
elitism, however, has its own peculiarities and effects, especially on
regional processes, which it is worthwhile to discuss in a wider context.
The literature on integration is divided in its views on the
role of elite attitudes and behaviour. At one end of the scale is Karl
Deutsch's implicit rejection of a crucial elite group role and his
strong emphasis on the importance of what one writer has called his
'sociocausal paradigm of political integration, which holds that political
integration cannot occur until after a process of social assimilation
73creates a homogeneous transnational population'. Ernst Haas' ideas,
on the other hand, are almost exclusively concerned with elites and in
The Uniting of Europe he says that 'it suffices to single out and define
the political elites' and that 'it is as impracticable as it is unnecessary
74to have recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys'.
Apart from the attitude, outlook and expectations of the elite groups their 
influence is a function of their plurality, variety and size. In an 
article nearly a decade later Haas modified his earlier theory in one 
important respect. In a reference to the earlier explanation of the 
integrative process according to which 'the superiority of step-by-step
Perhaps the most important feature to emerge from the preceding
73. William E. Fisher, "An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm 
of Political Integration", International Organization3 Vol. XXIII, 
No. 2 (Spring 1969), p. 254.
74. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe3 Political3 Social and 
Economic Forces 1950-57 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1958), p. 17.
economic decisions over crucial political choices is assumed as permanent’ 
and 'the determinism implicit in the picture of the European social and 
economic structure is almost complete', Haas states that the 'phenomenon 
of a de Gaulle is omitted'. His primary task in the article was to
amend the picture of the integrative process as an automatic 'progression 
from a politically inspired common market to an economic union, and 
finally to a political union among states'. Acknowledging the example
of de Gaulle's influence on the European Economic Community, Haas amended 
his theory by allowing for the influence of the strong, dominant, pol­
itical leader who as well as urging the integration process along also 
may be capable of reversing it. 77
In the ASEAN states most of the initiatives and commitment to 
regional cooperation have originated with a small group of political 
leaders in the various countries. Without implying a leadership role 
and position of the de Gaulle variety, persons such as Adam Malik in 
Indonesia, Thanat Khoman in Thailand, Tun Ismail and Ghazali bin Shafie
in Malaysia and Carlos Romulo have been the driving force behind the
78participation of their countries in ASEAN. In this respect these
persons plus perhaps two or three more in each country have played a 
role comparable to that of de Gaulle, only in reverse. The great differ­
ence between the situation in Europe and Southeast Asia is that in the 
latter the leaders have no extensive or influential elite groups which 
either support or oppose them in terms of regional cooperation. Indeed, 
it is not an exaggeration to say that in relation to such an organization 
as ASEAN these few persons are the elite group and that regional cooper­
75. "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America",
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. V, No. 4 (June 1967),p.327.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., esp. pp. 327-331.
78. Gordon, "Rhetoric and Reality in Regional Cooperation", 
op. cit., p. 52.
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ation is largely sustained by their commitment. On the one hand this 
dependence on two or three persons in each country lends a measure of 
volatility and uncertainty to ASEAN because one can never be sure what 
will happen if and when such key individuals either disappear from the 
scene or change attitude. Without more extensive elite groups to 
sustain it if the leaders lack commitment the cooperation is apt to 
totally collapse. The interest and commitment of the Philippines in 
ASA fell disastrously with the advent of Macapagal as president because 
of his disinterest in the association. Hence, whilst lack of interest among 
top leaders in Europe may still enable the cooperation and integration 
process to be sustained or go forward due to the influence of the elite 
groups, a similar disinterest on the part of top leaders in Southeast 
Asia is likely to bring the same processes in that region to a complete 
halt or to bring about their complete reversal. This situation is not 
easily remedied. The creation of more extensive and influential elite 
groups is not likely to take place within the institutional structure of 
ASEAN. As noted above, these institutions contribute little or nothing 
to the development of a supranational bureaucracy and larger elite groups 
and, furthermore, are not likely to do so in the future if they remain 
as presently constituted.
The other side of the coin is, of course, that leaders strongly 
favouring regional cooperation can commit their countries more strongly 
than had they been opposed by extensive and significant elite groups within 
their countries. Possibly the only country in Southeast Asia where there 
are groups which could successfully bring pressure to bear on political 
leaders, is the Philippines. However, these groups would seem to have 
exercised no such pressure primarily because they are neither strongly neg­
atively nor positively oriented towards ASEAN.
The relatively frequent participation of heads of states and
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governments and foreign ministers in ASEAN diplomacy is partly a result 
of the factors just discussed. Precisely because ASEAN's existence is 
so dependent on their commitment, their participation in ASEAN activities 
is required in corresponding proportions. Affirmative assurances of 
continued support are often needed from the only persons able to issue 
them, namely the top leaders.
The style and technique of the diplomacy,of the ASEAN countries 
are substantially similar and seem on the whole to be geared to the 
forms and content of regional cooperation in its present stage. Apart 
from the threats of force, as a method of diplomacy bargaining is 
limited by the lack of complementarity of the economies of the ASEAN 
countries. In this respect it is highly significant that most of the 
projects planned and executed within ASEAN concern technical and research 
cooperation and other projects which do not involve questions of economic 
policy. For reasons outlined above persuasion has its limits too. This 
brings to the fore again the question of the use of threats. It is not 
unthinkable that the limits to bargaining and persuasion in certain 
situations might cause such frustration that the countries in a position 
to do so might turn to threats of force once more.
Chapter 7
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL FORCES
The pervasive influence of extra-regional forces has done much 
to shape the present day relations between the countries of Southeast 
Asia. Situated between the two giants of Asia - India and China - the 
region has been the meeting point of the four great religions, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, all of which have put their indelible 
marks on it. As in so many other parts of the world, colonialism and 
imperialism set in train a transformation process on which the indigenous 
peoples had only a peripheral influence. When these peoples finally gained 
control over their own affairs they did so at a point in history when inter­
dependence rather than independence was the concept most appropriately des­
cribing the relations among themselves and others. In many cases they only 
imperfectly understood the forces they came up against, and those who did 
understand more often than not lacked the means with which to deal with them. 
Statehood did not signal the emergence of a unified people working together 
for the betterment of their society. Every imaginable ideology competed for 
the allegiance of the population, and one section became pitted against 
another. Some less, others more willingly accepted the support of outside 
forces so readily available and eager to enter the scene. This support 
came from those that had the capability to provide it, primarily the big 
powers. Thus, Southeast Asia became the scene, not only of competing indig­
enous forces, but also of a struggle between extra-regional powers which 
tended to view it as merely a part of a world wide contest and test of 
strength.
The tendency of these extra-regional forces to influence and 
even exacerbate indigenous conflicts is a story which has been told many
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times and it will not be repeated here. But this negative effect of the 
extra-regional forces should not make us blind to the positive influence 
they have had on cooperation within the region be it by their example or 
by more direct methods. In this context the word 'positive* should be 
used advisedly, because not all acts and policies of extra-regional actors 
in relation to Southeast Asian regional cooperation were necessarily meant 
to have a positive influence, any more than all acts and policies with a 
positive intent have had the desired impact on regional cooperation. The 
focus of this chapter will be on the effect of extra-regional forces on ASA 
and, in particular, ASEAN, and the countries or the group of countries whose 
policies will be considered are the United States, the Soviet Union, China, 
Japan and the European Economic Community (EEC).
THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Joseph Nye has suggested that the United States’ policies towards 
regional organization in general have served four major interests, namely 
hemispheric influence, containment, economic development, and conflict pre­
vention and management.  ^ In relation to hemispheric influence her policies 
have been focused on Latin America and the Caribbean, whilst in regard to
containment they have had global application, as have the policies related
2to economic development and conflict prevention and management.
In Southeast Asia much of the United States’ policies have been 
formulated with a view to containment, that is, the central objective was 
to establish 'a hard political and military line between a U.S. and a Chinese
1. "United States Policy Toward Regional Organization",
International Organization3 Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (Summer 
1969), pp. 719-740, esp. pp. 723-734.
2. Ibid.
sphere of influence'. For this reason her attitude towards regional 
cooperation cannot be properly understood without reference to her policy 
of containment of communism in general and China in particular.
Throughout nearly the entire post World War II period the 
United States placed overwhelming stress on the military aspect of her 
containment policies. Through various defence organizations such as 
SEATO and CENTO, and various bilateral arrangements with countries such 
as the Philippines and Thailand, she sought to bolster the capacity of 
the countries themselves to resist what she saw as imminent and actual com­
munist aggression. Beginning in the early 1960's her direct military 
involvement in the conflict in Indo-China served only to further emphasize 
this stress on military solutions. But she did not entirely rely on 
military means. Considerable injections of economic assistance on a bilateral 
basis to selected countries also served in the interest of containment, as 
well as economic development.
Until the mid 1960's regional economic cooperation would not 
appear to have figured very prominently in U.S. policy calculations. What­
ever support she extended was directed towards ventures such as the Colombo 
plan and the Mekong River project both of which were western inspired and 
sustained projects. An organization such as ASA would not appear to have 
been assigned any role whatsoever in her Southeast Asia 'strategy'.  ^ The 
Kennedy Administration would appear to have given some encouragement to and 
placed some hope in Maphilindo, but mainly because it was hoped it would help
3. David P. Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered",
World Politics3 Vol. XIX, No. 3 (April 1967), p. 361.
4. It is illuminating that ASA is not mentioned at all in the account 
of US policy under Kennedy given by Roger Hilsman who himself was 
deeply involved in the formulation of these policies. See his
To Move a Nation3 passim.
3
’Indonesia to steer the forces of its nationalism into constructive channels, 
to turn towards economic development and towards picking up some of the 
responsibility for peace and security in the region' ** and, by implication, 
to prevent her from turning to communism.
However, as the United States' involvement in the Vietnam conflict 
escalated dramatically in the mid 1960's, a search began for additional means 
by which to pursue her policy objectives. In a speech delivered at Johns 
Hopkins University in April 1965 President Johnson inaugurated a new trend of 
U.S. support for regional cooperation as a means of fostering unity and
£cohesion among the countries bordering on or near China. Encouraging the 
Southeast Asian countries to get together Johnson declared that he would 
ask congress for a billion dollars towards a development plan for Southeast 
Asia in which he hoped other industrialized nations would also participate.
In the time which followed other administration officials reiter­
ated the theme of support for regional cooperation throughout non-communist 
East and Southeast Asia. Washington's policy was one of encouragement rather 
than initiative or, as Walt Rostow phrased it, 'it means that the United
7States increasingly will lead from the middle, not from the front'. The 
same idea was reiterated by U Alexis Johnson, deputy under-secretary for 
political affairs, when he said, 'I now turn to the question of "communities" 
of Asian nations. Our policy has consistently been to favour such commun­
ities and we have recognized that, to have any viability, the thrust must
gcome from within the countries themselves'.
5. Ibid., chapter 27, esp. p.400.
6. Nye, op. cit., p. 726, Gordon, East Asian Regionalism and United 
States Securityy p. 29. For the text of Johnson's speech, see 
Department of State Bulletiny Vol. LII, No. 1348.
7. Quoted in Department of State Bulletiny Vol. LV, No. 1412, p. 82.
8. Ibid., Vol. LV, No. 1426, p. 641.
verbal support included especially the Asian Development Bank (ADB) based
in Manila, which was established in December 1965 largely on the initiative
of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE),
and to whose capital the United States contributed $US 200 millions. An
object of much verbal support was the Asian and Pacific Council.(ASPAC),
established in June 1966, which, like the ADB, drew its membership from
9countries outside Asia as well. ASA also received its share of diplomatic
and verbal encouragement, ^  and the same was the case with ASEAN when it
was formed in August 1967. Commenting on the formation of ASEAN, a state
department spokesman welcomed the new association while stating that the
11United States had taken no part in its establishment. In the ensuing
period ASEAN continued to be an object of verbal support from the Johnson
12as well as the Nixon administrations.
While little or no concrete assistance has been given ASEAN as 
such, it is not therefore suggested that the United States' influence was 
negligible. The importance of the United States in relation to an organ­
ization such as ASEAN lay as much as anything else in the creation of a certain
The institutions or organizations singled out for more than
9. See, for example, address by William P. Bundy to the Philippine- 
American Assembly in February 1966, ibid., Vol. LIV, No. 1395, 
p. 450; the joint statement of the meeting of the United States' 
chiefs of missions in the Far East in Baguio in the Philippines 
in March 1966, ibid., Vol. LIV, No. 1396, p. 493; speech by Dean 
Rusk to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, in May 1966, 
ibid., Vol. LIV, No. 1407, p. 933; and speech by Walt Rostow, 
ibid., Vol. LVI, No. 1437, p. 47.
10. Ibid. See also Vol. LVI, No. 1441, p. 196; Vol. LVI, No. 1444, 
p. 396; and Vol. LVI, No. 1458, p. 853.
11. Bangkok World, 10 August 1967, Philippine Herald, 10 August 1967.
12. See, for example, speech by U Alexis Johnson, Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol. LXII, No. 1604, p. 384.
international climate, a point which will be dealt with at greater length 
below.
THE SOVIET UNION AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
If for no other reason the Soviet Union is an Asian power on the 
strength of the fact that the bulk of her territory and much of her pop­
ulation are situated within Asia. Since Stalin’s death Soviet interest in 
that part of her own territory which falls within Asia as well as her 
interest in Asia in general have grown steadily with her increased capacity 
to influence. ^
At the general level this increased interest and activity on the
part of the Soviet Union can be viewed as the ’natural' tendency of a big
power to extend its influence on a global scale. At a more specific level
Soviet policies have been motivated by considerations related to the
influence of the United States and China as well as Japan. In this context
it has been suggested that the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective
14security system are serving four main Soviet interests. Firstly, the
Soviet Union has viewed intra-regional conflicts as conducive to American 
and Chinese intervention. Especially after the rapprochment between the 
United States and China there has been considerable anxiety in Moscow that 
these two countries and Japan might act in collusion. In this regard a col­
lective security system would obstruct American-Chinese subversion. External 
intervention, in the Soviet view, can only be prevented if the Asian states 
themselves are strong and stable enough. This has, secondly, lead to a Soviet 
interest in the internal development of these states and to the advocacy of 
regional economic cooperation as a means of strengthening the Asian states.
13. Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, pp. 1-2 and pp. 287-293. See 
also T.B. Millar, "Soviet Policies South and East of Suez",
Foreign Affairs, October 1970, pp. 70-80.
14. Ian Clark, "Collective Security in Asia. Towards a Framework for Soviet 
Diplomacy", The Round Table, No. 252 (October 1973), pp.473-487, esp. 
474-476.
A collective security system would result in a situation whereby the states 
could concentrate their resources on their economic and social development 
without having to channel them into defence. A third motive follows from 
the expansion of its interest in Asia, which would be greatly facilitated 
by the reduction of tensions and conflicts between the Asian states.
Finally, the Soviet Union has been interested in promoting the concept of 
non-alignment, especially of the 'positive* neutrality variety which is seen 
as implying a certain bias towards the socialist camp. ^
However, the Soviet Union's endorsement of regional cooperation has 
not meant that she has necessarily been favourably disposed towards all 
regional cooperative ventures. In general her support would seem to have been 
directed towards those schemes which she herself has initiated, or in which 
she has a part, or which are consonant with her own ideological predilections. 
Thus while the attitude of the United States towards ASA and ASEAN has ranged 
from the indifferent to the highly positive, at least at the verbal level, 
the utterances and attitude of the Soviet Union have on the whole been neg­
ative. When ASEAN was formed IzVestia commented that the new association 
was * cause for serious concern in Asia'.  ^ At the 25 th session of ECAFE in 
Bangkok in April 1969 the Soviet delegate argued against ECAFE undertaking a 
study of the development potential of ASEAN on the grounds that the latter was
a military organization, and therefore excluded from recourse to the services 
17of ECAFE. Nonetheless, the Soviet attitude was not one of complete host­
ility. After the ASEAN countries had strongly denied the existence of any 
military role for the association, the Soviet delegate declared towards the
15. Ibid.
16. Quoted in Asian Almanac, 2 September 1967, p. 2272.
17. Japan Times, 26 April 1969, Djakarta Times, 1 May 1969,
Asian Almanac.
if she was convinced that the association's projects were economic and
cultural in character. He also added, however, that 'we have information in
our possession to show that ASEAN is not merely an economic, social and
cultural body'. ^
When the Soviet Union has not completely condemned ASEAN this is
in large measure due to the broader motives underlying her policies. She is
in general interested i n closer relations with the countries of Southeast
Asia and the membership of Singapore and Malaysia in ASEAN for instance, has
not prevented her from attempting to broaden her relations with these
19countries whenever an opportunity offered itself. Moreover, an outright
hostile attitude towards ASEAN would not serve to further the acceptance of
her own scheme for an Asian collective security system because of the
danger of alienating the memberstates of ASEAN. This point was further
emphasized when Malaysia sought and obtained from the other ASEAN states
the endorsement in principle of her proposal for the neutralization of
Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union has tended to view the Malaysian proposal
20as being consonant with her own collective security proposal, and it would 
consequently be unwise to criticise too strongly an organization which is seen
end of the session that the USSR would change her attitude towards ASEAN
18. Asian Almanac3 ibicL.> p. 3412.
19. Jukes, op, dt. 3 pp. 145-149.
20. Arnold L. Horelick, "The Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security 
Proposal: A Club in Search of Members", Pacific Affairs3 Vol. 47, 
No. 3 (Fall 1974), pp. 278-279. See also the unpublished paper 
delivered at the Australian Institute of International Affairs' 
conference: Asia and the Western Pacific: Internal Changes and 
External Influences, in April 1973 in Canberra, by K.V. Malakhovsky 
of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, entitled "Problems of 
Security Strengthening and Development in the Pacific Area', p. 3.
by Malaysia in particular as playing an important role in bringing to
fruition her neutralization proposal.
The Soviet Union's increased activity in Southeast Asia since
the mid 1960's must be seen primarily in the context of her rivalry with
China in particular and the United States. The change of regime in Indonesia
in 1965-66, although losing her one 'friend', enabled her to adopt a more
21flexible policy vis-a-vis countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, whilst
the diminished American commitment to and presence in Southeast Asia in
general opened up new opportunities for Soviet diplomacy in countries with
which she previously had only the scantest of relations. Her attitude
towards ASEAN has on the whole been negative though restrained and has
22been tempered by the wider motives underlying her Asian policies.
CHINA AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Perhaps more than in the case of other big powers, divided opinions 
and doubts have existed among observers about the policies and intentions of 
China vis-a-vis Southeast Asia. On one point, however, there is widespread 
agreement, namely that China in her relations with Southeast Asia is strongly 
motivated by considerations of security. This, of course, is not in itself 
strange since all states to a lesser or greater degree, depending on indiv­
idual circumstances, are similarly motivated. As far as China is concerned 
the disagreement among observers has centred on the question of what exactly 
she is intent on and prepared to do about her security, which in one way or 
another would or could affect Southeast Asia.
21. For a broad review of Soviet policies towards certain Southeast 
Asian countries, see Robert C. Horn, "Changing Soviet Policies 
and Sino-Soviet Competition in Southeast Asia", Orbis3 Vol. 
XVII, No. 2 (Summer 1972), pp. 493-526.
22. Melvin Gurtov, "Sino-Soviet Relations and Southeast Asia: Recent 
Developments and Future Possibilities", Pacific Affairs3 Vol. 
XLIII,No. 4 (Winter 1970-71), pp. 491-505, esp. p.496.
cause for anxiety about her security in a sense more distant powers,
including Japan, have not. This factor, coupled most importantly with the
ideological persuasion of the regime in China, led to the widespread
belief, underlying much of the policies of, for instance, the United States,
that China was intent on nothing short of extending her territorial expanse
and control into Southeast Asia. In recent years, however, the small group
of observers which disputed this thesis has grown considerably thus tending
to make yesterday’s orthodoxy into today's heresy. Despite the convulsions
of the cultural revolution and its external repercussions, a significant
element of the reappraisal of China's policies, which has taken place over
the last decade or so, is the diminution of ideology as a motivating force
in favour of considerations of expediency and pragmatism. No longer is it
believed that China is exclusively preoccupied with the exportation of her
own brand of socialism come what may. Increasingly China's major aim in
Southeast Asia is considered to be the elimination of the presence of hostile
military powers from neighbouring countries, even at the expense of her own
revolutionary aspirations as well as those of the Southeast Asian commun-
23ists, and the eventual establishment of a uniquely Chinese sphere of
24influence in Southeast Asia in much the same way as the Americas have been
Due to her geographical proximity to Southeast Asia, China has
23. See Ross Terrill, "China's Aims in Southeast Asia", in Ian Wilson 
(Ed.), China and the World Community (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1973), pp. 200-219; Roderick MacFarquahar, "China's Relations with 
the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and India", paper del­
ivered at the conference of the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, Canberra, April 1973, Asia and the Western Pacific: Internal 
Changes and External Influences, Hinton, Communist China in World 
Politics3 pp. 394-396. See also Gurtov, ibid., and Horn, op. cit.
For a different view which essentially argues the primacy of ideology 
in China's foreign relations, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "People's 
China and Asian Insurgency: The Continuing Partnership", Pacific 
Community (Melbourne), No. 9, Winter 1971, pp. 15-42.
24. Hinton, ibid.3 p. 396.
This does not mean that China would not like socialism adopted in
Southeast Asia but rather that, when all circumstances have been evaluated
and weighed, ideological considerations, such as whether or not to support
'people’s wars', have mainly been used to influence the foreign policies of
the countries concerned in directions beneficial to China's interests,
25especially her own security.
China's attitude to regional cooperation would largely appear to 
have been determined by the identity of the countries involved. As far as 
ASA and ASEAN are concerned the tendency of China has been to view these 
organizations as parts of a broadly based 'plot' or alliance directed at 
herself, a perception the formation of which is understandable in view of 
the outspoken anti-China sentiments of the member states throughout the 
I960's. Thus when ASEAN was formed China's reaction was unequivocally 
hostile.
An important link in the chain of the US-Soviet campaign
against China is to actively rig up an encirclement of
China. With this in mind the Soviet revisionist clique has
been fraternizing with the followers and lackeys of US
imperialism in Asia - the reactionaries of India, Japan,
Indonesia and other countries - and working at criminal
designs against China with them. Jointly instigated by
the Soviet revisionists and US imperialists Indonesia, the
Philippines, Thailand and "Malaysia" formed an "Association
of Southeast Asian countries" as part of the US-Soviet anti-
26China ring.
Although China would still appear to consider ASEAN an aggressive 
and hostile organization her denouncements of it have been considerably less
25. Terrill, op. oit.3 pp. 210-219.
26. Peking Review3 No. 52 (December 1967), p. 41.
considered a sphere of influence of the United States.
shrill in recent years. This more 'reasonable1 attitude on the part of 
China is no doubt related to the overall changes in her approach to foreign 
relations since the heady days of the cultural revolution. It is perhaps 
best exemplified by her apparent acceptance of the neutralization idea of 
Malaysia. Philippine Senator Salvador Laurel, for example, was told by 
Chinese officials in April 1972 that China would respect the neutrality of
27Southeast Asia once the military links with the United States were no more.
A similar assurance was given to Thailand’s Deputy Undersecretary of State,
28Pan Wannamethi, in June 1973. The acceptance, if such it is, of the 
neutralization idea does not, of course, necessarily imply a positive 
attitude towards ASEAN. However, to the extent the neutralization proposal 
is being identified with and promulgated by ASEAN it would be difficult for 
China to accept the one and not the other.
JAPAN AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Japan's relations with Asia in general and Southeast Asia in 
particular over the last three decades have been cultivated and developed 
within the limits created largely by her own military adventurism and sub­
sequent defeat in World War II. Partly as a result of impositions from 
without (mainly the United States), and in part due to a remarkable degree 
of self-abnegation resulting from a soul-searching examination of her war-time 
experiences and defeat, she adopted foreign and defence policies which were in
no way commensurate with her ascent to the status as one of the strongest
29economic and commercial powers in the world.
27. Bangkok Post3 20 April 1972.
28. Asia Research Bulletin9 Vol. 3 (June 1973), p. 1910.
29. For a general exposition of Japan's relations with Asia, see 
Lawrence Olson, Japan in Post War Asias (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1970). See also Hans H. Baerwald, "Japan", in Wilcox, 
op. cit.j pp. 32-60.
Protected militarily by her alliance with the United States and 
eschewing a military posture of her own that could be seen as a possible 
threat to the rest of Asia, Japan’s primary objective has been to support 
policies in regard to Southeast Asia which were likely to create the con­
ditions necessary for the development and continued well-being of her own 
commercial and economic interests. The importance to Japan of this objective 
is best illustrated by a few statistics. In 1967, for example, Southeast 
Asia ranked with Western Europe as Japan's second most important trading 
area only surpassed by the United States. Furthermore, the importance of 
Southeast Asia is also underlined by the fact that it is one of the most
important suppliers of raw materials as well as an important location for
30Japanese foreign investment.
Japan's policies on regional organization and cooperation have con­
sisted of a blend of initiative and encouragement. On the one hand are 
organizations such as the Asian Productivity Organization and the Asian
Parliamentarian's Union,as well as others, which to a great extent owe their
31existence to Japanese initiatives and participation. On the other hand
are organizations which are seen by Japan as being instrumental in bringing 
about a measure of stability and order in regional affairs and therefore worthy 
of her support. Among these were in the past ASA and at present ASEAN. The 
Japanese foreign office welcomed the formation of ASEAN and saw it as evidence
30. For details, see Olson and Baerwald, ibid.\ Bernard K. Gordon, 
Selective Noninvolvement in Southeast Asia, McLean, Virginia: 
Research Analysis Corporation, RAC-P-59, April 1970, pp. 6-8-, 
Kyoko Sheridan, "Japanese Investment in Overseas Countries", 
Australian Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 3 (September 1971), pp.40-52; 
Png Poh-seng, "Japanese Relations with Southeast Asia", Asia 
Research Bulletin, Vol. 1, February 1972, pp. 695-700, "Notes on 
Foreign Investment in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines", Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 2, September 1972, 
pp. 1220-1226.
31. See Michael Haas, op. c it . , pp. 508-509.
of a move away from narrow nationalism and the existence of common interests
32which would bring about a greater measure of stability in the region.
The general support for ASEAN was reiterated by the Japanese Prime Minister,
33Sato, when he visited several ASEAN countries in September 1967, and as
a policy it was continued by his successor, Tanaka, who expressed similar
support for ASEAN on his tour of Southeast Asia during December 1973 and
34January 1974. It should, however, be stressed that, as with the United 
States, Japan’s policy has been one of moral encouragement and support at 
the verbal level, and she has continued to deal with the ASEAN countries on 
an individual basis.
THE EEC AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Of the countries which constitute the European Economic Community 
at present, especially Britain, France and the Netherlands have had long­
standing relations with most of Southeast Asia, first in their capacity as 
colonial masters and later as significant trading partners and aid donors. 
Although they have rapidly weakened in later years, Britain has in addition 
retained relatively strong military and defence links with Malaysia and 
Singapore through various defence arrangements which provided for a British 
military presence in the area. Due to the nearly total British military 
withdrawal from the area, however, the significance of Britain’s relations, 
as of the rest of the EEC countries, now rests nearly entirely in the 
economic, commercial and political contacts that exist.
The years prior to 1967 were characterized by bilateral relations 
between the countries of the EEC and those of Southeast Asia. The EEC as such
32. Asian Almanac, 2 September 1967, p. 2271.
33. Ibid., 28 October 1967, pp. 2367-2368.
34. See Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 3, January 1974, pp. 2431-2432.
362.
had no particular relations or agreements with any one country or group of 
countries in the region. Since about 1967-68, however, there has been a 
slow but perceptible change in the character of the relations between the 
countries of the EEC and those of ASEAN in particular. There are signs that 
in relation to certain matters the EEC and ASEAN have begun to deal with 
each other on an organizational basis. The reason for this can be largely 
related to the fact that the formation of ASEAN more or less coincided with 
the entrance of the EEC into a new significant phase. This was the establish­
ment, with effect from 1 July 1968, of the customs union which meant that
the customs duties within the common market were no more, and that a single,
35external tariff of the community was introduced. With some exceptions, 
this in turn meant that trade agreements had to be concluded with the com­
munity as such rather than with individual EEC members. The consequence of 
this has been that more than before the outside world has tended to look 
upon the EEC as an entity the trading and commercial power of which calls 
for greater coordination among countries outside the community. As far as 
ASEAN is concerned this process towards inter-organizational relations began 
with the visit of the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, to Southeast Asia 
in mid 1968. On that occasion he advocated the formation of a common market
among the ASEAN countries which would serve to enhance the bargaining power
36of these countries in their dealings with the EEC. A similar impetus 
towards a greater measure of coordination of policies was received when Foreign 
Minister Walter Scheel pledged West German economic and technical aid to 
projects initiated by ASEAN during a visit to the region in 1970. In late
35. European Commission, "Declaration on the Occasion of the 
Achievement of the Customs Union on 1 July 1968", reproduced 
in Michael Hodges (Ed.), European Integration (Harmondswarth: 
Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 69-73.
36. Straits Times} 9 July 1968.
1971 the Indonesian Minister of Trade, Dr. Sumitro, met EEC officials who 
expressed the EEC's preference for dealing with the ASEAN countries collect­
ively rather than individually. This first contact with EEC officials
caused the formation of an ASEAN committee to coordinate the policies of
37the member states towards the EEC. At the official level the first talks
between ASEAN and the EEC took place in June 1972. On that occasion the
ASEAN delegation submitted for consideration by the EEC a memorandum dealing
with the conditions of access of ASEAN exports to the community. At the
institutional level an ASEAN Brussels Committee was formed to handle the
38day-to-day relations with the EEC institutions. These initial and sub-
39sequent meetings were of an exploratory nature, and no agreement has as
yet been concluded between the EEC and ASEAN. Until such time the trade of
the ASEAN countries (as well as that of other Asian countries) will continue
to suffer a handicap compared to that of countries from other regions of the
world, especially Africa. This has become even more pronounced after the
entry of Britain into the EEC which led to the abolition of Commonwealth
40preferences for countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. Nonetheless, 
the continuing contact between the EEC and ASEAN holds the promise that this 
situation will be remedied.
37. See Djakarta Times3 19 October 1971, Straits Times3 21 January and
26 February 1972.
38. Straits Times3 23 June 1972, Asia Research Bulletin3 Vol. 2,
June 1972, p. 1040, Straits Times3 30 November 1972.
39. For reports and references to recent meetings see, EEC Commission,
Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Communities3 1972, 
p. 297 and Seventh General Report on the Activities of the Commun­
ities, No. 4, 1974, pp. 46-47.
40. See John Pinder, "The Community and the Developing Countries: Assoc­
iates and Outsiders", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. XII, No. 
1 (September 1973), pp. 53-77. For the effect on the trade of 
Singapore and Malaysia of Britain's entry into the EEC, see Asia 
Research Bulletin, Vol. 2, December 1972, pp. 1471-1472.
EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION
The extra-regional environment and, more specifically, certain 
extra-regional powers such as those dealt with above, may be seen to exert 
influence on two levels. At the more specific level there is the impact of 
particular extra-regional policies either towards ASEAN as such or towards 
individual member states. In more ways than one these may influence the 
course of the cooperation within the organization. At a more general level, 
there are the thoughts and attitudes the political leaders of the ASEAN 
countries entertain about the international environment. Since this environ­
ment is never static, these thoughts and attitudes are liable to change in 
response to outside developments. Such changes may also have considerable 
effect on the thinking of the political leaders as far as regional cooper­
ation in general and ASEAN in particular are concerned.
As regards the influence of the policies of the extra-regional pow­
ers on ASEAN, one can do little more than speculate, primarily because of 
the short existence of ASEAN itself. Nonetheless, there are certain features 
which would seem to stand out and in relation to which two initial obser­
vations should be made. The first concerns the extent to which the policies 
are essentially political or economic in nature. The second concerns the 
extent to which extra-regional policies are directed ar ASEAN per se, or 
at individual member states. The importance of these distinctions rests on 
their capacity to produce a common or an individual response from the ASEAN 
countries, that is, whether or not they have caused the ASEAN countries to 
adopt common policies towards the outside world, and thus presumably been 
instrumental in ’nudging’ the organization along the road towards a higher 
degree of integration.
As already indicated only the EEC has stated a clear preference for 
dealing with the ASEAN countries as an entity. Indeed, the reaction of the 
ASEAN countries has been such as to suggest that the community has made this
stipulation a condition for future economic relations. Whatever the case 
may be in this regard, this preference on the part of the EEC has provided 
an added incentive for the ASEAN countries to search for a common approach to 
economic relations with the community. It remains to be seen, of course, to 
what extent the ASEAN countries will be able to define their economic inter­
ests in such a way that a common policy emerges. However, the pressure to 
downgrade differences and to emphasize the search for common solutions is 
certainly there. Depending inter alia on the duration of the relations 
between the EEC and ASEAN, whatever agreements are concluded are likely to 
entail a measure of integrative behaviour which may become internalized 
within the various countries. In this way external pressure and influence on 
ASEAN may in some measure impress upon the relevant elites a regional outlook 
the development of which is, as argued in the previous chapter, otherwise 
unlikely within the present institutional structure of ASEAN.
As far as the United States and Japan are concerned their relations 
with ASEAN as such have mainly consisted of moral and verbal support for the 
idea of regional cooperation as expressed in ASEAN. There have been no or 
only inconclusive moves on their part indicating a readiness to treat the 
five countries as a group in any other than a symbolic way. Policies continue 
to be formulated with a view to individual countries. It is arguable and, 
indeed, quite likely that the strong political and military presence of the 
United States in particular, has served to maintain the fragmented nature 
of much of Southeast Asian inter-state relations. Through her policy of 
containment and her military presence she has provided some Southeast Asian 
countries with an 'easy1 option as far as their security needs are concerned, 
thereby in a sense abolishing the need for distinctly regional solutions. A 
corollary of this is that it may have removed much of the urgency from the 
need to settle intra-regional conflicts. The American presence and military
assistance to Thailand to counter the perceived threat from China and 
North Vietnam may, for example, have made it less important for Thailand 
to attempt to bring about a detente with Sihanouk's Cambodia.
On the other hand, certain policies of the United States and
Japan may quite unintentionally have served to strengthen the unity within
ASEAN or, at any rate, brought into existence a perception of common
interests in special areas where no or only a weak perception existed
before. This was the case when the United States released on the world
market a quantity of rubber from her stock piles. This action provoked a
protest from the ASEAN countries. A similar ASEAN concern was expressed
in relation to Japan's production of synthetic rubber which has tended to
41adversely affect the production of natural rubber within ASEAN. Such
actions on the part of the United States and Japan have served to heighten 
the awareness within the ASEAN countries of the value of a common policy for 
the protection of important economic interests.
Neither the Soviet Union nor China has recognized ASEAN as a 
group. On the contrary, both have tended to consider the organization as 
being inimical to their interests. Nevertheless, the question of China 
forced the ASEAN countries to coordinate their policies as far as relations 
with her were concerned. The policies of China after the cultural revolution, 
and her apparent willingness to broaden her formal relations with Southeast 
Asia, led the ASEAN countries, firstly, to adopt a common policy on the 
admission of China to the United Nations and, secondly, to extensively con­
sult each other on the question of diplomatic relations. This consultative
41. See reports on ASEAN approaches to Japan in Asia Research 
Bulletin, Vol. 3, December 1973, p. 2316, Vol. 3, March 
1974, pp. 2560 and p. 2584.
and cautious approach derived not only from the uncertainty about China's
external policies in general, but more specifically from a concern for the
effect of relations with China on the large Chinese minorities in the
various ASEAN countries. This last consideration has been uppermost in the
minds of the political leaders in Malaysia and Singapore, the latter of
42whom herself is essentially a Chinese state. Nonetheless, when in May
1974 Malaysia concluded an agreement with China on diplomatic relations
this was done on the basis of an understanding among the ASEAN countries,
all of which have agreed in principle to relations subject to the fulfilment
43of individual conditions.
The extent to which policies emanating from the international 
environment will forge a greater measure of unity and cohesion within 
ASEAN is still a matter for conjecture. However, there are signs showing 
that certain policies have had such an effect. In this regard, the insist­
ence of the EEC on relations with ASEAN as such rather than with the 
individual members, would seem to possess in itself a greater potential 
capacity for encouraging such tendencies within ASEAN. To the extent 
economic relations with the EEC yield results beneficial to ASEAN, this in 
turn may lead to a stipulation on the part of ASEAN that other countries or 
group of countries also treat the ASEAN countries as an entity at least in 
relation to some economic activities.
It is also likely that economic rather than purely 'political' 
policies and stimulants will serve as the greater incentive to the develop­
ment of ASEAN unity and cohesion. This can be attributed to two factors in
42. For a general and informative analysis of China's relations with 
Southeast Asia, see FitzGerald, China and Southeast Asia since 1945, 
passim.
43. See Asia Research Bulletin> Vol. 4, June 1974, pp. 2762-2764.
particular. Although there are signs of more extensive political consult­
ations the organization is nonetheless predominantly geared to the 
development of economic cooperation. This being the case one would expect 
the countries involved to more readily react to economic pressures and 
stimulants. But more importantly, because of the transitory nature of 
many specifically political stimulants, their effect may not be as lasting 
as the more enduring stimulants provided by economic factors. Political 
decisions and agreements may also more easily be reversed than decisions 
and agreements based on economic and commercial considerations.
When all this is said it should also be added that one ought to be 
on guard against the economic determinism that this type of argument often 
entails. Cooperation within ASEAN takes place within an environment, reg­
ional and global, in which factors essentially political in nature tend to 
have an overriding influence. As argued in the previous chapter the develop­
ment of ASEAN is ultimately dependent on the commitment and support of a 
fairly limited group of people in the various member states. Their commit­
ment in turn is anchored in the ideas, thoughts and perceptions they have 
about the international environment in general and the regional in partic­
ular, and the place and status of their own countries in relation to these 
surroundings. It is therefore important to pause for a moment to examine 
these ideas and perceptions and their relationship to the course ASEAN has 
taken so far.
Perhaps more than any other the perception of the international 
environment as predatory in nature permeates the thinking of most leaders in
44. See the call by Singapore's Foreign Minister, supported by 
Thailand and the Philippines, for more extensive political 
consultation, reported in Japan Times3 14 April 1972 and
Manila Bulletin3 16 April 1972.
the ASEAN countries. Host often this idea is expressed in a belief in the 
readiness of outside powers to exploit all internal weaknesses and to seek 
the domination of Southeast Asia if given the opportunity. The strength 
with which this belief is held may vary from person to person and from 
country to country, but it is in some measure present in the thinking of 
all. Yet, it is not held with equal conviction in relation to all outside 
forces and powers.
More so than others Indonesian leaders would seem to harbour 
suspicions about the international environment in general. In the words of 
Franklin Weinstein, they see the outside world as 'basically a hostile place 
in which there are always forces at work seeking to exploit and subjugate 
Indonesia. Every nation, of course, has its enemies. But those who perceive 
the outside world as predominantly a hostile place are worried about their 
45friends as well'. However, feelings and perceptions of being victimised
by the international environment are not confined to the Indonesians. In
an address in March 1967 the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, said
inter alia that '...it is by no means an exaggeration to observe that the
world we live in today is at best difficult and challenging and at worst
46hazardous and even dangerous'. On another occasion he expressed the 
'need for a more effective effort to neutralize any eventual interference
47or intervention on the part of others into our affairs and our interests'. 
Malaysia's Ghazali bin Shafie wrote in October 1971 about Southeast Asia's 
strategic value and economic potential which made the region a natural target 
for exploitation and an arena for big power struggle. In his view foreign
45. "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia", p. 367.
46. Address reproduced in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok), Vol. 6,
No. 4 (February-March 1967), p. 311.
47. Ibid*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (October-November 1968), p. 104.
interference is primarily a matter of global strategy and power balance as
well as economic exploitation which will make the major powers continuously
examine the international situation to gain an advantage in relation to
48other powers. The most outspoken of all Southeast Asian leaders, Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, expressed it in this way, 'In the next
hundred years, we shall have to live with the fact that at present two, and
later three superpowers, will contend in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to
so order the political and economic life in the region to the maximum
49advantage of each superpower1.
These general though sometimes vaguely held attitudes of uneasi­
ness and suspicion of the international environment, represent the constant 
and more enduring element in the thinking of ASEAN leaders. In particular 
periods of time and under certain conditions they become reinforced and 
explicitly focused on particular parts of the international environment, 
and during the 1960's and early 1970's on none more than communism and 
communist ruled states such as China and North Vietnam. The following quotation 
sums up the attitude and perceptions of most leaders in the ASEAN countries.
...in the wake of the...retreat [of Western colonialism] 
a new form of imperialism - the communist imperialism - 
is stepping into the shoes thus vacated hoping to reap 
the benefits enjoyed by the former exploiters of foreign 
lands and peoples. The communist imperialists seek to 
attain the same objectives as the western colonialists, 
namely domination and subjection of other nations and 
exploitation of the riches and resources belonging to 
others. However, they are clever enough to introduce 
novel methods of implementing their aims. ^
From the standpoint of any one of the member states, the rest of 
the ASEAN members are nominally a part of the international environment in
48. "Neutralism, Neutrality and Neutralization", Pacific Communityy 
(Tokyo), October 1971.
49. Straits Times3 17 February 1968.
50. Thanat Khoman in Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Vol.6, No.4, pp.311-312.
general, and thus presumably the object of much the same distrust as the 
extra-ASEAN environment. But the question arises about the extent to which 
this is the case. Given an attitude of distrust towards the general environ­
ment, a propensity on the part of each member to distinguish between the 
rest of ASEAN and the international environment as such, may be taken as a 
sign, weak though it may be, of a growing feeling of community among the 
ASEAN states.
The very formation of ASEAN itself is, of course, an explicit 
indication that a distinction of sorts is part and parcel of the thinking 
of the ASEAN leaders. But it need not necessarily be a sign of growing 
community sentiments. The motives underlying the participation in any regional 
cooperation are usually mixed. In the case of the ASEAN states the perception 
of an outside threat to all of them stronger than that of each to the other 
proved a considerable motivating force. Singapore is the only possible 
exception in that she would appear to harbour anxieties vis-a-vis her 
neighbours, especially Indonesia, which possibly matched her distrust of 
the extra-ASEAN environment. Whatever the case may be, however, the exist­
ence of distrust of the international environment in general, cannot be taken 
as evidence of the development of community feelings. One further point should 
be made about Singapore's decision to join ASEAN which also would tend to 
question the content of the distinction between ASEAN and the rest of the 
international environment. There is considerable reason to believe that 
Singapore joined ASEAN as much out of necessity as from an exercise of free 
choice. In other words, there was an element of compulsion involved in 
Singapore's decision to join which was not present in the decision of the 
other members. Singapore's leaders would appear to have favoured other, 
more broad conceptions of regionalism than that encompassed in ASEAN. She 
was more Interested in countries such as Britain, Australia, the United 
States and Japan than in her Southeast Asian neighbours as cooperative
partners primarily because she thought there were greater benefits to be 
harvested from such relations. However, the facts of her own geographic 
and economic position made it difficult, if not virtually impossible, for 
her not to join ASEAN. The attitude of her leaders may perhaps best be sum­
marized in the words, 'if you can't lick 'em, join 'em1. Given the per­
ception of having to join ASEAN, Prime Minister Lee saw the membership in 
the organization as an opportunity for her neighbours to prove that their 
intentions towards Singapore were peaceful and harmless. Asked just after 
the formation of ASEAN in August 1967 about Singapore's readiness to play 
her part in constructing a framework for regional prosperity and security, 
he answered,
I don't think we can come to mutual security until
we come to the economic and commercial part first.
If you are trying to fix me economically, do you
believe that I will believe that you are going to
defend me? I mean, this is nonsense, isn't it?
First of all, let us demonstrate to each other
52that we mean well to each other.
Thus, in 1967 the formation of ASEAN and the implied distinction between it 
and the rest of the international environment were not necessarily an indi­
cation of a qualitatively different relationship among the ASEAN countries. 
However, in the years since there have been signs that when ASEAN leaders 
distinguish between ASEAN and the international environment at large, they 
increasingly do so because they regard the relations within ASEAN to be 
different, less predatory and exploitative, less directed by devious motives, 
and more moved by enlightened self-interest to an extent the rest or most 
of the environment is not. In short, ASEAN leaders are increasingly beginning
51. Chan Hong Chee, "Singapore"s Foreign Policy, 1965-1968", Journal of 
Southeast Asian History3 Vol. X, No. 1 (March 1969), pp. 188-189.
52. Straits Times, 7 November 1967.
The increasing propensity to seek common solutions to economic,
commercial and even political, relations with the outside workd is, of
course, the practical manifestation of this tendency. But it is also
reflected in the thinking of the various leaders. In this respect the
changes in the outlook of the Singapore leaders are especially significant
because none was more skeptical about the potentials of ASEAN. Commenting
in 1967, Lee said,
First, we must convince each other that we don't want 
to change boundaries by force...Once that is demonstrated 
and I am convinced nobody wants to do me in, more 
important, Singapore is convinced - because I may be con­
vinced, but if the people of Singapore are not convinced, 
the Prime Minister cannot do it - if Singapore is convinced 
that her neighbours, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, eventually even Burma, Cambodia, Laos mean us 
well, once we are convinced of that, then we will really 
cooperate to mutual advantage. ^
In 1971, the Foreign Minister, Rajaratnam, talked less about mutual sus­
picions and anxieties, "The nations of Southeast Asia, more than ever 
before in their history, are talking more directly to one another. There 
is a growing awareness of not only one another's presence but also of the 
fact that they have many problems in common'. In April the following
year, Lee himself talked about the greater understanding of each other's 
problems as perhaps the greatest achievement of ASEAN. The understanding 
and goodwill it had generated had helped to lubricate relationships which
to think in terms of ’us and them', of 'we and they'.
53. Ibid.
54. ASEAN 71 FM/STA-4, 12 March 1971, Opening statement by Mr. S. 
Rajaratnam, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Labour of Singapore, 
at the Fourth Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Manila 12 March 
1972, p. 6.
in May 1974, Rajaratnam talked about the things which ASEAN had not done.
However, the past seven years have been spent largely 
in tstablishing the habit of regional co-operational 
thinking, both of which barely existed before the 
setting up of ASEAN...So while conceding that we could 
have done more during the past seven years, nevertheless 
I am not inclined to be unnecessarily modest about the 
progress ASEAN has made so far. I am convinced that 
ASEAN is now an established organization, and that it 
has now passed the point of no return. We cannot, even 
if we wanted to, dismantle it without each of us 
getting into very serious economic and political dif­
ficulties. Perhaps without our realising it, ASEAN 
ideas and techniques have sufficiently permeated national
frontiers and national thinking to make their eradication
56an extremely difficult and possibly risky operation.
Statements and words such as these by the Singaporeans have also 
been spoken by other ASEAN leaders. Malaysia's Tun Ismail said in April
1972 that '...the existence of the regional bodies I have mentioned leads
me to believe that we are in a position to embark upon what has been so far
. 57no more than a dream, the creation of a Southeast Asian Community .
Carlos Romulo of the Philippines gave expression to similar thoughts when he
stated in March 1971, 'We wish to erect a community among ourselves with
strong economic and cultural ties binding us together. Underlying all is the
search for a moral consensus, the vital ingredient of any community. That
58is our first task'. Talking about the progress of ASEAN so far, Thanat
55. Straits Times, 14 April 1972.
56. Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 4 (August 1974), p. 2973.
57. Ibid., Vol. 1 (April 1972), p. 907.
58. ASEAN 71 iM/STA-2, 12 March 1971, Acceptance Speech by Foreign 
Minister Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines upon his selection as 
Chairman of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Conference, 12 March 1971, 
p. 2.
55could otherwise had created frictions. At the ASEAN ministerial conference
1971, '...we cannot help feel that the Organization has now passed its
organizational stage and should from now on ... bring direct and tangible
59benefits to our peoples'.
Statements such as these contain no doubt a measure of rhetoric 
and optimism designed to suit the occasion. They have, however, nearly 
invariably been accompanied by warnings against expectations of instant­
aneous benefits. In this respect Adam Malik's words from 1971 could have 
been spoken by all of them. 'Meanwhile, it has been recognized that we shall 
not attempt to reach our ultimate goal overnight, nor shall we achieve them 
without pains, inconvenience, disagreement and painful adjustment.'  ^ Nor 
do these statements reflect a belief that all conflicts, problems and dif­
ferences have been removed from intra-ASEAN relations. They do, however, 
reflect a cautious belief that some suspicions, differences and anxieties 
have been reduced in strength, that the cooperation within ASEAN has been 
worthwhile and instrumental in bringing about this state of affairs, and that 
ASEAN will and can play a useful role in the future.
To say that all regional organizations in some measure are child­
ren of the perceptions political leaders have about the international 
environment, and the status and place of their own countries within this 
environment is, of course, to state the obvious. The important question 
concerns the degree to which this is so in individual cases, because it is
Khoman of Thailand said at the ministerial meeting of the organization in
59. ASEAN 71 FM/STA-3, 12 March 1971, Opening Statement by Dr. Thanat 
Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, at the Fourth 
Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 12 March 1971, p. 8.
60. ASEAN 71 FM/STA-6, 12 March 1971, Opening Statement by H.E. Adam 
Malik, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 
at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of ASEAN, Manila, 12 March 
1971, p. 10.
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after all not unthinkable that a regional organization might be forjned 
largely in response to ’objective' conditions in the environment which may 
have only a tenuous relationship to the prevailing perceptions of this 
same environment. In the case of ASEAN, there is a sense in which this 
organization, perhaps more than others of a similar kind, is the child of 
and has been molded by the perceptions of the political leaders involved.
Reference has already been made to the perception of the inter­
national environment in general as predatory, hazardous, even brutish in 
nature. This is of course an impression one might acquire without refer­
ence to particular concrete experiences. In the case of the present 
generation of political leaders in Southeast Asia, however, the colonial 
experience and especially the exploitative aspects of it, left a deep imprint 
on their minds. 'Among the deleterious effects of foreign domination the
most painful to bear was perhaps the injury done to Asian pride and 
61dignity’. In some cases, such as Indonesia, independence was won only
after a long and hard armed struggle. Moreover, unlike most other decolonized
areas of the world the Southeast Asian countries were not left to deal with
their problems in relative peace. No sooner had they rid themselves of one
set of imperial powers before another set attempted to encroach on their
62independence. The whole tragic story of the Indo-China conflicts and
the problems connected with insurgency and subversion could not but reinforce 
the view of the world as a dangerous place to live in. The words of Thanat 
Khoman describe well the situation most of them found themselves in. 'Ever 
since I took office almost ten years ago, I cannot recall a month or a year 
about which I can say that we are living in peace, that we have no problems
61. Thanat Khoman quoted in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok), Vol. 9, 
No. 2 (October-November 1969), p. 143.
62. Ibid.j p. 144.
an external threat to the security of their countries and its role as a 
motivating force in the formation of ASEAN were discussed in chapter 5.
As far as the leaders of the ASEAN countries are concerned, this is the 
most important danger emanating from the international environment. But 
there are others as well. The economic weakness of their countries is seen 
as making them an easy prey for determined predators. The then Philippine 
Foreign Minister, Ramos, talked about this danger at the meeting in Bangkok 
in 1967 when ASEAN was formed. 'The fragmented economies of Southeast Asia, 
each pursuing its own limited objectives and dissipating its meager res­
ources in the overlapping or even conflicting endeavours of sister states,
carry the seeds of weakness in their incapacity for growth and their self-
• 64perpetuating dependence on the advanced industrial nations.'
These strong perceptions of living in an international environ­
ment fraught with danger and inhabited by forces only too ready to exploit 
and even conquer, it is argued, played an unusually prominent role in deter­
mining the formation of ASEAN. They created a desire to find means to 
counter these dangers, and coupled with the perception of their countries' 
individual weakness, prompted the leaders to seek solutions beyond national 
boundaries. The influence of these perceptions, however, did not cease with 
the formation of ASEAN in 1967. In a general sense they have continued to 
fuel the organization in subsequent years. At the same time they have also 
strongly influenced the pace with which the cooperation within the organ­
ization has proceeded. Well aware of the existence of mutual suspicions and
63to try to think about and to find the solutions'. The perception of
63. Ibid., Vol. 8, No. 1 (August-September 1968), p. 5.
64. ASEAN/Dec/3 Proceedings* p. 2.
latent conflicts among themselves, the ASEAN leaders moved cautiously 
and slowly. Feeling their way with each other, they have avoided forcing 
the pace lest the strain would lead to the collapse of the organization, 
and thus leave them more exposed than ever to the vagaries of the inter­
national environment.
Ernst Haas (and others) has suggested that the external environ­
ment can be of great importance in explaining integration. There is, 
however, a need to distinguish between several sources of influence all of 
which are but parts of this environment and not all of which necessarily 
exert equal influence. Haas himself has suggested three sources in part­
icular, namely the global system as such, a single state (or its elite) 
and a regional counter system. ^
As argued above the perception of the ASEAN leaders of being 
victimized by the international environment has, indeed, had a strong
impact not only on the formation but also on the subsequent course of
66ASEAN. In words identical to those used by Haas , the Malaysian Deputy 
Prime Minister, Tun Ismail, in a speech in April 1972 talked about regional 
cooperation and the formation of a Southeast Asian ’community' as a means 
by which the countries in the region may be 'able to get out from under', 
to rid themselves of undue influences, and to 'breathe the free air and 
grasp the opportunity to decide [their] destiny'. ^
As already suggested the reason for this unusually strong influence 
of the international environment as such rests in the historical, especially 
the colonial, experiences which could not but greatly influence the percept­
ions of the leaders. Such experiences are, of course, not unique to the
65. "The Study of Regional Integration", p. 620.
66. Ibid,
67. Reported in Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 1, April 1972, p. 907.
leaders in Southeast Asia. But in their region independence did not 
mark the start of a period of relative tranquility and peace but rather 
the opposite. Nearly without exception the era of independence has been 
a time of great turmoil and conflict for these countries to an extent 
unmatched in other regions. If anything, it reinforced their view of 
the international environment as basically predatory and hostile.
In terms of single extra-regional states, no one state can be 
said to have had anything but a marginal direct influence on ASEAN. 
Especially after the mid 1960’s, the United States offered moral and 
symbolic encouragement to regional cooperation. Together with Japan, she 
has continued this form of support without, however, in any apparent way 
having directly had a strong influence on the course of the cooperation 
within ASEAN. By their largely negative attitude, the Soviet Union and
68China may possibly have strengthened the resolve of the ASEAN leaders.
All four of them have, on the other hand, indirectly greatly influenced 
ASEAN through their roles as the most significant elements of the 
int ernat ional environment.
In its capacity as a regional counter system, the EEC has had a 
greater influence which has expressed itself in essentially three ways. 
Firstly, together with other regional organizations it has become an example
68. See the reaction of Thanat Khoman to opposition to ASEAN, reported 
in Bangkok World, 21 March 1968.
to be copied and possibly emulated. As alluded to in chapter 2, the Tunku 
often referred to the EEC and the Nordic Council as possible models for 
similar efforts in Southeast Asia. In this sense the EEC has been used 
perhaps mainly as an example of a contemporary vogue. Secondly, the EEC 
is seen as the foremost exponent of a trend in the international system 
towards bigger economic and commercial concentrations, the emergence of 
which makes it imperative for smaller countries to respond by coming tog­
ether. Tun Ismail expressed this idea in explicit terms when he said,
I think it would be true to say that the concept of
regional cooperation is now widely recognized and
universally acknowledged as an important instrument, if
not an imperative in the development of nations,
particularly those that are small and still in various
stages of economic growth...In a sense, regional
cooperation is a logical and inevitable fact of economics;
for just as small companies have to combine and join
together to meet the challenge of new and bigger companies
so have small countries to come together to pool their
resources and coordinate their efforts. That way only
can we rise effectively to the challenge and provide an
alternative to the threat of domination by the big
69countries with their powerful economies.
Thirdly, the EEC has at least the potential of greatly influencing 
ASEAN, especially by its preference for dealing with the ASEAN countries as 
a group rather than individually. As seen already this process has started. 
Hence, the EEC has had an impact on ASEAN inasmuch that its presence has 
impressed on the leaders of the ASEAN countries a view of regional cooperation
69. ASEAN 71FM/STA-5, 12 March 1971, Opening Statement by H.E. Tun (Dr) 
Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Deputy Pvime Minister of Malaysia, at 
the Fourth Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Manila, 12 Maroh 1971, 
p. 3.
Although no extensive treatment will be accorded it here, since 
this would inevitably involve a thorough and detailed analysis of the 
domestic politics of the countries concerned, there is another aspect of 
the influence of the external environment about which a few words should 
be said.
The arguments which pertain to this aspect revolve around the 
notions of 'neocolonialism1 and 'neoimperialism'. More specifically, they 
hold that much of the less developed world is in effect controlled by the 
developed capitalist governments and economies through the penetration of the 
economies of the former by the economies of the latter. Though the colonial 
empires by and large have crumbled, the control and dominance exerted by 
the capitalist states have nonetheless continued in much the same way as in 
colonial times, only, in the contemporary world, the means have changed. 
Moreover, 'imperialism is not a matter of choice for capitalist society; it 
is the way of life of such a society'. In other words, imperialism and
neocolonialism are seen as essential parts of the nature of capitalism.
Leaving aside the question of the nature of capitalism, there is 
one aspect in particular of this argument, which has special relevance to 
processes of regional cooperation and integration. Sometimes it is said that 
the penetration of the economies of the less developed countries by the 
economies of the developed capitalist states, has imposed on the economic 
and political systems of the former a semblance of stability and order which 
is 'artificial', and without which social forces within these societies would 
bring about much needed social change. More often than not, this stability and
70. Perhaps the most prominent contemporary exponent of this thesis is 
Harry Magdoff. See his, The Age of Imperialism. The Economics of 
U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), passim.
For a recent, critical analysis of Marxist and radical theories of 
imperialism, as well as for some suggestions of his own, see Benjamin 
C. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism. The Political Economy of 
Dominance and Dependence (London: Macmillan, 1973), passim.
as something urgent, necessary and, indeed, inevitable.
and order with their implied bias in favour of the status quo, are seen as 
results of a deliberate policy on the part of the developed capitalist states 
designed to suit their interests. A corollary of this argument is that the 
relative peace and tranquility which have on the whole characterized the 
relations between the ASEAN states in recent years, are in no small measure 
due to this kind of influences, which allow the capitalist states to extract 
maximum profits from the former.
The merits of this kind of arguments cannot easily be determined 
since they are essentially complex empirical questions, the answers to which, 
we believe, are not to be found in immutable laws pertaining to the ’nature of 
capitalism1. One can, however, put forward one or two tentative points about 
possible effects of economic penetration in the ASEAN countries. There are, 
for example, indications that foreign investments in Indonesia have contrib­
uted to a more stable economic situation. Whether or not this 'stability* is 
of any benefit to Indonesia as a whole is a question to which many and con­
flicting answers have been given. Views have also been advanced which argue 
that the Indonesian military elite in particular is dependent on foreign 
investment for their continued stay in power. In Thailand, another heavily 
'penetrated1 country, western capital and investment did not save the military 
from being removed from Power. Furthermore, both in Indonesia and Thailand, 
the visible presence of foreign capital and enterprises have caused consider­
able internal conflict between the governments and indigenous business, which 
argue in terms of lost opportunities and unfair advantages given to foreign 
capital, and between the governments and nationalists, who argue in terms of 
the erosion of sovereignty and independence. Thus, the penetration by foreign 
capital has had many effects, by no means all of which support those who argue 
that the relative stability and tranquility within and between the ASEAN 
states are due to the influence of western capital.
Such arguments tend to overlook the actions of the governments 
themselves. Moreover, although a measure of economic stability may be 
necessary for any ordered relationship between states, the cooperation 
between the ASEAN countries has in one sense been essentially political 
in that much of the activities have resulted from actions of ’political 
leaders concerned with creating a political climate conducive to more 
fruitful economic cooperation.
Nonetheless, when all this is said, it remains also to be pointed 
out that these are questions which need to be researched, if we are to 
arrive at a fuller and more complete picture of the influence of the inter­
national environment on regional cooperative and integrative processes.
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PART THREE 
Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS: PROCESSES OF COOPERATION AND 
INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
It has been assumed throughout this study that cooperation and 
integration are continuous in the sense that at some point along a continuum 
processes of cooperation pass a threshold at which they are transformed into 
or become processes of integration. This point has been assumed to have been 
reached with the first transfer, however modest, to regional bodies of func­
tions and powers which previously rested with the individual states. ASEAN, 
and for that matter any other regional organization in Southeast Asia, has 
plainly not reached this point. In the case of ASEAN there are nevertheless 
signs that in some respects there have been slow but discernible moves 
towards this point. In other respects, however, the signs are less unequiv­
ocal, and in this last chapter an attempt will be made to assess these trends, 
some of which appear to be contradictory, and to relate them to elements of 
existing theories of regional integration.
In assessing the contribution of the study of regional organizations 
such as ASA and ASEAN to our understanding of integration, it is necessary to 
make one or two initial points.
The existing knowledge of cooperative and integrative processes at 
work in Southeast Asia leaves much to be desired,and this study has only in 
some degree been able to remedy this situation. Our knowledge is partial and 
fragmented,and a number of potentially important factors have not been invest­
igated. This being so,it is difficult, if not impossible, to relate the find­
ings of this study to particular theories as such. The best that can be done 
is to relate what we have learnt to specific elements or parts of these
The second and related point was made in the introductory 
chapter but needs restating here. Most theories of regional integration 
deal with processes that have passed the point on the continuum at which, 
at least, some functions and powers have been transferred to regional 
bodies. The empirical generalizations and relationships they stipulate, 
therefore, deal with conditions and processes the outcomes of which are 
associated with levels of integration not reached in Southeast Asia. For 
this reason they may indeed be considered ’ideal' outcomes, and as far as 
Southeast Asia and ASEAN are concerned, there is no a priori reason to 
believe in their attainment. In other words, any eventual outcome of the 
specific processes at work in Southeast Asia may be quite different from 
those attained elsewhere.
COOPERATIVE AND INTEGRATIVE PROCESSES AND THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Since our knowledge of the cooperative and integrative processes 
at work in Southeast Asia is so partial and fragmented, it is impossible to 
firmly determine the relative salience of the various factors. Bearing in 
mind the tentative nature of such an undertaking, it is, nevertheless, 
possible to indicate an order of importance among the factors about which 
some knowledge exist.
The most significant conclusions to emerge from the analysis in 
the preceding chapters are clustered around the role of the external environ­
ment in the cooperative and integrative processes in Southeast Asia. It is 
not, therefore, implied that the external factor is all important, every­
where, all the time. To the extent the external factor has been examined, 
the concern has been with the conditions under which it could exert the 
strong influence it has.
theories.
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In the search for explanations we shall find much of the 
answer in the prevailing perceptions of the international environment.
From the point of view of Southeast Asia as a whole, the 
perceptions of an extra-regional threat have on the whole been stronger 
than similar perceptions pertaining to the regional environment. For 
reasons discussed in chapter 5, these perceptions have contributed strongly 
towards a division of the area into essentially two non-communist camps, of 
which one based its foreign policies on accommodation to China and the other 
on opposition to her. It is among the latter group that regional cooperative 
processes have flourished. This fact raises the question whether or not one 
can talk about Southeast Asia as a region in any other than a geographical 
sense. There are certainly a number of conditions that are common to more or 
less all the countries in the region, such as the less developed state of 
their economies, a high incidence of internal, often violent, conflict, and 
so on. The main characteristic of most of these shared conditions rests in 
their negative aspects, that is, a great number deal with things that these 
countries do not possess. Although the latter may be a motivating force in 
the sense that a belief may arise in the superiority of collective over 
individual efforts in the search for remedies, it is suggested that alone, 
they provide an insufficient motive in getting cooperative processes started. 
In Southeast Asia they have been cut across by considerations related to 
security, in a manner outlined in chapter 5. Due to historical relations 
and circumstances, and geographical proximity to the main extra-regional 
threat, the fact of underdevelopment has not provided the impetus in Burma 
in the way it has in the case of the ASEAN states.
Should the cooperation within ASEAN continue and flourish, the 
countries involved may learn and acquire cooperative practices which will 
set them apart from the rest of the area. Another possibility is, of course, 
that the ASEAN states and the rest of Southeast Asia, including the communist
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ruled states, may see themselves as having interests in common in relation 
to China. It has long been part of the thinking of Adam Malik and others, 
that once the situation in Indo-China was settled in one way or another, 
these states should be brought into the cooperative framework of ASEAN.
When we turn from the region as a whole to specific states, it 
was suggested before that the political leaders of the ASEAN states perceive 
the general international environment as hostile and predatory; that they 
have a particularly strong sense of their countries being victimized by this 
environment, and that these perceptions and feelings produced much of the 
desire for 'getting out from under’, that is, for cooperation among them­
selves to counter all sorts of dangers and threats from the environment.
It needs to be stressed once more that these perceptions are deep rooted.
They derive from a keen sense of history which in these leaders’ view has 
treated their countries none too kindly. Nearly all of them consider them­
selves and their countries heirs to and the custodians of what is left of 
the great civilizations of Southeast Asia. To them the colonial experience was 
especially humiliating, and the struggle to cast off the colonial yoke was in 
many ways a cleansing process which restored their self-esteem. But as men­
tioned above, the era of independence was in more ways than one merely a 
continuation of the colonial times. There were still forces within, as well 
as without, ready to exploit and to dominate. Having recaptured a measure of 
control over their own destinies, it became imperative to retain and possibly 
expand the scope of this control. Well aware of their countries' individual 
weakness, the idea has grown among these leaders that the chance of survival 
could be enhanced through a collective rather than an individual approach.
It is suggested that the external factor, conceived in this manner, has 
played a crucial part in the formation of ASA and ASEAN.
This leads on to a related question to which no one answer exist. 
How enduring are these perceptions as a motivating force? What will happen
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if the international environment changed to the 'better'? Much will in this 
regard depend on which elements of the perceptions of the leaders are the 
more durable and strongly held and which are the more transitory. It was 
suggested that the view of the international environment as fundamentally 
hostile and treacherous is firmly embedded in the beliefs of the political 
leaders of the region. One would therefore expect that the external factor 
will continue to exert considerable influence on the course of regional 
cooperation in general, and ASEAN in particular, since changes in the part­
icular parts of the international environment, unless of a drastic nature, 
are unlikely to change in any fundamental way the perception of the inter­
national environment as such.
In Southeast Asia both ASA and ASEAN came into being partly 
because of the strong perceptions of a threat to the security of the member 
states. When ASA proved less viable than ASEAN, this can in no small 
measure be explained by reference to the changes in the external factor.
In the early 1960's Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines had strong 
military links with western powers, notably the United States and Britain, 
who served as guarantors of their security. This externally provided 
security against mainly extra-regional threats made the resolution of intra- 
regional and intra-ASA conflicts less urgent and imperative. In the late 
1960's and early 1970's the same countries, plus Singapore and Indonesia, now 
as members of ASEAN, could no longer rely on the same degree of externally 
supported security. There is on the whole a realization in Southeast Asia 
that sooner rather than later, the countries in the region will have to fend 
for themselves in matters of military security. Being on their own has made 
them realize that intra-regional and intra-ASEAN conflicts must be down­
graded in the interest of a common approach to threats from without. These 
threats include not only the military variety, but also other kinds prominent 
among which is the fear of economic domination and subjugation.
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As argued in chapter 7 the external environment has also exerted 
considerable influence on the pace with which ASEAN has developed. Although 
the threats from the external environment have on the whole been considered 
more dangerous than any threats, tensions and potential conflicts within 
ASEAN, the awareness of the existence of the latter has caused more caution 
and a slower pace than otherwise might have been the case, lest this would 
lead to intolerable strains and the collapse of ASEAN, thus exposing the 
members to the full force of the international environment. In other words, 
the presence of internal tensions and suspicions have in themselves been a 
hindrance to the development of ASEAN. Over and above such obstacles, how­
ever, the tension between the strong perception of an external threat and the 
awareness of intra-organizational suspicions has been an added obstacle.
These effects of the international environment may be summarized 
and given a more general formulation. Firstly, strong perceptions of a 
hostile international environment and of victimization are likely to have a 
strong influence on the formation and initiation of cooperative activities.
In cases where these perceptions are based on and informed also by historical 
memories of injustice and exploitation, they are apt to prove particularly 
strong and enduring, and, consequently, likely to constitute a correspondingly 
strong motivating force.
Secondly, in a case where strong perceptions of victimization by 
the international environment are present, the existence of intra-organization 
tensions and potential conflicts will tend to slow down the progress towards 
a higher degree of cooperation and integration over and above what they nor­
mally might have, because of anxieties about the consequences of an organ­
izational collapse. In other words, the strong perceptions of victimization 
by the international environment tend to heighten the awareness of intra­
organization tensions and lead to a more cautious and slow advance, lest the 
more forceful pace would bring into the open latent intra-organization
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conflicts with a capacity to destroy the organization, and thereby expose 
the members to the much more dangerous international environment. Thirdly, 
for much the same reason this relationship between external threats and inter­
nal tensions will also positively influence the durability of the organization. 
Thus, the somewhat paradoxical situation has occurred whereby perceptions of 
extra-regional and intra-regional threats interact so as to, on the one hand, 
serve as an obstacle in the way of more speedy progress of cooperative efforts, 
and, on the other, ensure, as it were, the continued existence of the organ­
izational framework within which such cooperation as there is, can continue 
and slowly develop. In a case, however, where all or a substantial number of 
the members of the organization have their security needs catered for by extra- 
regional or extra-organizational powers, the effect of this relationship might 
be deflected, and lead to a more vulnerable organization. The extra safety- 
valve provided by the need for a united stand to meet the common threat, has 
to some extent been removed by the existence of military arrangements with 
outside powers.
The influence of the external environment has also made itself 
felt in a more indirect, but perhaps no less real, manner. In chapter 3, it 
was argued that ASEAN had contributed towards a condition of relative peace 
among its members through the influence it exerted on the parties to the Sabah 
dispute. It was able to do so because of the scarcity of foreign policy 
options, which tended to enhance the value of membership in the organization. 
The high value placed on membership served the same function as an 'economic 
web of interdependence' in restraining the conflict behaviour of the parties.
The question arises whether or not membership in the organization 
can again serve the same purpose in the absence of a higher degree of economic 
interdependence and integration. In the explanation above, high value on 
membership was seen as a function of the available range of foreign policy 
options. The latter, however, is in some degree a function of changing inter-
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national environmental conditions. According to the reasoning above it 
would, therefore, seem natural to argue that should additional options 
become available due to changes in the international environment, the 
value of membership in ASEAN would decrease, and its effect on conflict 
behaviour dissipate. Or, would it?
The relationship between range of options and the value of 
each option is not necessarily such that with an addition of several more 
options, the value of existing ones would decrease, and vice versa. The 
crucial point is the nature of the new options, that is, are there among 
the additions one or more which, in functional terms, compete with existing 
ones? Only to the extent new possibilities offer themselves, which embody 
similar or identical needs, hopes, and expectations as those presently 
invested in ASEAN, would one expect that the value of membership in the 
organization would decrease appreciably. Since the organization is in an 
early stage of development, it no doubt is vulnerable to such competing options, 
primarily because few tangible, material benefits have accrued from it so far.
These remarks about options bring the discussion to a question 
raised in chapter 5, where it was argued that ASEAN in one sense may be 
seen as an attempt by the members to avoid being included in a distinctly 
Chinese sphere of influence. The condition that made this possible was 
mainly the power of the United States who, through her policy of containment 
of communism, tacitly or openly committed herself to the defence of most of 
non-communist Southeast Asia. Her failure in Indo-China in this respect, as 
well as her partial withdrawal from the area, have led to strong doubts about 
the credibility of American commitments. These factors have brought home to 
the political leaders in Southeast Asia the need for some sort of accommo­
dation with China. The nature of the relationship with China remains to be 
worked out as far as most of these countries are concerned, although moves 
are well in train in the case of some of them. It seems a fair bet, however,
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to assume that China's influence will increase considerably in the years 
to come, and that the unifying force provided by the opposition to Chinese 
influence in the past, may not last long. In other words, closer relations 
with China tend to mitigate against anti-China policies and sentiments as 
a rationale underlying regional cooperation. Given a general need for 
closer and more amicable relations with China and communist ruled Southeast 
Asia, the members of ASEAN may, nonetheless, succeed in agreeing among them­
selves about the desired nature of their relations with China, in which case 
the factor of China may yet prove to be a force with a positive effect on 
regional cooperation. There is, of course, another big unknown in this equa­
tion, namely China herself. What kind of relations does she want with the 
countries of ASEAN?
Specific actors in the external environment may also have an 
influence on regional cooperative and integrative processes. Some of the 
economic policies and actions of these actors may have quite unintended 
results, such as the examples given in chapter 7 related to actions by the 
United States and Japan in regard to synthetic rubber. Whilst these actions 
may be detrimental to the economies of the countries concerned, they have had 
a positive effect on the cooperation within ASEAN in that they made the 
members appreciate the value of common policies towards the outside world.
The same has been the case in regard to the policies of the EEC towards 
ASEAN.
What has been learnt about the influence of the external environ­
ment in this study, does not constitute a refutation of earlier hypotheses 
and empirical generalizations \  In this sense it is merely a confirmation
1. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", pp. 620-621.
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of the existence of one variable which has been found to be present elsewhere. 
When it was argued, however, that the external variable has had a strong 
impact on the initiation and the maintenance of cooperative processes in 
Southeast Asia, the emphasis was on the conditions and the factors that con­
spired to make the external factor exert the influence it has. It is hoped 
that in this sense the analysis has provided useful and additional insights.
In the analysis of that special form of poorly integrated 
country represented by the existence of numerous non-integrated or partially 
integrated ethnic minorities, it was argued that this situation need not 
necessarily detract from leadership power in such a way as to impair the 
quality of the country’s participation in cooperative and integrative pro­
cesses. According to the sense in which the problem was posed in chapter 4, 
this may indeed be true. Ethnic minorities can, however, influence the 
quality of participation in ways other than by detracting from leadership 
power. The integration of minorities into the political system is quite 
clearly a difficult task which is both resource and time consuming. Depend­
ing on how urgent the problem is felt to be, the allocation of very substantial 
material and human resources may be necessary. In countries in which resources 
of nearly every kind are in short supply, their distribution is a particularly 
acute problem, especially so when considerations of national security are 
involved. In some ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines, the 
minority and the security questions are so mixed that it becomes difficult to 
distinguish one from the other. In a situation such as this, in which the 
participation in cooperative and integrative processes has to compete for 
scarce resources with problems that are intimately related to considerations 
of immediate security, the former is likely to find itself on the losing side.
As far as ASEAN is concerned, this has not become a problem so far, because
the participation in the organization has not as yet demanded the kind and amount
of resources that would confront the members with this dilemma. Nor would the
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minority problems appear to have been a significant factor in the develop­
ment of ASEAN until now. But it is not an exercise in frivolous 
’futurology’ to suggest that the minority question will become a problem 
that will demand more and more of available material resources and human 
talent to be resolved.
These considerations of the relationship between poor domestic 
integration and participation in cooperative and integrative processes at 
the regional level serve to highlight the complexity of this relationship.
The empirical generalization by Haas to which reference was made in chapter 4, 
is not invalidated by these remarks. But they point at least to the necessity 
for further refinement.
Although no answer will be provided here, it is worthwhile in 
passing to raise a question which is quite fundamental to the problems just 
discussed. It concerns the meaning of poorly integrated. When is a country 
'poorly integrated'? What are the criteria according to which one considers 
a country 'poorly integrated'? There seems to be a presumption in much of 
the literature on international or regional integration that all countries 
which are located in Africa and Asia are automatically 'poorly integrated'. 
Moreover, the notion of poor integration seems to be related to ideas of 
'modernization' and 'economic development’ in a manner which suggest that if 
a country is not modern in the western sense and has not achieved a GNP 
comparable to those of the western countries, it is somehow ’poorly integrated’. 
For example, in what sense is Thailand less integrated than France or, for 
that matter, Britain? Excluding the ethnic minorities, there is much to 
suggest that if an integrated polity is considered to be one that functions 
in a relatively orderly and peaceful fashion according to indigenous criteria 
of order and peace, one in which power and authority are distributed and 
transferred according to the rules of that particular system, one in which 
individuals and groups function largely according to the scheme of things as
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defined by that system, then a country such as Thailand may have to be 
classified as integrated in much the same way France and Britain presumably 
are. In other words, perhaps the notion of an integrated country employed 
in much of the literature on regional integration is much too dependent on 
experiences and criteria derived from western examples, and that this has
led to a somewhat distorted picture of what constitutes integration in, for
L ml . 2 instance, the Thai context.
Regional cooperation has many uses, for instance, as a means of 
promoting more peaceful relations among a particular group of states. This 
has been part of the motivation of the ASEAN countries. As we have seen, it 
has more importantly also been considered an instrument - a protective shield 
as it were - enabling the countries to escape the exploitative and more 
hazardous aspects of the international environment.
A corollary of this latter view is the thought of ASEAN as a 
means whereby the member states might gain added internal strength. Regional 
cooperation is envisaged as a tool with which to increase national resilience 
and the viability of their respective countries. By contributing to the pro­
duction of values such as stability, economic welfare, and security, regional 
cooperation in this view is seen as adding to the internal prestige of gov­
ernments and helpful in securing the continued loyalty of the citizenry to the 
state. In short, regional cooperation is but part of a process which will
2. For ideas along similar lines, see Gerald S. Maryanov, Conflict 
and Political Development in Southeast Asia3 Ohio University 
Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1969, 
passim. On the state of integration in Thailand, see Fred W.
Riggs, Thailand. The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Elite 
(Honolulu: East-West Center, 1966), esp. pp. 385-391. See also 
William J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy. Institutional Change 
and Development (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1966), esp. chapter
10, and Hans-Dieter Evers (Ed.), Loosely Structured Social Systems: 
Thailand in Comparative Perspective3 Yale University, Southeast 
Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series No. 17, passim.
strengthen the member countries qua sovereign states . Conceived in 
this way regional cooperation is a station on the way to a terminal 
state which is the very opposite of that to which an integration process 
leads.
The political leaders involved are not unaware of the link 
between processes of cooperation and integration. They realize that the 
processes involved in the cooperation within ASEAN may lead to regional 
integration in one form or other. Thanat Khoman, for example, displayed 
this awareness when ASEAN was formed. 'The modern trend either in politics 
or economics points towards closer cooperation and even integration. South
4East Asia ... cannot escape the present-day exigencies'. Although aware 
of the link between these processes, other leaders are more apprehensive, a 
feeling Rajaratnam has described as the reluctance of the countries of 
Southeast Asia 'to compromise their sovereignty in the interests of region­
alism' .  ^ This feeling of apprehension about the thought of relinquishing 
sovereignty is, as Rajaratnam has suggested, closely related to the novelty 
of nationhood.  ^ There is a high degree of sensitivity about the status of 
sovereignty, and its exercise is a new experience. It is symptomatic that 
it is Thanat Khoman, the representative of the only country with an unbroken 
line of sovereign existence, who appear to entertain least misgivings in this 
regard. Thus it is possible and, indeed, quite likely that a more ready, or
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3. For statements expressing this view see, for example, the speeches 
at the meeting in Bangkok in August 1967, when ASEAN was formed, 
in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok), Vol. 7, No. 1 (August- 
September 1967), pp. 30-39. See also speech by Adam Malik before 
the Gotong-Royong House of Representatives, 21 August 1967, in 
The Association of Southeast Asia, (Department of Information, 
Indonesia), pp. 3-9.
4. Cited in Foreign Affairs Bulletin, op.cit. 3 p. 38.
5. S. Rajaratnam, "ASEAN's Economic Role in the Pacific", Asia Pacific 
Record, Vol. 1, No. 8 (November 1970), p. 9.
6. Ibid.
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less reluctant, acceptance of the idea of a surrender of national powers 
to a regional body, might have to await a new generation of political leaders. 
This observation conforms to the finding of Deutsch and others that a close 
association existed between the rise of a new elite and integration in a 
number of historical cases. 7
This tension between what is perceived to be thp advantages 
accruing from the cooperation within ASEAN, on the one hand, and the feeling 
of apprehension about possible consequences for the sovereign powers of the 
individual states, on the other, has also contributed to the course of ASEAN 
so far. We would suggest that it has expressed itself most prominently in 
the institutional structure of ASEAN which is, as we have seen in chapter 6, 
decentralized to an extreme degree with nearly all the organizational bodies 
situated in surroundings which offer maximum opportunity for the expression 
of national points of view. Consequently, the decision of the ministerial 
meeting of ASEAN in 1973 to establish a central ASEAN secretariat to be loc- 
g
ated in Djakarta may be interpreted as a weakening of the anxieties about 
the consequences of the cooperation within the organization. It may, of 
course, also indicate a realization that the cooperative processes need not 
necessarily lead to integration and surrender of national sovereignty.
There is also a tension between those, such as the Indonesians, 
who believe in a quicker pace and others, such as the Singaporeans, who are 
less convinced of the potential of ASEAN. No one has so repeatedly called 
for increased cooperation as Adam Malik. In an interview in 1971 he said 
inter alia, ’We must look at ASEAN as an organization to boost development.
9We cannot leave each country to develop by itself; it is too slow'.
Contrast this with the attitude of Rajaratnam who in 1970 said, ’...it is my
7. Deutsch et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area3 
esp. pp. 46-53.
8. Asia Research Bulletin3 Vol. 2, April 1973, p. 1761, and Vol. 4,
June 1974, p. 2832.
9. The Age3 17 August 1971.
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submission that a combination of economically weak and underdeveloped nations 
does not add up to strength nor does it make for effective regional cooper­
ation. .. Before there can be a meaningful regional association the national 
economies of its members must reach a certain level of economic modernization 
and sophistication’. ^  The imperative of survival makes cooperation within 
ASEAN proceed mainly by accommodation on the basis of the minimum common 
denominator. Given their views, it seems therefore reasonable to suggest that 
Singapore rather than Indonesia decides the tempo. There are, however, limits 
to Singapore's influence in this regard. The existence of views such as 
Malik's puts the onus on Singapore to justify her position, a task not always 
easy to perform. Moreover, the threat of organizational collapse cuts both 
ways. Singapore may well threaten drastic action if she thinks the tempo too 
ambitious and harmful to her interests, but Indonesia may do the same if she 
thinks the tempo too slow.
It is necessary to say a few words about the possible causes of 
the difference in the views between Singapore and Indonesia. Although the 
Singapore leaders share the view of the international environment as hostile 
and predatory, and therefore admit to the need for collective efforts to 
counter threats of domination, they nonetheless are more confident than most 
other leaders about their own ability to deal with the outside world. This 
is particularly the case in regard to economic and commercial matters.
A good deal of this confidence no doubt derives from cultural characteristics 
but much of it also stems from the actual economic performance of the island 
state itself. Between 1963 and 1969 Singapore increased her GDP (gross 
domestic product) about 82 per cent and her GDP per capita by about 60 per
10. Rajaratnam, op. cit.3 p. 8.
11. For the attitude of Singapore to foreign investment and multi­
national corporations, see T.H. Elliot, "Multinational Corporations 
in Developing Countries", Asia Research Bulletin3 Vol. 3, July 1973, 
pp. 1963-1968.
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her GDP about 48 per cent and her GDP per capita about 21 per cent, from
$US 70 to $US 88. In 1969 Singapore's GDP per capita was nearly two and a
12half times larger than that of her nearest rival, Malaysia. Furthermore,
in 1968 50 per cent of Singapore's GDP came from industrial activities and 
trade. The corresponding figure for Indonesia was about 30 per cent. Indo­
nesia is still a largely agrarian society with 52 per cent of her GDP coming
from agriculture while the corresponding figure for Singapore is only 3 per
13cent. As these figures indicate, the Singaporeans are increasingly 
acquiring experience in dealing with the outside world, especially the 
developed parts, on their terms, that is, on a level which is technologically 
and economically advanced. Moreover, they are gaining this experience at a 
faster rate than any of their partners in ASEAN. Because of her small size 
and compactness Singapore has also been able to distribute her increased 
wealth more equitably throughout society, a task vastly more difficult in a 
country such as Indonesia whose population is about sixty times that of 
Singapore. Thus economic achievements have produced in the Singaporeans a 
confidence in their ability to achieve which increasingly has led them to 
look to the developed countries as their 'natural' peers - the group to which 
they can more easily relate and the group with which economic relations are 
potentially most profitable. But geopolitical facts, most prominent among which 
are her geographical location, her small size both absolutely and relatively 
to her own neighbours, and the ethnic origin of the majority of her population, 
have made membership in ASEAN an imperative. Factors such as these in large 
measure explain the ambivalent and vacillating attitude of Singapore to ASEAN 
and regional cooperation in general.
cent, from $US 519 to $US 829. During the same period Indonesia increased
12. Calculated figures in United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1972.
13. Ibid.
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Singapore's position and role in ASEAN as described above 
would tend to lend credence to Nye's suggestion that level of development 
as measured by, for example, GNP per capita is closely related to inte­
gration, that is, inequality of development tends not to be conducive to
14integration. We would like to add that inequality of development also
have a tendency to affect perceptions about expected profits from regional
integration. Singapore's achievements in economic development have led to
a relative shift in her expectations away from the region, because she
perceives the greatest profits to lie in relations with developed countries,
even though there are great untapped possibilities within the region and
ASEAN. It is, however, prudent to enter a qualification here. The ASEAN
countries have until now been mainly preoccupied with creating the conditions
under which meaningful and mutually profitable cooperation can take place.
This has been a deliberate policy and it is reflected in numerous remarks
and statements some of which were cited in the last chapter. It has meant
that plans and projects involving major national economic policies have
been eschewed during this initial period. Thus the observations pertaining
to the effect of Singapore's higher level of development, have to await the
test of more demanding decisions and policies within ASEAN.
It has been argued that the expectations of the participants
in integration processes, especially among late developing countries, tend
to be prematurely politicized and in relation to Southeast Asia Gordon
has argued that 'matters that relate to the economy are subjects of high
16governmental priority'. Whether Gordon's observation can be taken as a
14. Joseph S. Nye, "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist 
Model", International Organization} Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), 
pp. 815-816.
15. Ibid., pp. 822-825 and 831-832 and Haas, "The Study of Regional Inte­
gration", p. 617. See also Roger D. Hansen, "Regional Integration: 
Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts", World Politics 3 
Vol. 21, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 242-271, esp. pp. 257-261.
16. Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia3 p. 142.
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confirmation of the 'premature politicization' hypothesis is not certain, 
at least if the experiences of ASEAN are invoked. In this context a couple 
of observations should be made. In the paragraph above it was argued that 
much of the activities of ASEAN so far have been of a preliminary nature 
designed to create the conditions for more mutually profitable cooperation. 
These activities have mainly been related to areas such as the promotion of 
tourism within ASEAN, the easing of travel restrictions within the area, and 
similar projects. Much of the reason for embarking on these projects with 
less than monumental integrative potential has been to test the goodwill 
and sincerity of the members. They have served as means whereby mutual 
suspicions could be dissipated and a measure of trust be established. The 
leaders of the ASEAN countries were well aware of the lack of trust, and in 
this policy of caution there may well have been involved a realization that 
premature politicizing could be a consequence if more ambitious policies 
were attempted. But a more direct cause has been the determination not to 
let suspicions and distrust created by past conflicts, prejudice, inhibit, and 
politicize future cooperative efforts. Hence, the need for an initial period 
during which a measure of trust that did not exist before, could be built, 
and in this, they would seem not to have been entirely without success.
Whether or not premature politicization will in fact take place 
is a matter for the future to decide, if and when more ambitious projects 
involving major national economic policies are attempted. As Gordon has 
observed, some of the conditions that spawn early politicizing of economic 
issues are present in Southeast Asia, such as the high priority of economic 
development. ^  But here again one should be aware of the inhibiting effect 
of the prevailing perceptions of the international environment which may 
serve to check eventual tendencies towards 'overpoliticization'.
17. Ibid.
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The cooperation within ASEAN has been initiated and sustained 
by a rather small group of political leaders in each country. What has 
given an appearance of unity and solidarity to their efforts, has been the 
shared perception of a strong extra-regional threat, which brought about the 
desire to find remedies whereby this threat could be diminished. But beneath 
the unity forged by the perception of a common enemy, and within the limits 
set by the interaction between external pressures and the dangers from latent 
intra-organizational conflicts, there exist various conceptions related to 
regional cooperation about which there is less than unanimity. There is a 
tension between those who see regional cooperative processes as a means 
towards, inter alia, the establishment of a military security organization, 
and those who will hear none of it; there is tension between those who see these 
processes as a means towards strengthening their country qua sovereign state, 
and those who are less concerned with this aspect; there is tension between 
those who are impatient for quick benefits and rewards, and those who, for 
various reasons, prefer a more leisurely pace; there is tension between those 
who expect mainly material gains, and those who are content with gains of a 
symbolic and ideal nature, at least in the short term; and, finally, there is 
considerable tension between those who see regional cooperation as a means 
by which to establish a dominant or leading position for their country, and 
those who fear and resist such ambitions.
Of these tensions, the last is clearly the most dangerous among 
a group of states so sensitive about their independence and sovereignty as 
most of the ASEAN states. An example of this sensitivity is the disinte­
gration of the relationship between Malaysia and Singapore. This is a case 
which deserves a study of its own, because the departure of Singapore from 
Malaysia in 1965 was not the end of the story. In the subsequent years the 
commonly owned, managed, and run Malaysia-Singapore Airlines broke up, only 
to continue as two distinct national airlines. Not long after, the currency
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split occurred between the two countries. Apart from the substantive issue 
involved, certain sentiments related to ideas of 'sovereignty' and 'inde­
pendence' were also present as precipitating agents. In other words, the 
relationship between Malaysia and Singapore had to acquire a new equilibrium, 
which could not be found without the disappearance of all the vestiges of 
the old 'dependence'.
Then, are the ASEAN states any nearer a situation in which char­
acteristics associated with their sovereign status may be surrendered to 
regional bodies?
There is no doubt that, as far as ASEAN as a group is concerned, 
there is a higher degree of realization of common interests both in terms of 
relations with the outside world and among themselves. In this sense, the 
consummate and careful diplomacy within the institutions of ASEAN has borne 
fruit. This more relaxed and improved intra-regional climate has produced 
modest progress towards a higher degree of interdependence, especially in 
relation to the perceptions of the leaders. When it has not produced more 
spectacular results, this has partly been due to deliberate policies which 
are merely reflections of the fact that suspicions and anxieties about 
motives, though not as strong as before, are still present. Nonetheless, 
the cooperation has produced increased responsiveness to each other’s 
needs, which in itself is conducive to a higher degree of interdependence 
and integration. So far this responsiveness and increased realization of 
common interests are largely confined to a small group of political leaders 
in each country. There are, however, signs that a certain amount of seepage 
into the larger societies has taken place, as can be gleaned from the for­
mation of transnational business groups associated with ASEAN bodies.
The reluctance to contemplate the use of force and the threat 
of use of force may be seen as trends towards an end state associated with 
the concept of a pluralistic security community in the Deutschian sense.
There is, however, a need for a more thorough analysis of this aspect than
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The processes and factors isolated in this study lend them­
selves more naturally to analysis in the neo-functional mold, inter alia 
because of the strong emphasis in this approach on the perceptions of the 
actors, and its view of welfare-related and foreign and defence policy 
issues as the most important considerations underlying the actions of the 
leaders involved. If a communications approach, with its lack of discrim­
ination between various forms of transactions, had been utilized, it is 
believed that nothing very useful could have resulted from a study of 
regional processes in Southeast Asia.
has been afforded it here.
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